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Note to the reader 
 All translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated. They often lack elegance, since I have tried to 
remain as close to the Greek text as possible. This is always provided, along with the indication of 
the critical editions used. I have chosen to print the most recent critical editions available, but I have 
consulted a large number of previous critical editions and divergences from the chosen critical 
edition are invariably signalled. 
 The Greek text of the Physics is taken from Sir William David Ross’ 1936 Oxford critical edition. 
For what regards the first book of the Physics, I could profit from the critical apparatus provided by 
Prof. Dr. Oliver Primavesi during a seminar at Musaph dedicated to this text. 
 The Greek text of the Metaphysics, unless otherwise indicated, is also Ross’ 1924 Oxford critical 
edition. I have punctually confronted Ross’ text with Jaeger’s 1957 critical edition. Occasional 
diversions between the two texts are signalled. 
 I have made my best to keep the footnotes and bibliographical discussion within a reasonable limit. 
This has not been difficult for privation, since there is virtually no secondary literature on the topic. 
The extensive existing literature on matter has been curled according to relevant topics (e.g. prime 
matter or persistence). The literature on the form and on its relation with matter is exterminate, but 
has often little bearing on the enquiry of Phys.I, which is quite concise regarding the role of the 
form as a principle. Scholarship on the topic has rightly addressed other texts and issues that hardly 
surface in Phys.I, due to its introductory character. Instead of importing problems belonging to 
different contexts and speculations, I have decided to keep close to the Aristotelian text and to 
reconstruct the problems he is confronted with and the arguments he provides to solve them. 
 All abbreviations are taken from Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek Dictionary (LSJ), with the exception of 
Metaph. and Phys. instead of LSJ’s Meta. and Ph. 
 
 
Was ist denn 
ein Hauch? und doch kriecht zwischen Tag und Nacht, 
wenn ich mit offnen Augen lieg’, ein Etwas 
hin über mich. Es ist kein Wort, es ist 
kein Schmerz, es drückt mich nicht, es würgt mich nicht, 
nichts ist es, nicht einmal ein Alp, und dennoch, 
es ist so fürchterlich, daß meine Seele 
sich wünscht, erhängt zu sein, und jedes Glied 
in mir schreit nach dem Tod, und dabei leb' ich 
und bin nicht einmal krank: du siehst mich doch: 
seh’ ich wie eine Kranke? Kann man denn 
vergehn, lebend, wie ein faules Aas? 
Kann man zerfallen, wenn man gar nicht krank ist? 
zerfallen wachen Sinnes, wie ein Kleid, 
zerfressen von den Motten? 






















0.1. The problem. 
 Positing privation as a principle of natural things is a somewhat bold move. A brief survey of 
the occurrences of the word στέρησις (privation) through the Corpus, by means of either TLG or 
Bonitz’s Index, shows that privation belongs to the conceptual sphere of non-being, 
indeterminacy and absence. As negation and absence of a determinate form, the positive content 
of privation is nothing or close to nothing, so that privation is constitutively indeterminate. As 
non-being-F opposing to a particular form F, privation is ontologically dependent on the form F 
that it lacks. If forms and what is endowed with a form have the lion’s share in Aristotle’s 
catalogue of substances, privations seem to find no place in it. 
 This notwithstanding, Aristotle is committed to the idea that features such as being-unshaped, 
formlessness, scatteredness and similar privations qualify as principles. For instance, if the house 
is planks and bricks composed in a certain way into the form of the house, Aristotle posits as a 
principle of the house the scatteredness pertaining to the planks and bricks before the 
composition has taken place. Likewise, if a statue of Hermes is a certain portion of bronze 
informed by the figure of Hermes, the figurelessness pertaining to the lump of bronze before 
moulding has occurred qualifies as a principle. Such an endorsement is puzzling to say the least. 
 Accordingly, a first and major task of this study is to unfold Aristotle’s rationale for positing 
privation as a principle. This rationale can be found in the central chapters of the first book of the 
Physics, a text which is both introductory and seminal. A long-standing tradition has seen Phys.I 
as a key-text of hylomorphism, namely for the doctrine that natural things can be explained in 
terms of matter and form. Phys.I does not only employ hylomorphism. More importantly, Phys.I 
justifies hylomorphism. 
 The first task of this study is to unfold the arguments for hylomorphism contained in Phys.I.4-7. 
These chapters, I argue, constitute an uninterrupted argument for the doctrine of the three natural 
principles. The argument for hylomorphism in Phys.I is achieved in two steps. First, by arguing 
for the triad of natural principles – matter, form and privation. Second, by selecting matter and 
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form as full-fledged principles and showing that privation is not on an equal footing with the 
other these. 
 The justification for endorsing privation as a principle lies in Aristotle’s claim that opposition is 
a principle of natural things. If form is a principle, its opposite, privation, is also a principle. 
Thus, arguing for hylomorphism entails arguing that privation is a principle of natural things. 
Nonetheless, privation does not constitute the core of the doctrine of the three principles, which 
consists of matter and form. 
 Accordingly, a second task of this study is to show not only why privation must be assumed as a 
principle, but also why privation cannot be accepted as a full-fledged principle of natural things. 
Phys.I.7 offers a reflection on the internal relation among matter, form and privation. Here, 
Aristotle provides two rationales for the defective aetiological status of privation. 
 First, if we consider the hylomorphic compound, privation does not belong to its constitutive 
elements. These are rather matter and form. Privation qualifies as a principle only in so far as it 
comes to coincide with matter, when matter is considered in abstraction from its form. Let us 
take the statue of bronze as an example. Matter (the bronze) and form (the statue) qualify as full-
fledged principles, for they are the substantial elements of the statue of bronze. Privation, 
instead, qualifies as a coincidental principle, because it comes to coincide with a full-fledged 
principle, namely with matter. For, when we consider the bronze in abstraction from the form of 
the statue, then the bronze is deprived of its form and the privation of the statue inheres in it. 
 Second, privation can be reduced to a mode of the form, namely to its absence. In this 
connection, privation is a coincidental principle, because it comes to coincide with the other full-
fledged principle of natural things, namely with the form. 
 
0.2. The place of Physics I. 
 A solid tradition has speculated over the idea that Phys.I might not belong to the original bulk of 
the work called Physics and be rather the independent treatise mentioned in the lists of 
Aristotle’s oeuvres under the title Περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, On principles. There is little doubt that Phys.I 
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is a self-contained text. Nonetheless, its connection with the rest of the Physics, and in particular 
with Phys.II, is evident. 
 Phys.I.1 opens by stating that the principles that are going to be searched for are those 
grounding natural science, and thus the rest of the Physics.1 Moreover, the hylomorphic doctrine 
introduced in Phys.I constitutes the general framework for the explanation of natural things and 
phenomena. Matter and form constitute the internal principles of the doctrine of the four causes 
developed in Phys.II, which is invoked in Metaph.VIII as necessary for the answering the 
question on what substances is. The four causes are employed in Metaph.XII.1-5 in order to 
explain natural substance. The resolution of the three principles model of Phys.I into the four 
causes model of Phys.II can be observed in Metaph.XII.1-3. Here, Aristotle first summarises the 
arguments of Phys.I.5-7 for the triad of natural principles. Then, he lets privation drop, and 
implements the remaining internal principles (matter and form) with the external principles (the 
moving and final causes) into the four causes model. 
 Against this backdrop, Phys.I is most likely to be understood as introductory to Phys.II (as well 
as to other more complete accounts of hylomorphism), with which it shares the project of 
providing a causal explanation of natural things. The introductory character of Phys.I should not 
be understood in a denigrating sense. The importance of Phys.I is evident on at least two 
arguments. 
 First, no other text, to my knowledge, engages as diffusely in justifying the endorsement of 
matter and form as principles. The argument for hylomorphism occupies Phys.I.4-7 in a winding 
and nuanced path stretching from the endoxa of the predecessors to the Aristotelian doctrine of 
the three principles. This path unwinds through a number of arguments and through the 
introduction of new layers to remedy the shortcomings of the triad of principles of the 
predecessors. Understanding the arguments of Phys.I.4-7 enables us to achieve a deeper 
understanding of what kind of principles are searched for in Phys.I, and thus of the scope and 
character of hylomorphism. 
 Second, there is a sense in which the four causes model surpasses and substitutes the internal 
principles of Phys.I, for matter and form alone are not sufficient to account for the origin of 
 
1 Cf. Phys., I.1, 184a10-6. 
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natural things. Since nature “never acts without an end”, the final cause is necessary to account 
for natural things and phenomena. Since accounting for the nature of natural things is also, to 
some extent, accounting for their coming into being, the moving cause must be part of the causal 
account of nature. Despite the insufficiency of the account of Phys.I, there is a sense in which the 
four causes are reducible to the dyad of matter and form advocated here. 
 In standard cases of coming into being, the synonymy principle secures the identity in account 
among the formal, the final and the moving causes. In fact, a human being comes into being out 
of a determinate matter whose intrinsic end is the human being and through the action of another 
external human being. In this connection, the moving cause can be reduced to the formal cause 
with relation to the account: the father generating his child is formally one and the same with his 
child. The final cause coincides with the formal cause, for the matter out of which the human 
being comes into being is teleologically oriented towards one and only one form, the form of the 
human being, which represents the actualisation of its intrinsic capacity. 
 In this scenario, the picture of Phys.I presents the core of the more advanced doctrine of the four 
causes. On the one hand, it is incomplete, because, due to its introductory character, it does not 
bring in the complete teleological machinery of the four causes and of the capacity of matter. On 
the other hand, Phys.I advocates for the essential principles, matter and form, to which the more 
complex and complete doctrine of the four causes and teleological tendency can be reduced by 
virtue of the synonymy principle. 
 Thus, on the one hand, the hylomorphism of Phys.I internally requires to be complemented by 
the teleological and more complete causal theory of Phys.II and Metaph.VIII. On the other hand, 
matter and form constitute the core of more complete and complex causal accounts. 
 So far, I have expanded on the positive aspect of my claim that Phys.I is an introductory text, 
and only hinted at the fact that other texts present a more complex causal account of natural 
things. I offer now an overview of what Phys.I does not account for. 
 First, the triad of principles of Phys.I, further reduced to the dyad of matter and form, fails to 
provide a sufficient account of the processes of coming into being of natural things. In order for 
matter to be actualised and informed, an external moving cause is needed. The menses that are 
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the human being in potentiality would not come to be the human being in actuality, if not 
through the action of an external agent, the father, that is himself a human being in actuality. 
 Second, Phys.I only touches upon the issue whether matter is prior to form or the other way 
round. The topic is a recurrent one in Aristotle’s speculation, and it belongs to a mature 
hylomorphic account to assess whether matter or form is primary, and in which sense. Phys.I 
explicitly declares its failure to provide an answer to this issue.2 
 Third, the final cause has no role in Phys.I. Numerous natural substances and phenomena do not 
occur in vain, but rather in virtue of an end. Moreover, the perspective opened by the concept of 
potentiality (or capacity) and actuality is not in play in Phys.I. Phys.III grounds its account of 
change on the concepts of potentiality and actuality.3 Phys.I, in undertaking the same project, 
confines its account of change to the couple of opposites and the underlying substrate. 
 The absence of the final cause and of a dynamic perspective are to be considered as 
complementary in the failure of Phys.I to account for a teleological perspective. In fact, what is 
missing in Phys.I is a reflection on the orientation towards an end of the intrinsic capacity of 
matter, which can be found in Phys.II and Metaph.VIII. 
 Phys.I.9 represents the natural bridge from an introductory, non-teleological causal account 
nature and of hylomorphism to a more complex and teleological account thereof. The positive, 
full-fledged teleological doctrine developed in Phys.II is built out of the criticism to a conceptual 
apparatus that Plato glimpsed, but failed to understand properly. 
 In Metaph., I.6, 988a14-7, Plato is acknowledged as one of the few philosophers who (although 
quite unsuccessfully) attempted to provide a teleological explanation of nature. Phys.I.9, 
employing a language of Platonic flavour, discusses the aporias raised by Plato’s failure to 
distinguish matter from privation, and therefore from non-being. In this connection, the Platonic 
doctrine of natural principles is faced with the charge of overlooking the difference between 
being one in number and one in capacity (δυνάμει). Moreover, the Platonic identification of 
matter with privation and non-being clashes with another Platonic assumption, namely that 
matter “yearns for” the form. If matter has a natural tendency for the form; if matter coincides 
 
2 Phys., I.7, 191a19-20. 
3 Be here sufficient to remind of the notorious, and controversial, definition of change in Phys., III.1, 201a10-1: “the 
actuality of that which potentially is, qua such, is change” (Hussey 1993 (1983), p.2). 
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with the privation of the form; and if the opposites form and privation are incompossible; then, 
matter will be destroyed once it receives the form it tends to. Phys.I.9 confines itself to the task 
of bringing to the fore the internal inconsistency of Plato’s theory of the natural tendency of 
matter, and it does so by way of coupling it with Plato’s failure to account for the capacity of 
matter. 
 In conclusion, I have tried to map the relation of Phys.I with other key-texts providing a causal 
account of natural substances. Phys.I represents a justification of the essential explanatory tools 
of matter and form. Nonetheless, in its introductory character, Phys.I fails to account for: the 
external natural principles, a full-fledged teleological perspective and the issue on the priority of 
matter or form. 
 
0.3. The principles of natural things in Phys.I. 
 In this work, I maintain that the topic of Phys.I are the principles of change, thus curling the 
distinction between principles, causes and element drawn elsewhere. According to the locus 
classicus for the reciprocal distinction among these three terms (Metaph.V.1-3), principle (ἀρχή) 
is the genus of both cause (αἰτία) and element (στοιχεῖον), whereas the latter two are reserved 
for, respectively, the external and the internal principles. There is little doubt that the triad of 
principles advocated in Phys.I belongs to the kind of the internal principles or elements, in 
opposition to the moving cause and the final cause.4 The term στοιχεῖον, however, is used 
scantly in Phys.I, and not in opposition to the term αἰτία. Moreover, in other contexts, the term 
αἰτία is coextensive with the term ἀρχή and covers both the internal and the external principles.5 
 It appears evident that the causal vocabulary employed in Phys.I is neutral about the distinction 
drawn in Metaph.V.1-3. The opening of Phys.I contains the terms principle, cause and elements 
twice, first joined together the conjunction ἤ and subsequently by the conjunction καί. 
Phys., I.1, 184a10-16 
Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συµβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς µεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ 
ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόµεθα γιγνώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν 
 
4 Cf. Metaph.XII.1-4, that commentators have rightly noticed to contain a summary of the results of Phys.I (Charles 
2000; Rapp 2015). 
5 Cf. Phys.II.1. 
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τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωµεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ µέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), 
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήµης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς 
ἀρχάς. 
And since, out of all researches, knowledge and science occur – with relation to the 
things of which there are principles and causes and elements – when these are known (for 
we believe that we know something, when we know the primary principles and the 
primary causes and [when we have reached] as far as the elements). Thus, it is evident 
that, also in the science of nature, it must be attempted to discern primarily what is related 
to the principles. 
 The first occurrence may suggest that we ought to grasp either the principles or the causes or the 
elements of nature. This may be corroborated by the final mention of the principles alone (lines 
15-6). Moreover, the term ἀρχή is used consistently throughout Phys.I.4-6. 
 The second occurrence might appear to suggest a cumulative endeavour (i.e. grasping the 
principles and the causes and the elements of natural things), thus implying that there must be a 
difference between the three terms. 
 However, this impression is dispelled if we understand καί as epexegetic. If this is the case, then 
the endeavour prescribed by our passage is rather to search for the principles, i.e. the causes, i.e. 
the elements of natural things. In this case, it is clear that Aristotle uses the terms principle, cause 
and element as synonyms, and that the first, disjunctive occurrence of the terms must be 
understood in a broad sense. 
 Moreover, the term στοιχεῖον is omitted in the crucial passage of Phys., I.7, 190b17-20, where 
we would most expect it to be used in its technical, narrow sense. Aristotle here draws the 
conclusion of his enquiry into the internal principles and elements of natural things, and uses the 
terms ἀρχή and αἰτία to label them. 
 In conclusion, in the causal vocabulary of Phys.I, the terms ἀρχή, αἰτία and στοιχεῖον are 
employed as synonyms for the internal principles. 
 
0.3.1. The basic definition of principle in Metaph.V. Source condition and priority 
condition. 
 It is not my intention to tackle here the numerous issues related to Aristotle’s views on causality. 
An extensive literature has been produced on the topic, part of which deals with problems that 
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are quite remote from the introductory perspective of Phys.I. Here, I deal only with two 
conditions set in the definition of principle (ἀρχή) contained in Metaph.V.1, and that also apply 
to the definition of cause (αἰτιον) and element (στοιχεῖον) in Metaph.V.2-3. If we admit that 
these three concepts exhaust the realm of the causes in Aristotle, then the two conditions 
analysed here must be taked to apply to the whole spectrum of causality. 
 My claim is that, according to the basic definition of principle presented in Metaph.V.1, X is a 
principle of Y, if it fulfils two conditions:  
 (1) The source condition, namely if X is that-out-of-which with relation to Y (i.e. if X is the 
source of Y);  
 (2) The priority condition, namely if, given a Z that is also a source of Y, X is prior to Z. That is, 
X is a source of Z (and of Y). 
Metaph., V.1, 1013a17-20 
πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται: 
τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσαί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐκτός. 
What is common to all principles it to be the first that-out-of-which [their results] either 
are or come to be or are known. And some of them are internal, whereas others are 
external. 
 There are three elements in the definition of principle. In short, a principle of something is the 
primary source out of which this something φs. I leave aside the causal action expressed by φ, as 
it is a topic for the next section. Let us for now abstract from the quality of the causal action 
performed by the principle and consider a partial definition of principle as “the primary that-out-
of-which” of its results. 
 (1) The source condition (SC). The causal language employed by Aristotle consistently features 
“out of” (ἐκ) formulas. Points are principles of lines, for they are that-out-of-which (τὸ ἐξ οὗ) of 
lines. A lit candle is the principle of the blaze that destroyed someone’s house, for the lit candle 
is that-out-of-which of the blaze. The impulse given by a cue hitting ball 8 is the principle of the 
rectilinear movement of ball 8; the impulse transmitted by ball 8 onto ball 1 is the principle of 
ball 1’s falling into the pocket and, consequently, of me winning the match. In fact, in both cases, 
the former member is that-out-of-which of the second member. 
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 These situations quite uncontroversially describe a causal relation between two events, things or 
phenomena. The first member of this relation is the principle of the second member, which is the 
effect or result or object of the principle. In order for the linguistic qualification of causality 
through the ἐκ-language to yield something relevant for causality, two questions must be posited 
and answered. 
 In other words, are the above-mentioned principles necessary or non-necessary, sufficient or 
non-sufficient? 
Necessary: if X is a principle of Y, then X is that-out-of-which of Y. 
Sufficient: if X is that-out-of-which of Y, then X is a principle of Y. 
 In Phys.I.5, Aristotle seems to assume the sufficiency-option, for he concludes from the 
observation that the contraries fulfil the source condition (and priority condition) to the claim 
that contraries are principles. 
 Admittedly, there is some difference between my first geometric example on one side, and the 
second and third examples on the other side. If we consider the line as a single phenomenon that 
can be drawn or not drawn, then it is clear that the point I draw when I lay the tip of my pencil 
onto the paper necessitates the line, but is not sufficient for its existence. In fact, I may confine 
myself to drawing the point. Thus, with relation to the single line that I may or may not draw, the 
point is a necessary but non-sufficient principle. There seems to be, instead, another sense in 
which the point may be regarded as sufficient. In fact, the following statement is true: “if there is 
a line, then there is a point.” The difference seems to lie in the fact that there is a particular 
grounding relation between the point and the line, where the point is necessarily a component of 
the line. We can object that the line is composed out of semi-lines, but semi-lines are in turn 
composed out of points. Thus, the point is a sufficient principle of the line, but a non-necessary 
one (for I may confine myself to drawing the point). 
 Now, is the relation between SC and principles similar to the point/line model? There are two 
evident difficulties for this. 
 First, let us take different examples of ἐκ-formulas in Aristote’s Corpus. The day is that-out-of-
which of the night; the night is that-out-of-which of the day. This is meant is a merely temporal 
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sense; in fact, neither is day a principle of night nor the other way round.6 Furthermore, ἐκ can 
express mereological relations such as “the whole is out of the parts” and “the parts are out of the 
whole”.7 In neither of the two cases, a causal relation is implied. Thus, the simple fact that X 
fulfils SC (that X is that-out-of-which of Y) cannot be sufficient for X to qualify as principle. 
 Second, the priority condition (PC) is also required for X to qualify as a principle. Thus, the 
relation between PC and SC must be clarified with relation to their status. 
 Third, Phys.I does not deal with sufficient, but only with necessary principles. In fact, its causal 
description is incomplete (the moving cause and the final cause are missing). Furthermore, the 
internal and external concauses have no place in its account. For instance, the internal resistance 
and external impediments for the fulfilment of a causal action are not part of the picture of 
Phys.I. Considering again the second, the lit candle may fail to start a blaze, because it is placed 
too far from the closest inflammable stuff or because the quantity of heath is too small. None of 
these considerations is part of the account of Phys.I. The role of the concauses has some bearing 
on SC as well. In fact, it seems implausible that SC may be regarded as sufficient for X to 
qualify as a principle, if the concauses can undermine the fulfilment of the causal action of X. 
 This having been said, there may be some conceptual ground to save the sufficiency of SC that 
seems to be required by the arguments in Phys.I.5. The second problem may be managed by 
assuming as a hypothesis that SC and PC are sufficient when taken in conjunction. The third 
problem may be tackled by making clear what kind of principles Phys.I searches for with relation 
to the fulfilment of their causal action. Phys.I seems to search for the Xs that sufficiently qualify 
as principles, rather than for the Xs that are sufficient to the fulfilment of a causal action. The 
distinction I want to make here may be captured by the distinction de facto/de jure. The Xs that 
Phys.I selects as principles seem to be those Xs that must fulfil certain conditions (SC and PC), 
although they must not de facto fulfil a certain causal action. In fact, the causal description of 
Phys.I is partial both with relation to the kinds of principles and to the concauses. 
 This may be easily taken to support the view that the principles of Phys.I are only necessary. 
Instead, I want to try to make conceptual space for the idea that Aristotle endorses a de jure 
sufficiency of necessary, non-sufficient principles. Matter, form and privation must be meant as 
 
6 Metaph., V.24, 1023b5-11. 
7 Metaph., V.24, 1023a31-b2. 
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necessary, non-sufficient principles, for they do not exhaust the kind of the principles and 
concauses that are necessary and sufficient for a certain causal action to be fulfilled. Nonetheless, 
Aristotle, in arguing in Phys.I.5 from SC and PC to the principles, may be taken to state 
sufficient conditions for X to qualify as a necessary principle, or de jure sufficient conditions for 
X to qualify as a principle (i.e. regardless of the fulfilment of its causal action). 
 This brings us to reconsidering the first problem mentioned above. It is possible that SC may be 
considered by Aristotle as sufficient (when it is taken in conjunction with PC) with the proviso 
that ἐκ has a causal sense. This is quite tautological and amounts to ground the notion of 
principle on that of causality, such that X is a principle, if, given a causal relation CR, X is the 
primary that-out-of-which of CR. Nonetheless, in dealing with primary concepts, this circularity 
may be the best Aristotle can get to. Assessing whether the relation in which X qualifies as a 
principle is or is not a CR may hinge to some extent on the consideration of the causal field of 
the principle, to which the next section is devoted. 
 (2) The priority condition (PC). In selecting that-out-of-which of a certain result Y, we may 
come up with a plurality of sources. For instance, both the stroke of the cue on ball 8 and the 
impulse transmitted by ball 8 onto ball 1 can be considered that-out-of-which of the fact that ball 
1 falls into the pocket. All PC prescribes is that, given a source X and a source Z that both 
qualify as that-out-of-which of Y, X is a principle of Y rather than Z, if X is that-out-of-which Z. 
 Unlike other passages in which Aristotle endorses that the relevant principle of Y is the most 
proximate principle ending with the result Y, Phys.I deals with, one may say, the remote 
principles.8 For instance, in my interpretation, the second argument of Phys.I.5 follows two 
steps. First, it selects the sources of a certain change as the components of a certain logical range. 
E.g., for the change of colour, white, black (X) and all the intermediate colours that are included 
between these (Z). X and Z are the sources of the change of colour. Second, it shows that the 
intermediate colours in fact derive from white and black. For, they are in a certain sense a 
mixture of white and black. Thus, X (white and black) are principles, for they are sources of the 
change of colour, and they are primary with relation to the other sources (i.e. the intermediate 
colours) as well. The intermediate colours do not qualify as principles, for they do not fulfil the 
priority condition, but only the source condition. 
 
8 Compare, for instance, Metaph., VIII.4, 1044b1-3. 
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 Summing up, I have claimed that Aristotle states in Metaph.V.1 two conditions for being 
principle: SC and PC. I have tried to make conceptual space for Aristotle’s assumption in 
Phys.I.5 that SC and PC are sufficient conditions for qualifying as a principle. If my attempt is 
judged a failure, then Aristotle’s arguments in Phys.I.5 appear less cogent than we would wish. 
 
0.3.2. The causal field of the principle. Principles of being, principles of change. 
 In the previous chapter, I have focused on four elements of the concept of principle: the 
principle itself, the two conditions for being principles (SC and PC) and the results of the 
principle. 
 I here take for granted a fact that should be as uncontroversial as it gets: that the concept of 
principle is a relational one. With the term “relational” I mean nothing more than the fact that a 
principle is always a principle of something else. A principle is a principle of something else in at 
least two main senses. 
 In the first sense, we say that X is the principle of its result or object Y. Spelling this out with 
relation to SC and PC, X is a principle of Y, if Y φ-s out of X, and there is no Z out of which X 
φ-s. For instance, the point is the principle of the line, the line is the principle of the surface and 
the surface is the principles of the solid. In all cases, in fact, the former term is that out of which 
the latter term φ-s (for φ=being composed of). 
 In the second sense, X is principle of a certain quality of the causal action, namely of a certain 
causal field (φ).9 For instance, water is a principle of change in the transformation of water into 
air, but a principle of ontological composition for the bile. The causal actions of water in these 
two contexts are obviously qualitatively different. 
 Thus, from an object-related point of view, water is a principle, respectively, of air and of the 
bile. From a field-related point of view, water is a principle of change with relation to water, and 
a principle of being or ontological composition with relation to the bile. 
 
9 I borrow the notion of causal field from two classics of the debate on causality: Anderson 1938, pp.126-136; 
Mackie 1965, pp.248-252. 
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 Let us consider the enquiry of Phys.I. From an object-related point of view, enquiring into the 
principles of natural things amounts to searching for what is causally responsible for a set of 
beings, τὰ φυσικά, that are such and such. Namely, of the set of beings that are essentially 
capable of change and perceptible. 
 Nevertheless, such a general statement of purpose lacks the determinacy allowing for a sound 
answer, as looking for what is causally responsible for natural beings does not inform us on the 
causal action performed by the principles. As it seems, the fundamental question of natural 
science which Phys.I tackles, namely “what are the principles of natural beings?” is a complex 
one and needs to be spelled out with respect to the causal field of the principle. 
 At least three different fields are relevant in the inquiry of Phys.I. 
 In the first sense (a), the principles whose pursuit is announced in the first lines of Phys.I.1 are 
the principles of natural science, i.e. the principles of knowledge of natural things. If Y is 
something that can be known and X causes the knowledge of Y, then X is the principle of 
knowledge of Y. As a general outset, the principles sought for in Phys.I are the fundamental 
principles of natural science, for they are the explanatory principles of the objects of natural 
science, i.e. of natural things. But what are the principles of natural things and what are they 
explanatory of? An answer to this question is likely to be found by considering the second and 
third causal field of the principles of natural things. 
 In the second and third sense, as I show in the next two chapters, Phys.I.5-6 present two pairs of 
arguments claiming that the contraries and the substrate are the principles of natural things, 
respectively, with relation to being and with relation to change. 
 In the second sense (b), the principles searched for are the principles of being of natural things. 
X is a principle of being of Y, if X causes Y to exist or (i.e.) to be what Y is. I will further 
specify what I take this to mean. 
 In the third sense (c), the principles searched for are the principles of change of natural things. X 
is principles of change of Y, if Y is something that is capable of undergoing change (as natural 
things are essentially), and X causes Y to undergo change. 
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 With regard to the general scope of Phys.I, I claim that Aristotle thinks that finding (a) the 
principles of natural science, namely providing an answer to the general question “what are the 
principles of natural things?”, amounts to answering two distinct but not completely independent 
questions with relation to (b) and (c):  
QB (question on being): “what are the principles of the being of natural things?”; 
QC (question on change): “what are the principles of the change of natural things?”. 
 This may seem to lead to the unwanted consequence of splitting the unity of the results of Phys.I 
into two different questions with two different results: 
PB (principles of being): X is principle of natural things as it causes their being; 
PC (principles of change): Y is principle of natural things as it causes change in them. 
 I think that this is not how Aristotle sees the point. As a matter of fact, Aristotle identifies PB 
and PC in a central passage of Phys.I.7, where he provides with great emphasis his answer to the 
general question of Phys.I “what are the principles of natural beings?” The principles of natural 
things searched for in Phys.I are such to answer both QB and QC, thus qualifying both as PB and 
as PC of natural things. 
Phys., I.7, 190b17-20 
φανερὸν οὖν ὡς, εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ [a] τῶν φύσει ὄντων, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων [b] εἰσὶ 
καὶ γεγόνασι µὴ κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς ἀλλ’ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅτι γίγνεται 
πᾶν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειµένου καὶ τῆς µορφῆς· 
In conclusion, if there are causes and principles of natural things, primary [sources] out of 
which they [a] are and [b] have come into being non-coincidentally, but rather each said 
according to substance, it is evident that every [natural thing] comes into being out of the 
substrate and the form. 
 I will comment more fully on the passage in §5.7. Here, I confine myself to showing how the 
text confirms my claims. First, I have claimed that the question about natural principles presents 
two layers (compare [a] and [b]), which I will call, borrowing Mackie’s10 terminology, the 
object-related and field-related layer. 
 
10 Mackie 1965. 
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 With object-related layer ([a]), I mean to say that a principle is always a principle of something, 
in the sense that its causal efficacy acts on a certain object or on a certain set of objects. The 
same principle X, say fire, can manifest its causal efficacy on a variety of different inflammable 
things: paper, dead leaves, wood, alcohol. Each of these inflammable things are the objects on 
which the causal efficacy of the principle acts. The principles that Phys.I enquires into are, on an 
object-related point of view, the principles of natural beings, namely the principles of that set of 
beings that is individuated by the differentia of being capable of change. 
 With field-related layer, I mean to say that a principle is always a principle of something, in the 
sense that it causes a certain effect with relation to a set of objects. There is a certain number of 
effects that can apply to the same object Y. A heap of dead leaves, when it is exposed to the 
presence of fire, can: change its colour during the process of combustion; change its spatial 
position; cease to exist when the process of combustion has been fulfilled. Changing colour, 
location and ceasing to exist are different causal actions performed by one and the same principle 
(fire) on one and the same object (a heap of dead leaves). Each of these causal actions falls under 
a different causal field: qualitative change; locomotion; substantial change or being (in fact, we 
can consider the cessation of existence of a heap of dead leaves either as a process or as a state). 
 Now ([b]), the set of principles Phys.I searches for is, from a field-related point of view, the set 
of principles that are responsible both for the being and for the capacity to change of natural 
things. There is a certain degree of indeterminacy in the expression ἀρχὴ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐξ οὗ 
[τὰ φύσει ὄντα] εἰσί that rests on the meaning of εἶναι. 
 At least two interpretations are viable. On the first one, εἶναι has an existential meaning, so that 
the principles are responsible for the existence of natural things. On the second interpretation, 
εἶναι addresses the essence of natural thing, so that the principles are responsible for the fact that 
natural things are what they are. I believe on two main grounds that the second option is the most 
plausible one. First, and foremost, the argument for matter and form to qualify as principles that 
follows our passage hinges on definition and essence. Matter and form are principles of being 
(and change), for they are parts of the definition and essence of the natural thing they constitute. 
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Second, Phys.I deals with necessary, non-sufficient principles of change. Thus, the same items 
that are principles of change cannot account for the existence of their results.11 
 My interpretation on the twofold explanatory task of the principles in Phys.I may be contested 
by appealing to the fact that, although bringing together being and capability to change in line 
18, Aristotle refers only the latter where he lists the natural principles (line 20: γίγνεται πᾶν ἔκ τε 
τοῦ ὑποκειµένου καὶ τῆς µορφῆς). This would still give ground to the traditional idea that what 
is at stake in Phys.I are the principles of change. What follows in lines 20-3 seems nevertheless 
to reject this idea. In fact, the argument provided by lines 20-3 is one that regards the 
constituents from which natural things are: σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου 
καὶ μουσικοῦ τρόπον τινά.  A second and different argument (lines 22-3) appeals to the fact that 
matter and form are parts of the essence of natural things. 
 The inherent elements out of which natural things are composed, namely substrate and form, are 
identified with the principles out of which natural things have come into existence, namely with 
the principles of (substantial) change of natural things. In other words, in so far as X is a 
principle of being with respect to natural things, it is also a principle of change with respect to 
them. 
 As a compositional language characterises the argument for matter and form as principles of 
being, and as I believe that matter and form are principles of being in the sense that they account 
for the essence of natural things, I refer to the principles of being as the principles of ontological 
composition. By ontological constituents of elements, I refer to a relation part-whole that is not 
merely mereological or spatial, but rather ontological. The arm is a mereological element of the 
human being; Sparta is a spatial part of the Peloponnese. In both cases, the element does not bear 
 
11 Pace Bolton 1991, p.22-4. Bolton does not mention a distinction between principles of change and principles of 
being. Nonetheless, he seems to assume that the principles of natural things are explanatory both of the capacity for 
change and of the existence of natural things. On this latter function of the principles of natural things: “[…] in 
natural science the principle that nature, the realm of naturally changing things, exists can be more fully spelled out 
as the principle that form, privation and substratum exist” (p.23). Nonetheless, in expanding on the former function 
of natural principles, Bolton endorses (against Irwin 1988, pp.70-1) that the opposites are necessary, non-sufficient 
principles of change. Now, it may seem reasonable to believe that the same principles that are necessary with respect 
to change are also necessary with respect to being. Substrate, form and privation are not sufficient for a natural 
substance to come into existence (to have undergone substantial change). Rather, the existence of natural things may 
be guaranteed by the addition of the moving cause and, in most cases, of the final cause (plus by the absence of 
external impediments and by other necessary conditions). The principles of beings searched for in Phys.I, thus, are 
meant to be: either necessary, non-sufficient principles of the existence of natural things or principles of their nature 
or both.   
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relevance to the definition and essence of the whole. The human being is such even if one-
armed; the Peloponnese would be a peninsula stretching into the Aegean Sea even in the 
unfortunate case in which Sparta should be swept away by an earthquake. By ontological 
constituents, instead, I refer to the parts of substance without which the whole would simply not 
be the same whole it is. Let us anticipate a terminology that will be used extensively in this work. 
If M stands for matter and F+ stands for form, then natural things are in a strong, essential sense, 
MF+. By this, I do not want to commit to the view, refuted elsewhere, that substance is the sum 
of matter and form understood as ingredients. Rather, I want to address the weaker claim that 
matter and form are necessary components of the essence of the natural things they constitute, 
whatever their reciprocal relation may be. The relation between matter and form is addressed in 
the last section of Phys.I.7 and will be object of analysis in Ch.5. 
 Now, a problem arises from the picture I have been drawing. My claim on the twofold sense of 
the principles of nature may appear to duplicate the object of enquiry of Phys.I. In fact, it is 
reasonable to think that the principles of different fields (of being, of change, of knowledge…) 
are numerically and specifically different principles. The principles of knowledge of Socrates 
(i.e. of knowing that he is a man, namely the universals “biped”, “rational” and “animal”) will 
apparently not coincide with his principles of being (his individual matter and his form), nor with 
the reason why he heads towards the agora (the parts of his soul and body in charge of 
deliberation and movement, and the scope). 
 If we consider generally the case of the principles of natural things, it is prima facie difficult to 
see how PB and PC should coincide, that is, to see how that which effects the change of a natural 
being should also be the ground for its existence. Existing things undergo change in quality, 
quantity and place. The principles of these kinds of change obviously do not bear any role on the 
fact that the already existent Y undergoing these changes exists, or that it is such and such.12 
 
12 A certain parallelism between PB and PC may be saved if we hold with Phys.V.1 that every non-substantial 
change is itself in some sense a generation/corruption, namely a γένησις τις. When Socrates becomes, say, pale, we 
can describe the phenomenon both as the qualitative change of a pre-existing substance and as the generation of the 
compound substance-quality “pale Socrates”. Such a claim seems to leave conceptual room for reckoning pale as a 
principle of being of “pale Socrates”. In fact, such an entity as “pale Socrates” exists only in so far as pale comes to 
coincide with Socrates. This notwithstanding, on two grounds I do not think that this is a path Aristotle wants to 
follow. Firstly, the status of substance-accident compounds in Aristotle’s philosophy is controversial. Matthews 
(1982) has convincingly shown that, as the unity of this kind of beings is merely accidental, they would not qualify 
as substances and objects of science, but rather be some sort of “kooky objects” (partially against this claim: Lewis 
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 This notwithstanding, Phys., I.7, 190b17ff. shows quite clearly that Aristotle holds that the same 
principles are causally responsible both for the being and for the capability to change of natural 
things. The same principles are causally effective on one set of objects with respect to two 
different causal fields. The fact that principles of change and principles of being are coextensive 
is something that Aristotle is not eager to explain, but that seems to constitute the foundations of 
his enquiry into natural things in Phys.I. I claim that he has good reasons to hold it. 
 Let us return to the object-related layer of the principles searched for in Phys.I. Two points must 
be considered. 
 First, Phys., I.7, 190b17ff. argues that the principles of natural things are actually the principles 
of natural substances. Thus, the identification proposed is not between principles of alteration 
(white, black; smooth, rough) and the principles of what natural things are, which would be 
absurd. Rather, the identification proposed is that between the principles of substantial change 
and the principles of being of something. 
 Second, the principles of natural things in Phys., I.7, 190b17ff. are achieved through a diairetic 
argument introduced in Phys., I.7, 190a31, which starts by dividing into its elements (matter and 
privation) a certain kind of substance, namely the starting point of substantial change or what-
comes-into-being. Phys., I.7, 190b17ff. represents the second step of this diairetic argument, 
namely the step in which Aristotle divide into its elements (matter and form) the end point of 
substantial change or what-has-come-into-being. What-has-come-into-being is no more than the 
natural substance that results from the process of (natural) substantial change. 
 Thus, combining the object-related layer with the field-related layer, the principles of natural 
things are explanatory both for the fact that natural substances have come into being and for their 
essence and ontological composition. This is thus the kind of identification assumed in Phys.I 
that is in need of explanation. 
 What are natural substances considered in general, as a province of being? In several passages, 
Aristotle contrasts natural beings to other provinces of being. Leaving aside the issue of the 
 
1982). Secondly and more importantly, I do not think that Aristotle is at any extent concerned in Phys.I with the 
principles of such objects as “pale Socrates”. Rather, Phys.I is concerned with the principles of natural substances 
such a tree and a man; in short, with natural substances as hylomorphic compounds. 
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consistency of Aristotle’s ontological partition, I claim that both Phys.I and other texts agree on 
the view that natural beings are those beings that are essentially capable of changing. 
 Phys.I recognises the capacity for change of natural substances as one of the fundamental 
premises on which natural science is grounded. In Phys.I.2-3, in fact, Aristotle engages in a 
refutation the Eleatic monism13 and changelessness of being, on the ground that they undermine 
the possibility itself of natural science (Phys., I.2, 184b25-185a12). 
 The essential feature of being changeable proper to natural things is not considered by Aristotle 
as something to be argued for. Rather, the capacity to change of natural beings is acknowledged 
as an empirically self-evident datum. 
Phys., I.2, 185a12-14 
ἡμῖν δ’ ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. 
But we assume that natural [things] – either all or some of them – are in change. And this 
is evident by induction. 
 At least two points about this short passage are worth noticing. 
 Firstly, the passage is inserted in a broad context stretching from Phys., I.2, 184b25 to the end of 
Phys.I.3, which is mainly devoted to the refutation of the Eleatic claim that being is one. In lines 
12-4, Aristotle dismisses the Eleatic claim that being is changeless, referring to the presumed 
evidence that natural things undergo change. No further attempt to refute the Eleatic claim on the 
changelessness of being is made until Phys.I.8 solves the famous aporia on the possibility of 
change. Moreover, in Phys.I.4-7 Aristotle seems to take for granted that natural things undergo 
change, as he argues for the principles of natural things (also) on the basis of the way in which 
natural things undergo change. Phys.I.5 even lists Parmenides among the Physicists who 
explained change by way of positing the contraries as principles.14 
 Returning to our passage, the use of the verb ὑπόκειμαι may suggest that Aristotle in Phys.I.2 
simply assumes changeability as a self-evident feature proper to natural things and leaves it for 
 
13 As I read it, the argument against monism has the form of a modus ponens in two steps: If there is science → there 
is (at least) one principle (cf. Phys., I.1, 184a10-6). If there is a principle → there is also (at least) one result. There 
is science╞ there is (at least) one principle and there is (at least) one result. Therefore, being cannot one, but is rather 
many. 
14 Phys., I.5, 188a20-2. 
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further discussion (i.e. to Phys.I.8) to refute the wrong reasoning that had lead Parmenides to 
deny this datum of experience.15 
 Second, my claim may be mitigated by the restriction Aristotle adds with the words ἢ ἔνια. If 
changeability belongs only to a subset of the natural things, then my claim that changeability is a 
necessary, essential differentia of the set of natural beings as a whole is threatened. Nevertheless, 
parallel passages show with sufficient solidity that this limitation should be taken merely as a 
cautionary note due the fact that Aristotle does not mean to settle the question beyond referring 
to what is self-evident and therefore universally accepted (with the exception of the Eleatics, 
who had lost track of the phenomena because of their wrong reasoning). Aristotle often delimits 
natural science from mathematics and from the science of being with relation to their respective 
objects of enquiry. Differently from the other two theoretical sciences, natural philosophy deals 
with the set of things that, by definition, have a principle of change in themselves (coinciding 
with their nature). Far from pertaining only to a subset of the natural things, being changeable is 
a necessary, essential feature of natural things. 
 A locus classicus for Aristotle’s partition of substance is Metaph.XII.1. 
Metaph., XII.1, 1069a30-b3 
οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθητή — ἧς ἡ μὲν ἀΐδιος ἡ δὲ φθαρτή, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, 
οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα [ἡ δ᾽ ἀΐδιος] — ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε 
πολλά· ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος […] ἐκεῖναι μὲν δὴ φυσικῆς (μετὰ κινήσεως γάρ), αὕτη δὲ 
ἑτέρας, εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή. ἡ δ᾽ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή. 
And [there are] three [kinds of] substances. The first one is the perceptible substance – 
and of this, one [kind] is eternal, another [kind] is corruptible. And on this [latter kind] 
(e.g. plants and animals), everybody agrees. […]. The other [kind of substance] is not 
subject to change […]. And those [kinds of substance] are [the object] of natural science, 
for they are twined with change. […] Perceptible substance is capable of change. 
 Leaving aside the numerous interpretative issues raised by this text, what is relevant to my 
argument is that Aristotle identifies the province of being falling within the scope of natural 
science as a that of the substances that are perceptible and capable of change. These two 
characters of natural substances are evidently not to be understood as coincidental ones, for they 
 
15 For this use of the imperative 3rd person singular of ὑπόκειμαι: EN, II.2, 1103b31-4: τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν 
λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω – ῥηθήσεται δ’ ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει 
πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. “Now, that we must act according to right reason is a common principle and must be 
assumed–it will be discussed later, i.e. both what it is, and how it is related to the other excellences.” (ROT) 
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identify a certain province of being instead of others. Thus, natural substances are those 
substances that are essentially perceptible and capable of change. 
 In clarifying the peculiarity of ontology as a science that is not confined to a particular province 
of being, but rather enquires into being qua being – Metaph.VI.1 defines the object of natural 
science in the following way.16 
Metaph., VI.1, 1025b18-21 
[…] ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνει οὖσα περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος (περὶ γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην 
ἐστὶν οὐσίαν ἐν ᾗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ) 
[…] natural science happens to deal with a certain genus of being (for it deals with that 
certain kind of substance in which the principle of change and rest is in [the thing] itself). 
 Similarly, the opening of Phys.II.1 notoriously distinguishes between things whose cause is 
nature and things whose causes are different from nature. And nature is the principle of change 
and rest inhering by definition in the beings that qualify as natural things. 
 In conclusion, the passages discussed above, along with evidence from Phys.I.2 (when it is 
interpreted correctly), have shown that natural things are those things that are essentially capable 
of change. 
 The cumbersome fact that Aristotle argues for the principles of natural things by way of 
enquiring into the principles of substantial change may find an explanation in the intersection 
between three ideas. 
 First, from an object-related point of view, the principles we are looking for are the principles of 
natural substances as what-has-come-into-being. Namely, we are looking for the substances that 
are results of processes of coming into being. 
 Second, changeability is an essential feature of natural things. Natural thing =def a thing that has 
capacity for change (and is perceptible). 
 Third, from a field-related point of view, the principles of being of natural things account for 
what natural things are, namely for their essential features or nature. 
 
16 Metaph., XI.7, 1064a28ff. 
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 The concurrence of these three claims enables to account for the claim about the principles of 
natural beings that I see in play in Phys.I. The principles accounting for what natural things are 
(the principles of being) are the same principles accounting for the fact that natural things are 
capable of change (the principles of change), for being capable of change belongs to what natural 
things essentially are. 
 
0.4. Method in Phys.I. 
 Phys.I represents a favourite battlefield for the debate on Aristotle’s method for the enquiry into 
the first principle of science triggered by Owen’s groundbreaking contribution to the topic.17 
Notoriously, Owen claimed that the process of enquiry into the first principles hinges on 
dialectic, and thus on endoxa (the agreement of everybody or of all philosophers). Thus, Owen 
rejected the traditional views on the topic indentifying either experience18 or deductive reasoning 
as sources of the knowledge of the first principles. 
 The influence of Owen has been enormous and still reverbereates in contemporary scholarship.19 
Irwin’s extensive monography on the topic is the paramount example of a complete endorsement 
of Owen’s perspective.20 The first sixty pages of Irwin’s book contain a detailed analysis of 
passages from Phys.I supporting the importance of endoxa and dialectic in the enquiry into the 
first principles of natural science. 
 Wolfgang Wieland devoted an entire book to the method of Phys.I, expanding Owen’s 
dialectical perspective of collection and evaluation of the authoritative endoxa into the analysis 
of everyday speech typical of his Zeitgeist.21 In Wieland’s expanded dialectical approach, the 
first principles of natural science are gained through the analysis of the way in which the Greek 
 
17 Owen 1961. Owen’s view had been anticipated by Le Blond 1939, pp.46-7 and Weil 1975 (1951). Giving account 
of the debate over the question whether dialectic is or is not Aristotle’s philosophical method for the enquiry into the 
first principles falls out of the scope of the present work. Notable champions of Owen’s interpretative line are 
Brunschwig (1967, pp.XIV-XVIII) and Evans (1977). Decisive criticism to this interpretative line has been 
advanced by Bolton (1987, 1990, 1991), Smith 1993, Mesch 1994, Primavesi (1996, pp.17-20, 31ff.). For an 
assessment: Rapp 2002, Vol.I, pp.244ff. 
18 Jaeger 1955 (1923), pp.309-27 and 346ff. With relation to biology in particular: Düring 1943, pp.22-3; Lloyd 
1968, pp.71-80. 
19 For an overview: Bolton 1987, p.121, n.4. 
20 Irwin 1988. 
21 Wieland 1970 (1962), esp. pp.216ff. Also: Wieland 1975. 
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Everyman commonly speaks about natural things and natural change. Common speech is, in 
Wieland’s interpretation, a reservoir of agreed-upon concepts of reflection intuitively and for the 
most time unconsciously grasped by the speakers. Although Wieland’s analysis is evidently 
biased by extrinsic concerns and blatantly mistranslates and misinterprets passages for the sake 
of making its point, it has proved extremely influential.22 
 For instance, Charlton, in the introduction to his edition of books I and II of the Physics, in 
dealing with the method, claims: 
[…] the special technique of the dialecticial is to argue from endoxa […], which are, 
roughly speaking, propositions which cannot be proved, but which an opponent could not 
deny without seeming unreasonable, and this is Aristotle’s technique in Phys. I-II: he 
constantly appeals to what is ordinarily said or thought […]; though he relies more on 
detailed linguistic analysis […] than the Topics may lead us to expect.23 
 The beginning of the passage testifies Charlton’s debt to Owen; the last sentence for his 
sympathy, more than for Owen’s restricted dialected method, for Wieland’s expanded dialectical 
approach. The same holds for Jones’ reconstruction of Aristotle’s doctrine of the substrate in 
Phys.I.24 The shortcomings of Jones’ analysis lie chiefly in his failure to account for the 
importance of the arguments presented in Phys.I.5-6 for Aristotle’s enquiry into the principles of 
natural things. Rather, Jones’ analysis concentrates on the linguistic analysis that occupies part of 
Phys.I.7 and that Jones assumes to bear the whole burden of proof.  This, nonetheless, amounts 
to overlooking several central passages of Phys.I.5-6 and of Phys.I.7 itself, and to mistaking a 
collection of linguistic data for the arguments provided to account for these data. 
 There is some natural appeal in the dialectical method. If the first principles of science are 
genuinely first, then they cannot be deduced from more prior principles. The belief in Aristotle’s 
endorsement of a super-capacity grasping the first principles by intellectual intuition has the 
philosophical stance of a deus ex machina and is likely to have spuriously stemmed from the 
attempt to reconcile Aristotle with Platonism.25 The idea that the first principles are drawn from 
experience is confronted with the well-known limits of empiricism; first and foremost, with the 
inevitable objection that a posteriori experience is never exhausted. 
 
22 For recent contributions on the epistemological value of endoxa: Frede 2012; Mies 2013. 
23 Charlton 1992 (1970). 
24 Jones 1974. 
25 I have provided an overview of the problem in Trentini 2016, pp.178-85. 
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 The dialectical method, instead, has three main virtues. First, where the endoxa are selected 
properly, it draws on the bits of evidence that have presented themselves as evident to those who 
are knowledgeable. Second, dialectic provides an indirect proof of the first principle, when they 
prove to resists denial or refutation. Third, it accounts for the importance of the endoxa in 
Aristotle’s treatment of philosophical problems and in his enquiry into the principles. There is 
little doubt that Aristotle makes reference to endoxa in his enquiries into the principles of science 
and in setting the philosophical problems. The scope and limits of the endoxa, nonetheless, are 
object of controversy. According to hardcore defender of the dialectical reading, endoxa seem to 
be the alpha and omega of the enquiry into principles. According to this reading, the principles 
are argued for ex authoritate.  
 The main shortcoming of the dialectical method with relation to the first point if that it ends up 
relying on arguments ex authoritate. The second point may secure a certain degree of stability of 
the results, but not the kind of stability derived from direct proof. 
 When applied to the enquiry into the principles of natural things pursued in Phys.I, the main 
contribution of the dialectical method is to recognise Aristotle’s appeal to both the agreement 
among his predecessors in Phys.I.4-6 (Owen-ish dialectical method) and to the analysis of 
common language in Phys.I.7 (Wieland-ish dialectical method). This still does not amount 
necessarily to using either of these dialectical tools as cornerstones for argument. My claim is, in 
fact, that they do not, at least not unqualified ex authoritate. 
 First, we have to draw a difference between Phys.I.4-6 and Phys.I.7. This difference is long 
acknowledged, but not appreciated in the right way. It has been lamented by Kelsey that scholars 
have too often proceeded to analyse Phys.I.7, overlooking the importance of Phys.I.4-6 for the 
overall argument of Phys.I.26 A tendency of scholarship has thus been to consider the latter block 
of chapters as merely dialectical (in a weak sense, namely as devoted to the discussion of the 
opinions of the predecessors), in opposition to Phys.I.7, where Aristotle would argue from his 
own point of view. It is clear, instead, that Phys.I.4-6 contribute crucially to the overall argument 
 
26 Kelsey 2008. 
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of Phys.I. Thus, Phys.I.4-6 cannot be merely dialectical.27 Nonetheless, they depart from the 
opinions of the predecessors. 
 The status of Phys.I.4-6 is thus in need of further clarification. The core of the difficulty of their 
status rests on the relation between argument (understood in general as a rational procedure 
yielding reliable results) and endoxon. I take the arguments of Phys.I.5 as a case study, as 
Phys.I.5 contains the most important reflection on the topic. I do not mean to reject the 
importance of endoxa for the enquiry into natural principles in Phys.I, but I think it is important 
to understand the relation between endoxon and argument, and, along with this, their respective 
roles and limits. 
 A reflection on the relation between endoxon and argument can be found in Phys., I.5, 188b26-
30. In the previous lines (188a30-b26), Aristotle has provided an argument showing that 
contraries are the principles of natural change. It is controversial how the argument works and 
what its limits are. What is certain is that Aristotle provides an argument using his own 
conceptual tools.28 In the following lines, Aristotle reinforces his own rational argument by 
referring to the common opinion held by his predecessors that contraries are principles. 
Phys., I.5, 188b26-30 
µέχρι µὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον σχεδὸν συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, 
καθάπερ εἴποµεν πρότερον· πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ’αὐτῶν καλουµένας ἀρχάς, 
καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὅµως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας 
ἀναγκασθέντες. 
As I have stated previously, also most of the other [thinkers] – roughly – go along with 
me with relation to what I have claimed so far. For they claim that the elements and that 
which they call principles are the contraries, even though they fail to provide arguments 
[for their claim], but rather [endorse it] as if they had been constrained by truth itself. 
 In the passage, Aristotle first restates the endoxon opening ch.5, namely that principles must be 
identified with contraries. There are some points which are worth making. 
 First, the endoxon is not found as such in any of the predecessors and accepted, but rather 
abstracted from the individual opinions held by the predecessors. Phys.I.6 (cf. §4.2.2.2.) clarifies 
that the agreement of the predecessors is not given as such, but rather gained by the philosopher 
who is able to see the unity beyond the single, partial truths grasped by each of the predecessors. 
 
27 Mansion 1961, p.41. 
28 Cf. §2.1-3. 
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Empedocles posited Love and Strife, Plato the Great and the Small, Anaximenes and other 
Physicists density and rarity. The endoxon is born, when the philosopher can surpass the 
limitations and particularity of the single received doctrines and see their similarity by virtue of a 
process of analogic abstraction. 
 Thus, even if we grant a strong argumentative role to the endoxon, this is nonetheless fruit of a 
process of rational abstraction and modification. This process is proper to the philosopher who 
sees beyond the partial truth of her predecessors and is capable of grasping the core of truth 
underlying the errors and singularity of each doctrine. Far from passively accepting an argument 
ex authoritate, using endoxa in the argumentative process entails a process of abstraction and 
reformulation of the received material. 
 Second, Aristotle reassures us that this opinion is true and that universal consensus applies to it 
by necessity in virtue of its truth. The idea that truth somehow imposes itself on thought is found, 
among other passages, in Metaph., I.4, 984b8ff. A certain degree of self-evidence of truth seems 
to be implied in Metaph., II.1, 933a30-b19: truth is here said to be easy to acquire and to be 
something which is not possible to miss completely (although it is difficult to grasp truth in 
detail). This passage shares more than one point with Phys.I, for truth is also said to be the effort 
of a community of men, each bringing a greater or smaller contribution towards the knowledge 
of what is most evident by nature. Moreover, the difference between knowledge of truth as a 
whole and in detail may find a parallel in the discussion of scientific method in Phys., I.1, 
184a16ff. Here, scientific knowledge is said to start from that which is more knowable for us (i.e. 
easier) and καθόλου (generically or known as a whole) to that which is less knowable for us (i.e. 
more difficult) and καθ’ ἕκαστα (i.e. known in detail). 
 Hence, scientific progress in Phys.I does not amount to replacing older, fallacious theories with 
new, correct ones. Scientific progress rather coincides with gathering the truth that is contained 
in the older theories, but generically and lacking of conceptual distinctions, and to bringing it to 
rational certainty by virtue of finding the rationales for it and to clarity through analysis. 
 If this is right, neither is scientific progress independent from truthful endoxa nor does it identify 
with the mere repetition of endoxa. The question we must answer is: what allows scientific 
progress to take place, namely the passage from the generic truth glimpsed by everybody (who 
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knows) to the grasp of truth that is accurate in its details and pertains properly to each thing 
enquired that is into? 
 Far from stating the sufficiency of endoxa for the pursuit of truth, Aristotle laments (ll.28-29) 
that the doctrines of the predecessors – although true in their seminal common intuition – were 
assumed by these without providing a reason, or argument (λόγος). It is clear that he sees his 
endeavour in the previous lines of Phys.I.5, and in Phys.I.6-7, as providing arguments and 
digging out the rationale underlying for the endoxa gathered from his predecessors. Thus, 
Aristotle does not identify endoxon and argument: the passage rather states that, once an endoxon 
has been gained, one still has no argument claiming on rational grounds for the truth of this 
endoxon. Scientific progress rather requires argument in order to gain rational certainty, and 
argument does not identify itself with endoxon. 
 Now, what counts as an argument in Phys.I? I have excluded that consensus and authority in 
Phys.I.4-6, are arguments at all. What about the linguistic analysis pursued in Phys.I.7? As I 
have said, a long tradition around and about Wieland has identified the argument for positing the 
three principles (matter, form and privation) in the linguistic analysis. In analysing Phys.I.7, I 
show how Phys.I.7 starts from evidence gathered from the analysis of common speech on 
change, but supports the data gathered by virtue of other kind of arguments than linguistic ones. 
These – provided that there is such a thing as a linguistic argument, that I strongly doubt – have 
at best the function of bringing to light the unconscious pre-comprehension of reality buried in 
the way in which one talks about reality. Same as for the abovementioned, more authoritative 
endoxa, the way in which change is spoken of may reveal a generic truth that is too evident to be 
missed altogether. Nonetheless, when it comes to arguing for this truth, Aristotle provides other 
kinds of arguments than linguistic ones. 
 It has been endorsed by Bolton that the arguments of Phys.I are empirical ones. Bolton’s view is 
well argued, but still takes into account only part of the argument developed through Phys.I.4-7. 
Not only does Bolton’s view fail to account for the role of dialectic and endoxa in Phys.I. Also, it 
fails to account for arguments that cannot, or at least should not, be interpreted as empirical ones. 
 In my analysis of the arguments of Phys.I.5-7, I grant great importance to a priori arguments. 
With this label, I mean arguments that are not based on collections of empirical data, but that rest 
either on other primary principles, for instance through the exclusion of the contradictory. Let us 
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consider the argument presented in Phys., I.7, 190a33-b1 for the claim that there is always a 
substrate underlying change. It has been shown that what comes into being does so out of an 
opposite. Now, it is immediately clear that what comes into being does so also out of a substrate, 
for, if the contradictory where the case, we should admit the existence of non-enmattered 
opposite properties. This argument makes no reference to any a posteriori collection of data; 
rather, it is derived a priori from a cornerstone of Aristotle’s metaphysics, namely from the 
impossibility that properties exist in absence of their bearer (substrate or matter). 
 Aristotle, occasionally states that he is arguing a posteriori. For instance, when he argues, in the 
lines following the abovementioned a priori argument, that everything that undergoes substantial 
change comes into being out of a substrate. In order to make his point, Aristotle collects a series 
of cases of coming into being and shows how, in each and every case, a certain substrate 
underlies the process of substantial change. Obviously, the argument is valid only under 
condition that the series of comings into being considered is exhaustive of each and every kind of 
coming into being. Even in this obvious case of a posteriori argument, nonetheless, Aristotle 
wants to extend a general truth that he had previously argued for with relation to change in 
general, namely that everything that changes, changes out of a substrate. This truth is argued for 
through an a priori argument (190a33-b1). Aristotle may feel that his argument for the 
substantial case does not need to be as strong as an a priori argument; rather, he can be content 
with the a posteriori analysis of several cases of coming into being. Thus, without wanting to 
understate the importance of a posteriori arguments in Phys.I, I believe that a priori arguments 
have the lion’s share in Aristotle’s argument for the natural principles. 
 
0.5. From Phys.I.4-6 to Phys.I.7. Past the aporia, towards the principles of substance. 
 It goes without saying that getting clear about the distinctions and details of a generic truth 
grasped without clarity entails or can entail a more precise specification and a degree of 
reformulation of the generic truth itself. Namely, if can make what is known generically not only 
clearer with relation to the details, but also more precise with relation to the whole. I show in 
what follows that the failure of the predecessors to account for substance and Aristotle’s specific 
focus on it entail a modification of the generic endoxon employed in Phys.I.4-6. A main shift 
taking place in Phys.I is the passage from the enquiry into the principles of natural things in 
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general (Phys.I.4-6 and part of Phys.I.7) to the enquiry into the principles of natural substances 
as what-has-come-into-being (Phys., I.7, 190a31ff.) This passage exceeds the notorious and 
misleading distinction between Phys.I.4-6 and Phys.I.7 as, respectively, dialectic and non-
dialectic (meaning that Aristotle would speak in his own voice). 
 It is clear that Phys.I.7 relies on the arguments of Phys.I.4-6. Nonetheless, when the arguments 
for the principles of natural things are applied to the enquiry into natural substances, a certain 
degree of modification of the generic endoxon in Phys.I.4-6 is necessary. I believe that this 
modification occurs in two main fields. 
 (1) In Phys.I.4-6, the relation between the principles (substrate and contraries) is understood 
according to a certain model of metaphysical predication, the non-substantial one: 29 
Coincidental metaphysical predication (CMP): S is H+. 
 According to this model, the substrate S is a natural substance functioning as the bearer of the 
non-substantial, contrary metaphysical predicate (or property) H+. With relation to priority, it is 
clear that S is prior to H+, for S exists without H+, but not the other way round. 
 From this constellation, the aporia on the number of principles of Phys.I.6 arises. If what is a 
principle must be primary; if the candidates for principles are the contraries (Phys.I.5) and the 
substrate (Phys.I.6); if the substrate is prior to the contraries; then, it may seem that only the 
substrate has claim to qualify as a principle.30 
 To be sure, the aporia is presented by Aristotle as a “2 vs 3 principles” one (contraries alone vs 
contraries and substrate), not as a “2 vs 1” one (substrate vs contraries), as we might expect. This 
can be explained by considering the fact that the existence and necessity of a substrate is argued 
for, in Phys.I.6, on the basis that the claim of Phys.I.5 is true, namely on condition that there are 
contrary principles. This having been assessed, the task required for the solution of the aporia on 
the number of principles amounts to showing either that the contraries are sufficient principles of 
 
29 A classical definition of metaphysical predication has been provided by F. A. Lewis (Lewis 2001, p. 247, n. 2): 
“metaphysical predication is a relation between items in the ontology: between a metaphysical subject, Socrates 
(say), and – not a predicate (a linguistic item), but – a predicable, man (say) or pallor, without quotation marks. This 
is in contrast with linguistic predication, where what is predicated is a linguistic item–a grammatical predicate.” 
30 Cf. 3.3.2, Subargument 2 of Arg.2 of Phys.I.6. 
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natural things or that endorsing the existence of the substrate does not undermine the claim of the 
contraries to qualify as principles. This latter task is the one undertaked by Aristotle in Phys.I.7. 
 In deepening the level of analysis to the analysis of S into matter, form and privation, Phys.I.7 
introduces a different kind of metaphysical predication: 
Substantial metaphysical predication: M is F+; M is F-. 
 The difference between the two kinds of predication is not explicitly stated, but it is quite clear 
that Aristotle does not believe that the priority-relation existing in the two kinds of predication 
are one and the same. In fact, Aristotle leaves unexplored whether form or matter has claim to 
substantiality and, therefore, to ontological priority.31 Moreover, the solution of the aporia 
provided in Phys.I.7 seems to drop altogether the aforementioned concerns related to priority. 
 The aporia of Phys.I.6, read in this way, may appear to be too thin for the solemn title that is 
bestowed upon it.32 Much the other way round, the solution of the aporia on the number of 
principles entails the overcoming of the ontology of the Categories – based on the symmetry 
between logical and metaphysical predication, and thus on one single model on metaphysical 
predication, the non-substantial one – for a deeper level of analysis. This level includes the 
analysis into matter and form of the individual substance representing the subject of predication 
in the Categories. Or rather, in the case of Phys.I, of a particular case thereof, namely of 
individual natural substances.33 The deepening of the level of analysis to substantial 
 
31 Phys., I.7, 191a19-20: πότερον δὲ οὐσία τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ὑποκείµενον, οὔπω δῆλον. “Nonetheless, it has not yet 
become clear whether substance is the form or the substrate.” 
32 Cf. Phys., I.6, 189b27-9, where Aristotle claims that ἀπορίαν ἔχει πολλήν with relation to the choice between 
either the two principles option or the three principles option. 
33 The relation between the Categories and Phys.I is long acknowledged. I do not want to commit myself to any 
particular view about the relation between the ontology of the Categories and the ontology of other parts of 
Aristotle’s Corpus. What I assume on this topic, although far from being uncontroversial, can perhaps be shared by 
scholars without need of argument. First, that the Categories present an ontology and not only a linguistic analysis. 
Second, that the beings that the Categories calls substrates of coincidental properties include the natural things dealt 
with in Phys.I: this man, this tree, this dog…, namely the inventory of the natural substances. Third, that this 
analysis is less complex than the hylomorphic analysis pursued in Phys.I and other texts (which does not necessarily 
mean that the Categories are of earlier composition, as in Jaeger’s influential reading). Four, that substance means 
chiefly, in the Categories, the subject of non-substantial logical/metaphysical predication. These same points are 
endorsed, if I am not wrong, by Furth (1988, pp. 13ff.), to whose work I refer for their defense. From what I have 
claim, it is clear that I am sceptical towards interpretations opposing the (allegedly) early ontology of the Categories 
to the (allegedly) mature ontology contained other works (for instance, if I understand correctly, Graham 1987). 
Nonetheless, as I said, taking an argumented position in this scholarly titanomachia lies both beyond the scope of 
this work and beyond my forces. 
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metaphysical predication is the founding stone of hylomorphism, to which Phys.I is an 
introduction. 
 (2) In Phys.I.7, moreover, Aristotle refines of the concept of opposition qualifying as a natural 
principle. In Phys.I.4-6, the kind of opposition employed is that of contrariety, the scope thereof 
does not include substances. In arguing for the principles of change of natural things, Aristotle 
presents an a priori argument showing that contraries qualify as principles, for they are the 
extremes defining the range within which change occurs per se.34 Contraries identify a range for 
natural per se change; contradictories do not. For instance, white and smooth do not define a 
range. Instead, white and black qualify as the extremes of the range encompassing all colours 
that are intermediate between white and black. Thus, white and black are the principles of any 
change of colour, for they qualify as sources of change, and for they are primary with relation to 
their intermediates. Aristotle’s argument is presented as universal. In defending the universality 
of this claim, Aristotle analyses several cases that seem to present an intuitive difficulty. Without 
presenting them as such, for the enquiry has not been set on substance yet, Aristotle tackles 
several cases of substantial opposites and tries to show that his model encompasses these as well. 
Thus, what is composed comes to be out of what is non-composed and what is joined comes to 
be out of what is not joined.35 
 Now, there is an intuitive problem. Namely, the substantial opposites of form and privation do 
not yield a range as contraries do. A favourite Aristotelian definition for privation is 
“contradiction in a subject”, and, as we have seen, contradictories do not identify any range. A 
basic requirement for this seems to be that the opposites represent a certain determinate degree of 
a certain property and a certain determinate degree of the opposite property. Nonetheless, if form 
fulfils this requirement, privation does not seem to. In fact, the capacity to define a range seems 
to lie entirely on the side of the form, whereas privation is the mere lack thereof. If we were to 
imagine the structure of a non-substantial range and that of a substantial range, the latter may 
appear as a line stretching between two well-defined points (e.g. white and black). A substantial 
range, instead, is neither uncontroversially a stretch (for it is not clear whether there are 
intermediates between the form of man and the privation thereof) nor uncontroversially defined 
 
34 Phys., I.5, 188a30-b8, cf. §2.1. 
35 Phys., I.5. 188b8-23, cf. §2.2. 
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by two definite points (for privation is nothing but the absence and the contradictory of the 
form). 
 In Phys.I.7. the passage from contrariety to the substantial opposition of form/privation is 
realised smoothly and without explanations. It is clear that, once the enquiry has come to pivot 
around substance, the concept of opposition in play has to be broader than that of contrariety, in 
order to include natural substances. Nonetheless, the rationale underlying the position of 
contraries as principles of change Phys.I.5 does not seem to extend to the case of substantial 
change. 
 Also in this case, the argument of Phys.I is more complex than scholars are prone to recognise. 
Phys.I.5 (and Phys.I.6 with it) is neither a dialectical discussion of the opinions of the 
predecessors nor does it contain the definitive arguments that Aristotle needs for the principles of 
natural substances. Rather, Phys.I.5-6 contain arguments that Aristotle is ready to endorse within 
the conceptual framework of his predecessor’s philosophy. Namely, in an enquiry that does not 
focus yet natural substances, and where the relation between the principles is the one dictated by 
coincidental metaphysical predication. 
 The passage from the opposition of contrariety to that of form/privation is necessitated, in 
Phys.I.7, by the shift of the enquiry to the principles of natural substance. It is clear that the 
argument supporting form and privation as principles is contained in Phys.I.5. Nonetheless, the 
extension of the concept of opposition to form and privation is not supported by the range 
argument of Phys.I.5. At best, Phys.I.5 provides the analogical basis for endorsing form and 
privation, but not the definitive argument needed for it. We could think, in fact, that Aristotle 
may have a thought of this kind in mind:  
white/black: change of colour = smooth/rough: change of texture = form/privation: 
change of substance. 
 In the first two parts of the analogy, the first member is a couple of contraries capable to define 
a range, and the second member is a kind of non-substantial change, of which the couple of 
contraries are principles. In this scenario, form and privation may be said to be principles of 
substantial change by virtue of analogy with the previous, non-substantial cases, although the 
rationale supporting the non-substantial cases does not hold for the case of substantial change. 
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 In conclusion, the shift towards the principles of substance provides the final premise in the 
justification of the claim that privation is a principle. At the same time, it poses the necessity to 
establish the internal relation among the principles, matter, form and privation, as well as their 
respective aetiological status. This is the task of the final section of Phys.I.7, which constitutes 
the crowning achievement of the enquiry of Phys.I and the object of my §§5.7-9. 
 
 
1. CONTRARIES AS PRINCIPLES OF BEING. ON PHYS.I.5, ARGUMENT 1 (188a26-
30). 
 
1.0. Introduction.  
 In the present chapter, as in the following one, I analyse the arguments of Phys.I.5 claiming for 
the doctrine that contraries are principles (C). My claim is that C is internally complex, since the 
concept of principle refers to two different, but partially overlapping, causal fields: being and 
change. 
 The complexity of the field determinacy of natural principles is present both in the arguments 
claiming for C in Phys.I.5 and in the arguments in Phys., I.6, 189a20-b3 claiming for the 
necessity of positing the substrate as a principle. 
 In Phys.I.5, Aristotle presents two different arguments for C. The first one (188a26-30) 
advocates that contraries are principles of being (ontological elements, or constituents) of natural 
things. The second one (188a30-b26) argues that contraries are principles of change of natural 
things. I analyse each of these arguments in, respectively, Ch.1 and Ch.2. 
 Similarly, Phys., I.6, 189a20-b3 can be analysed into two arguments for the claim that the 
substrate is a principle, each of which endorsing a different causal field and addressing one of the 
arguments of Phys.I.5. I analyse these arguments in my Ch.3. 
 Before turning to the analysis of Arg.1 of Phys.I.5, I briefly deal with the delimitation of the 
argument and with its nature. 
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1.0.1. Where Aristotle’s first argument for C starts and what it claims for. 
Phys., I.5, 188a19-30  
Πάντες δὴ τἀναντία ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν οἵ τε λέγοντες ὅτι ἓν τὸ πᾶν καὶ μὴ κινούμενον (καὶ 
γὰρ Παρμενίδης θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀρχὰς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ προσαγορεύει πῦρ καὶ γῆν) καὶ 
οἱ μανὸν καὶ πυκνόν, καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλῆρες καὶ κενόν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὡς ὂν τὸ δὲ ὡς οὐκ 
ὂν εἶναί φησιν ἔτι θέσει, σχήματι, τάξει. ταῦτα δὲ γένη ἐναντίων· θέσεως ἄνω κάτω, 
πρόσθεν ὄπισθεν, σχήματος γεγωνιωμένον ἀγώνιον, εὐθὺ περιφερές. ὅτι μὲν οὖν 
τἀναντία πως πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον. καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως· δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς 
μήτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μήτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πάντα· τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις τοῖς 
πρώτοις ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, διὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτα εἶναι μὴ ἐξ ἄλλων, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντία μὴ ἐξ 
ἀλλήλων. 
And all [the predecessors] posited the contraries as principles: both those who made the 
All one and non-changeable (in fact, even Parmenides posited hot and cold as principles, 
and called them fire and earth) and those [who posited] the dense and the rare [as 
principles], and Democritus as well. [This latter posited] the full and the empty [as 
principles], and claimed that one of these is being, whereas the other one is non-being. 
Moreover, he [employed] position, shape and disposition. These are the genera of the 
contraries: up and down, before and behind [are species of/belong to] position; having-
angles and lacking-angles, straight and curved [are species of/belong to] figure. 
Thus, it is evident that all [the predecessors] made, in some sense, the contraries 
principles. And this is reasonable, for the principles [b] must not be out of each other, [c] 
nor out of anything else, and [a] everything must be out of the principles. And the 
primary contraries fulfil these conditions: [c’] as they are primary, they are not out of 
anything else; [b’] as they are contraries, they are not out of each other. 
 In the introduction, I have already argued against the idea that Phys.I provides arguments by 
authority or ex consensu sapientium. In the present section, I want to contrast the view held by 
certain scholars36 that 188a19-30 provides a homogeneous piece of argument claiming for C ex 
consensu sapientium and thus opposing to the real argument for C contained in 188a30-b26. 
 Against this view, I argue, first, that 188a19-30 contains an argument for C that is not merely 
dialectical; second, that 188a19-30 claims for C from a different perspective than the successive 
argument. As I have claimed, Phys.I.5 presents two arguments for C under two different 
perspectives: Arg.1 (188a26-30) with relation to being, Arg.2 (188a30-b26) with relation to 
change. 
 
36 Charlton 1992 (1970), pp.65-6 and Ross 1936, pp.487-9 echoing Philoponus 2009, 110, 24-111, 8. Philoponus 
treats these lines as part of the argument ex consensu starting at the beginning of ch.5 and opposing to the argument 
“by reasoning” of 188a30-b26. 
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 My first claim is that 188a19-30 does not constitute a unified block, but must rather be divided 
into two sections. The first one (188a19-26) is dialectical, for it exemplifies the endoxon exposed 
in Phys.I.4 and recapitulated in the opening line of Phys.I.5 (“all [the predecessors] posited the 
contraries as principles”). The second one (188a26-30) provides an argument for this endoxon. 
 The dividing line between the two sections, i.e. between consensus and argument is drawn in 
188a26-27. These lines open with a slightly varied and more cautious (πως) repetition of the 
endoxon, followed by the sentence καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως and by another sentence introduced by 
γάρ. I believe that the most natural way of reading these lines is that they introduce an argument 
for the endoxon previously stated, which is exactly what 188b26-30 declares to be lacking (and 
to be in need of being provided) in the theories of the predecessors. At least three reasons support 
this view. 
 (a) the repetition of the endoxon in line 26 ceases to be redundant and acquires a stronger sense 
in the economy of the passage, if it is taken to introduce the argumentative aim of the lines which 
follow, namely if the γάρ clause introduces an argument for it. 
 (b) εὐλόγως is properly rendered by the English word “reasonable”, which is well-suited to 
introduce an argument showing why the endoxon in line 26 is judged such. As Judson (forth.) 
points out, εὐλόγως is seldom used to connote views that Aristotle is not ready to support with 
arguments, whatever degree of plausibility he may attribute to them. Falcon and Leunissen 
(2015) have made the even stronger point that εὐλόγως normally introduces claims that Aristotle 
is willing to endorse. 
 (c) γάρ normally introduces an argument. It is therefore most likely that lines 27-30, introduced 
by γάρ, convey an argument for the fact that the endoxon presented in the previous passage is 
held by Aristotle reasonable. 
 In a nutshell, I claimed against Charlton et all. that there is nothing like a consensus argument in 
188a19-30, but rather that Aristotle firstly gathers and states an endoxon which he holds true, and 
then (lines 27-30) provides an argument for it. 
 With relation to my second claim, I have mentioned the widespread view that difference 
between Arg.1 and Arg.2 is that between an argument by authority and a proper argument. Far 
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from lying only in the form of the argument, the difference between Arg.1 and Arg.2 rests, I 
believe, in what is argued for. 
 
1.1. The condition of ontological simplicity (COS) and the suitability of primary contraries 
to fulfil it. On Arg.1 (188a27-30). 
 After the opening dialectical section showing that all predecessors endorsed C, Aristotle 
provides his first argument for C, or rather for a well-defined version of C, namely that the 
contraries are principles of natural things with respect to their being or ontological composition. 
Phys., I.5, 188a26-30 
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τἀναντία πως πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον. καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως· δεῖ γὰρ 
τὰς ἀρχὰς [b] μήτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι [c] μήτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ [a] ἐκ τούτων πάντα· τοῖς δὲ 
ἐναντίοις τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, [c’] διὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτα εἶναι μὴ ἐξ ἄλλων, [b’] διὰ 
δὲ τὸ ἐναντία μὴ ἐξ ἀλλήλων. 
Thus, it is evident that all [the predecessors] made, in some sense, the contraries 
principles. And this is reasonable, for the principles [b] must not be out of each other, [c] 
nor out of anything else, and [a] everything must be out of the principles. And the 
primary contraries fulfil these conditions: [c’] as they are primary, they are not out of 
anything else; [b’] as they are contraries, they are not out of each other. 
 Arg.1 can be divided into two parts. In lines 27-8, Aristotle states three conditions for something 
to be a principle of being ([a-c]). These three conditions, taken together, form what I call the 
“condition of ontological simplicity” (COS). According to COS, P is a principle of R, if P is the 
simplest, most basic element out of which R is composed. I expand on COS in the next section. 
 In lines 28-30, Aristotle shows that primary contraries qualify as principles, for they fulfil all 
conditions of COS ([a-c]). I analyse this in §I.3. 
 To be precise, Aristotle only implicitly assumes, but neither explicitly states nor justifies, that 
primary contraries fulfil condition [a] of COS, namely that [a’] everything is composed out of 
primary contraries. I show in §I.3.1.1. that [a’] is an endoxon. My Chapter 4 contains reflections 




1.2. The first part of Arg.1 (188a27-8). The condition of ontological simplicity for being a 
principle (COS). 
 As I have showed in §0.3.1, Metaph.V.1 provides a basic notion of what a principle is. In a 
nutshell, P is a principle of R, if R φs out of P (source condition) and there is no Z out of which P 
φs (priority condition). 
 The variable φ is the placeholder for the kinds of causal action that the principle P performs on 
the result R. For example, for φ = change, we say that P is a principle of R’s change, if P is that 
out of which R changes; for φ = being, we say that P is a principle of R’s being, if P is that out of 
which R is. 
 I claim that Phys., I.5, 188a27-8 provides three criteria for something (A and B) to be principle 
of [NT] natural things. As I read it, [a] corresponds to the source condition; [b, c] spell out the 
priority condition. 
A and B are principles of NT, if 
[a] [NT] φs out of A, B and C (source condition); 
[b] A and B do not φ out of any other source C; 
[c] A and B do not φ out of each other. ([b] and [c] = priority condition). 
 Several points are worth making. 
 First, Phys., I.5, 188a27-8 defines the basic notion of principle on a plurality of principles, 
coherently with the aim of Arg.1, namely to argue that primary contraries are principles. This 
plurality is composed out of items that fulfil the source condition, but not the priority condition 
(C), and of items which fulfil both the source and the priority conditions (A; B). Only the latter 
items qualify as principles, for [NT] and C derive from them, but A and B neither derive from 
them, nor derive from each other. 
 Second, the role of [a] in Arg.1 is to select the set [S] including each and every source of [NT]. 
Nevertheless, being a source is not sufficient to qualify as a principle, for only primary sources 
are principles. [b-c] provide a criterion for distinguishing the subset of the primary sources [PS] 
(i.e. the subset of the principles) from the subset of the non-primary sources [NPS]. 
38 
 
 [b] states that: a certain source S1 belongs to [PS], iff S1 does not derive from any other source 
S2. At first sight, [b] may seem to fulfil the task of isolating [PS] from [NPS] without any need 
for [c]. Nevertheless, it can be the case that S2 derives from a plurality of PS’s. Let us take the 
simplest case in which S2 derives from a pair of sources, say A and B. [c] is necessary in order to 
clarify whether both A and B or just one of them belong to [PS], thus qualifying as a principle. 
 [c] states that, if it is the case that A and B are both sources of [NPS] and [NT], then both A and 
B belong to [PS] and are principles, for they do not derive from each other. Let us take the case 
in which B derives from A. In this case, B qualifies as a source, for it is that from which [NT] 
derives. Nonetheless, if B derives from A, B does not fulfil [c], and therefore does not qualify as 
a principle. Let us take the case in which NT’s derive from A and B, but it is neither the case that 
A derives from B nor the case that B derives from A. This latter case is the one contemplated by 
[c]. According to this scenario, A and B both qualify as primary sources and therefore as 
principles, for both A and B are primary with relation to NT’s and NPS’s, but none of them is 
primary with relation to the other one. Thus, both A and B qualify as principles. 
 In conclusion, taken together, [b] and [c] spell out the priority condition for sources to qualify as 
principles. Thus, the sources A and B qualify as primary sources and principles, iff [b] A and B 
do not derive from any other source C, and iff [c] A and B do not derive from each other. 
 Third, lines 27-8 remain uncommitted with relation to the causal field of the principle (φ). They 
make use of the ἐκ-language (“P is a principle of R, iff R primarily ἐκ P”) proper to the 
definition of principles, omitting the verb that qualifies the causal effect of the principle P with 
relation to its result R. This elliptical formulation seems to amount to this other one: “P is a 
principle of R, if P is that out of which R primarily φs”, where φing (e.g. “being”, “changing”) 
designates the causal action of P with relation to R, namely the causal field of the principle φ. 
This basic notion of principle is as comprehensive as unspecific, for it leaves φ unspecified, and 
φ indicates the nature of the relation of source performed by P on R. In other words, the basic 
notion of principle offered in lines 27-8 is neutral with relation to the kind of causal action 
performed by P on R. 
 The comprehensiveness and lack of specificity of the basic notion of principle as a primary 
source provided in lines 27-8 enables it to be in play both in the second part of Arg.1 and in 
Arg.2 of Phys.I.5. 
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 Fourth, in the second part of Arg.1 (188a28-30), φ is specified as “being”, thus qualifying the 
basic notion of principle of the first part of Arg.1 into what I label as the Condition of 
Ontological Simplicity (COS). With this label, I want to capture the idea that P is a principle of 
being of R, if P is a primary (i.e. most simple) constituent of R. If P fulfils COS, then, P is a 
primary element (στοιχεῖον) of R, using a technical term that appears only once in Phys.I as a 
synonym of the general term principle.37 
 
1.3. The second part of Arg.1 (188a28-30). How primary contraries fulfil COS. 
 In what follows, I analyse the three premises of Aristotle’s argument for the claim that primary 
contraries fulfil the three conditions ([a-c]) of COS. In order for the argument to work, I assume 
that we have to add a hidden premise ([a’]) corresponding to [a], in the same way as the premises 
[b’] and [c’] in 188a28-30 correspond, respectively, to [b] and [c]. As I understand it, Arg.1 
unwinds through two steps. 
 The first step of Arg.1 (§I.3.1.) argues that contraries are that out of which natural things are 
composed ([a’]). This amounts to showing that contraries fulfil the source condition for being 
principle, i.e. that contraries are that-out-of-which all natural things are. 
 The second step of Arg.1 (§I.3.2-3.) has the role of selecting as principles a specific subset 
within the set identified in the first step. This set includes the beings out of which all natural 
things are composed, namely the contraries. Within the set of the contraries, subarguments [b’] 
and [c’] have the function of selecting the subset of the primary contraries as the subset 
containing the contraries that qualify as principles, for all other contraries are composed out of 
them. 
 Taken together, [a-c] show that primary contraries fulfil COS and qualify as principles of natural 
things with relation to their being or ontological composition. Thus, Arg.1 argues for [C*] a 
narrower claim than [C] the endoxon extracted from the theories of the predecessors that 
contraries are principles of natural things. 
 
37 Phys., I.1, 184a11. 
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 Moreover, the claim argued for by Arg.1 (and Arg.2) of Phys.I.5 must be stronger than the 
generic claim that [C*] the primary contraries are principles of natural things. In order for the 
aporia on the number of principles raisen at the end of Phys.I.6 to be motivated, and according to 
Phys., I.7, 191a15-6,38 Phys.I.5 must argue for the stronger claim: 
[C**] the primary contraries are the only principles of natural things. 
 In the next section, I discuss which version of [a’] has the required strength to yield [C**]. 
 
1.3.1. The source condition of COS: [a’] all natural things are composed out of the 
contraries. 
 I claim that Arg.1 works on condition that [a’] is introduced as a hidden premise corresponding 
to premise [a] of COS. Premise [a] states what I have labelled as the source condition for 
principles of being, namely that P is a principle of R, if R is composed out of P. In arguing that 
contraries are principles of natural things, Aristotle must assume that:  
[a’] (generically,) all natural things are composed out of the contraries. 
 Some points are worth making. 
 (1) The force of [a’] can be interpreted in at least two ways. Since Aristotle refrains altogether 
from formulating [a’], the discussion of its force is possible only by way of establishing the force 
of the conclusion of Arg.1. The weaker interpretation of [a’], 
[a*] all natural things are composed out of the contraries, without being exhausted by the 
contraries, 
in addition to [b’, c’], yields the weaker conclusion that 
[C*] the primary contraries are principles of natural things non-exhaustively. 
 For [a*] only claims that each and every natural thing has at least one component that is a 
contrary. 
 
38 Phys., I.7, 191a15ff. summarises the line of argument stretching from Phys.I.5 to Phys.I.7. Lines 15-6 recapitulate 
the argumentative scope of Args.1-2 of Phys.I.5: Phys.I.5: πρῶτον µὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη ὅτι ἀρχαὶ τἀναντία µόνον, “First, 
it has been said that the principles are only the contraries.” 
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 Although [a*] presents itself as plausible, the development of the argument on the principles of 
natural things through Phys.I.4-7 may give preference to the stronger version of [a’]: 
[a**] all natural things are exhaustively composed out of the contraries. 
 In addition to [b’, c’], [a**] yields the expected stronger conclusion [C**], according to which 
primary contraries are the only principles of natural thing. [a**], nonetheless, requires a stronger 
motivation than [a*] does. 
 (2) [a’] and its variations are far from being self-evident claims. Common observers, 
dependently on their own private experience and degree of knowledge, may analyse reality into 
this or that set of primary components. That they might agree on the claim that the components 
of reality are contraries, is questionable to say the least. 
 Aristotle does not mention the rationale for this view. The closer we may get to a motivation of 
[a**] is, I believe, that Aristotle treats it as an endoxon (cf. §I.3.1.1.) 
 (3) If [a**] is an endoxon, the question that must be asked is whether and how far Aristotle is 
ready to endorse it. If he is not, Arg.1 has the value a merely dialectical argument. If Aristotle is, 
at least to some extent, ready to endorse [a**], then Arg.1 must present at least some degree of 
plausibility (provided that the remaining premises are also either plausible or true). 
 Now, the result of Arg.1 is evidently assumed in Phys.I.7 as a cornerstone for Aristotle’s own 
doctrine of natural principles. Thus, Arg.1 must enjoy at least a certain degree of plausibility. 
This entails that Aristotle must be ready to endorse [a**], at least to some extent and on 
condition that [a**] undergoes a certain degree of refinement. I analyse the issue in Chapter 4. 
 
1.3.1.1. [a**] as an endoxon. 
 In this section, I show that Aristotle believes that the first premise of Arg.1 ([a**]) is an 
endoxon. Out of several texts in which Aristotle attributes [a**] to his predecessors, I devote the 
following discussion to a passage of Metaph.IV.2, because it connects [a**] with the general 
claim that the contraries are principles. 
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 The argument contained in Metaph., IV.2, 1004b27-1005a13 argues, against sceptics of the 
possibility of metaphysics, that there is a single science inquiring into that-which-is in its 
entirety. A plausible reconstruction of the argument is the following: 
[1] all the things-that-are are (exhaustively) composed out of the contraries;  
[2] all contraries can be reduced to the primary contraries one/many and being/non-
being;39 
[3] one and many are studied by the same single one discipline (for they are themselves 
contraries, and contraries are studied by the same single one discipline).40 Therefore,  
[4] there is something as a single one discipline studying that-which-is in its entirety. 
 In other words: [1] the whole of reality can be reduced to contraries, for the contraries are the 
primary components of the whole reality; and [2] the contraries can be reduced to one/many and 
being/non-being, for all contraries are said with relation to one/many and being/non-being. And 
since [3] it is the case that each pair of contraries is studied by a single one discipline; and since 
one/many are contraries; it follows that there is a single one science studying one and many; and 
since the whole reality can be reduced to one and many, then [4] there is a single one discipline 
that studies reality in its whole. 
 According to my reconstruction of the argument, its first two premises should be understood in a 
robust, reductionist sense: [1] the whole reality is exhaustively composed out of contraries; [2] 
all contraries can be reduced to the primary contraries one/many and being/non-being. If [1] is 
not interpreted in a reductionist way, namely as claiming that contraries compose exhaustively 
the whole reality, then the argument seems to fail in demonstrating [4]. 
 The crucial question about the validity of argument in Metaph., IV.2, 1004b27-1005a13 
concerns premise [1]. My main claim is that [1] is clearly presented by Aristotle as an endoxon. 
This does not entail that [1] is held as true by Aristotle. In fact, Aristotle’s readiness to endorse 
[1], and consequently the validity of the argument of Metaph.IV.2, has been rejected by several 
 
39 Namely not as their synonymous genera, but analogically, i.e. in so far as every contrary is said with reference to 
one and many. Cf. Metaph., IV.2, 1005a5ff., in which Aristotle probably refers to the relation of homonymy πρὸς 
ἕν. 
40 Metaph., IV.2, 1004a9. 
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scholars, who have downplayed the argument of Metaph.IV.2 as a merely dialectical one.41 For 
the sake of brevity, I restrict my quotation of the Aristotelian text to premise [1]. 
Metaph., IV.2, 1004b29-33 
[1] [α] τὰ δ’ὄντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐξ ἐναντίων σχεδὸν ἅπαντες συγκεῖσθαι· 
[β] πάντες γοῦν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας λέγουσιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, οἱ δὲ 
θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἱ δὲ πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον, οἱ δὲ φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος. 
[1] [α] And, roughly speaking, all [thinkers] agree that the things-that-are, and substance, 
are composed out of contraries; [β] for, at least, all [thinkers] claim that principles are 
contraries: some [claim that they are] odd and even, some hot and cold, some limit and 
limitless, some love and strife. 
 Premise [1] from the argument in Metaph., IV.2, 1004b27-1005a13 can be divided into two 
claims. I take [α] to be equivalent to [a**] and to represent an endoxon drawn from the 
predecessors. On the face of it, [β] seems to some extent to better qualify [α] by way of stating 
that all predecessors made the contraries principles. 
 The compositional thesis of [α] is stated with a qualification (σχεδόν). This may be explained as 
a limitation of the universality of the claim (ROT: “nearly all thinkers”). I suggest that σχεδόν 
rather expresses Aristotle’s caution in attributing [α] to his predecessors. I spell out my 
suggestion by analysing the relation between [α] and [β]. 
 The relation between the compositional claim [α] and the claim about the principles [β] is not 
immediately clear. [β] is linked to [α] through the particle γοῦν, that expresses both limitation 
and inference.42 The limitation expressed by γοῦν in [β] can be seen as matching the cautious 
σχεδὸν in [α]: Aristotle would ground his cautious compositional claim [α] on the less 
controversial claim that all predecessors posited the contraries as their principles. The causal 
meaning of γοῦν suggests that [β] may to some extent provide a proof for the compositional 
claim [α]. Aristotle may draw the inference that [α] all predecessors thought that everything is 
constituted out of contraries from [β] the evidence that all predecessors posited the contraries as 
principles. 
 This reading of the text, which hinges on the meaning of γοῦν, allows us to endorse two claims 
about [1]. 
 
41 For a collection and a discussion of passages in which Aristotle rejects [1], see Kirwan 1993, p. 85. 
42 LSJ: “Restrictive particle with an inferential force”. Also, Denniston 1950, pp. 448ff. 
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 First, Aristotle, to a certain extent, infers [α] from [β]. Aristotle starts from [β] the endoxon that 
the contraries are principles and traces back to the claim that [α] the contraries are the 
constituents of everything. A similar strategy can be found in Arg.1 of Phys.I.5, in which 
Aristotle starts from the endoxon “the contraries are principles” and further qualifies it in Arg.1 
into a compositional sense, arguing that the contraries are principles of natural things, for they 
are the elemental components thereof. As in Phys.I.5, in Metaph.IV.2, the compositional thesis 
[α] specifies the claim [β] that the contraries are principles. 
 Second, the restrictive sense of the particle (“at least”) may account for the caution with which 
[α] is expressed. [α] may be seen as Aristotle’s own attempt to spell out the rather indeterminate 
claim [β] of his predecessors in a compositional way. Since [α] is Aristotle’s own qualification of 
a general and vague [β], [α] is stated cautiously. In this connection, [β] is the endoxon clearly 
stated by the predecessors, whereas [α] is Aristotle’s rationale for it. 
 In conclusion, Metaph., IV.2, 1004b29-33 assesses that Aristotle believes that the claim that 
[a**] (natural) things are exhaustively composed out of the contraries is an endoxon. Moreover, 
[a**] represents a qualification of the indeterminate claim that [β] the contraries are principles as 
a claim concerning the being and ontological composition of natural things. Similarly, Arg.1 of 
Phys.I.5 qualifies the general and vague endoxon that contraries are principles of natural things 
with relation to being or ontological composition. 
 
1.3.2. The priority condition of COS: first subargument. [b’]: The primary contraries are 
not out of other contraries, for they are primary. 
 [b’] and [c’] spell out the priority condition of COS. They show that, among the contraries, the 
primary contraries are that-out-of-which the other contraries are constituted. Since the primary 
contraries fulfil both the source and the priority condition, they qualify as the principles of 
natural things with relation to their being. 
 The first subargument [b’] claims that the primary contraries are principles, for they are prior to 
the other contraries. Let us consider the set [C] including all contraries. [C] fulfils condition [a] 
for being principle of the set of natural things [NT], for all natural things are constituted out of at 
least one member of [C]. Now, [C] includes at least two subsets: [PC], i.e. the subset including 
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primary contrary pairs ([PC+ and PC-]), and [IC], i.e. the subset including all intermediate 
contraries. A contrary belongs to [PC], if there is no further member of [C] out of which [PC] is 
composed, and if there is at least one member of [NT] that is composed out of it. The latter 
condition can occur either directly (when [NT] is composed out of at least one [PC]) or 
indirectly, i.e. by virtue of [NT] being composed out of a member of [IC], which is in turn 
composed out of a member of [PC]. Instead, a member of [C] belongs to [IC], if it is composed 
out of at least one member of [PC].  
 Summing up, the relation between primary contraries, intermediate contraries and natural things 
can be portrayed according to two scenarios. First scenario: [NT] is composed out of [IC], and 
[IC] is composed out of [PC]. If this is the case, [PC] is the primary constituent both of [IC] and 
of [NT]. Second scenario: [NT] is composed out of [PC], and [PC] is the primary constituent of 
[NT]. According to both scenarios, [PC] qualifies as principle, for it fulfils both the source and 
the priority condition of COS. 
 The relation between primary/intermediate contraries and natural things can be portrayed 
according to the following Russian doll-like model and is found frequently in the Aristotelian 
Corpus. The biggest and most external Russian doll represents [NT]. [NT] is composed out of a 
certain number of intermediate sets [IC1], [IC2], [IC3], which are such that [IC1] is composed out 
of [IC2-3] and [IC2] is composed out of [IC3]. The intermediate sets [IC1-3], taken together, 
constitute the set of intermediate contraries [IC] composing [NT]. In turn, [IC] is composed out 
of the most internal and smallest Russian doll, i.e. out of the set of the primary contraries [PC]. 
As [NT] is composed out of [IC], and [IC] is composed out of [PC], then [NT] is composed out 
of [PC]. Therefore, [PC] has better claim than [IC] to qualify as ontologically simple, and thus to 
qualify as a principle. 
 One of the numerous examples of the Russian doll-like model with relation to composition out 
of contraries can be found in Metaph.VIII.4, where Aristotle draws a distinction between the 
concepts of remote and proper matter. The general claim of Metaph., VIII.4, 1044a15-24 is that 
natural things in some sense have the same remote matter and in some other sense have a 
proximate matter that is proper to each kind of natural things. For example, two different natural, 
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contrary things (the phlegm and the bile)43 can have different proximate matters: the proximate 
matter of the phlegm is the sweet stuff; the proximate matter of the bile is the bitter stuff. The 
sweet stuff and the bitter stuff are the contraries out of which the phlegm and the bile are 
respectively composed, and therefore their respective proximate matter. The sweet stuff has, in 
turn, a further proximate matter out of which it is composed, namely the fatty stuff. The line of 
the phlegm (the phlegm, the sweet stuff and the fatty stuff) and the line of the bile (the bile, the 
bitter stuff) have in turn a common matter out of which they are composed and which represents 
the remote matter of both the phlegm and the bile, namely water. 
Metaph., VIII.4, 1044a15-24 
Περὶ δὲ τῆς ὑλικῆς οὐσίας δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντα πρώτου ἢ τῶν 
αὐτῶν ὡς πρώτων καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη ὡς ἀρχὴ τοῖς γιγνομένοις, ὅμως ἔστι τις οἰκεία 
ἑκάστου, οἷον φλέγματος [ἐστι πρώτη ὕλη] τὰ γλυκέα ἢ λιπαρά, χολῆς δὲ τὰ πικρὰ ἢ 
ἄλλ’ἄττα· ἴσως δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. γίγνονται δὲ πλείους ὗλαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅταν θατέρου 
ἡ ἑτέρα ᾖ, οἷον φλέγμα ἐκ λιπαροῦ καὶ γλυκέος εἰ τὸ λιπαρὸν ἐκ τοῦ γλυκέος, ἐκ δὲ 
χολῆς τῷ ἀναλύεσθαι εἰς τὴν πρώτην ὕλην τὴν χολήν. διχῶς γὰρ τόδ’ἐκ τοῦδε, ἢ ὅτι πρὸ 
ὁδοῦ ἔσται ἢ ὅτι ἀναλυθέντος εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν. 
On the topic of material substance, we must notice that even if everything does come 
from the same primary stuff, or stuffs, and even if it is the same matter that functions as a 
principle of the things that come into being, nevertheless there is a different matter 
appropriate to each. Thus, the matter appropriate to phlegm is the sweet or fatty stuff, 
while the matter appropriate to bile is the bitter stuff or something else; but these latter 
perhaps come from the same stuff. The same thing will come to have several matters 
when one is the matter of the next. Thus, phlegm may come from what is fat and what is 
sweet, if fat itself comes from what is sweet. Whereas, phlegm comes from bile in virtue 
of the resolution of the bile into its primary matter. For one thing may come from another 
in two ways: either because the one is reached via the other; or because the other is 
resolved into its principle. [Transl.: Bostock 1994, modified] 
 The reconstruction of Metaph., VIII.4, 1044a15-24 I have presented raises several interpretative 
problems. 
 (1) As Bostock notices, it is not clear whether Aristotle talks about the matter out of which 
something is composed or of the matter out of which something comes to be. On the face of it, 
something can come out of a matter M at t1 without being composed out of M at t2, if M does not 
persist through the process of change out of M. The difference between these two kinds of matter 
 
43 For phlegm and bile as contraries, cf. Pr., I.29, 826b25-9, where bile is qualified as (essentially) hot and phlegm 
as (essentially) cold. The fact that the qualies of being hot and of being cold are essential to, respectively, bile and 
phlegm is a necessary assumption of the argument developed. 
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becomes clearer when we ask what the matter of Socrates is. On the one hand, Socrates comes 
out of the menses; on the other hand, the proximate matter of Socrates is his own human body. 
The latter qualifies as the matter out of which Socrates is and has come to be. The former 
certainly qualifies as matter out of which Socrates has come to be, but does not qualify as 
uncontroversially as the matter out of which Socrates is, for Socrates does not seem to be 
composed out of the menses. The menses, in fact, do not seem to persist as such through the 
process of generation of Socrates. This has led to a widespread scepticism about the idea that 
matter persists through change.44 
 Applying this problem to the example in Metaph.VIII.4, if it is not the case that matter persists 
through change, then it is not the case that IC is composed out of PC, but it is only the case that 
IC comes to be out of PC. Concerning remote matter (PC), which appears to be the decisive 
point at stake, it is not clear how far we can endorse the claim that remote matter persists, and 
therefore that remote matter is contained in the proximate matter. Water does not seem to be a 
constitutive element of phlegm and bile more than menses are with relation to Socrates. 
 I analyse the issue of the persistence of the substrate through substantial change in §5.6, where I 
conclude that, in every substantial change, the substrate persists at least in a weak sense. 
Therefore, Metaph.VIII.4 presents a case in which contraries are composed out of other 
contraries. 
 (2) Aristotle elsewhere excludes that matter belongs to the set of the contraries [C]. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to reject the intuition that the sweet stuff and the bitter stuff are most 
likely to qualify as contrary kinds of matter, in so far as each of them is in itself essentially sweet 
and bitter. Similarly, water is defined in GC.II.3 as the kind of matter that is essentially qualified 
by the possession of the contraries cold and wet out of the two fundamental contrarieties of 
cold/hot and wet/dry. In virtue of being in itself cold and wet, water opposes completely to fire, 
that is qualified by the remaining contraries of each pair (hot and dry); and partially to the 
remaining elements (each in virtue of only one contrary). The contrariety of hot/cold and dry/wet 
qualifies essentially the sublunary elements, and the contrariety of each sublunary element to the 
others (complete or partial) is the basis of their reciprocal interaction. Therefore, the relation 
between matter and contrariety is not one of neat alterity, as Aristotle sometimes depicts. It is 
 
44 Cf. §5.6. 
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one of the tasks undertaken by Aristotle in solving the aporia raised in Phys.I.6 to clarify the 
relation between contrariety and matter or substrate. 
 In conclusion, I believe that we have good reasons for interpreting the two series presented in 
Metaph., VIII.4, 1044a15-24 (water-fatty stuff-sweet stuff-phlegm; water-bitter stuff-bile) as 
series in which: (1) each member belonging to the same series is composed out of its preceding 
member(s); (2) each member is a contrary. 
 Summing up subargument [b’], since [PC] and [IC] are the sets of contraries out of which [NT] 
is composed, and since [PC] is prior to [IC] with relation to composition (for [IC] is composed 
out of [PC]), then [PC] qualifies as principle. 
 Nonetheless, the twofold nature of contrariety (i.e. the fact that contraries come in pairs) makes 
[b’] still non-sufficient to spell out the priority condition. In fact, [PC] contains two further 
subsets of primary contraries, [PC+] and [PC-], respectively including the positive and the 
negative members of each pair of primary contraries. Now, we may wonder whether [PC] in its 
whole or either [PC+] or [PC-] fulfils the priority condition. The second subargument for the 
claim that primary contraries fulfil the priority condition ([c’]) is devoted to assessing this issue. 
 
1.3.3. The priority condition for COS: second subargument. [c’]: The primary contraries 
are not out of each other, for they are contraries. 
 I claim that the second subargument [c’] purports to show that natural principles cannot be 
further narrowed down to a subset of [PC] that is prior to [PC]. 
 As a matter of fact, Aristotle believes that each member of every contrary pair is analogically 
one with one member of another contrary pair. Each member of each contrary pair is in fact 
either positive or negative. If we consider the contrary pairs of white/black, hot/cold and 
musical/unmusical, the former member of each contrary pair is positive, whereas the latter one is 
negative. The members of [C] (and thus of [PC]) can be thus divided into two columns 
(συστοιχίαι) of analogical terms, thus generating two further subsets of [C]: [C+] and [C-]. Thus, 
the set [PC] identified by [b’] as the set of the principles of being of natural things, is composed 
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out of two further subsets: [PC+], including the positive member of each primary contrary pair; 
[PC-], including the negative member of each primary contrary pair. 
 In this scenario, I believe that [c’] has the role of showing that the set of the principles cannot be 
further narrowed down to either [PC+] or [PC-]. Rather, [PC+] and [PC-] are shown to be co-
primary; therefore, they both qualify as principles. Thus, the whole set of the primary contraries 
[PC] must be taken to identify with the set of the natural principles. 
 If my reconstruction is correct, [c’] claims that it is neither the case that [PC+] is composed out 
of [PC-] nor the case that [PC-] is not composed out of [PC+], for [PC-] and [PC+] are contrary to 
each other. How are we to understand the argument? I believe that a promising way of 
understanding the argument is that it may pivot on one property which is shared by all exclusive 
opposites, namely incompossibility.45 In short: A is the exclusive opposite of B, if A and B 
cannot both exist at the same time t in the same subject S. 
 Let us consider a pair of primary contraries PC1+ and PC1-. As PC1+ and PC1- are exclusive 
opposites, PC1+ and PC1- are incompossible. Now, if PC1+ were composed out of PC1-, then 
there would be a time in which PC1+ and PC1- coexist. But this is impossible, for PC1- and PC1+ 
cannot coexist at any time. Therefore, it is evident that PC+ cannot be composed out of PC1- (nor 
can PC1- be composed out of PC1+). 
 Provided that my attempt to understand the role of [c’] in Arg.1 meets Aristotle’s intentions, 
some objections and problems can be raised. 
 First, some interpreters have seen a contradiction between [c’] and the main claim of Arg.2 of 
Phys.I.5 (188a30-b8), in which Aristotle argues that contraries (C+ and C-) are principles, for 
every C+ γίγνεται ἐκ its corresponding C-, and vice versa. Thus, implicitly, also every PC+ 
γίγνεται ἐκ its corresponding PC-. A strategy of interpreters for solving this alleged inconsistency 
hinges on the hypothesis that the preposition ἐκ is used in Arg.1 and Arg.2 in two different 
meanings.46 I have argued that the difference between the two arguments is rather related to a 
 
45 Metaph.V.10; Cat.10. Incompossibility is shared by all kinds of opposites, excluding relatives. Namely by 
contradictory and contrary pairs, as well as by habiti and their corresponding privations. 
46 Judson (unpublished paper). Judson must nevertheless admit that the meaning of ἐκ that he wants to be in play in 




difference in the causal field. There is no contradiction between the claims that primary contrary 
are not out of each other (Arg.1, [c’]), but come to be out of each other (Arg.2). 
 Second, the role I have attributed to [c’], namely to demonstrate that both [PC+] and [PC-] 
qualify as principles of natural things, seems to contradict one of Aristotle’s strategy of reducing 
the number of the principles of natural things from three to two. In Phys., I.7, 191a5-7, Aristotle 
that the triad of principles reached in Phys.I.7 (substrate, form ([F+]⊃[PC+]) and privation ([F-
]⊃[PC-])) can be reduced to the dyad of substrate and form, for privation can be reduced to form. 
In fact, every privation is no more than the absence of its corresponding form. The claim of [c’] 
in Arg.1 of Phys.I.5 and that of Phys., I.7, 191a5-7 appear difficult to harmonise, and I confine 
myself to flag the issue. 
 Third, incompossibility rules out that A and B, if they are contraries, can ever exist actually at 
the same time t and in the same subject S. This is not sufficient to exclude that A and B may 
inhere potentially in the same subject S, or that A may inhere actually and B potentially in S (or 
the other way round). As a matter of fact, appealing to incompossibility does not seem to be 
sufficient to exclude that any kind of composition (potential composition, for example) is in play 
between [PC+] and [PC-]. 
 This may lead us to either look for a new reconstruction of [c’], or to assess that [c’] is not an 
argument that Aristotle would seriously endorse. I believe that none of the two options should be 
pursued. I believe that we should not look for a different reconstruction of [c’], for the 
reconstruction proposed works at least with relation to the stage of the argument of Phys.I 
reached so far. First, potentiality and actuality do not belong to the conceptual tools employed in 
Phys.I. Secondly, this objection makes use of the concept of substrate (S), which has not yet been 
introduced at this stage of the argument.47 At the stage of the argument we have reached so far, 
C+ and C- (A and B) are contrary natural things (see the previous footnote). Thus, if C+ were 
composed out of its contrary C-, either the principle of non-contradiction would be infringed or 
C+ would be destroyed by the presence of its contrary. Therefore, reciprocal composition 
between C+ and C- is impossible. 
 
47 The concept of substrate is mentioned before Phys.I.5 only in the dialectical discussion of the opinions of the 
predecessors of ch.4. It is the task of Phys.I.6 to argue for the claim that the substrate is a principle of natural things, 
and the task of Phys.I.7 to show that C+ (and F+) and C- (and F-) are actually compounds of a matter M (or of a 
substrate S) and a contrary (or opposite) feature, e.g MF+/MF-. 
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1.4. Conclusions on Arg.1. 
 I have claimed that Phys., I.5, 188a26-30 presents an argument for the endoxon C that the 
contraries are principles of natural things. Arg.1 hinges on the basic notion of principle, 
specifying it with relation to being or ontological composition into the Condition of ontological 
simplicity (COS). The intuition behind COS is that A is a principle of being of B, iff B is 
composed out of A (source condition), and A is not composed out of C (priority condition). 
 The rationale supporting the claim that the primary contraries fulfil the source condition is the 
endoxon that [a’] the primary contraries are the basic components of reality. The force of the 
claim is in need of discussion. I have shown that, in order for the aporia on the number of 
principles in Phys.I.6 to arise, the result of Arg.1 must be that [C**] the primary contraries are 
the only principles of natural things. In order for Arg.1 to yield [C**], we need a stronger version 
of [a’], namely [a**] the primary contraries are the only components of reality. 
 The priority condition is spelled out by two further arguments [b’-c’] claiming that the primary 
contraries are not composed out of any other contrary, [b’] they are primary. Since the set of the 
primary contraries can be divided into the two columns of positive and negative primary 
contraries, a doubt arises whether one of these columns qualifies as a principle rather than the set 
of the primary contraries as a whole. [c’] argues that none of the two subset is composed out of 
the other one, for they are contrary. It is possible that the argument hinges on the 
incompossibility of the contraries. 
 In conclusion, Arg.1 shows that [C**] the primary contraries are only principles of being of 
natural things, for they [a**] are the only components of natural things (source condition), and 








2. CONTRARIES AS PRINCIPLES OF CHANGE. ON PHYS.I.5, ARGUMENT 2. 
 Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 (188a30-b26) claims that contraries are principles of natural things with 
relation to change. As in the case of Arg.1, I divide Arg.2 into two argumentative steps. The first 
step argues that the contraries and their intermediates fulfil the source condition for qualifying as 
principles of change, for they are that-out-of-which natural change occurs (cf. §2.1-2.) The 
second step refines the claim of the first one, concluding that, if both contraries and their 
intermediates are sources of natural change, only contraries fulfil the priority condition and 
qualify as principles, for the intermediates lack priority (cf. §2.3.) 
 The conclusion of Arg.2 is further confirmed through a survey of the theories on natural change 
held by the predecessors (188b26-189a10; cf. §2.4.) This survey is hardly what may be called an 
argument ex autoritate, for Aristotle makes clear through the words ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου that his 
argument starts in 188a30. Rather, the function of this section is both to provide external support 
for the argument developed in the previous section, and to pinpoint the difference between 
Aristotle’s and his predecessors’ principles. 
 
2.1. On Phys.I.5, Arg.2. Contraries as principles of change of natural things. The source 
condition. 
 The aim of Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 is to identify the principles of change of natural things. This 
amounts to finding the primary sources out of which and into which (τὸ ἐξ οὗ/τὸ εἰς ὅ πρῶτον) 
natural things come to be in a proper sense. I analyse this endeavour into two conceptual steps, 
corresponding to the source condition and to the priority condition. 
 Spelling out the source condition for change is accomplished in two steps. First, change 
occurring by nature (πέφυκεν) or natural change must be distinguished from coincidental change 
or change occurring by chance. Second, the enquiry must turn to the identification of the 
principles of natural change, for they coincide with the principles of natural things with respect 
to change. 
 This identification can be gain theoretical justification from the following considerations. First, 
coincidental change presents no regularity and no definite kind of principle. Natural change, 
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instead, presents the regularity provided by having a definite kind of beings as principles, namely 
the contraries and their intermediates. Coincidental change occurs between any two sources, 
regardless of their reciprocal relation. Natural change occurs between two sources, on condition 
that they are either contraries or intermediates between contraries. Second, the principles of 
coincidental change are themselves coincidental to the principles of change occurring by nature. 
Thus, coincidental change is second to and dependent on natural change. 
Phys., I.5, 188a30-b8 
[1] ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου σκέψασθαι πῶς συμβαίνει. [2] ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον 
ὅτι πάντων τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν οὔτε ποιεῖν πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν τὸ τυχὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
τυχόντος, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ὁτιοῦν ἐξ ὁτουοῦν, ἂν μή τις λαμβάνῃ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· [2.1.] 
πῶς γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο λευκὸν ἐκ μουσικοῦ, πλὴν εἰ μὴ συμβεβηκὸς εἴη τῷ μὴ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ 
μέλανι τὸ μουσικόν; ἀλλὰ λευκὸν μὲν γίγνεται ἐξ οὐ λευκοῦ, καὶ τούτου οὐκ ἐκ 
παντὸς ἀλλ’ ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, καὶ μουσικὸν οὐκ ἐκ μουσικοῦ, πλὴν οὐκ ἐκ 
παντὸς ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀμούσου ἢ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἐστι μεταξύ. [2.2.] οὐδὲ δὴ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ τυχὸν 
πρῶτον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν οὐκ εἰς τὸ μουσικόν, πλὴν εἰ μή ποτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ’ εἰς 
τὸ μὴ λευκόν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ μέλαν ἢ τὸ μεταξύ· ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ τὸ 
μουσικὸν εἰς τὸ μὴ μουσικόν, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ ἄμουσον ἢ εἴ τι 
αὐτῶν ἐστι μεταξύ. 
[1] But it is necessary to examine how this [that contraries are principles] results also 
according to the [following] argument. [2] Let us first assume that, among all beings, no-
one either acts or suffers action by nature in such a way that any chance thing [acts on or 
suffers action] from any chance thing; also, nothing comes to be anything whatsoever out 
of anything whatsoever; this, of course, provided that one does not mean [acting, 
suffering action and coming to be] in a coincidental sense. [2.1.] For, how would white 
ever come to be out of musical, if not in the case in which the musical is coincidental to 
the non-white or to the black? Rather, white comes to be out of non-white; and not out of 
[non-white] in general, but rather out of black or the intermediates [between white and 
black]. And musical out of non-musical; only, not out of [non-musical] in general, but out 
of unmusical and out of the intermediates [between musical and unmusical] (provided 
that there are any). [2.2.] Also, nothing ceases to be into the first chance thing [or: 
nothing ceases to be primarily into any chance thing]; for instance, the white does not 
cease to be into the musical, if not in a merely coincidental sense; rather, [the white] 
ceases to be into the non-white, and not into any chance [non-white], but rather into the 
black or into the intermediates [between white and black]. In the same way, the musical 
ceases to be into the non-musical; this [the musical] [does not cease to be] into any 
chance [non-musical], but rather into the unmusical and the intermediates (provided that 
there are any). 
 The scope of the text is to clarify what values of A and B enjoy the right reciprocal relation R 
that enables natural change to occur. The result of the argument, as I reconstruct it, is that this 
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relation is a relation of reciprocal difference proper to the contraries. Thus, the source condition 
of natural change (SCnc) is grounded on the relation of difference or contrariety. 
 For the sake of clarity, in analysing the source condition, I will not specify every time that a 
further condition related to time must be fulfilled as well. Namely, that A and B must always 
occupy two different instants in time t1 and t2. The language used by Aristotle in dealing with the 
conditions of change (ἐξ A … εἰς B) implicitly expresses this time requirement. Since my study 
concerns the source condition, I will leave the time constrain aside. 
 Our passage can be divided into three main sections. 
 [2] distinguishes natural change from coincidental change with relation to their respective 
sources. A and B qualify as sources of coincidental change,48 iff A and B are any chance A and 
B whatsoever, say H+ and G. H+ and G are two chance items that do not enjoy any determinate 
reciprocal relation. 
 [2.1.] and [2.2.] specify the condition under A and B qualify as sources not of coincidental, but 
rather of natural change. This is accomplished by considering two cases of natural change: [2.1.] 
coming to be (γίγνεσθαι); and its opposite, [2.2.] ceasing to be (φθείρεσθαι).49 
 A and B qualify as sources of natural change, iff they are not any two chance items, but rather 
two items enjoying a relation of reciprocal difference, i.e. of contrariety. Namely, iff A and B 
coincide with H+ and H-. 
 In what follows, I spell out the source condition for natural change (§2.1.1.) and the source 





48 The rendition closer to original would be “A acts on or suffers action from B coincidentally”. I do not believe that 
the use of elsewhere technical terminology such as ποιεῖν/πάσχειν is here loaded with any special, technical 
meaning. I assume that ποιεῖν/πάσχειν mean a general relation of change between A and B. 
49 The terms γίγνεσθαι and φθείρεσθαι in [2.1-2.] should not be understood in their technical sense of (substantial) 
generation and corruption, as the distinction between substantial change and non-substantial change is introduced 
only in Phys.I.7. They should rather be understood as referring to, respectively, the kind of change occurring from A 
to B and its backward change occurring from B to A. 
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2.1.1. The source conditions for natural change (SCnc). 
 I claim that sections [2.1.] and [2.2.] of Phys., I.5, 188a30-b8 state two conditions that must be 
fulfilled in order for natural change to occur between two items A and B. These conditions 
concern the reciprocal relation R between two items A and B. 
 The first condition prescribes that, in order for change between A and B to occur, A and B must 
coincide with the contradictories A and non-A (¬A). 
 The second condition prescribes that, in order for natural change between A and B to occur, A 
and B must coincide with a particular case of A/¬A, namely with the contraries H+ and H-. 
 The rationale of these two claims is not provided in Phys.I.5. In the following two sections, I try 
to show how the first and the second condition for change express two essential features of 
change. 
 The first feature (§2.1.1.1.) is so self-evident that it sounds like a platitude. If A undergoes 
change, then A cannot be there any more, once the process of change is accomplished. If A at t1 
undergoes change, then at t2 ¬A is. 
 The second feature (§2.1.1.2.) is less evident and less of a platitude than the first one. 
Nonetheless, it may be reasonably recognised to be essential to change. We have a better chance 
to make it clear by using the language of ποιεῖν/πάσχειν employed in 188a32-3. Two completely 
unrelated items such as A and ¬A do not have enough in common to act or suffer reciprocally. In 
order for action and passion between A and B to be possible, there must be a certain degree of 
similarity between A and B. Intuitively, if A has nothing in common with B, A cannot not act on 
or suffer from B. Thus, since change is a particular case of ποιεῖν/πάσχειν, in order for change to 
occur, there must be a certain degree of similarity between the starting point (at t1) and the end 
point (at t2) of change. The radical alterity between two completely alien items such as two 






2.1.1.1. First (necessary and non-sufficient) source condition for natural change. The 
otherness condition. 
 On an intuitive understanding of change, a certain item A has undergone change, if it is A at t² 
from having been ¬A at t1 (where t1<t2). Only if this is the case, we say that ¬A has undergone 
change into A. I label this requirement for change otherness condition, for it states that, in order 
for change to occur, the sources of change A and B must stand in a relation of reciprocal 
otherness. A and B qualify as sources of change, if A is other than B (and B is other than A, as 
otherness is a transitive relation). With the expressions “being other than” and “otherness”, I 
mean a relation between two items A and B in which, if A is other than B, then B is ¬A. 
 The otherness condition is the most generic condition for natural change and is necessary for A 
and B to qualify as sources of natural change. Let us assume that A occupies the time slot t1. Let 
a certain stretch of time pass and check the time slot t2. If t2 is still occupied by A, then no 
natural change has occurred. If, on the contrary, t2 is occupied by ¬A, then natural change has 
occurred. 
 The otherness condition does not entail any positive determinacy of the end point of change B 
into which A has changed at t2. What the otherness condition prescribes is rather a negative 
criterion for the identification of the sources of natural change. Therefore, the otherness 
condition cannot be sufficient to positively qualify the relevant relation in which the sources of 
natural change must stand. 
 A major endeavour of our text is to distinguish between natural (per se) and coincidental change 
with relation to their respective sources. The otherness condition, being merely negative, cannot 
serve this scope by positively distinguishing the sources of natural change from the sources of 
coincidental change. 
 Nonetheless, it is possible that the otherness condition is instrumental to this distinction by 
virtue of applying in different ways to each kind of change or by virtue of applying to only one 
kind of change and not to the other. I analyse two options. First option: the otherness condition is 
necessary and sufficient with relation to coincidental change, but only necessary with relation to 
natural change. Second option: the otherness condition is necessary only for natural change, but 
irrelevant for coincidental change. 
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 The first option gains some sort of likeliness from a prima facie reading of the text. Let us 
consider the case of coincidental change as it is presented in [2]. It may seem that, in order for A 
to change coincidentally into B, no other requirement needs to be fulfilled by B, if not that B is 
other than A. In fact, any chance A can be said to change into any chance B, provided that A≠B. 
For instance, let us consider the case in which white coincidentally changes into smooth, or 3-
meters-long coincidentally changes into into asleep. Apparently, in order for each of these end 
points of change (smooth and asleep) to qualify as end points of coincidental change with 
relation to the starting points (respectively, white and 3-meters-long), no other condition than the 
otherness condition needs to be fulfilled. In conclusion, according the first option, the otherness 
condition would be necessary and sufficient for coincidental change to occur, whereas it would 
be only necessary with relation to natural change. 
 An unwelcome consequence seems to challenge the first option, for it seems to entail that 
coincidental change is prior to, or at least independent from, natural change. In other words, 
coincidental change would not require the necessary and sufficient conditions for natural change 
to be fulfilled, in order to occur. Conversely, it would be mandatory for natural change that the 
necessary and sufficient condition of coincidental change (the otherness condition) is fulfilled. 
Thus, with relation to their conditions of possibility, coincidental change would not entail natural 
change, but natural change would entail coincidental change. 
 This consequence of the first interpretation is unwelcome, for Aristotle clearly understands the 
priority relation between coincidental and natural change in the opposite way. 
Relational scheme of the kinds of change: natural change independent of coincidental 
change, whereas coincidental change is dependent on natural change. 
 According to the second option, the otherness condition would be instrumental to the distinction 
between coincidental and natural change, for it would apply to the latter, but not to the former. 
Phys.I.8 (191b17ff.) contemplates the cases of coincidental change in which animal comes into 
being out of animal, and dog out of dog. Although here the examples regard the relation between 
what comes into being and its moving cause, it may provide, mutatis mutandis, evidence for 
coincidental change of the kind “C comes to be out of C”. 
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 If this were the case, nonetheless, coincidental change may occur independently of natural 
change, for it would occur independently of the otherness condition, and no natural change 
occurs in absence of it. This, again, contradicts the Relational scheme of the kinds of change. 
 The negative results of the first and second option exclude the possibility that the otherness 
condition may positively contribute to draw a distinction between coincidental change and 
natural change. Moreover, with relation to coincidental change, it has appeared unclear whether 
the otherness condition must be fulfilled or not. On the one hand, if coincidental change rests on 
natural change, and natural change on the otherness condition, coincidental change must rest on 
the otherness condition as well. On the other hand, coincidental change of the type “C comes to 
be out of C” obviously violates the otherness condition.  
 I believe that the otherness condition is the general, necessary source condition (SCc) for every 
kind of change, for it is the necessary condition of natural change, and natural change is in turn 
the necessary condition of possibility for coincidental change. 
 In order for A and B to qualify as sources of natural change, an additional, necessary and 
sufficient condition (SCnc) must be fulfilled. 
 In order for A and C to qualify as sources of coincidental change, the conditions for natural 
change (including the otherness condition) must be fulfilled. Namely, there has to be two sources 
A and B qualifying as sources of natural change. Moreover, a further necessary and sufficient 
condition for coincidental change (SCcc) must be fulfilled. Namely, that C is numerically one 
with (at least) B. With relation to SCcc, the otherness condition is not mandatory, for the case 
may be given that both A and B are numerically one with C, so that C comes to be out of C. 
 This interpretation squares with the relational scheme of the kinds of change, for it makes 
coincidental change dependent on natural change. Moreover, it explains away the case of 
coincidental change between C and C in Phys.I.8. 
 What the passage of Phys.I.8 shows is that there may be coincidental change between C and C 
(and thus in absence of the otherness condition). Nonetheless, this coincidental change occurs 
only on condition that A and B qualify as sources of natural change (for A and B fulfil all SCnc’s, 
including the otherness condition), and that C comes to coincide numerically with both A and B. 
Thus, in the case of coincidental change between C and C, the real sources of change (i.e. the 
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sources of natural change, A and B) fulfil the otherness condition. Nonetheless, both A and B 
can be described according to a coincidental property C that remains unchanged in both A and B, 
so that A=C and B=C. In this scenario, the natural change between A and B happens to be 
coincidentally the change between C and C. This notwithstanding, it remains true that, in order 
for coincidental change to occur, the otherness condition must hold, for it must hold of the 
sources of natural change grounding coincidental change. 
 In conclusion, the otherness condition is the necessary source condition of change in general, for 
it is the necessary condition of natural change, and coincidental change depends on natural 
change. Nonetheless, it is not necessary with relation to SCcc. Namely, it is necessary with 
relation to what really changes (i.e. A and B), when C comes to be out of C; but it is not 
necessary with relation to what comes to coincide with A and B.  
 In §2.1.1, I expand on SCnc, namely on the necessary and sufficient condition for natural change. 
I claim that, in order for natural change between A and B to occur:  
(1) the necessary otherness condition must be fulfilled with relation to the sources of 
natural change (i.e. A≠B). 
(2) SCnc must be fulfilled with relation to the sources of natural change, i.e. A and B have 
to be in a relation of reciprocal contrariety. 
 In §2.1.2, I expand on SCcc, namely on the necessary and sufficient for coincidental change. I 
claim that, in order for coincidental change between A and C to occur:  
(1) there must be two sources of natural change A and B which fulfil both conditions for 
natural change, namely: 
(1.a.) the otherness condition must be fulfilled with relation to the sources of 
natural change (i.e. A≠B);  
(1.b.) SCnc must be fulfilled with relation to the sources of natural change, i.e. A 
and B must be in a relation of reciprocal contrariety.  
(2) (SCcc) there has to be at least a C that is coincidentally one with at least one of the 
sources of natural change. 
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 With relation to coincidental change, the conditions for natural change in (1) are necessary, 
whereas the condition SCcc in (2) is both necessary and sufficient. 
 
2.1.1.2. Second (necessary and sufficient) source condition for natural change (SCnc). 
 In the previous section, I claimed that the otherness condition is a necessary, non-sufficient 
source condition, for it prescribes a merely negative constraint. Here, I deal with the positive, 
sufficient source condition for natural change. 
 In order to qualify as the sources of natural change, A and B must enjoy a relation of reciprocal 
contrariety (A/B=H+/H-), or qualify as intermediates between two contraries (iH+/H-). 
SCnc = A and B qualify as sources of natural change, either iff A=(H+ or iH+/H-) and B=(H- 
or iH+/H-); or iff A=(H- or iH+/H-), B=(H+ or iH+/H-). 
 Let us consider two couples of values of A and B that fulfil the otherness condition, but that, 
respectively, do and do not qualify as sources of natural change. (1) The case in which A and B 
coincide with the contraries H+ and H-, e.g. white and black, or with any of their intermediates 
(iH+/H-), e.g. magenta, cobalt blue, royal yellow. (2) The case in which A and B coincide with any 
two chance things that do not enjoy intrinsically50 any other reciprocal relation than reciprocal 
otherness (A≠B), e.g. white and smooth. 
 In case (2), the fact that white and smooth fulfil the otherness condition, makes it possible for 
them to qualify as sources of natural change. Nonetheless, white and smooth do not stand in any 
necessary, stable, reciprocal relation, excluding reciprocal otherness. As I have claimed, 
 
50 With the word “intrinsically” (which could be replaced by “per se”), I mean to add an important requirement: the 
sources of coincidental change may indeed, under certain conditions, appear to enjoy a particular relation of 
contrariety, and thus fail to qualify as any two chance things A and B enjoying no other reciprocal relation than 
reciprocal otherness. For instance, in the case of John suffering from tactile-visual synaesthesia, the visual 
perception of white may be invariably coupled with the tactile perception of roughness, and the visual perception of 
black may be invariably coupled with the tactile perception of smoothness. According to this scenario, John may 
confidently claim that white changes naturally into smooth. The explanation of John’s mistake is that white and 
smooth enjoy a relation of contrariety only privately (or coincidentally), but not intrinsically (or per se). When John 
experiences white invariably changing into smooth, what happens is that white changes naturally into black, but 
black and smooth are for John (privately and coincidentally) one thing. The relation which white and smooth 
invariably enjoy for John fails to qualify as intrinsic to white and smooth (or to inhere per se in white and smooth). 
Therefore, white and smooth fail to qualify as sources or sources of natural change, for they are intrinsically any two 
chance things with relation to each other, although they may appear to enjoy a particular relation of contrariety 
under private or accidental circumstances. 
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otherness is a merely negative relation; therefore, it cannot yield the regularity expected from 
natural change. Such regularity must rest on a special reciprocal relation necessarily binding the 
sources of change A and B. Moreover, change seems to require similarity along with otherness, 
and no similarity between A and B can be grounded on their reciprocal otherness. 
 To be sure, I have claimed in the previous section that white and smooth happen to qualify as 
the sources of a specific kind of change, namely of coincidental change. Nonetheless, this is not 
grounded on their reciprocal otherness, but rather on a special source condition of coincidental 
change (SCcc). 
 In case (1), the values of A and B = H+ and H- (e.g. white and black) qualify as sources of 
natural change, for they fulfil both the necessary otherness condition and the necessary and 
sufficient SCnc for natural change. 
 The otherness condition is fulfilled by H+/H-, for, within a contrary pair, one member of 
contrariety belongs to one side of the opposition of contradiction, whereas the other member of 
contrariety belongs to the other side of contradiction. In fact, contrariety is a species of the genus 
of contradiction, and the member of each contrary couple are reciprocally incompossible. Thus, 
when the necessary and sufficient source condition for natural change is fulfilled, by necessity 
the otherness condition is also fulfilled, for every H+/H- is H+/¬H+. The converse does not hold, 
for it is not true that every H+/¬H+ is H+/H-. 
 With relation to the necessary and sufficient source condition for natural change (SCnc), I argue 
here that H+/H- may qualify as such, for they stand in a determinate, necessary relation. In the 
next two sections, I argue that and why they qualify as such. 
 Unlike the negative term of the contradictory couple H+/¬H+, the negative contrary H- is one 
particular, determinate item within the genus ¬H+. Unlike the contradictories H+/¬H+, the 
contraries H+/H- are necessarily bound to each other by an intrinsic relation of a certain kind.  
Thus, they may qualify as sources of natural change, for they are a positively and necessarily 
determinate couple of items. 
 The same holds for each and every value of H+/¬H+ identifying with any of the intermediates 
(iH+/H-) between the contraries H+/H-. In the case of white and black, for example: magenta, 
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cobalt blue, royal yellow. For the intermediates are necessarily determined by their extremes, the 
contraries, and therefore stand in a necessary relation with each other and with their extremes. 
 
2.1.1.3. SCnc and its justification. 
 The justification of SCnc has been and is heavily disputed. The issue is made more severe by the 
fact that it is intertwined with a second problem. Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 argues that contraries are 
principles of natural things. The definitive answer to the question on the identity of the principles 
of natural things that we receive in Phys.I.7, and which Phys.I.5 contributes to reach, is that the 
couple of opposites form and privation are principles. Thus, if we want Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 to be 
instrumental to reaching the result of Phys.I.7, two strategies are viable. 
 The first strategy is to hold that ἐναντίον means in Phys.I.5 “opposite” in general (and not 
“contrary” in particular). On the one hand, the first strategy has the advantage to include 
privation in the claim of Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 (for both privations and contraries are opposites). On 
the other hand, this interpretation fails to individuate one particular kind of opposition within the 
contradictory opposites A/¬A, which, due to a particular kind of opposites, qualifies as a source 
of natural change. 
 The second strategy is to hold that ἐναντίον in Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 means the particular kind of 
opposition of contrariety. The advantage of this strategy is that it succeeds in selecting a 
particular kind of opposition within the contradictories (i.e. contrariety) as the source of natural 
change. The disadvantage of this reading is that it raises issues with relation to the possibility to 
use the result of Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 for the results of Phys.I.7. 
 In the next section (§2.1.1.3.1.), I present the two main interpretative proposals for the 
justification issue that are on the table. In §2.1.1.3.2, I analyse these two interpretations with 
particular attention to their impact on the development of the argument in Phys.I.5-7. The 
outcome of my discussion is a defence of the proposal advanced by Bogen in 1997. Bogen, 
nevertheless, did not tackle the issue concerning the applicability of his proposal to the 
development of the argument in Phys.I.5-7, which has been raised with more or less emphasis by 




 I claim that, in the overall agenda of Phys.I.5-7, the following section of the text of Phys.I.5 
(188b8-23) has the function to tackle the applicability issue of Arg.2 of Phys.I.5. Aristotle wants 
to show that there is a homogeneity between the cases explained by the opposition of 
form/privation and ones explained by the opposition of contrariety. He does so in pre-technical 
language, by means of terms such as “being-formed/being-unformed” and, subsequently, 
“excess/defect”. This is something we expect from a context such as that of Phys.I.5, in which 
Aristotle provides arguments that he is ready to endorse, but that are partially dependent on the 
language and conceptual tools of his predecessors.51 Although the attept to build a bridge 
between non-substantial change and substantial change in 188b8-23 is pre-technical and 
unsatisfactory, it nonetheless provides evidence for the first strategy. 
 
2.1.1.3.1. SCnc and its justification. An overview of the secondary literature. 
 Scholarship can be divided into two main currents with relation to the attempt to find a 
justification for SCnc. The first current was initiated, to my knowledge, by James Bogen52 and 
followed by most interpreters53 before and after Kelsey. The second attempt of finding a 
justification for SCnc is represented by Sean Kelsey,54 who has reacted to Bogen and his 
partisans. 
 According to Bogen’s interpretation, contraries and intermediates qualify as sources of natural 
change, for each couple of contraries identify a certain logical range. 
SCnc = range determinacy condition = A and B qualify as sources of natural change, iff A 
and B belong to the same range. 
 Let us consider a couple of contraries H+/H- (e.g. white and black), the set of their intermediates 
(iH+/H-, e.g. magenta, cobalt blue, royal yellow) and any chance item G (e.g. smooth) that is 
related to H+ merely by virtue of being ¬H+. 
 
51 Phys., I.5, 188b26-189a10 shows Aristotle’s general attitude towards his predecessors with relation to the topic of 
the principles of change. In a nutshell, Aristotle thinks that the theories of his predecessors are (at least mostly) on 
the right track, but that they (a) lack the required degree of conceptual abstraction; (b) must be supported with 
arguments (which Aristotle does with Arg.2). Thus, Aristotle is willing, at least to some extent, to endorse the 
conceptual tools of his predecessors and argue by means of them. 
52 Bogen1997. 
53 Recently, Delcominette (unpublished paper) and Judson (unpublished paper). 
54 Kelsey 2007. 
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 The contraries H+/H- and their intermediates iH+/H- constitute a determinate range; the 
contradictories H+/G do not. For example, white and black qualify as the extremes of the 
continuous range of colour, for, assuming that the degree of a colour depends on its capacity of 
widening sight, white possesses the capacity of widening sight to the biggest extent, whereas 
black lacks this capacity to the greatest extent (or possesses the opposite capacity, i.e. the 
capacity to narrow sight, to the greatest extent). The intermediate colours are disposed at 
determinate points between the extremes of black and white according to the degree of the 
capacity of widening sight they possess. For example, royal yellow possesses the capacity of 
widening sight to a smaller degree than white; magenta is less capable of widening sight than 
yellow, but more capable than cobalt blue; cobalt blue is more capable of widening sight than 
black, but less capable than magenta. Thus, each of the intermediate colours occupies a definite 
place within the continuous range of colour stretching from what possesses the maximum degree 
of the capacity to widen sight (white) to what possesses the minimum degree thereof (black). 
 Unlike the contraries H+/H-, the contradictories H+/G (where G=¬H+) do not yield a determinate 
range and cannot therefore qualify as sources of natural change. This fact can be ascertained by 
virtue of a negative consideration. It is reasonable to assume that, if two items A and B qualify as 
the extremes of a certain range, A and B must enjoy a necessary, intrinsic relation safeguarding 
the necessary, immutable topology of the range. In other words, it is reasonable to believe that 
the extremes individuating a certain range (A and B) and their definite set of intermediates iA/B 
enjoy an intrinsic reciprocal relation of some kind. Since G is any chance value of ¬H+, H+ and G 
cannot qualify as a couple of items necessarily associated by any intrinsic relation. Therefore, H+ 
and G cannot intrinsically belong to the same range (and a fortiori cannot intrinsically qualify as 
the extremes of a certain range). 
 The range determinacy reading inaugurated by Bogen has indeed the advantages of being 
grounded on several Aristotelian texts, first and foremost on Metaph.X.3-4.55 In Metaph.X.3-4, 
Aristotle claims that contradictories are too radically unrelated in order to affect each other and 
 
55 Metaph., X.3, 1054b28-30: “Things which have no common matter and do not come to be from each other are 
said to differ with respect to the genus, i.e. things which belong to different categories.” Even more clearly: Metaph., 
X.4, 1055a6-10: “Things which differ with respect to the genus do not allow for any reciprocal passage, but are 
rather at great extent far from each other and incomparable. Things which differ with respect to the range are things 
that generate from the contraries as extremes, and the distance between the extremes is the greatest, as the distance 
between contraries is.” 
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yield change. Contraries, instead, fulfil two requirements for change that Bogen must evidently 
understand as both necessary and sufficient. 
 (1) H+/H- are not mere others; rather, they are different items. They have something in common, 
for they belong to the same genus, of which they represent the maximal difference. Being 
reciprocally similar and not just other than each other, they have capacity to affect each other and 
yield change. Contradictories, instead, are mere others, and thus too radically distant from each 
other for possessing the capable for to affect each other and yield change. 
SCnc = range determinacy condition = difference condition = A and B qualify as sources 
of natural change, iff A and B are reciprocally different. 
 (2) H+ (or iH+/H) is, within the same range, other than H- (or iH+/H-) and fulfils thus the otherness 
condition for change. For, H+/ H- always coincide with H+/¬H+. 
 The range determinacy reading has the disadvantage of applying only to the particular 
opposition of contrariety and not to the opposition of form and privation, that is elected as 
principle of natural things in Phys.I.7. If the difference condition holds, then we need an 
additional conceptual step to extend the range determinacy condition to the opposition of form 
and privation. I refer to this problem as to the applicability issue. 
 Sean Kelsey’s proposal for the justification of SCnc solves the applicability issue, for it applies 
to opposition in general. Nonetheless, it does not seem to square with the endeavour of Arg.2 to 
select a particular subset of opposites fulfilling SCnc.56 
 According to Kelsey, natural change would occur between opposites (in general), for opposites 
possess opposing capacities enabling them to take each other out of their own nature. For 
instance, white possesses the capacity to widen sight, whereas black possesses the capacity to 
narrow sight. White can interact with black and yield change, for white possesses the capacity to 
annihilate black, namely to annihilate its capacity to narrow sight. 
 
56 For the sake of accuracy, the rationale of Kelsey’s interpretation has nothing to do with the worry related to the 
applicability problem. Rather, Kelsey’s reading is motivated by the aporia raised at the end of Phys.I.6. According to 
Kelsey, the aporia arises from a strong incompatibility between the arguments of Phys.I.5 and Phys.I.6. In this 
connection, Arg.2 from Phys.I.5 would endorse a destructive interpretation of change, whereas the arguments of 
Phys.I.6 would endorse a conservative, non-destructive interpretation of change. 
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SCnc = opposing capacities condition = A and B qualify as sources of natural change, iff 
A and B possess opposing capacities, such that A has the capacity to bring B out of its 
nature and B has the capacity to bring A out of its nature. 
 In the next section, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of Bogen’s and Kelsey’s 
proposals. I defend Bogen’s proposal and show how the applicability issue is explicitly 
addressed by Aristotle. 
 
2.1.1.3.2. SCnc and its justification. An assessment. 
 As I have already mentioned, Bogen’s justification of SCnc is faced with what I called the 
applicability issue. It is clear that the range determinacy condition suits some of the examples of 
Phys.I.5, especially the case of colour that Bogen uses as a paradigmatic model for change in 
general. It is nevertheless also clear that the range determinacy condition is faced with 
difficulties, when different models of change are at stake. 
 The main difficulty for the range determinacy reading is represented by the case of substantial 
change, which is made in Phys.I.7 into the subject of enquiry. In answering the question 
concerning the identity of the principles of substantial change, in Phys.I.7, Aristotle selects a 
different kind of opposition than contrariety, namely form and privation. Now, the privation of a 
certain form, for example the privation of man, appears to be hardly anything determinate as 
black is. If this is the case, the substantial range of man presents a different topology that the 
range of colour and fails to qualify as a determinate continuum stretching between two 
determinate extremes. Rather, the substantial range of man seems to be delimited by an extreme 
that is determinate (the form of man) and by one extreme that is indeterminate (the privation of 
man). Moreover, it is unclear whether the stretch man-privation of man may qualify as a 
continuum, as the range of colour does. In fact, there seems to be no intermediate between man 
and non-man: it seems that something either is or is not man. In conclusion, the topology of 
substantial ranges and the topology of non-substantial ranges (or at least of qualitative ranges) 
appears to be different, both with relation to the criterion of determinacy of the range and to its 
continuity or discreteness. 
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 Similar problems seem to affect quantitative change and locomotion. In both cases, we have 
indeed one determinate starting point (a determinate quantity and a determinate place at t1) and a 
determinate end point of change (a determinate quantity and a determinate place at t2). 
Nonetheless, it is not clear how the starting point and the end point of quantitative change and 
locomotion may qualify as the extremes of a range. In fact, a quantitative range seems to stretch 
from zero (the complete lack of quantity) to infinite. Similarly, if we place two spatial 
starting/end points of locomotion onto an ideal line, it seems possible to pick out infinitely many 
more extreme starting/end points along the ideal line.57 
 This difficulty notwithstanding, Aristotle endorses the view that change occurs between contrary 
pairs not only in Phys.I (where quantitative and local change are not mentioned), but also in 
Phys.V.1, where qualitative, quantitative and local change are explicitly mentioned, and are 
explicitly said to occur between contrary pairs. 
 I do not deal with the difficulty related to quantitative and local change in detail for two reasons. 
Firstly, because it is not mentioned in Phys.I. Secondly, because I have nothing to add to the 
solution of the problem that has been already advocated by some interpreters. It has in fact been 
suggested that, in a finite universe as Aristotle’s, it makes sense to speak of extreme spatial 
points. A rectilinear locomotion from point A to point B may be considered as the locomotion 
between two extremes placed at the border of the universe (or their intermediates). With relation 
to quantity, it has been reminded by several interpreters that natural beings possess capacity for 
quantitative change with relation to a determinate minimum and maximum. For instance, a 
human being cannot grow shorter than a minimum and taller than a maximum that both ensure 
the correct functionality of the human body. Thus, when I grow 1 inch taller, this growth is 
contained within a range stretching from the minimum and the maximum height for which my 
body has capacity. 
 Unsatisfactory as these solutions may be for a modern reader, they are probably satisfactory 
ways of making sense of Aristotle’s endorsement of the range determinacy condition within his 
own conceptual framework. 
 
57 Non-rectilinear kinds of locomotion raise specific problems that I am not going to tackle. 
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 The justification of SCnc proposed by Kelsey has the advantage of not being exposed to the 
applicability problem affecting the previous reading. In fact, a couple of contraries H+/H- 
qualifies as a source of change, iff H+ and H- possess opposing capacities and are thus capable of 
taking each other out of their own nature. Likewise, a couple of privative opposites F+/F- 
qualifies as a source of change, iff F+ and F- possess opposing capacities and are thus capable of 
taking each other out of their own nature. 
 This advantage notwithstanding, Kelsey’s capacity condition is exposed to the suspicion of 
being extraneous to the conceptual tools employed in Phys.I. On a close inspection of Phys.I as a 
whole, Aristotle does not employ the δύναμις/ἐνέργεια vocabulary before the very last chapter of 
the book, and even there, it is done in a pre-technical and mainly dialectical way. 
 In addition to the general absence of the δύναμις/ἐνέργεια vocabulary in Phys.I, one passage 
from Phys.I.8 clearly excludes this perspective from the solution of one of the central problems 
of Phys.I. In Phys.I.8, Aristotle tackles the Eleatic aporia rejecting the possibility of change both 
from being and from non-being (or from being-X and non-being-X). After having solved the 
Eleatic aporia with the conceptual tools of Phys.I.7, Aristotle makes the following statement: 
Phys., I.8, 191b27-9 
εἷς µὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, ἄλλος δ’ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὰ λέγειν κατὰ τὴν δύναµιν καὶ τὴν 
ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται δι’ ἀκριβείας µᾶλλον. 
And this58 is one way [to treat these things]. A different way consists in claiming that it is 
possible to treat these things with relation to capacity and actuality. This way will be 
fleshed out in other [writings] with greater precision. 
 In this passage, Aristotle claims that the Eleatic aporia can be solved also with the help of 
different conceptual tools than the one developed in Phys.I.7, namely with the help of the 
concepts of potentiality and actuality. He adds that he is not going to pursue this kind of solution 
in Phys.I, but that he is rather going to expand on it in a different book. This can be reasonably 
read as a statement that the perspective of natural capacities is extraneous to the scopes and to 
the conceptual machinery of Phys.I. 
 
58 “This” refers to the solution of the Eleatic aporia spelled out in the preceding lines. It is to the Eleatic aporia that 
the following ταὐτὰ λέγειν refers to. 
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 In conclusion, Kelsey’s capacity condition, on the one hand, is not confronted with the 
applicability issue of Bogen’s range determinacy condition. On the other hand, the capacity 
condition is exposed to the suspicion of being extraneous to the conceptual horizon of in Phys.I. 
 My proposal for the solution of the difficulty concerning the justification of SCnc can be seen as 
a defence of Bogen’s interpretative line. The range determinacy interpretation advocated by 
Bogen is, I believe, theoretically too appealing and too well-grounded on parallel texts to be 
dismissed. 
 I believe that Aristotle endorses the range determinacy condition as a justification for SCnc, and 
that the agenda of Arg.2 revolves around the defence of this endorsement. In my reading, 
Aristotle first (188a30-b8) endorses SCnc on the ground of the range determinacy condition with 
relation to examples for which the range determinacy condition is evidently well-suited (e.g. 
colour). Aristotle then (188b8-23) proceeds defending the validity of the range determinacy 
condition in the limit case of composite contraries. The extremes of change considered in the 
examples of composite contraries, I claim, are features belonging to the category of substance, 
such as being-composite/being-non-composite and being-formed/being-formless. Perhaps with a 
certain degree of overconfidence, in 188b8-23 Aristotle intends to show that formal features 
engaged in substantial change are not dissimilar from the non-substantial contraries and also 
fulfil the range determinacy condition.  
 In §2.2, I discuss the extent of the homogeneity between standard contraries and limit cases such 
as composite contraries, i.e. substantial opposites considered in a pre-technical way. I reject a 
strong version of this homogeneity claim entailing that the substantial opposites are both 
determinate items such as white and black. I rather opt for a weak reading of the homogeneity 
claim, which rejects the previous assumption, but states that the range determinacy condition is 
secured by the positive opposite alone (i.e. by the form). 
 
2.1.2. The source condition of coincidental change. 
 I have claimed that – against what a prima facie reading of Phys., I.5, 188a30-b8 may suggest – 
Aristotle does not believe that two items A and C qualify as sources of coincidental change, iff 
the otherness condition is fulfilled (i.e. iff A≠C). If this were the case, coincidental change would 
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be prior to and independent of natural change, for natural change must fulfil the otherness 
condition and an additional, necessary and sufficient SCnc. 
 Instead, it is evident that Aristotle believes natural change to be primary with relation to 
coincidental change. Therefore, in order for one item C to qualify as sources of coincidental 
change, the conditions for natural change must first be fulfilled. In other words, in order for C to 
qualify as a source of coincidental change, there must be two items A and B which qualify as 
sources of natural change, for they fulfil the necessary otherness condition (A≠B) and the 
necessary and (with relation to natural change) sufficient SCnc (A=H+ and B=H-; or A=H- and 
B=H+). 
 Both source conditions for natural change are, with relation coincidental change, only necessary, 
for coincidental change does not occur in absence of them. They are nonetheless non-sufficient, 
for their fulfilment does not entail the identification of the sources of coincidental change, or 
coincidental change would identify with natural change. 
 In order for one item C (or two items C and D) to qualify as a source of coincidental change, 
two conditions must be fulfilled. 
 First, C must fulfil the otherness condition: C≠A and B (or C and D≠A and B). If this were not 
the case, the distinction between coincidental change and natural change would collapse. This 
condition is necessary, but not sufficient. 
 Secondly, an additional, necessary and sufficient condition for coincidental change (SCcc) must 
be fulfilled: 
SCcc = C qualifies as a source of coincidental change, iff C is numerically one with either 
A or B.59 
 
59 Aristotle’s examples of coincidental change contemplate the case in which one source of coincidental change is 
one of the sources of natural change (either A or B), whereas the other source of coincidental change is a third item 
C that is numerically one with either A or B. A second case is comtemplated in Phys.I.8, where C is both the starting 
point and the end point of coincidental change, for C is numerically one with both A and B. A third case of 
coincidental change is thinkable, according to which the sources of coincidental change are two items C and D that 
are different from A and B, and each is numerically one with either A or B (i.e. C is numerically one with A, and D 
is numerically one with B; or vice versa). In conclusion, coincidental change occurs, iff there is at least one source C 
that fulfils SCcc (i.e. that is numerically one with either A or B). 
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 I will not expand here on the technical notion of “being numerically one”, or of numerical 
coincidence. The notion returns prominently in Phys.I.7, where it is instrumental to the solution 
of the aporia raised in Phys.I.6. In Phys.I.7, the notion is numerical coincidence is contrasted 
with that of formal coincidence (i.e. of being one in form), or of coincidence/being one in being. 
As an overview, these two notions are complementary and clarify each other. Let us exemplify 
them with relation to two items X and Y. 
 If X and Y differ with relation to their essence and definition (or to their being), then X and Y 
are not one in form. For instance, the dramatic tenor Max Lorenz and the role of Siegmund in 
Richard Wagner’s “Die Walküre” are two different beings with relation to their essence or 
definition. What it is for Max Lorenz to be is different from what it is for Wagner’s Siegmund to 
be. The former is60 a substance existing in reality, whereas the latter is a fictional character. 
 Listening to the famous recording of Richard Wagner’s “Die Walküre” conducted by F. Stiedry 
at the Met in 1949, I may utter the sentence: “In this recording, Max Lorenz is Siegmund”. Being 
an enthusiastic admirer of Max Lorenz, I may even push my statement further and claim 
emphatically: “Max Lorenz is Siegmund” (meaning that Max Lorenz is Siegmund par 
excellence). In this case, two items differing in essence, Max Lorenz and Siegmund, are 
numerically one, for they are counted as one single item. In fact, there is one single item, namely 
Max Lorenz, that is both Max Lorenz and Siegmund. 
 Finally, as I marvel at Max Lorenz’s high C, I may wonder what a tenor high C is and answer 
this question with the definition: “A tenor high C is a note that is 523 Hz. high”. In this case, two 
items – “tenor high C” and “note that is 523 Hz. high” – are one in form or in being, for their 
essence and their definition are the same. 
 Let us go back to the case of Max Lorenz and Siegmund coinciding numerically. In this case, 
something that is one in number, Max Lorenz, is two in form. Considered in himself, Max 
Lorenz is an individual man who happens to be an incredibly gifted dramatic tenor. With relation 
to the role he inhabited at the Met on the 29th of January in 1949 under the baton of F. Stiedry, 
 
60 Or rather was such, as Max Lorenz existed in reality as a living being in a temporal stretch comprised between his 
birth and his death. For the sake of example, I do not consider here the temporal constraints to Max Lorenz’s 
existence in reality, but consider him as a presently living being. 
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Max Lorenz happens to coincide numerically with a fictional character created by Richard 
Wagner in his opera “Die Walküre”. 
 When X and Y are one in number, X and Y do not enjoy any intrinsic relation. Max Lorenz and 
Siegmund, for instance, merely happen to coincide numerically. In fact, Max Lorenz coincides 
with Siegmund only whenever he inhabits the role of Siegmund (or regularly for anyone who 
holds the private opinion that Max Lorenz is Siegmund par excellence). The absence of any 
intrinsic, necessary relation between two items X and Y that are one in number is shown by the 
fact that X and Y are not permanently in relation with each other, but rather merely come 
together on certain occasions. Max Lorenz is by virtue of an intrinsic, necessary relation man and 
rational. Max Lorenz is Siegmund only on the occasions in which he performs Siegmund, or, 
regularly, only to the private judgement of a fervent admirer. 
 In the same connection, SCcc prescribes that C qualifies as a source of coincidental change, if 
and only if C happens to be one in number with one of the sources of natural change (either A or 
B). C and A (or B) are two items that are different in form, but happen to coincide numerically as 
a single item. 
 When a certain item changes coincidentally from A to C, this does not happen according to any 
necessary connection between A or B and C, but rather by virtue of: (SCnc) the necessary, 
intrinsic relation between A and B; and (SCcc) the casual numerical coincidence of C with either 
A or B. In fact, the relation between the source of coincidental change C and the two sources of 
natural change A and B is neither an intrinsic nor a necessary one.61 
 For instance, an item changes from white to smooth, if the source conditions for a natural 
change from white are fulfilled (i.e. if there are two sources of natural change: white and black, 
or their intermediates); and iff (SCcc) smooth happens to be one in number with black. The 
relation between black and smooth, or any other source of coincidental change, is non-intrinsic 
and non-necessary. Smooth, 3 feet-high, well-pitched can all be one in number with black and 
sources of natural change with relation to white, provided that black coincidentally happens to be 
also smooth, 3 feet-high and well-pitched. 
 
61 In the case in which coincidental change occurs between two sources C and D that are both other than A and B, 
the relation between C and D is neither intrinsic nor necessary. Of the same kind is the relation enjoyed by C and D 
with A and B. 
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 As an overview, coincidental change occurs: 
if there are two items A and B such that 
A≠B (otherness condition with relation to the sources of natural change; necessary 
with relation to coincidental change); and 
(SCnc) = A=H+ and B=H-; or A=H- and B=H+ (Necessary and sufficient with 
relation to natural change. Only necessary with relation to coincidental change); 
if there is (at least) a C such that 
C≠A and C≠B (otherness condition with relation to the sources of coincidental 
change; necessary with relation to coincidental change); and 
iff 
(SCcc) C is numerically one with either/both A or/and B (necessary and sufficient 
with relation to coincidental change). 
 
2.2. Contraries as principles of change of natural things. Dispelling a threat to the source 
condition for natural change (SCnc). 
Phys., I.5, 188b8-23  
ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἁπλᾶ τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ σύνθετα κατὰ 
τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ τὰς ἀντικειμένας διαθέσεις ὠνομάσθαι λανθάνει 
τοῦτο συμβαῖνον. ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἡρμοσμένον ἐξ ἀναρμόστου γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ 
ἀνάρμοστον ἐξ ἡρμοσμένου, καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ ἡρμοσμένον εἰς ἀναρμοστίαν, καὶ ταύτην 
οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀντικειμένην. διαφέρει δ’ οὐθὲν ἐπὶ ἁρμονίας εἰπεῖν ἢ τάξεως 
ἢ συνθέσεως· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἰκία καὶ ἀνδριὰς καὶ ὁτιοῦν 
ἄλλο γίγνεται ὁμοίως· ἥ τε γὰρ οἰκία γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διῃρῆσθαι ταδὶ 
ὡδί, καὶ ὁ ἀνδριὰς καὶ τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων τι ἐξ ἀσχημοσύνης· καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων τὰ 
μὲν τάξις, τὰ δὲ σύνθεσίς τίς ἐστιν. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀληθές, ἅπαν ἂν γίγνοιτο τὸ 
γιγνόμενον καὶ φθείροιτο τὸ φθειρόμενον ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἢ εἰς ἐναντία καὶ τὰ τούτων 
μεταξύ.  
And similarly, this [claim] can be extended to all cases. For it is reasonable that also the 
beings that are not simple, but rather composite, [are treated] according to the same 
claim. Nonetheless, one overlooks that it is the case because these opposite dispositions 
are not called by names. For it is necessary that, in every case, the joined comes to be out 
of non-joined and the non-joined comes to be out of joined; and the joined ceases to be 
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into non- joinedness; and not any chance non-joinedness, but rather the non-joinedness 
that is the opposite [to the joinedness]. And it makes no difference if we consider 
joinedness or disposition or composition, for it is evident that the same claim [applies to 
all of these]. Indeed, the house and the statue and all other things of this kind come to be 
in the same way. For the house comes to be out of the not-being-composed and [out of 
the] being-divided that is such and in this wise; the statue and what is formed [come to 
be] out of the formlessness. And of these, one is disposition and the other is a certain 
composition. 
 In conclusion, if this is true, what comes to be comes to be and what ceases to be ceases 
to be out of a contrary into [its corresponding] contrary, or any of the intermediates 
between them. 
 In Phys., I.5, 188b8-23, Aristotle tackles a set of objects, the so-called composite contraries, 
which apparently pose a threat to the source condition for natural change (SCnc: A and B qualify 
as sources of natural change, iff A and B are contraries or intermediates). The conclusion 
reached at the end of the passage (lines 21-3) restates SCnc. Evidently, Aristotle is confident of 
having dispelled the threat to SCnc posed by composite contraries. 
 The issue whether composite contraries fulfil SCnc is not a trivial one and Aristotle’s solution is 
introduced with some (at least rhetorical) caution: εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀληθές. The reason why 
the issue is not trivial lies in the nature of its objects. So, what are the composite items at stake? 
 At face value, the objects raising a difficulty are qualified as composite ones, in contrast with 
simple beings such as white or black from the previous lines. A key distinction drawn in Phys.I.7 
is the one between simple and composite items. There, nonetheless, what is simple is either one 
of the contraries or the substrate, whereas what is composite is the unity of the substrate and a 
contrary. Here, the distinction must have a different meaning, for the substrate has not been 
introduced, yet. Let us consider the instances of composite items mentioned in our passage. The 
statue is something-formed (ἐσχηματισμένον) coming to be out of the formlessness; these latter 
belong to the genus of the disposition. The house comes to be out of the non-being composed, 
i.e. out of the being-divided. The term ἁρμονία and its derivatives are difficult to translate. It is 
most plausible that the terms refer to the being-joined or to the being-arranged of the parts of 
something. At face value, the composite contraries addressed in our passage are those that entail 
a certain composition of their parts. For instance, the sources of change for the statue are the 
disposition, and the lack thereof, of the parts of the statue (the legs, the torso, the arms, the head). 
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When these parts are in a certain reciprocal disposition, the statue is something-formed. When 
they are not, the statue is formless. 
 The fact that the examples provided in the passage belong to the realm of substances suggests an 
interpretation of the difficulty that will result more insightful for the development of the 
argument in Phys.I.5-7. Although the difference between substances and non-substances is laid 
bare only in Phys.I.7, the concept of substance plays an important role already in the arguments 
of Phys.I.6.62 I believe that the issue raised in Phys., I.5, 188b8-23 concerns substantial forms 
and their privations. 
 A counterargument to my claim may be that the examples provided by Aristotle are confined to 
the realm of artefacts, whose claim to substantiality is controversial. Nonetheless, in Phys.I, 
artifacts are extensively used as models for substantial change in general.63 Thus, this 
counterargument can be easily answered. 
 According to the reading I develop here, the main role of Phys., I.5, 188b8-23 is to solve a 
difficulty concerning the lack of homogeneity between non-substantial contraries (e.g. white and 
black) and substantial opposites (e.g. formedness and formlessness). 
 In Metaph.VII.7,64 Aristotle addresses the imperfect application of the synonymy principle 
between the artefact and the matter constituting it, as in the cases of the brazen statue. 
Commonly, we conceptualise the production of the brazen statue as “the statue comes into being 
out of the bronze”. This is nonetheless improper, since the formula “X comes into being out of 
Y” applies in the cases in which Y does not persist through change, thus failing to fulfil the 
synonymy principle. Due to this improper attribution of the formula, the bronze is erroneously 
said to persist not as such (as in “the bronze statue”), but rather imperfectly (i.e. as “of M” or 
“M-en”, e.g. “brazen”). This error of common thought depends on the intrinsic difficulty of 
identifying negative substantial opposites (i.e. privations) such as formlessness or being-divided. 
In fact, privations are said to be ἄδηλα. 
 
62 Cf. §3.3. 
63 Cf. Phys., I.7, 190a31-b9. 
64 Metaph., VII.7, 1033a5ff. 
76 
 
 This characterisation of negative substantial opposites leads us to the second difficulty, 
concerning the intrinsic dishomogeneity between substantial opposites and non-substantial 
opposites (or contraries). 
 The being-formed of a certain statue has a name and is something determinate. Its privation has 
no name and is indeterminate.  
 The diamond and the coal, similarly, are both generically composite beings, whereas their ways 
of being-composed differ individually from each other, as diamond and coal are different in 
form. The matter of both diamond and coal is the same one: atoms of carbon. Most likely, the 
difference between the form of coal and the form of diamond amounts to the difference between 
the way in which the atoms are composed in coal and the way in which the atoms are composed 
in diamond. Before the atoms of carbon are composed into the particular way yielding to 
diamond or into the other particular way yielding to coal, the scattered bunch of atoms of coal is 
deprived both of the form of coal and of the form of diamond. In whatsoever particular way the 
atoms of carbon are scattered in space, none of these particular ways is the determinate opposite 
of the form of diamond or of coal. Therefore, the privations of the form of diamond and the 
privation of the form of coal are devoid of the formal determinacy that would enable them to 
qualify as contraries and to identify a range. 
 As the absence of a determinate form in a certain matter, privation lacks the positive 
determinacy which would enable it to identify a range and to oppose to form as a contrary. 
 The positive and the negative contraries, instead, are two formally determinate items. As I have 
claimed, the notion of contrariety is linked with the notion of range determinacy, for each term 
belonging to a contrary pair is one determinate extreme within a given range. White is the colour 
possessing the capacity to widen sight at maximum degree, whereas black is the colour 
possessing the maximum degree of the opposite capacity. Roughness is the presence of any 
discontinuity in a surface, whereas smoothness is the lack thereof. There may be limit cases to 
this rule, but Aristotle seems to endorse it. For instance, in our framework, contraries such as up 
and down are bound with indeterminacy, since they are relative to the position of the observer 
and since, given a point that we consider down with relation to another one, an infinity of lower 




 The difficulty with relation to negative substantial opposites concerns not only the difficulty to 
identify them, but especially the homogeneity between substantial and non-substantial change. 
Therefore, the possibility of explaining them with a unified theory. This difficulty concerns the 
source condition for natural change. As I have claimed,65 Phys., I.5, 188a30-b8 endorses a 
necessary, sufficient range determinacy condition for the identification of the sources of natural 
change within the set of the items fulfilling the otherness condition. Now, privations such as the 
formlessness relative to a determinate form and the being-divided relative to a certain 
composition fulfil the otherness condition. From what I have claimed, nonetheless, privations 
seem to fall short of fulfilling the sufficient condition for natural change. Thus, the formlessness 
of the bronze does not seem to qualify as the relevant source of the statue more than the 
formlessness of a gush of air that cannot turn into a statue. 
 A robust interpretation of a unified theory of the sources of substantial and non-substantial 
change entails a perfect homogeneity between substantial opposites (forms/privations) and 
contraries. Namely, it entails a positive formal determinacy of privations. As in the case of non-
substantial change, a substance comes into being or ceases to be within a range stretching 
between a formally determinate privation to its corresponding substantial form. For instance, in a 
clump of bronze that is the proximate matter of the statue of Ulysses both the form of Ulysses 
and the corresponding determinate privation thereof would inhere. This latter would be formally 
different from different determinate privations (say, the privation of the form of Zeus) 
representing the determinate starting point of other substantial changes culminating in different 
forms. 
 Some textual support for the robust interpretation lies in lines 18-9, which seem to mirror 
188a30-b8 in pursuing the endeavour to select the relevant sources of natural change out of the 
contradictories. Taken literally, lines 18-9 claim that what is joined comes not out of any chance 
non-joined whatsoever, but rather out of a certain determinate non-joined that is opposed to the 
determinate being-joined that is proper to the house. The determinacy of the particular non-
joinedness that qualifies as the source of the house seems to be expressed in the text by the words 
 
65 Cf. §2.1. 
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ταδὶ ὡδί in line 19. The robust reading has been endorsed by Judson66 with relation to 
Metaph.XII.2, and, with relation to Phys.I.5, by Delcominette.67 
 Against the robust reading looms a serious worry over the internal coherence of formally 
determinate privations. Let us go through a survey of cases. 
 There are at least some cases in which a substantial range may seem to resemble the continuum 
stretching between two contraries identifying a range. Controversial as believing in degrees of 
substantiality is,68 (at least) some substantial forms seem to be possess a continuous structure that 
can be assimilated to that of a continuous range identified by a pair of contraries. For example, 
the form of human being seems to allow to be possessed on a certain degree or another along the 
process of development of an adult human being. The starting point of the generation of a human 
being (the menses) possesses the form of human being in a merely potential way, but are 
completely deprived of it in actuality. The stages of development of the human being stretching 
from the embryo, through the child, to the adult human being69 may be seen as possessing and 
realising the form of the human being on ascending degrees starting from an extremely limited 
possession of it in the embryo and reaching to the complete possession of it in the adult human 
being. 
 In some sense, the degrees of possession of the form of human being build up a continuum 
stretching from the complete privation proper to the menses to the complete possession proper to 
the adult human. Such a continuum of the possession of the substantial form of human being 
may be seen as resembling the non-substantial range stretching between two contraries. The 
substantial range of human being stretches from a formally determinate privation of the form of 
human being (the menses), through determinate degrees of possession of the form of human 
being (the embryo, the child…), to the complete possession of the form of human being in the 
adult. 
 Even if we were to accept this reconstruction of the degrees of substance, its identification with 
the non-substantial ranges of contrary pairs is open to objections. Once we get to the bottom of 
the range of human being, is the complete privation of human being something determinate or 
 
66 Charles 2000. 
67 Delcominette (forth.) 
68 For a recent defence: Cohen 1996, cf. Introduction. 
69 Or rather, shamefully, to the adult man. 
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not? The menses are a certain determinate being other than white, smooth, air, grass, which do 
not qualify as sources of the human being. 
 On the one hand, it is evident that the menses (a) are endowed with the complete privation of the 
form of human being and (b) possess a certain formal determinacy and properties that make them 
what they are and that account for their capacity to become the human being. On the other hand, 
the formal determinacy of the menses has a problematic status, and the relation between (a) and 
(b) is far from clear. 
 To put it briefly, it is not clear whether the formal determinacy of the menses coincides with the 
complete degree of privation of the form of human being ((a)=(b)) or whether the form of the 
menses is different from the privation of the human being ((a)≠(b)). Reformulating this, it is not 
clear whether the form of the menses is a degree of the form of human being (i.e. the complete 
privation of it) or whether it is an independent form. 
 If ((a)≠(b)) the privation of the human being does not coincide with the form of the menses, then 
we have no reason for believing that the privation of the human being is something determinate. 
The form of the menses would be the set of features and the conformation proper to the 
proximate matter of the human being (the menses), whereas the privation of the human being 
would amount to the mere absence of the form of the human being from the menses. As such, 
privation would be the mere negation or the absence of the form. 
 If, on the contrary, ((a)=(b)) the privation of the human being coincides with the form of the 
menses, then privation is a positive, formally determinate, single item opposite to a determinate 
form, and the homogeneity with the contrariety model laid down in the previous section is 
safeguarded. 
This latter possibility is nevertheless both exposed to general worries concerning the doctrine of 
the degrees of substance (i.e. of substantial form) and to particular difficulties concerning the 
identification of a positive degree of the form of human being (the form of the menses) with the 
complete privation thereof. 
 With relation to the former issue, the idea that the form of the menses is a degree of the form of 
human being may carry a threat to the doctrine of the unity of the form: if the form of human 
being allows for degrees, how can it be one? Difficulties concerning the relation of the form of 
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the matter of the human being (the menses) with the form of the accomplished human being may 
also arise. What is, in general, their relation to each other? Does the form of the menses cease to 
be when the form of the human being supervenes? Does it, at least to some extent, endure 
through the generation of the human being? 
 With relation to the latter issue, it is in general unclear how the absence of a form may identify 
with the possession of another form. The menses possess a determinate formal configuration (if 
not a full-blown form) and a determinate capacity (that of becoming a human being). How may a 
privation, namely the negation and absence of a form, coincide with a positive and determinate 
nature such as a form? In this connection, the privation of the human being seems to be more 
likely to be the absence and negation of the human being inhering in the menses than the 
positively-charged form of the menses. 
 Moreover, the case of the privation of the human being and of the form of the menses may be 
considered as a privileged case, for, as in the case of the contraries, it seems to entail the 
opposition of a single one form (of the human being) to a single one privation (the one in the 
menses). In fact, the human being comes into being from a single determinate source, the 
menses. In other cases, such as the previous examples of the statue and of the house, the 
privation of a certain form does not seem to identify with a positive, single one formal 
determinacy. 
 Let us consider the generation of a formed being such as a statue and the generation of a 
composite being such as the house. The statue comes to be from the marble, the house from a set 
of determinate parts and components that are in a disordered state before their ordered 
composition takes place. The marble and the set of parts and components of the house are not 
merely formless: the marble may be a perfectly squared cube or a lump of raw matter. In both 
cases, the marble has a formal configuration and determinacy, be it more or less orderly and 
shaped. In both cases, be it a cube or a lump, the marble is deprived of the form of the statue. In 
both cases, the cube and the lumpness yield the form of the statue. 
 Thus, if (a=b), the privation of the statue would coincide with indeterminately many positive 
shapes and degrees of shapedness. But this is an implausible consequence, and contradicts the 
supposed homogeneity between contrariety and substantial opposition. 
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 Moreover, the single one, particular formal determinacy inhering in the marble before the statue 
has been sculpted is irrelevant to the final form of the statue. Regardless whether the marble be a 
perfectly-squared cube or an irregular lump of matter, the form of the statue will be shaped out of 
it. The only requirement for a certain conformation of the marble to yield the form of the statue 
is that the marble does not already possess the form of the statue (i.e. the otherness requirement). 
(One might speculate that there are limit cases in which a particular formal determination of the 
marble might prevent a determinate form to be carved into it. For example, a 3-feet-high statue 
of Aphrodite cannot be carved into a 2-feet-high block of marble. Even if this objection were 
pertinent – and I think it is not, for it regards the quantity and not the form of the matter – it 
would not suffice to solve the difficulty.) 
 The same results seem to hold for the case of the house. There may be indefinitely many 
instances in which the same particular components of the house (bricks, windows, cement…) are 
in a state of dividedness or lack of composition. Whatever formal configuration the material 
parts of the house may assume, if we endorse that (a=b), the following consequences mar the 
supposed homogeneity between substantial opposition and contrariety. First, form/privation are 
not in a one-to-one relation as contraries are. Second, the formal configuration of the matter is 
irrelevant to the generation of the form of the house. 
 I believe that these conceptual difficulties cannot be answered in a theoretically satisfying way. 
If, then, (a)≠(b) (i.e. if the positive determinacy of the menses does not coincide with the 
privation of the form of man), the robust homogeneity claim between substantial and non-
substantial change does not hold. 
 I believe that Aristotle is tempted to endorse the robust reading of the homogeneity claim 
concerning the non-substantial and substantial opposites, as this is the most plausible 
interpretation of 188b18-19. That Aristotle has arguments for this stronger reading is something I 
doubt about, but I believe that there is a way of saving the homogeneity claim at least partially. I 
propose here a weaker reading of the homogeneity claim. 
 The weaker reading of the homogeneity claim states that there is a similarity, but not an identity, 
between the contrariety model of non-substantial change and the form/privation model of 
substantial change. I believe that it is possible to safeguard the range determinacy interpretation 
of SCnc without endorsing that substantial privations are single one, determinate features. The 
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range determinacy condition, in the case of substantial change, can be safeguarded by reference 
to form alone. Whether we endorse the theory of the degrees of substance or not, it seems 
sufficient for a substantial range to be individuated that its form alone is something determinate, 
regardless its privation being determinate or indeterminate. In other words, with relation to the 
determinacy of the range of substantial change, the substantial form is necessary and sufficient, 
whereas the privation of the substantial form is irrelevant. If it is true, as I have claimed, that 
SCnc identifies with the range determinacy condition, then the necessary and sufficient condition 
for natural change (SCnc) is fulfilled, in the case of non-substantial change, by virtue of the 
determinacy of the form alone. 
 Unlike non-substantial ranges, whose determinacy rests on the horizontal, logical relation 
between each member of a contrary pair (difference condition), the determinacy of substantial 
ranges rests on the form alone. Nonetheless, if this is the case, the substantial opposites do not 
stand in any particular relation that identifies them as the relevant sources of substantial change. 
Rather, form and privation seem to fulfil only the necessary, insufficient otherness condition. 
 The weaker reading of the homogeneity claim is sympathetic with texts, such as Phys.V.1, that 
are less confident on a unified theory of substantial and non-substantial change. The main point 
of the Phys.V.1 seems to be a differentiation of substantial and non-substantial change with 
relation to their respective sources. Non-substantial change occurs between contraries (H+; H-). 
Substantial change (coming into being/passing away) occurs between contradictories (A; ⌐A). I 
discuss this text and its import on the source condition for substantial and non-substantial change 
in §5.4, where I argue that there is no identity, but only analogy, between the sources of non-
sustantial change and the sources of substantial change. 
 
2.3. The final step of Arg.2. The priority condition. 
 So far, Aristotle has assessed that the relevant sources of natural change are the contraries or 
their intermediates. Argument 2 of Phys.I.5 finds its conclusion in 188b21-6, which introduce the 
priority condition. Namely the requirement that, among the sources of natural change, only those 
that are primary qualify as the principle of natural change. Thus, according to the basic notion of 
principle provided in Metaph.V.1 (cf. §0.3.1.), 188a30-b8 (cf. §2.1.) selects the sources of natural 
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change. 188b21-6 refines this result, by selecting the subset of the primary sources of natural 
change. 
 The priority condition ([b]) is introduced by [a] the recapitulation of the results of the source 
condition, namely that the sources of natural change are the contraries and their intermediates. 
[c] contains the result of Arg.2, reached through the application of both the source and priority 
conditions: contraries are principles of natural things with relation to change. 
Phys., I.5, 188b21-6 
[a] εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀληθές, ἅπαν ἂν γίγνοιτο τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ φθείροιτο τὸ 
φθειρόμενον ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἢ εἰς ἐναντία καὶ τὰ τούτων μεταξύ. [b] τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἐκ τῶν 
ἐναντίων ἐστίν, οἷον χρώματα ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος· [c] ὥστε πάντ’ ἂν εἴη τὰ φύσει 
γιγνόμενα ἢ ἐναντία ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων. 
[a] In conclusion, if this is true, what comes to be comes to be and what ceases to be 
ceases to be out of a contrary into [its corresponding] contrary, or any of the 
intermediates between them. [b] The intermediates, nevertheless, are out of the 
contraries, for instance the [other] colours are out of white and black. [c] Therefore, the 
things that come to be by nature are either contraries or out of contraries. 
 A reasonable reconstruction of Arg.2 is the following: 
[a] SCnc = A and B qualify as sources of natural change, iff A=H+ (or iH+/H-) and B=H- (or 
iH+/H-); or iff A=H- (or iH+/H-), B=H+ (or iH+/H-). 
[b] Priority condition = But iH+/H- derive from H+/H-. 
[c] Therefore (ὥστε), only H+/H- qualify as principles of natural change. 
 The source condition of natural change stated in [a] is refined into [c] by virtue of a brief 
argument contained in [b]. The priority condition in play in [b] prescribes that: if two sources of 
natural change S1 and S2 are given, and if S2 derives from S1, then only S1 qualifies as a principle 
(or primary source) of natural change. 
 Now, [a] the sources of natural change are the contraries (H+/H-) and their intermediates (iH+/H-). 
Nonetheless, [b] iH+/H- derive from H+/H-. Therefore, [c] iH+/H- fail to qualify as primary sources 
of natural change. In conclusion, only the contraries qualify as principles of natural change. 
 For instance, in the case of the range of colour, the intermediate colours such as magenta, cobalt 
blue and royal yellow are derived from the extremes of the range of colour white and black. For 
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each intermediate identifies with a certain degree of possession of one of the opposing features 
proper to their extremes white and black. Although the intermediate colours qualify as sources of 
natural change, they nevertheless fail to qualify as primary sources and principles. 
 Aristotle does not spell out, in [b], what it means for the intermediates to derive from the 
extreme contraries and what the priority of the extremes amounts to. The shift from verbs of 
motion, used through the whole Arg.2, to the verb εἶναι used in [b] makes plausible that Aristotle 
implicitly invokes the notion of ontological dependence and priority. 
 Intuitively, the intermediate degrees between any A and B do not exist as intermediates, if the 
extremes A and B do not exist in turn. To some extent, the notion of mixture or of participation 
helps clarifying the dependence of the intermediates on the extremes. At face value, iA/B can be 
interpreted as a mixture of A and B, or as participating of both A and B. The more of A is 
present in iA/B (and the less of B), the closer is iA/B to A within the range A-B. If this model 
captures the nature of the intermediates, then the extremes are ontologically primary with 
relation to the intermediates, for the intermediates do not exist in absence of the extremes, but the 
extremes exist in absence of their intermediates. 
 According to a different model, the contraries are prior to the intermediates with relation to their 
essence and definition. Magenta can be defined as the colour endowed with a certain degree of 
the capacity to widen sight comprised within the maximum degree possessed by white and the 
minimum degree possessed by black. Therefore, magenta is defined with relation to its extremes, 
but the extremes white and black are not defined with relation to magenta. 
 In conclusion, as the intermediates are dependent on and derived from the contraries (i.e. from 
their extremes), [c] only the contraries qualify as principles of change. In fact, [c] states, what 
undergoes change is either a contrary (namely a principle) or is derived from a contrary (namely 
is a product of change and/or an intermediate source that does not qualify as a principle).70 
 
70 This is of course not the only way of interpreting [c]. The advantage of my interpretation of [c] lies not only in its 
instrumentality in the reconstruction of Arg.2. Also, the conclusion of the survey on the predecessors (188b26-
189a10, see §2.4.), in the last sentence of Phys.I.5 (199a9-10), states that the principles of natural change are the 
contraries. Now, it is reasonable to hold that the conclusion of the survey must be the same as the conclusion of 
Arg.2, since the stated purpose of the survey (188b26-30) is to show that the predecessors generally agree with 




 The general conclusion of Arg.2 in Phys.I.5 is that the source condition of natural change (SCnc) 
must be integrated into the primary source condition of natural change (PSCnc). As I have 
claimed, SCnc can be spelled out most likely into the range determinacy condition, which is 
linked with the logical concept of difference. If A is extremely different from B, A and B yield a 
range. Thus, PSCnc can be spelled out as the extreme difference condition: 
PSCnc = extreme difference condition = A and B qualify as sources of natural change, iff 
A and B are maximally different = iff A and B belong to the same range, and iff there is 
neither a C that is more distant from A than B, nor a D that is more distant from B than 
A. 
 
2.4. The result of Phys.I.5 and the survey of the theories of the predecessors on the 
principles of natural things. 
 The general conclusion of Phys.I.5, stated at the beginning of the chapter and restated twice in 
the following passage, is compared to the doctrines of the predecessors. The survey of the 
doctrine of natural principles, I have claimed, is hardly presented as an argument. Rather, 
Aristotle is primarily interested in pinpointing the partial failure of his predecessors, and 
secondarily in drawing external support from the partial truth they grasped, although indistinctly 
and without argument. 
Phys., I.5, 188b26-189a10 
μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον σχεδὸν συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, 
καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον· πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καλουμένας 
ἀρχάς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς 
ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες. 
διαφέρουσι δ’ ἀλλήλων τῷ τοὺς μὲν πρότερα τοὺς δ’ ὕστερα λαμβάνειν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν 
γνωριμώτερα κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν (οἱ μὲν γὰρ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, 
οἱ δ’ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ἕτεροι δὲ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἢ νεῖκος καὶ φιλίαν αἰτίας τίθενται 
τῆς γενέσεως· ταῦτα δ’ ἀλλήλων διαφέρει κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον), ὥστε ταὐτὰ 
λέγειν πως καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, ἕτερα μὲν ὥσπερ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῖς πλείστοις, ταὐτὰ δὲ ᾗ 
ἀνάλογον· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς συστοιχίας· τὰ μὲν γὰρ περιέχει, τὰ δὲ 
περιέχεται τῶν ἐναντίων. ταύτῃ τε δὴ ὡσαύτως λέγουσι καὶ ἑτέρως, καὶ χεῖρον καὶ 
βέλτιον, καὶ οἱ μὲν γνωριμώτερα κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, οἱ δὲ κατὰ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνώριμον, τὸ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον κατὰ 
τὴν αἴσθησιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος τοῦ καθόλου, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις τοῦ κατὰ μέρος), οἷον τὸ μὲν 
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μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ὅτι 
μὲν οὖν ἐναντίας δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, φανερόν. 
As I have stated previously, also most of the other [thinkers] – roughly – go along with 
me with relation to what I have claimed so far. For they all claim that the elements and 
what they call principle are the contraries, even though they fail to provide arguments 
[for their claim], but rather [endorse it] as if they had been constrained by truth itself. 
And [the predecessors] differ from each other [α] by virtue of the fact that some of them 
endorse contraries that are prior, whereas some others endorse contraries that are 
posterior; [β] some of them endorse contraries that are more knowable through thought, 
whereas some others endorse contraries that are more knowable through sensation. For 
instance, some [of the predecessors] endorse as causes of coming to be [α] hot and cold, 
while others endorse moist and dry; and [β] some endorse odd and even, while others 
endorse hate and love. And these differ from each other in the way that I have explained. 
In conclusion, they [the contraries endorsed as causes of coming to be by the 
predecessors] can be said in a way identical to each other, and in another way different 
from each other. Different, as appears to most people. Identical in as much as they are 
analogous [to each other]. For they are taken from the same pair of columns of opposites 
[systoichia]. And for [α] some of the contraries contain [the others], whereas others are 
contained. With relation to this, [the contraries endorsed as causes of coming to be by the 
predecessors] are said to be both identical and different, and some are worse and some 
are better [in qualifying as principles]. And [β] some [contraries] are more knowable 
through thought and some through sensation, as has been said beforehand. In fact, what is 
a whole is known through thought, whereas what is related to the singular is known 
through sensation, for thought is of the whole, whereas sensation is of what is related to 
the parts. For instance, the Great and the Small are related to thought, whereas the dense 
and the rare are related to sensation. 
In conclusion, it is evident that the principles must be contrary. 
 The survey of the theories of the predecessors on the principles of natural change is introduced 
(188b26-30) by an assessment of the similarity between Aristotle’s view and the views of the 
predecessors. This similarity is qualified as a rough one (σχεδόν), thus entailing a certain degree 
of dissimilarity. 
 The similarity seems to lie in the general claim that all predecessors held that contraries are 
principles of natural change. The reason for the dissimilarity apparently lies in the superior level 
of abstraction gained by Aristotle over his predecessors. 
 Each predecessor is said to have endorsed one or more couples of contraries as principles of 
natural change. This endorsement does not gain, in the predecessors, the level of universality 
assured by the possession of a λόγος, i.e. of the argument or the principle underlying the view 
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endorsed. The view endorsed by each predecessor rather imposes itself on them due to its 
intuitive self-evidence, so that it is impossible to overlook it altogether. At the same time, a 
complete grasp of the self-evident truth is said to have eluded the other philosophers. 
 Each of the doctrines held by the predecessors are partial, for they select one particular couple 
(or more couples) of contraries as the primary source and principle of natural change. Thus, the 
predecessors endorse particular instances of the universal truth underlying them. 
 The argument or principle underlying the doctrines of the predecessors is that the contraries are 
natural principles, as 189a9-10 states literally, or rather that the principles are contrary, as the 
general conclusion of Phys.I.5. The two versions of the claim are not identical. I think that the 
latter is the conceptually more abstract version of the former, namely the result of Aristotle’s 
analogical abstraction of the doctrines of the predecessors. In some way, the second claim and 
the result of is the same as the analogical generalisation of the doctrine of the predecessors, only 
on a higher level of abstraction. 
 The doctrines of the predecessors with relation to the principles of natural change can be more 
or less close to truth with relation to two features of the contraries selected as principles, namely 
with relation to: [α] their being primary or posterior; [β] their being perceptible or rational. At 
least with relation to [α], there is little doubt that a doctrine selecting a primary couple of 
contraries, despite understanding the truth partially, nevertheless comes closer to the truth than a 
different doctrine selecting a posterior couple of contraries. 
 The doctrines of the predecessors, their individual differences notwithstanding, are nonetheless 
analogically identical. It is clear, in fact, that:  
hot : cold = dry : moist = even : odd. 
 The contraries selected as principles are different both individually and specifically (i.e. with 
relation to [α] and [β]). The first and second couple of contraries are perceptible, and the former 
is prior to the latter. The third couple is rational. Nonetheless, the reciprocal relation between the 









 The analogical unity of the individual couples of contraries endorsed by the predecessors as 




CHAPTER 3. THE SUBSTRATE AS A PRINCIPLE. LIMITATIONS TO THE CLAIM 
THAT ONLY THE CONTRARIES ARE PRINCIPLES. 
 
3.1. The aporia on the number of natural principles. 
 Phys.I.6 ends with a “serious aporia” concerning the question whether the principles of natural 
things should be confined to two, namely the contraries, or whether a third principle should be 
added to the count, namely the substrate. Before analysing the arguments in favour of the 
addition of the substrate, several structural features of the aporia in question should be discussed. 
 (1) The two horns of an aporia must be exhaustive. The opening lines of Phys.I.6 (189a12-20) 
set the agenda of the chapter on answering the question of the exact number of natural 
principles.71  
 With a brief move, 189a12-21 refutes both the monism and the infinity of the principle. Since 
the contraries are principles (Phys.I.5); and since contraries are opposites, and there is nothing 
like a single opposite; then there cannot be one single principle. The refutation of the claim that 
there are infinite principles both employs new arguments and draws on the refutation of 
Anaxagoras’ infinite principles presented in Phys., I.4, 187a26-188a18.72 
 
71 Phys., I.6, 189a11-2. 
72 The refutation ends with a general conclusion against positing infinite principles (Phys., I.4, 188a17-8): βέλτιόν τε 
ἐλάττω καὶ πεπερασµένα λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς. “And it is preferable to posit a smaller and finite [number 
89 
 
 Having assessed that principles have to be of a finite number bigger than one, Aristotle provides 
two arguments (Phys., I.6, 189a21-b1) in favour of the view that the principles are three in 
number (the contraries and the substrate). 
 Phys., I.6, 189b18-27 rules out that the finite number of principles may be bigger than three by 
showing that neither a further substrate nor a further couple of contraries should be added to the 
three aforementioned principles. By ruling out the necessity to posit four principles (i.e. two 
substrates and two contraries) or five principles (one substrate and two couples of contraries), the 
argument a fortiori rules out the necessity of a number of principles bigger than five.73 
 In conclusion, the horns of the aporia on the number of principles are exhaustive. 
 (2) In standard aporias, the two horns are not only exhaustive, but contradictory and thus 
mutually exclusive (in the form of [A]/[¬A]). The arguments supporting one horn of an aporia, 
thus, standardly rule out the possibility of the other horn. 
 In the aporia in Phys.I.6, this is on the one hand the case and on the other hand not the case. On 
the one hand, the First and Second horn are contradictory, for the First horn claims [C**] that the 
principles of natural things are only the contraries, whereas the Second horn claims ¬[C**] that 
the principles of natural things are not only the contraries.74 
 On the other hand, the second horn both rules out the First horn and endorses a weaker version 
of it. In fact, the Second horn states [C*] a weak, non-exhaustive version of [C**]: [C*] the 
principles are (also) the contraries. 
 
 
of principles], as Empedocles did.” Phys.I.6 echoes the preceding refutation in a selective way, namely retaining 
those that are valid for any theory contemplating infinite principles and dropping the arguments that dismiss details 
proper to Anaxagoras’ theory. 
73 I do not analyse the interesting and complex arguments provided for this scope. It is nonetheless of some 
importance to point out that Aristotle, in refuting the possibility that there are more than three principles, does not 
hold for necessary to refute it altogether. Rather, Aristotle refutes the possibility that there may be something 
qualifying as a principle over the three mentioned, on condition that this something is either a contrary or a 
substrate. The possibility that there may be further principles that belong to a different kind or to different kinds of 
reality is not contemplated. The argument, thus, either calls for solid justification or must be downplayed as resting 
on the unwarranted dialectical premise that all predecessors posited as principles only contraries and substrates (cf. 
Phys.I.4). 
74 Phys., I.6, 189a21-2 ἐπεὶ δὲ πεπερασµέναι, τὸ µὴ ποιεῖν δύο µόνον ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· “And as the principles are of a 
finite number, it is somewhat reasonable not to make them only two.” 
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 (3) The horns of the aporia in Phys.I.6 can be presented as follows: 
First horn: [C**] the principles are only the contraries. 
Second horn: (¬[C**]) the principles are not only the contraries. Rather, the principles 
are [C*] the contraries and [S] the substrate. 
 The formulation of the aporia I suggest spells out the peculiar nature explored above. On the one 
hand, it secures the mutual exclusiveness of the two horns, for [C**] is the contradictory of 
¬[C**]. On the other hand, it makes sense of the fact that choosing the Second horn entails 
accepting a weak version of the First horn, for [C*] is a weak version of [C**]. 
 (4) The arguments supporting the Second horn, I claim, have two different and partially 
opposing features and effects. 
 (a) On the one hand, they partially harmonise with the arguments for the First horn, for they 
endorse [C*]. In fact, at least Arg.1 argues for [S] on the assumption that [C*] is true. 
 (b) On the other hand, the arguments of Phys.I.6 undermine the claim that the contraries are 
principles not only in its robust version [C**], but also in its weak version [C*]. In §3.3, I show 
that Arg.2, in claiming for [S], undermines the validity of [C*]. If the contraries are 
metaphysically predicated of the substrate, then the claim of contraries to qualify as principles is 
threatened, for the substrate of metaphysical predication is prior to its predicates. Thus, Arg.2, in 
arguing for [S], also argues for the stronger and more threatening claim that  
[S>C] the substrate qualifies as a principle rather than the contraries. 
 Therefore, the Second horn is affected by internal difficulties, for [S>C] undermines the 
possibility of simply combining [C*] and [S]. 
 (5) In substantiating the aporia on the number of natural principles raised at the end of Phys.I.6, 
I proceed to analyse the arguments for [S] provided by Phys., I.6, 189a22-34. 
 In Chs.1-2, I have analysed the arguments of Phys.I.5 for the claim that contraries are the 
principles of natural things. Both with relation to being (Arg.1) and to change (Arg.2), I have 
showed that Aristotle’s intention in Phys.I.5 is most likely to claim that contraries are the only 
principles of natural things. 
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 I claim that [S] is argued for, in Phys.I.6, first with relation to change (Arg.1) and then with 
relation to being (Arg.2). Arg.1 and Arg.2 of Phys.I.6, thus, address respectively Arg.2 and Arg.1 
of Phys.I.5. 
 The idea that Aristotle provides two arguments in 189a22-34 is far from being uncontroversial, 
as well as the reconstruction and meaning of these lines. Some evidence for my reading can be 
found in the lines following Arg.2. 
Phys., I.6, 189a34-b1 
διόπερ εἴ τις τόν τε πρότερον ἀληθῆ νοµίσειεν εἶναι λόγον καὶ τοῦτον, ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ 
µέλλει διασώσειν ἀµφοτέρους αὐτούς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον 
Therefore, if one considers truthful both the previous argument and this last argument, 
then, if one intends to save the validity of both of them, one will necessarily posit some 
third nature. 
 The two arguments mentioned are most likely to be found in the lines immediately preceding 
189a34-b1, and in the lines following Aristotle’s programmatic claim that he is going to argue 
against the view that there are only two principles (189a21-2). In other words, the two arguments 
mentioned in 189a34-b1 are most likely to be contained in 189a22-34. 
 This idea is opposed to the authoritative interpretation of Sean Kelsey (2008), who believes that 
the two arguments mentioned in 189a34-b1 must be identified with the reciprocally opposing 
arguments of Phys.I.5 and Phys.I.6. If these are held true, they must result in the aporia 
denounced at the end of Phys.I.6. 
 Against Kelsey’s interpretation of these lines, it can be objected that the consequence of the 
acceptance of the two arguments they state is not the occurrence of an aporia, but rather the 
necessity of positing the substrate as a principle. This result is the one announced in 189a21-2 
and is pursues in the following lines. Thus, the two arguments mentioned in 189a34-b1 are most 







3.2. Arg.1 of Phys.I.6. The contraries are not principles of change exhaustively (⌐[C**]). 
 189a22-7 presents the first argument against [C**] from Arg.2 of Phys.I.5. 
Phys., I.6, 189a22-7 
ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πῶς ἢ ἡ πυκνότης τὴν µανότητα ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν ἢ αὕτη τὴν 
πυκνότητα. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁποιαοῦν ἐναντιότης· οὐ γὰρ ἡ φιλία τὸ νεῖκος συνάγει 
καὶ ποιεῖ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ νεῖκος ἐξ ἐκείνης, ἀλλ’ ἄµφω ἕτερόν τι τρίτον. 
For one may puzzle over how density may, by nature, make [poiein] rarity into something 
[else], as well as over how this [rarity] [may, by nature, make] density [into something 
else]. And the same [holds] also for the rest of contrariety. For neither does Love gather 
Hate and produce [poiein] something out of Hate, nor does Hate [produce something] out 
of Love. Rather, both Love and Hate act on [poiein] a third different thing. 
 Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 has the form of a reductio. Its strategy is to show that, if we posit one contrary 
pair as the only principle, then a difficulty concerning the possibility of change (line 22, 
ἀπορήσειε) arises. The solution of this difficulty consists in positing a third principle different 
from the contraries (ἕτερόν τι τρίτον). A possible reconstruction of the argument is the following. 
If [C**] dense and rare were the only principles of change, then  
[a] The dense would be what comes to be rare in t2. If this were the case, then 
[b] There would be a time t2 in which the dense is rare, 
[c] Since what comes to be persists through change. 
But [b] is impossible, for [d] dense and rare are incompossible. Therefore, ⌐[b]. 
Therefore, ⌐[a]. Therefore, ⌐[C**]. Instead, [e] there must be an ἕτερόν τι τρίτον. 
 The language and the topic of Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 make clear that it tackles directly Arg.2 of 
Phys.I.5, for it refutes the possibility that the contraries are the only principles of natural change. 
As a matter of fact, Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 picks from Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 both the ἐκ-language and the 
expressions related to change. For instance, ποιεῖν πέφυκεν in lines 23-5 occurs also in Phys., I.5, 
188a32-3. 
 In the previous section, I have labelled Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 “a mild reductio”. What I mean with 
this is that Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 does not refute the claim of Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 tout court. In fact, if 
Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 were to refute [C*] altogether, it would be unclear why the aporia on the 
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number of principles does not take the form of a one vs two aporia (i.e. the contraries vs the 
substate), but rather a two vs three aporia. Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 rejects the exhaustiveness of the 
conclusion of Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 ([C**]), but preserves and endorses it in its basic form, namely 
that [C*] the contraries are principles of natural change. In fact, the argumentative strategy of 
Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 is to argue that, if we assume that [C*] the contraries are principles of natural 
change, then we must also accept an additional principle, the substrate. 
 Now, neither the nature of the difficulty regarding [C**] nor the argument grounding the mild 
reductio are spelled out. The absence of any explicit explanation makes it plausible to assume 
that the rationale for the difficulty should rest on a self-evident principle of Aristotelian 
philosophy. I suggest that Aristotle may plausibly detect an infringement of the principle of non-
contradiction, in the case in which the sources of natural change were only the contraries H+ and 
H-. This diagnosis of the difficulty posed by Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 rests on three features: 
(1) The entanglement between the concepts of: (a) the source of change (the starting point 
and the end point of change); (b) what changes (or the subject of change). 
(2) The incompossibility of the contraries H+ and H-. 
(3) The requirement that the subject of change must persist through change. 
 (1) It is important to keep in mind that, in Arg.2 of Phys.I.5, the contraries qualifying as 
principles are designated mostly by substantive adjectives such as τὸ λευκόν, “the white” or 
“what is white”. These designations are ambiguous, for they stand both for the properties (e.g. 
the property of being white) and for the things that are endowed with these properties (e.g. a 
particular white thing). In the former case, “the white” refers to (a) the starting point of the 
process of becoming black; in the latter case, “the white” refers to (b) the subject changing from 
white to black. For instance, the white undergoing the event of tanning by virtue of its exposure 
to sunlight is, in the jargon of Arg.2 of Phys.I.5, both (a) the starting point of the event of tanning 
(i.e. the property of being white) and (b) the thing that undergoes the event of tanning (e.g. the 
skin that is white at t1 and comes to be black at t2). As I show in Ch.5,75 it belongs to the 
endeavours of Phys.I.7 to clarify what, within the complex concept of “the white”, is the 
 
75 Cf. mainly §5.3. and §5.5.2. 
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substrate of change (i.e. the thing that is white) and what is the source of change (white as a 
property). 
 (2) The contraries H+ and H- always belong, respectively, to one of the two members of the 
contradictory pair H+/¬H+ (whereas H+/¬H+ do not belong to H+/H-). Therefore, H+ and H- are 
incompossible. 
 (3) In order for incompossibility to raise and for my reconstruction to work, the contrary that is 
(1b) the subject of change and (1a) that out of which change starts must be assumed to persist 
through change. Namely, what is white at t1 and gets tanned at t2 must be assumed to persist as 
such (as white) at t2, in order for contradiction to occur. Such an assumption is a controversial 
one, but I do believe it can be defended against its critics, and that is endorsed in Phys.I.7.76   
 According to this scenario, if (1) H+ is both (a) a contrary source of change and (b) the subject 
of the process of change between H+ and H-; if (3) H+ persists as such once it has come to be H-; 
and if (2) H+ and H- are incompossible; then, there is a time t2 in which H+ is H-. But this is 
impossible. For, either there would be nothing that has undergone change at t2 (for the starting 
point of change has been annihilated by the end point of change) or the principle of non-
contradiction would be infringed (for the end point of change would be at the same time H+ and 
H-). Since [C**] is shown to lead to an impossible consequence, it must be false. 
 For instance, adopting as an example the principles of Anaximenes, it is impossible for rarity 
and density act on each other, if [C**] there is no third principle different from the contraries. 
Density will not make rarity dense and rarity will not make density rare. Rather, each will make 
a third principle different from the contraries either rare or dense. 
 By showing that the conclusion of Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 faces absurd consequences with relation to 
the possibility of change, Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 concludes is that ⌐[C**] a couple of contraries 
cannot exhaust the set of the principles. Rather, a third principle different from the couple of 
contraries must be posited alongside them. 
The meaning of [e] the solution of the aporia is unclear. On the one hand, we expect ἕτερον to 
refer to contrariety in general, and the ἕτερόν τι τρίτον to be [S] a substrate [Alterity condition] 
 
76 Cf. §5.6. 
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that is not itself a contrary. According to this reading, the argument would refute [C**] in 
general, namely that the contraries are the only principles of natural things. 
 On the other hand, the argument, as it stands, does not seem to secure the conclusion we expect 
it to pursue. In fact, it seems rather to analyse a narrow sense of [C**] such as the one endorsed 
by many predecessors. Namely, that only a determinate pair of contraries (dense/rare or 
Love/Hate are the principles of natural things. If this is the case, Arg.1 does not seem sufficient 
to rule out a possible scenario according to which a pair of contraries H1+/H1- acts on a third 
contrary H2- (or H2+) different from H1+/H1-. According to the latter scenario, ἕτερον would 
refer to a particular pair of contraries undergoing change, and the result of the argument would 
clearly not rule out [C**] in its general sense, but only in its particular sense. 
 Let us assume Anaximenes’ scenario. If we posit dense and rare as the primary contraries out of 
which all other contraries derive, then, in order for change between the dense and the rare to 
occur, we must assume that [e] there is an ἕτερόν τι τρίτον on which the dense and the rare act. 
Nonetheless, it is left undetermined whether this ἕτερόν τι τρίτον be itself a contrary or a non-
contrary substrate. 
 This conclusion, nonetheless, is too weak to justify the doctrine of the three principles argued 
for in Phys.I.7 claiming that [S] the substrate is a principle and [Alterity condition] is not itself 
an opposite. 
 Other texts, such as GC.II.1, make the case for an ultimate, indeterminate (i.e. non-contrary) 
matter common to all natural things.77 Phys.I does not draw a distinction between proximate and 
remote (or remotest, i.e. primary) matter, although we may assume that he has the latter in mind, 
given that he tackles the first substrate and the first contraries of his predecessors.  
 In fact, if the proximate matter of change were at stake, Arg.1 would not escape the possibility 
that the ἕτερόν τι τρίτον be itself a contrary, so that, when H1+ changes into H1-, the the ἕτερόν 
τι τρίτον may be any other chance contrary H2+. 
 If, instead, the primary matter underlying all natural things and their contraries were at stake, 
Arg.1 would yield the expected result. Let us assume that the matter underlying the change 
between H1+ and H1- were the primary matter underlying all natural things and their contraries. 
 
77 Cf. 4.2.2.3.4. 
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If the primary matter coming to be all contraries were itself a particular contrary (e.g. H2+), then 
matter would allow for the contradictories to coexist whenever it changes into its contrary (H2-). 
Since this is impossible, primary matter [Alterity condition] must be different from contrariety. 
 Although it is possible that Aristotle has this argument in mind, Arg.1 most probably tackles 
dialectically a particular inconsistency deriving from a particular endorsement of the 
predecessors. Namely from a narrow version of [C**]: a particular pair of contraries are the only 
principles of change of natural things. Accordingly, the nature of the ἕτερόν τι τρίτον solving the 
aporia on the possibility of change is intentionally left indeterminate. 
 In conclusion, the main effects of Arg.1 are three. First, rejecting [C**] with relation to change. 
Second, in making this, endorsing its weaker version [C*]. Third, assessing the necessity of a 
third principle alongside the contraries, leaving its nature indeterminate. 
 
3.3. Arg.2 of Phys.I.6. The contraries are not principles of being exhaustively (⌐[C**]). 
 Phys., I.6, 189a27-34 challenges the conclusion of Arg.1 of Phys.I.5 that the contraries are the 
only principles of natural things with relation to their being. The relation between the two 
arguments is evident on two grounds. 
 First, the language of the argument is reminiscent of a terminology related first and foremost to 
the being and to the ontological constitution of things: the expression τῶν ὄντων οὐσίαν ([c]) and 
the formula εἶναι + ἐκ ([i]). 
 Second, in two places, the argument seems to take up Arg.1 of Phys.I.5.78 [d-g] seem to address 
the capacity of contraries to fulfil the priority condition of [COS], by showing there is something 
more primary than the contraries, namely the substrate. Moreover, in order to make sense of [i], 
we need to add a premise similar to [a’] from Arg.1 of Phys.I.5: [H3] everything is composed out 
of the contraries. 
 A general issue with relation to the scope of Arg.2 of Phys.I.6 must be tackled. It is clear that its 
main scope is to refute [C**] with relation to the being or ontological composition of natural 
 
78 Phys., I.5, 188a27-8: δεῖ […] τὰς ἀρχὰς μήτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μήτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πάντα: “The 




things. This scope is achieved by arguing that [C**] is faced with two aporias that must be taken 
to be insoluble. Nonetheless, refuting [C**] does not amount straightaway to arguing for [S]. In 
fact, [S] features in Arg.2 as a premise ([f]), rather than as a conclusion. 
 With relation to the substrate and its capacity to qualify as a principle, Arg.2 makes two 
different claims that have two different imports on the capacity of the contraries to qualify as 
principles. 
[S] The substrate is a principle; 
[S>C] The substrate is a principle rather than the contraries. 
 In Arg.1 of Phys.I.6, Aristotle had refuted [C**] and endorsed [C*] that the contraries are 
principles of natural things (non-exhaustively). 
 Arg.2 of Phys.I.6, instead, alongside endorsing [S], not only refutes [C**], but also poses a 
threat to [C*]. For endorsing [S] seems to entail that [S>C] the contraries fail to qualify as 
principles, for the substrate is prior to the contraries, and principles are prior. In a nutshell: 
[S] is incompatible with [C**], but compatible with [C*]; 
[S>C] is incompatible with both [C**] and [C*]. 
 In conclusion, endorsing [S], on the one hand, solves certain difficulties for the ontological 
constitution of natural things deriving from positing [C**]. Since [S] undermines [C**], but not 
[C*], it may seem that the result of Arg.2 is the endorsement of the Second horn of the aporia on 
the number of principles. 
 On the other hand, it appears that, once we endorse [S], a stronger version thereof necessarily 
follows, namely ([S>C]). And since [S>C] undermines not only [C**], but also [C*], the Second 
horn of the aporia appears to be internally problematic. For, the Second horn claims that [S] and 
[C*] are both true, but once we endorse [S], [C*] cannot be true, for [S>C]. 
 The aporia on the number of principles is thus a severe one, for Args.1-2 conclude that neither 





Phys., I.6, 189a27-34 
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι [a] κἂν τόδε τις ἀπορήσειεν, [b] εἰ µή τις ἑτέραν ὑποθήσει τοῖς 
ἐναντίοις φύσιν· [c] οὐθενὸς γὰρ ὁρῶµεν τῶν ὄντων οὐσίαν τἀναντία, [d] τὴν δ’ ἀρχὴν 
οὐ καθ’ ὑποκειµένου δεῖ λέγεσθαί τινος. [e] ἔσται γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς· [f] τὸ γὰρ 
ὑποκείµενον ἀρχή, καὶ [g] πρότερον δοκεῖ τοῦ κατηγορουµένου εἶναι. [h] ἔτι οὐκ εἶναί 
φαµεν οὐσίαν ἐναντίαν οὐσίᾳ· [i] πῶς οὖν ἐκ µὴ οὐσιῶν οὐσία ἂν εἴη; [l] ἢ πῶς ἂν 
πρότερον µὴ οὐσία οὐσίας εἴη; 
Moreover, [a] one may encounter further difficulty, [b] if one does not posit a different 
nature underlying the contraries. [c] For we see that the contraries are not the substance 
of any of the beings; and [d] it is necessary that a principle be not predicated of any 
substrate, [e] for in that case there would be a principle of a principle. [f] For the 
substrate is a principle, and [g] it seems to be primary with relation to what is predicated 
of it. Moreover, [h] we say that substance is not contrary to substance. [i] How can a 
substance ever be out of non-substances? [l] Or how can a non-substance be prior to a 
substance? 
 In what follows, I present a possible reconstruction of Arg.2. The structure of the argument is 
not transparent and requires the introduction of several hidden premises (that are indicated in my 
reconstruction by the letter H). 
[b] If [C**], then [a] aporias will arise. 
    [H0] Aporia 1: The substance of things will be itself a contrary. 
        [c] = ¬[H0] But substance is not a contrary, for 
            [h] substance1 is not contrary to substance2. And 
            [H1] substance1 is not contrary to a non-substance. 
                [H2] For, if ¬[H1],  
                    then two false consequences will arise ([i], [l]): 
                    [i] (Natural) substances will be composed out of non-substances, since 
                        [H3] = ~[a’] all natural things are composed out of the contraries (from    
                        Arg.1 of Phys.I.5). 
                    [l] Non-substance will be prior to substance, 
                                    for [H3] and for 
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                                    [H4] that out of which things are is primary with relation to the things    
                                    composed out of it (i.e. the elements of X are prior to X). 
                    [C1] [i] and [l] are false. Therefore, ¬[H2]. Therefore, [H1]. Since [H1] and [h], then    
                    [c]. Therefore, ⌐[H0]. Therefore, ⌐[C**]. 
    [d] Aporia 2: Predicates will qualify as principles, for 
        [H5] the contraries are predicated of a substrate. 
            [e] If [d], then there will be a principle of a principle. For 
                [f] the substrate is a principle 
                [g] and the substrate is prior to its predicates, and 
                [H5] 
                [H2] and the principle is prior. 
    [C2] But ⌐[e]. Therefore, ⌐[d]. Therefore, ⌐[C**]. 
 
3.3.1. Subargument 1. If [C**], then [Aporia 1] the substance of natural things will be itself 
a contrary. 
 The first aporia arising from [C**] concerns the substance of natural things. If [C**] all natural 
things are composed exhaustively out of the contraries, then, by necessity, [H0] the substance of 
natural things is itself a contrary. [C**] necessarily entails [H0], for, once we assume that the 
contraries exhaust the realm of natural things, the substance of natural things must be itself a 
contrary. But substance is not a contrary; therefore, [C**] must be false. 
 According to my reconstruction, the structure of the refutation is the following. [C**] is refuted 
by virtue of ruling out its necessary consequence [H0]. [H0] is shown to be false, for [c] (its 
contradictory: “substance is not a contrary”) is shown to be true. For the two possible ways in 
which a substance may be a contrary are both ruled out. Namely, a certain substance cannot be 
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contrary either to [h] a different substance or to [H1] a non-substance. [h] is assumed as true.79 
[H1], instead, is demonstrated by virtue of reductio, namely assuming its contradictory ([H2]) 
and deriving two false, necessary consequences from it ([i], [l]). Having ruled out the two 
possible ways in which a substance may qualify as a contrary, [c] is shown to be true. Therefore, 
[H0] must be false. And since [H0] is a necessary consequence of [C**], [C**] must be false as 
well. 
 I expand briefly on the passages of the argument that are in need of further explanation. 
 Premise [H1] must be introduced in oder to explain the reference to non-substance made in the 
two aporias in [i] and [l], which refute the claims that substance is, respectively, constituted out 
of and primary with relation to non-substance. 
 [h] and [H1] represent the two possible, exhaustive ways in which [c] may occur. Since [H1] 
neither can a substance be contrary to a non-substance [h] nor a can substance be contrary to 
another substance, then [c] substance is not a contrary. 
 [i] is a necessary, false consequence of [H2] (the contradictory of [H1]) and is derived from it 
through the addition of [H3], a premise similar to the source condition of COS from Arg.1 of 
Phys.I.5. Namely, the claim that contraries are that out of which natural things are composed. [i] 
is evidently considered implausible enough not to require the effort of confutation. Regardless 
whether we understand non-substance in a categorical sense (as quality, quantity, relation…) or 
as nothingness, it is evident that [i] substance cannot be composed out of non-substance. 
 [l] can be derived from the aforesaid premises and from [H4] a self-evident principle of 
mereology resembling the priority condition of COS. As in the case of [i], [l] is not explicitly 
refuted. Regardless whether we understand non-substance in a categorical sense (as quality, 
quantity, relation…) or as nothingness, it is evident that [l] non-substance cannot be prior to 
substance. 
 Two points are worth making. 
 (1) Aporia 1 clearly take up material from Arg.1 of Phys.I.5. First and foremost, Aporia 1 stems 
from the assumption of [C**]. Second, [H3] takes up the source condition of COS, namely the 
 
79 Such as Cat.5, where it is nonetheless also assumed without further discussion. See §4.1. 
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claim that natural things are composed out of the contraries. Finally, [l] employs the concept of 
priority in play in COS. Thus, Aporia 1 clearly addresses Arg.1 of Phys.I.5. 
 (2) It is questionable whether Aristotle really believes that Aporia 1 cannot be solved. In fact, 
there seems to be a contrast between the rejection of the idea that substance is an opposite in 
Arg.2 of Phys.I.6 and the result of Phys.I.7. In Phys.I.7, Aristotle posits form and privation as 
principles. Quite against [c], form and privation are substances, and are reciprocally opposed, 
although not in the same way as contraries are. Thus, according to Phys.I.7, there is a sense in 
which a substance is opposed – although not contrary – to another substance. If we reformulate 
the first subargument substituting “contrary” with “opposite”, no aporia arises out of it. 
 Likewise, [i] the aporia concerning the idea that natural things are composed out of non-
substances (i.e. privation) seems to posit no issue in Phys.I.7. In §5.5, I show that the substance 
representing the starting point of coming into being is composed out of matter and privation. 
 Considered within the conceptual framework of Phys.I.4-6, where the opposition between 
substance and non-substance coincides with that between primary substances and predicates of 
the Categories, Aporia 1 is an unescapable difficulty. If we consider the first subargument in the 
hylomorphic perspective of Phys.I.7, Aporia 1 does not arise at all. 
 
3.3.2. Subargument 2. If [C**], then [Aporia 2] predicates will be principles. 
 A further necessary and false consequence arising from [C**] is presented in [d]. If the 
contraries were the only principles of natural things, then predicates would qualify as principles. 
For the contraries are always predicated of a substrate. And since the substrate is a principle and 
prior to the contrary predicates, assuming that the contraries are principles amounts to endorse 
that there is a principle of a principle. But this is false, for principles are something that is prior. 
Therefore, since the contraries are posterior to the substrate, the contraries do not qualify as 
principles, whereas the substrate does. 
 Let us consider again the scenario evoked by COS in Arg.1 of Phys.I.5. Let us assume P1 is a 
principle of P2, that both P1 and P2 are principles of [NT], the set of natural things. P1 fulfils both 
the source and the priority condition with relation to P2 and [NT], for P2 and [NT] are 
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ontologically composed out of P1, and there is no P3 out of which P1 is composed. Therefore, P1 
is a principle of P2 and [NT]. P2, instead, may seem to qualify as a principle of [NT], for [NT] is 
composed out of P2. Nonetheless, P2 fails to fulfil the priority condition, for it is in turn 
composed out of P1. Therefore, P2 fails to qualify as a principle. 
 With relation to the result of Aporia 2, three points are clear. First, as expected, [C**] is ruled 
out. Since [d] is a necessary and false consequence of [C**], [C**] is itself false. Second, against 
what might be expected, [S] does not belong to the results of the subargument. Rather, it is 
assumed as a premise ([f]). Third, Aporia 2 rules out not only [C**], but also its weaker version 
[C*]. Since the contraries are predicated of a substrate, they fail to qualify as primary, and 
therefore as principles. The substrate, instead, is predicated of nothing and exhibits the priority 
required to qualify as a principle. In short, the results of Subargument 2 are: ⌐[C**], for [S]; 
[S>C], therefore ⌐[C*]. 
 The reconstruction of Subargument 2 meets several difficulties that threaten its validity. 
 The predicational priority of the substrate over the contrary predicates does not seem to square 
with the causal priority prescribed by COS. In COS, the priority relation is subordinate to the 
source relation. P1 is prior to P2, for P2 is composed out of it, and P1 is not composed out of P2. In 
Arg.2 of Phys.I.6, the substrate is prior to the contraries in a predicational sense, whose import 
for the claim of the contraries to qualify as principles is not clear. 
 The nature of the relation of dependence of the predicates to their substantial subjects is 
controversial. A long-standing tradition has interpreted this dependency in a modal-existential 
sense, according to which P is dependent on S, if S is capable of existing separately, whereas P is 
not. This view is notoriously exposed to the counterfactual that no S can exist in absence of a 
certain number of Ps. Among other interpretations of the notion of dependence, Corkum’s recent 
suggestion hinging on the possession of a certain ontological status seems particularly promising. 
According to Corkum, P is dependent on S, if S qualifies as a being without P, but P does not 
qualify as a being without S. For S does not exist in absence of a certain number of Ps, but is a 
being not in virtue of having P; whereas every P is a being only on condition that it pertains to at 
least one S.80 
 
80 Corkum 2008. 
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 None of the aforementioned interpretations of dependence, nevertheless, seems to provide a 
rationale for the failure of the contrary predicates to qualify as principles. For the priority relation 
of COS that is relevant to causality is subordinate to the source relation, whereas predicational 
priority is not. 
 This difficulty may call either for a different interpretation of the priority condition of COS or 
for serious doubt over the validity of Subargument 2. As a matter of fact, the result of the 
argument leading to Aporia 2 is not endorsed in Phys.I.7. This may lead us to prefer the second 
option. 
 A further reason for doubt over the validity of the argument is the use of coincidental 
metaphysical predication as a key to understand the relation between the opposite and the 
substrate. It is clear that, in the case of 
[CMP] (Coincidental metaphysical predication): S is H+, 
S is prior to H+, for S is a substance and H+ is a non-substance. In the case in which the opposites 
are the substantial form and its privation endorsed in Phys.I.7, nonetheless, this proposition does 
not hold. Thus, [CMP] cannot describe the relation among matter, form and privation. For the 
way in which these latter two are predicated of the former one is evidently not the way in which 
non-substantial properties are predicated of substances. 
 Thus, Aporia 2 is faced with a row of problems. Does the priority of the substrate of [CMP] 
entail a full-fledged causal priority of the substrate over the contraries? (That is to say, if 
contraries are metaphysically predicated of the substrate, how may the substrate be an element of 
them?) Does the metaphysical priority of the substrate entail that the contraries are reducible to 
the substrate? Does coincidental metaphysical predication exhaust the relation of metaphysical 
dependence between the substrate and the contraries? 
 At least some of these questions find an answer in Phys.I.7, where the material provided by the 
arguments in Phys.I.5-6 – the opposites and the substrate – is reshaped according to their 
metaphysical and causal relations. The result of the long argument of the initial section of the 
chapter, that programmatically undertakes the task of solving the “2 vs 3 aporia” of Phys.I.6, 
does not seem to allow for the possibility to causally reduce the opposites to the substrate. 
Instead, the message of Phys.I.7 seems to be that the substrate and the opposites are causally on 
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the same footing, although, metaphysically, they might not be, for the substrate is primary, 
whereas the opposites (or at least the negative opposite, privation) comes to coincide with the 
substrate. Nonetheless, Phys.I.7 provides an aporetic answer to the question whether the 
substrate be primary over the positive opposite (i.e. the form) or the other way round. 
Apparently, further questions concerning the core of hylomorphism are postponed to other 
writings. 
 In conclusion, Subargument 2 has two different and contrasting effects with relation to the 
aporia on the number of principles. 
 First, [S] undermines its First horn, namely [C**]. Once the substrate has been introduced as a 
third different nature from the contraries, and as a principle of being, the First horn of the aporia 
on the number of principles is ruled out. 
 Second, Subargument 2 poses a threat also to the Second horn of the aporia, for it undermines 
the claim [C*] that contraries qualify as principles tout court. For Subargument 2 hinges on 
[CMP], and [CMP] entails [S>C] that the substrate is a principle rather than the contraries (for 
the substrate is prior to the contrary predicates, and the principle is prior). 
 A serious doubt looms on the validity of Subargument 2, both because [CMP] does not seem to 
describe the relation between matter and substantial opposition in the full-fledged hylomorphic 
perspective of Phys.I.7, and because the concept of priority entailed in [CMP] does not seem to 
be causally relevant. 
 
3.4. Args.1-2 and their effect on the aporia on the number of natural principles. 
 The horns of the aporia on the number of natural principles raised at the end of Phys.I.6 can be 
presented as follows: 
First horn: [C**] the principles are only the contraries. 
Second horn: (¬[C**]) the principles are not only the contraries. Rather, the principles 
are [C*] the contraries and [S] the substrate. 
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 I have endorsed that the aporia arises from a contrast between Args.1-2 of Phys.I.5 (arguing for 
the First horn) and Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6. On the backdrop of my reconstruction of the aporia, I 
first briefly summerise how each of its claims is argued for throughout Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6. 
Then, I expand on the relation between the various claims and show why the aporia they 
constitute is a serious one. Namely, why it is not possible to simply endorse either the First horn 
or the Second horn. 
 As their introduction anticipates, Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6 are primarily meant to undermine the 
conclusion of Args.1-2 of Phys.I.5 that [C**] the contraries are the only principles of natural 
things. I have claimed that Arg.1 does so in a dialectical way, by refuting a narrow version of 
[C**] endorsed by his predecessors (that a certain pair of primary contraries are the only 
principles). The scope of Arg.2 is to refute the broad version of [C**], for it addresses the claim 
of Arg.1 of Phys.I.5 that natural things are exhaustively composed out of contraries. Arg.2 shows 
that there is at least something, namely natural substances, that cannot be reduced to contrariety. 
Thus, Arg.2 undermines the first premise of COS argued for in Arg.1 of Phys.I.5, namely the 
claim that contraries are the exhaustive ontological components of natural things: 
[a**] all natural things are exhaustively composed out of the contraries. 
 Arg.1 clearly endorses [C*] as a premise. Subargument 2 of Arg.2, in arguing that [S>C], rules 
out that contraries are principles [⌐[C*]). 
 Concerning the necessity of positing a substrate, we must distinguish between two different 
claims. 
[S] The substrate is a principle of natural things. 
[S>C] the substrate is a principle rather than the contraries. 
 [S] is to some extent anticipated in Arg.1. Nonetheless, in arguing that an ἕτερόν τι τρίτον must 
be posited as a principle alongside the contraries, Aristotle omits to further qualify the nature of 
the third principle, although it is obviously a placeholder for the concept of a non-contrary 
substrate. Arg.2 first introduces the concept of substance and clarifying the failure of contraries 
to qualify as such (Subargument 1); then, it introduces the substrate as a substantial subject of 
predication for non-substantial contraries (Subargument 2). In doing so, Arg.2 makes clear that 
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the substrate and the contraries belong to different categories of being: the substrate is a 
substance; the contraries belong to the non-substances or coincidental properties. Thus, Arg.2 
endorses that – at least in the non-hylomorphic perspective opened by [CMP] – the substrate is 
not a contrary. 
 [S>C] derives from understanding the relation between substrate and contraries against the 
backdrop of the relation between substances and non-substances. Namely, according to [CMP]. 
If the contraries are predicated of the substrate, then they fail to exhibit the priority proper to the 
principles and fail to qualify as such. Thus, Subargument 2 of Arg.2 undermines [C*]. 
 The reciprocal opposition of the aforementioned claims shape the aporia on the number of 
principles into a serious one. At a close examination, in fact, neither of the horns presents a 
viable choice. 
 As I have claim, the main aim of Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6 is to undermine the First horn ([C**]) of 
the aporia on the number of principles. This aim is pursued with different scopes and in more or 
less convincing ways. Despite this, there is no doubt that Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6 aim at 
demonstrating ¬[C**], thus undermining the First horn of the aporia. 
 This is, nonetheless, not the end of the story, for the Second horn does not confine itself to 
claiming for ¬[C**]. Rather, the Second horn consists of two positive claims: [S] and a weak 
version of the First horn [C*]: the contraries are principles (namely [C**] deprived of its 
exhaustiveness). Now, a certain degree of antinomy between [S] and [C*] makes the Second 
horn as a non-viable option as the First horn. For Subargument 2 of Arg.2, by virtue of endorsing 
both [S] and [CMP], undermines the claim of the contraries to qualify as principles (¬[C*]). 
 In conclusion, Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6 score an aporetic result. On the one hand, they explicitly 
refute the First horn of the aporia ([C**]), by endorsing [S] a substrate different from contrariety. 
 On the other hand, in endorsing [S] in its stronger version [S>C], they endorse: [C*] and 
“[S>C], therefore ¬[C*]”, thus undermining the internal validity of the Second horn ([C*] and 
[S]). 
 Thus, the effect of Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6 is an aporetic one, for the arguments rule out both the 
First and the Second horn of the aporia on the number of principles. The solution of the aporia on 
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the number of principles in Phys.I.7 is achieved on several layers. First, Phys.I.7 shows in which 
cases the First horn and the Second horn are valid. Second, in order for the Second horn to be 
viable, Phys.I.7 must take position with relation to the priority issue stated in [S>C]. This second 
task is left undecided with relation to the form and the substrate. The riddle over the priority of 
either the form or the matter is a vibrant one in Aristotle’s philosophy. Providing an adequate 
answer to it entails differentiating the various meanings of priority and a nuanced answer. Phys.I 
does not embark on it, but is rather content with showing that the third principle, namely 
privation, is posterior with relation to both the form and the matter of the end point of change, 
i.e. the substance that has come into being. 
 Before reaching Phys.I.7 and solution of the aporia on the number of natural principles, I devote 
the next chapter to the analysis of the relation between the substrate and contrariety in the 
remaining section of Phys.I.6 and throughout the Corpus. Phys.I.5 has suggested that the 
contraries exhaust the realm of natural things. The arguments of Phys.I.6 aim at refuting this idea 
by making conceptual space for a substantial substrate different from the contraries. 
 The necessity for the substrate to be different from the contraries is, nonetheless, not as evident 
as we would wish. Arg.1 does not show it conclusively, if not from a dialectical point of view. 
Arg.2 makes a stronger case for it, by appealing to the concept of substance and to the failure of 
the contraries to qualify as such. This is, again, not decisive, for the prosecution of the argument 
of Phys.I.4-6 into Phys.I.7 posits as principle a pair of opposites from the contraries, namely 
form and privation, and these extend within the category of substance. Thus, if we reformulate 
[C**] into 
[C##] the principles are only the opposites, 
where the term “opposite” includes both the contraries and the substantial opposition of form and 
privation, the validity of Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6 is threatened. For neither it is true that a substance 
is not opposite to a substance (Subargument 1) nor is matter predicated of form/privation 
according to [CMP] (Subargument 2). In the next chapter, I analyse the relation between 





4. SUBSTANCE, CONTRARIETY AND OPPOSITION IN ARISTOTLE’S CORPUS. 
 For most of its part, this chapter provides a diversion from the text of Phys.I, but not from its 
topic, since I analyse the relation between substance and contrariety or opposition. 
 The First horn of the aporia on the number of natural principles raised in Phys.I.6 endorses that 
reality can be reduced to contrariety. This option is one that Aristotle evidently takes seriously, 
not only because the Second horn of the aporia is affected by internal difficulties, but also 
because, to some extent, Aristotle seems to endorse the possibility of reducing reality to 
contrariety. 
 There is some reason for doubting that the possibility of reducing reality to contrariety is faced 
with more counterfactuals than only substance. Evidence from the Categories denies that 
quantities may qualify as contraries (considering only the categories implied in change: 
substance, quality, quantity and place). With relation to quantity, I here confine myself to 
flagging the issue. 
 Substance is explicitly addressed in Arg.2 of Phys.I.6 as an exception to [C**]. In the following 
pages, I will enquire whether substance is really an exception to [C**] or to its broader version 
[C##] the principles are only the opposites. 
 The Categories provide the most clear-cut answer to the topic, and it is a negative one. Neither 
primary nor secondary substance, Aristotle claims in Cat.5, are contraries. I discuss these claims 
in §4.1. 
 Notoriously, the conceptual machinery employed in the Categories does not contemplate 
hylomorphism, i.e. the analysis of substance into matter and form. With relation to natural 
substances, which are hylomorphic compounds, the analysis of the Categories represents a first-
layer analysis that must be complemented with the hylomorphic analysis. Therefore, the enquiry 
on the relation between substance and contrariety or opposition must answer the questions 
whether form (§4.2.1.) and matter (§4.2.2.) are contraries/opposites or not. 
 My first result is that the former question can be answered affirmatively. On the one hand, form 
does not appear to fulfil the conditions for qualifying as a contrary; on the other hand, every form 
is opposed to a privation. 
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 My second result is a negative one. First, I analyse three key texts in order to show how the 
doctrines of the predecessors were unclear with relation to the nature of matter (§4.2.2.1-2.) As 
both Phys.I.4 and Phys.I.6 show, the predecessors, on the one hand, understood the need to posit 
a third principle alongside the contraries. On the other hand, most of them failed to properly 
delimit matter from contrariety, positing as primary matter one or more of the four elements, 
which are in turn contraries. 
 This having been ascertained, I turn to analyse the relation between the four elements and 
contrariety in GC.II.1-5 (§4.2.2.3.) I believe that this is a privileged position for assessing the 
issue, both because the four elements are the primary material constituents of the natural world 
and because they are essentially characterised by the four primary contraries hot/cold, dry/moist. 
If, as some modern interpretations contend, the four elements are nothing more than the primary 
contraries defining them, then matter is a contrary. Against this view, I show that the four 
elements are compounds of the primary contraries and of a primary substrate common to all four 
elements. The primary substrate, which I label “primary matter” in order to distinguish it from 
the traditional prime matter, is necessarily intertwined with contrariety, but is in itself non-
contrary, for it is what it is only potentially. Thus, primary matter does not exist actually as an 
indeterminate being, which would be absurd; rather, it exists actually only as a contrary element. 
Nonetheless, since it is what it is only potentially, it is different from the contraries and 
represents an exception to [C**] and [C##]. 
 
4.1. Substance and contrariety in the non-hylomorphic analysis of the Categories. 
 The text from Cat.5 I discuss makes two claims with relation to substance and contrariety, 
namely that neither [a] primary substance (Michael Jordan) nor [b] secondary substance (man as 
an abstract) has a contrary. 
Cat., 5, 3b24-27 
Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. Τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ οὐσίᾳ τί ἂν 
εἴη ἐναντίον; οἷον τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον· οὐδέ γε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ ζῴῳ 
οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον. 
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And it also belongs to substances that nothing is contrary to them. [a] For what would be 
contrary to a primary substance? For instance, there is nothing that is contrary to an 
individual man. [b] And to man or to animal, as well, there is nothing that is contrary. 
 Aristotle does not provide any argument for his claims [a] and [b], whose truth he probably 
believes to rest on their (alleged) self-evidence. A plausible rationale for these claims can be 
found in the impossibility for both [a] primary substances and for [b] secondary substances to 
qualify as maximal differences. 
 Contrariety is defined in numerous passages as the maximal difference within a genus.81 H+ is 
contrary to H-, iff H+ and H- belong to the same genus G and H+ is maximally different from H-, 
such that there is no Z that is more different from H- than H+. Let us consider the genus of 
colour. Within the continuous spectrum of colours, white is contrary to black, for both white and 
black belong to the genus of colour, and for there is no colour that is more different from black 
than white. For white possesses the maximal capacity to broaden sight and black possesses the 
maximal contrary capacity, i.e. the maximal capacity to narrow sight. All other colours are 
intermediate between white to black and can be ordered in a continuous series according to their 
relative degree of possession of one capacity or of the other. For example, cobalt blue will place 
itself very close to black within the continuum of colour, whereas lemon yellow will place itself 
very close to white. Cobalt blue possesses the capacity to narrow sight to a certain degree, 
whereas black possesses it maximally; lemon yellow possesses the capacity to broaden sight to a 
certain degree, whereas white possesses it maximally. Neither cobalt blue nor lemon yellow 
qualifies as contraries, for none of them possesses the capacity to broaden or narrow sight to a 
maximal degree, as white and black do. Rather, cobalt blue and lemon yellow are intermediate 
between the contraries white and black. 
 Now, one is not likely to find anything that qualifies as the maximal difference of [a] Michael 
Jordan or of [b] man within the genus of animal. 
 For, [a] why should a worm, a stone, a chair be contrary to Michael Jordan? A stone and 
Michael Jordan can have contrary qualities (one may be cold and the other hot, one animate and 
the other inanimate…), but the substance of Michael Jordan will not oppose to the substance of a 
stone as a contrary. 
 
81 Cat., 6, 6a11ff; Metaph.X.4. 
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 Similarly, [b] two secondary substances do not oppose as contraries, for substances such as the 
man or the worm or the dog do not seem to qualify as maximal differences within the genus of 
animal. How could the man qualify as the maximal difference of any other species within the 
genus of animal? 
 A doubt might be raised whether the substances S1 and S2 may be said to be contraries in virtue 
of the contrariety of their differentiae specificae. Let us consider a case in which that S1 and S2 
may seem to have contrary differentiae. For example, man is rational and worm is irrational.82 
This case of opposition might appear as an instance of substantial maximal difference, for 
rationality and irrationality seem to be maximally different, and for each of them individuates the 
substance of man and of worm. Without being rational, man would not be such; without being 
irrational, worm would not be such. Do man and worm, on account of their respective rationality 
and irrationality, qualify as contrary primary/secondary substances? This view can be rejected. 
 Even if we were to assume the principle83 “if Y and Y are substrances and have contrary 
differentiae, then X and Y are contrary substances,” still we are not likely to be able to identify 
one single determinate differentia (D-) that satisfactorily qualifies as the contrary of a given 
differentia (D+). For example, assuming that man possesses a certain kind of rationality (D+), will 
there be a determinate kind of irrationality that is contrary to man’s rationality and thus qualifies 
as D-? If the particular D- that is contrary to D+ cannot be identified, then everything that is 
utterly irrational (acacia, stone, worm…) will be contrary to the man, which is false, for every H+ 
has only one H-. 
 Let us accept provisionally the hypothesis that there are degrees of rationality, such that, for 
example, god possesses the maximal degree of rationality; the adult man possesses a somewhat 
smaller degree of rationality and the young man possesses an even smaller degree thereof. Once 
we get to the bottom of this scale, i.e. to utter irrationality, we lack a criterion for distinguishing a 
determinate kind of irrationality that qualifies as D- (i.e. as the determinate contrary of D+) from 
 
82 I here use articles before nouns in the following way: indefinite article (e.g. “a man”) to signify [a] primary 
substances; definite article (e.g. “the man”) to signify [b] secondary substances; no article (“man”) to signify both 
primary and secondary substances. 
83 I believe that Aristotle must be committed to this principle in some cases, for he endorses that the four elements 
are reciprocally contrary by virtue of possessing contrary properties (hot/cold, dry/moist) essentially. Nonetheless, it 
is controversial whether the four elements merit the status of substances. For an overview on this long-standing 
controversy, D’Angelo 2007. 
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a kind of irrationality that does not qualify as D-. Does the irrationality proper to the worm 
qualify as the D- that is contrary to the D+ of the man? Or rather, is the irrationality proper to the 
stone that qualifies as D-? 
 These questions are unlikely to find a positive answer: once we have reached the bottom of the 
degrees of rationality, it seems impossible to select a determinate kind of irrationality that is 
contrary to man’s rationality. Most plausibly, irrationality, when it is referred to acacia, worm 
and stone, is merely meant to qualify the complete absence of the positive feature of being 
rational that is common to all three items. If this is true, irrationality is an indeterminate property, 
under which indeterminately many instantiations of the complete lack of rationality fall. 
 If this is true, it seems impossible to choose any single instance of irrationality (viz. that of 
acacia) over another once (viz. that of worm) as the determinate D- that is contrary to the 
determinate D+ of man. Even if we were prone to accept the aforementioned principle that two 
substances are contrary, if their respective differentiae specificae are contrary to each other, we 
are nevertheless not likely to be able to individuate any two determinate differentiae specificae 
qualifying as contraries. Hence, we are not likely to find any two primary or secondary 
substances that are opposed to each other as contraries. 
 In conclusion, Cat.5 attests that neither [a] primary substances nor [b] secondary substances are 
contraries. 
 
4.2. Hylomorphic compounds and contrariety. 
 The claim of Cat.5 that substance has no contrary is not the end of the story. The relation 
between substance and opposition must be answered from a hylomorphic perspective, for it is the 
perspective that Aristotle pursues in Phys.I. 
 Since the hylomorphic compounds are analysable into matter and form, and as both matter and 
form have claim to qualify as substances, we need to specify whether matter and form are 
reducible to contrariety/opposition or not. 
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 My conclusion is that, from a hylomorphic perspective, substance as form is reducible to a 
certain kind of opposition (namely, that of form/privation). Substance as matter, instead, is not 
reducible to opposition. 
 
4.2.1. Form and opposition. 
 I claim that Aristotle conceives of a form of opposition for substance, in particular one for 
substantial forms. The opposition of form and privation, however, differs from the opposition of 
contrariety and applies to the category of substance. 
 The opposition of form and privation does not seem to identify with contrariety. For H+ is 
contrary to H-, if (1) H+ and H- belong to the same genus and if (2) H- is maximally different 
from H+. 2-feet-long and black neither (1) belong to the same genus (2) nor are maximally 
different (for only what fulfils (1) can also fulfil (2)). Yellow and black (i.e. the colour 
possessing the capacity to narrow sight maximally) both belong to the genus of colour, thus 
fulfilling the first condition for qualifying as contraries. Nevertheless, yellow is not maximally 
different from black, for yellow possesses only partially the capacity to broaden sight that is 
contrary to the capacity to narrow sight proper to black. White, instead, possesses the capacity to 
broaden sight to a maximum extent, thus qualifying as the contrary of black. 
 A corollary of this is that both H+ and H- must be single determinate degrees of a certain 
capacity, quality or feature. 
 In the case of substance, if a privation F- is opposed to a form F+, then neither the condition (1) 
that F- and F+ must belong to the same genus nor the condition (2) that F- must instantiate one 
determinate maximum degree of difference from F+ seems to hold. 
 (1) Form and privation may seem not to fulfil the first condition for qualifying as contraries, for 
it is questionable that F+ and F- do belong to the same genus G. Let us consider the form of man 
(F+) and the privation of the form of man (F-). Both the menses (i.e. the matter out of which the 
man is generated) and the corpse after death has occurred are deprived of the form of man. In the 
former case, the privation of the form of man inheres in the remote matter of man, the menses; in 
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the latter case, the privation of the form of man inheres in the proximate matter of the man, the 
human body. 
 When the form of man is lacking, neither the menses nor the corpse belong to the same genus as 
the man, for none of them is a living being. The menses are not yet a living being, for they are 
alive only potentially. The corpse is not a living being in actuality; moreover, it has even lost the 
capacity to be alive, to the extent that it is impossible to revivify a corpse. Thus, (at least in some 
cases) form and privation do not seem to belong to one and the same genus. 
 (2) The opposition of form and privation also does not seem to fulfil the second condition for 
qualifying as contrariety, for F- does not instantiate a determinate maximum degree of difference 
from F+. Let us consider the previous example. It does not seem the case that either the privation 
of the form of man in the menses or the one in the corpse may identify with H-, i.e. with the 
determinate, maximum degree of difference from H+. In fact, the privation F- opposing to F+ is 
said in many ways. In general, a natural thing can lack F+ either to a certain degree or 
completely,84 whereas H+ is contrary to H-, if H- lacks H+ completely.85 Thus, if F- lacks F+ only 
to some degree and not completely, then F- does not qualify as the contrary of F+. 
 One could answer this argument by claiming that at least complete privation may be identified 
with contrariety, whereas incomplete privation may coincide with the intermediates between the 
contraries. However, not even this seems to be the case. H+ has only one contrary, H-, which 
coincides with the maximum degree of privation of H+. The complete privation (F-) of the form 
of man (F+), unlike H-, cannot be identified with a single determinate item. In fact, F- is said in at 
least two different ways. In one sense, there is complete privation of the form of man in the 
menses before the man has been generated. In another sense, there is complete privation of the 
form of man in the corpse, i.e. when the proximate matter of man (the human body) has been 
deprived of the form of man, after the man has undergone corruption. These two instances of 
privation of the form of man cannot be two instances of the same way of being deprived, but that 
they are rather two different privations. 
 




 Let us look more closely at the complete privation (F-) of the form of man (F+) inhering in the 
menses and in the corpse. Both the menses and the corpse lack F+ completely. Nonetheless, they 
do not seem to lack the form of man in the same way. 
 In the former case, the privation of F+ does not seem to qualify the matter of man to any extent: 
the menses are a certain amount of matter endowed with such and such nature. The nature of the 
menses coincides with the positive features and capacity that are proper to the menses as a 
particular kind of matter (i.e. that is proper to the menses as they are such, and not marble or 
wood). The determinate, positive nature of the menses is unlikely to identify with the privation 
of the form of man inhering in the menses before fertilization has occurred and the man has been 
generated. The determinate nature of the menses that allows for them to generate a man and not, 
say, a horse, is the nature proper to the menses as the proper matter of the man, and not as the 
privation of the form of man. 
 The fact that privation is unrelated to the determinate nature of the matter of generation is shown 
by the fact that the corpse or the menses of the horse cannot generate a man, although they are 
both deprived of the form of man. Therefore, the capacity for the man is not proper to the 
privation of man, but rather to the relevant matter of the man. Thus, the privation of the man 
does not entail any positive determinacy. 
 In conclusion, I have claimed that substantial forms do not admit of contrariety. Nonetheless, 
they admit of opposition, for every form is opposed to a privation. The kind of opposition of 
form and privation cannot be identified with that of contrariety. For neither (1) each form and its 
privation belong to the same genus nor (2) privation qualifies as the determinate maximum 
degree of difference from its corresponding form. 
 Thus, with relation to [C**; C##], it is plausible to admit that all substantial forms have a 
privative opposite, for all substantial forms can either be present or absent, and the absence of a 
substantial form coincides with privation. Phys., II.1, 193b18-21 substantiates this idea, in 
claiming that the formal cause is twofold, for form is both the positive form F+ and its privation 
F-, since “privation is to some extent a form.”86 
 
86 Phys., II.1, 193b18-20: ἡ δὲ μορφὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις διχῶς λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ἧ στέρησις εἶδός πώς ἐστιν. Far from 
equating the status of form to the status of privation (πως), this passage attests with no restriction, and thus plausibly 
with universality, that a privation F- corresponds to (every) form F+. 
116 
 
4.2.2. Matter and contrariety. 
 As I have claimed, a major endeavour leading from the dialectical discussion of Phys.I.4 to the 
Aristotelian doctrine of natural principles of Phys.I.7 lies in the clarification of the relation 
between matter and opposition. Most of Aristotle’s predecessors, in positing one of the elements 
as matter, had assumed that matter is essentially intertwined with contrariety, and thus to some 
extent itself a contrary. For instance, fire would not be fire if it were not endowed with hotness, 
and hotness is opposed to coldness, which in turn qualifies essentially water; thus, water is the 
contrary of fire. A few other thinkers had argued, instead, that matter must be a different nature 
from the contraries. 
 The traditional view about Aristotelian matter is that Aristotle also endorses the existence of an 
indeterminate matter as the primary substrate of all things (prima materia or prime matter). 
According to the traditional view, Aristotle’s primary matter would resemble Plato’s more than 
that of his other predecessors. If the traditional view is true, then matter is radically different 
from opposition, and the First horn of the aporia is false. 
 The endorsement of prime matter has been widely criticised in the last decades. The opinion that 
the primary substrate of all natural things coincides with the four elements has become nowadays 
predominant. If the modern view is true, then matter seems to be itself reducible to opposition 
and does not represent an exception to the First horn of the aporia. 
 In the following sections, I first provide a survey of the relation between matter and opposition 
attributed by Aristotle to his predecessors in Phys.I.4 and Phys.I.6. Then, I discuss Aristotle’s 
doctrine of the four elements in De Generatione et Corruptione, II.1-5, showing that he endorses 
an ultimate substrate of the four elements, which I call primary matter. Primary matter is not 
itself a contrary and represents thus an exception to the First horn of the aporia. 
 
4.2.2.1. Matter and contrariety in Aristotle’s survey of his predecessors in Phys.I.4. 
 In the opening of Phys.I.4 (187a12-23), Aristotle classifies his predecessors into two main 
groups, each endorsing to some extent and in different versions the claim that natural principles 
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are the substrate and the contraries. This is the core idea that Aristotle wants to abstract from the 
various opinions held by his predecessors on the principles of natural thing. 
 The two groups of predecessors enlisted in Phys.I.4 differ from each other with relation to (a) 
the number of substrate(s) they endorse; (b) the way in which the multiplicity of natural things is 
derived from the substrate; (c) the relation between the substrate and the contraries. 
Phys., I.4, 187a12-23 
Ὡς δ’ οἱ φυσικοὶ λέγουσι, δύο τρόποι εἰσίν. [1] οἱ µὲν γὰρ ἓν ποιήσαντες τὸ [ὂν] σῶµα τὸ 
ὑποκείµενον, ἢ τῶν τριῶν τι ἢ ἄλλο ὅ ἐστι πυρὸς µὲν πυκνότερον ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον, 
τἆλλα γεννῶσι πυκνότητι καὶ µανότητι πολλὰ ποιοῦντες (ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἐναντία, 
καθόλου δ’ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ὥσπερ τὸ µέγα φησὶ Πλάτων καὶ τὸ µικρόν, πλὴν ὅτι ὁ 
µὲν ταῦτα ποιεῖ ὕλην τὸ δὲ ἓν τὸ εἶδος, οἱ δὲ τὸ µὲν ἓν τὸ ὑποκείµενον ὕλην, τὰ δ’ 
ἐναντία διαφορὰς καὶ εἴδη)· [2] οἱ δ’ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι, 
ὥσπερ Ἀναξίµανδρός φησι, καὶ ὅσοι δ’ ἓν καὶ πολλά φασιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἐµπεδοκλῆς 
καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας·  ἐκ τοῦ µίγµατος γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι ἐκκρίνουσι τἆλλα. 
And from what the physicists said, there are two models. [1] The first group of physicists 
made the underlying body one, namely either one of the three [elements] or something 
else that is denser than fire but rarer than air. And from density and rarity they generate 
the rest, which they make many. And these [density and rarity] are contraries or, speaking 
generally, excess and defect. (Or, as Plato says, the Great and the Small. But Plato 
posited these as matter, and he posited the Form as the one. Instead, the physicists posited 
the underlying matter as the one, and the differentiae and the forms [they posited] as the 
one.) [2] The second group of physicists [endosed that] the contraries are separated out of 
the one in which they are contained, as Anaximander said, as well as those that made it 
[that out of which the contraries are separated] one and many, namely Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras. For they separated the rest out of the mixture. 
 The first group of predecessors ([1]) posited (a) one substrate and two contraries; the contraries 
(density and rarity) (b) act on the substrate, differentiating it into the existing multiplicity. 
According to the parallel texts GC, I.1, 314a7-13 and b1-6, this process of differentiation is 
accomplished through alteration, whereas the second group of predecessors endorsed division 
and aggregation. 
 This general scheme can be filled in differently with the details proper to each of the various 
doctrines held by the predecessors. With relation to the substrate, Thales endorsed water, 
Anaximenes air, Heraclitus fire; the thinker(s) endorsing the intermediate are, to my knowledge, 
always mentioned anonymously in Aristotle’s Corpus. Aristotle’s interest, however, lies in the 
general tripartite scheme, rather than in the details relative to each thinker. 
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 Phys.I.4 remains uncommitted to the (c) the relation between the substrate and the contraries. 
The dialectical discussion of matter in Phys., I.6, 189b2-11 further divides the thinkers of the 
first group into two subgroups with relation to (c). The thinkers endorsing the four elements 
assumed, on the one hand, a certain degree of difference between the substrate and the contraries, 
for they posited the substrate as a third principle besides the contraries. On the other hand, in 
positing one of the four elements as a substrate, they made the substrate a contrary itself, for the 
four elements are contrary to each other. Unlike the philosophers of the first subgroup, the 
thinker(s) endorsing the intermediate came close to understanding the alterity of the substrate, 
although Aristotle does not seem to concede her/them full recognition. 
 A short mention of Plato follows the presentation of the first group (lines 17-20). It is commonly 
considered as parenthetical; and this, I believe, with good reason. This notwithstanding, it is clear 
that Plato’s position is to some extent the reverse of that of the first group of thinkers.87 If the 
thinkers of the first group posited one substrate and two contraries, Plato identified the principle 
that is one with the form, and the substrate with the contrariety of the Great and the Small. It is 
plausible that Aristotle believes that Plato cannot be fully harmonised with any of the two groups 
presented in our passage. Nonetheless, he is mentioned parenthetically in order to highlight the 
fact that he also endorsed three principles, the contraries and the substrate, although a different 
model thereof. 
 If one were nonetheless to judge on (c) with relation to the brief mention of Plato in lines 17-20, 
it is clear that Aristotle attributes to Plato the belief that the substrate can be reduced to 
contrariety, for the Great and the Small are contraries. It is clear that a major critical target of 
Phys.I.9 is Plato’s belief that matter is a privative nature.88 If this were true, Aristotle argues, the 
substrate would be annihilated in receiving the form, for form and privation are incompossible.89 
 The second group of predecessors (187a19-26) includes two subgroups. This internal partition 
has been consistently overlooked by Aristotelian commentators and interpreters of Anaximander, 
all too ready to oppose the thinkers of the first group to those of the second group as monists vs 
 
87 Cf. Phys., I.9, 192a8-9: ὥστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος κἀκεῖνος. 
88 Phys., I.9, 192a1-25. 
89 This result is valid for Phys.I and Aristotle’s analysis of Plato’s matter as the Great and the Small. Elsewhere, in 
analysing Plato’s matter in the Timaeus (χώρα), Aristotle attributes to Plato the belief that matter is an indeterminate 
being radically different from contrariety. The question whether Plato holds one or two theories of matter, and the 
possibility to harmonise these two Aristotelian interpretations of Plato’s matter, are not discussed in my work. 
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pluralists. Accordingly, Anaximander’s apeiron has often been interpreted as a pluralistic 
mixture, and thus as composed out of the contraries. The distinction between monists and 
pluralists has recently lost its popularity among scholars; nonetheless, it is one that Aristotle 
endorses to a certain extent. The decisive point of the issue is to understand Aristotle’s 
conceptual framework in presenting Anaximander’s doctrine. 
 Anaximander is mentioned by Aristotle in a small number of passages. In two of them (Phys.I.4 
and Metaph., XII.2, 1069b18-24), Anaximander’s apeiron is compared to the mixture of 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Another passage is relevant for Aristotle’s interpretation of 
Anaximander’s doctrine: Phys., III.4, 203b3-15. Although Anaximander is not explicitly 
mentioned, the reference to him is assured by the commentators and by a verbatim quotation of 
Anaximander.90 Here, Aristotle interprets Anaximander’s apeiron as a single one body separate 
from and devoid of contrariety. 
 There seems to be some internal tension between the first two passages, where the apeiron is 
mentioned along with Empedocles’ and Anaxagoras’ mixture of a multiplicity of contraries, and 
Metaph.XII.2, where the apeiron is said to be one and to be separate from the contraries. With 
relation to (a), the first two passages may seem to identify the apeiron with multiplicity, whereas 
the last passage declares it to be one. With relation to (c), the first two passages seem to endorse 
that the apeiron consists of the contraries, whereas the last passage claims that the apeiron is 
separate from the contraries. 
 I believe that a close analysis of the two main testimonies on Anaximander’s apeiron can 
harmonise this apparent contrast.91 I argue that, with relation to (a), the two groups of thinkers 
are partially identified and partially differentiated. For Anaximander’s apeiron is one, whereas 
the material principles of the second group are both one (as a mixture) and many (with relation to 
the components of the mixture). With relation to (b), all the thinkers of the two subgroups 
believed that multiplicity is generated by virtue of a process of separation from the material 
principle. 
 
90 12B3 DK. Several scholars accept also the words περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν as an Anaximandrean 
quotation. 




 Now, is the apeiron a mixture of contraries or not? If (b) the contraries came out of it, it is 
intuitively plausible that the answer to our question is positive. Nonetheless, (a) the apeiron is 
one, whereas the mixture of the second subgroup is said to be one and many. Evidently, the 
decisive point lies in (c) the relation between the contraries and the substrate (the apeiron).  
 I believe that it is possible to interpret the text of Phys.I.4 as suggesting a loose similarity 
between the apeiron and the mixture of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. The claim that the 
contraries inhere in the apeiron (Phys., I.4, 187a20) can be interpreted both in a strong sense 
(thus identifying the apeiron with a mixture) and in a weak sense (as a general statement that 
contraries are in some sense contained in the apeiron). The weak reading has three advantages. 
First, it harmonises Phys.I.4 with Phys.III.4. Second, it explains why the apeiron is one and the 
mixture “one and many” (namely, because the apeiron is no mixture). Third, it harmonises with 
the most complete testimony on Anaximander’s cosmogony that is in our possession, that of 
Pseudo-Plutarch (12A10 DK). According to Pseudo-Plutarch, the primary contraries of 
Anaximander’s philosophy, the hot and the cold, are not contained in the apeiron, but rather 
generated out of an intermediate principle called γόνιμον. If this testimony is accepted as 
trustworthy, then the contraries do not inhere in the apeiron, but are rather contained in an 
intermediate principle, the γόνιμον, which is in turn separated out of the apeiron. 
 Further evidence can be gained through the analysis of the parallel texts GC, I.1, 314a7-13 and 
b1-6. The scope of GC.I.1 is to distinguish two groups of physicists according to (b) their 
conception of change.92 Namely, it distinguished between those who reduced change to alteration 
and those who reduced change to aggregation and separation. Further, it connects each mode of 
change with (a) an endorsement on the number of the material principle(s). 
 In a nutshell, GC.I.1 divides the physicists into two groups. On one hand, those who identified 
substantial change with (b) the alteration of (a) a single one substrate. On the other hand, those 
who identified substantial change with (b) aggregation and separation out of (a) a substrate that 
is not one, but many. 
 The picture is consistent with that of Phys.I.4, and the thinkers belonging to each group are the 
same. Nonetheless, two differences in the presentation of the second group can be spotted. First, 
 
92 Since the processes of change here analysed are the processes in which plurality is derived from the substrate, I 
believe that they inform us on (b). 
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in GC.I.1, (a) the substrate is said to be many, instead of one and many. Second, once this 
reformulation is accomplished, GC.I.1 drops the mention of Anaximander. Thus, if the substrate 
is not said to be one, then the identification between Anaximander’s apeiron and the mixture of 
Anaxagoras and Empedocles ceases to be possible. 
 In conclusion, the similarity between the two subgroups composing the second group of the 
predecessors seems to be thinner than thought by most interpreters. On a closer look, it adds up 
to (b) the idea that the contraries are, in some way, separated out of the substrate (c) in which 
they, to some extent, inhere. The way in which the contraries inhere in the apeiron is, 
nonetheless, an indirect one, for they are actually generated by an intermediate principle, which 
in turn inheres in the apeiron. The contraries of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, instead, inhere 
directly in the primeval mixture out of which they are separated by virtue of, respectively, the 
action of Love and Hate, and of the Intellect. It is because of this difference with relation to (c) 
that Anaximander’s substrate is said to be one, whereas the substrate of the second subgroup is 
one and many. 
 To conclude the survey on the predecessors in Phys.I.4, I briefly analyse the second subgroup. 
Most of Phys.I.4 is devoted to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and in particular to the confutation 
of the latter. This confutation is too specific for the aims of my analysis. I confine myself to 
contrast the position on (a-c) of the second subgroup with that of Anaximander. 
 The thinkers belonging to the second subgroup are differentiated from Anaximander with 
relation to (a) and (c), but are assimilated to him with relation to (b), for they all generate 
multiplicity out of the substrate through separation. As we have seen, with relation to (a), 
Anaximander posited the substrate as one, whereas Empedocles and Anaxagoras posited it as one 
and many. Plausibly, “one” refers to the substrate as a mixture, whereas “many” refers to the 
ingredients out of which the mixture is composed. With relation to (c), the second subgroup 
diverges from Anaximander, for Anaximander posited his apeiron as different and separate from 
the contraries, whereas the second subgroup identified the substrate with the contraries (i.e. with 
a mixture thereof). Thus, despite endorsing a plurality of substrates instead of a single one, 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras are assimilated to the first group with relation to (c), for they also 
identify the substrate with the contraries. 
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 To be sure, there is some internal difference, within the second subgroup, with relation to the 
extent of this identification. First, with relation to the quantity of the kinds of components, 
Empedocles posited a finite number thereof, whereas Anaxagoras posited an infinite one. 
Phys., I.4, 187a24-6 
διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τῷ […] ποιεῖν […] τὸν µὲν ἄπειρα, τά τε ὁµοιοµερῆ καὶ 
τἀναντία, τὸν δὲ τὰ καλούµενα στοιχεῖα µόνον. 
And they [Anaxagoras and Empedocles] differ from each other in virtue of the fact that 
the former posits infinite [material components], namely the homoiomeries and the 
contraries, whereas the latter posits only the so-called elements. 
 Thus, with relation to (a), Anaxagoras and Empedocles are differentiated from the first group 
and from the first subgroup (Anaximander) for not endorsing a single one material principle. 
Furthermore, they are differentiated from each other for positing finite (Empedocles) and infinite 
(Anaxagoras) material components. 
 Second, the difference between Empedocles and Anaxagoras does not concern only the number 
of the material components of reality, but also the discussion on what the primary material 
component of reality is. In fact, Empedocles identified the primary material components of 
reality with the four elements; Anaxagoras with the homoiomeries. 
 With relation to (c), the second subgroup is assimilated to the first group and differentiated from 
Anaximander. This assimilation, nonetheless, reaches different degrees in Empedocles and in 
Anaxagoras with relation to their understanding of what the substrate of reality is. 
Cael., III.3, 302a28-b3 
Ἀναξαγόρας δ’ ἐναντίως Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ λέγει περὶ τῶν στοιχείων. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ καὶ γῆν 
καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτοις στοιχεῖά φησιν εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ συγκεῖσθαι πάντ’ ἐκ 
τούτων, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τοὐναντίον· τὰ γὰρ ὁμοιομερῆ στοιχεῖα (λέγω δ’ οἷον σάρκα καὶ 
ὀστοῦν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον), ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ μίγματα τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
σπερμάτων πάντων· εἶναι γὰρ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀοράτων τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν πάντων 
ἠθροισμένον. [Text: Moraux 1965] 
With relation to the elements, Anaxagoras endorses a view that is opposite to 
Empedocles’. In fact, Empedocles claims that fire and earth and the others in the same 
series are the elements of the bodies, and that out of these all bodies are composed. 
Anaxagoras argues, instead, that the elements [of the bodies] are the homoiomeries (e.g. 
flesh, bones and such things), whereas air and fire are a mixture of these and of all other 
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seeds. For each of these [air and fire] consist of all the invisible homoiomeries gathered 
together [lit.: are what in itself gathers together of all the invisible homoiomeries].93 
 From Phys.I.4, we learn that Empedocles reduced the substrate of reality to the four elements, 
and thus to contrariety. Anaxagoras, instead, identified the substrate with the four elements and 
the homoiomeries. Nonetheless, Cael.III.3 states that the four elements and the homoiomeries are 
not on an equal footing. Rather, Anaxagoras believed that the four elements are intermediate 
elements of reality, as they are in turn composed out of the homoiomeries. Thus, with relation to 
(c), Empedocles seems to reduce material reality to the contraries, whereas Anaxagoras does not, 
for he reduces it to the homoiomeries, and it is clear that at least some homoiomeries are non-
contrary beings such as bones and flesh. 
 In conclusion, concerning (c) the relation between the contraries and the substrate, the 
predecessors show a strong tendency to identify the substrate with the contraries. This applies to 
the first group of thinkers, to Plato and to Empedocles. Anaxagoras endorse this identification 
partially. Anaximander, instead, endorsed a separation of the substrate from contrariety. 
 
4.2.2.2. Substrate and contrariety in Phys.I.6. The Alterity condition. 
 In the Phys., I.6, 189b2-11, Aristotle presents a survey of the doctrines of the predecessors on 
the substrate. 
Phys., I.6, 189b2-11 
ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ µίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ πᾶν, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ τὸ µεταξὺ 
τούτων. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ µεταξὺ µᾶλλον· πῦρ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ γῆ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ µετ’ 
ἐναντιοτήτων συµπεπλεγµένα ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἀλόγως ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὸ ὑποκείµενον 
ἕτερον τούτων ποιοῦντες, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων οἱ ἀέρα· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ἥκιστα ἔχει τῶν ἄλλων 
διαφορὰς αἰσθητάς· ἐχόµενον δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ. ἀλλὰ πάντες γε τὸ ἓν τοῦτο τοῖς ἐναντίοις 
σχηµατίζουσιν, πυκνότητι καὶ µανότητι καὶ τῷ µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅλως 
ὑπεροχὴ δηλονότι καὶ ἔλλειψις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. 
[[…] one will necessarily posit some third underlying nature], as did those who claim that 
everything is one certain nature, for instance water, fire and the intermediate between 
these. And the intermediate between these appears to have better [claim to qualify as the 
underlying nature]. For, fire and earth and air and water are intertwined with 
contrarieties. Therefore, it is not without reason that those [philosophers] make the 
substrate different from any of these [i.e. from any of the elements], or air among the 
 
93 Also: GC, I.1, 314a24-b1. 
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other [elements], for air is the element which is least endowed with perceptible 
differences (and second comes water). But all of them shaped the one by means of the 
contraries – by means of density and rarity, of the more and the less; and these are 
namely, in general, excess and defect, as I have claimed before. 
 The survey presented in 189b2-11 does not purport to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
doctrines of the predecessors. Even if we confine ourselves to the number of thinkers discussed 
in Phys.I.4, Aristotle explicitly mentions only the thinkers belonging to the first group, namely 
those who posited the substrate as one determinate nature (water, air, fire) and the intermediate.  
 The survey rather has an argumentative role in the agenda of Phys.I.5 and Phys.I.6 culminating 
to the aporia on the number of principles. There is a tension between the endoxon of Phys.I.4 that 
the predecessors endorsed a three-principles scheme including the contraries and one substrate 
and the claim endorsed in Phys.I.5 that contraries are the only natural principles (First horn of the 
aporia). A plausible solution of this tension is to locate the decisive point on the riddle over the 
nature of the substrate as a third principle alongside the contraries. The gist of the aporia lies on 
whether the substrate should be reduced to the contraries or not. 
 If the substrate is a third nature different from the contraries, then the First horn of the aporia is 
dismissed, but we are confronted with the alleged internal inconsistency of the Second horn, 
which endorses both that contraries are principles and primary, and that contraries are not 
primary and therefore not principles. 
 If, rather, the substrate is reducible to the contraries, for it is identified with one (or more) of the 
positive four elements, and the four elements are intertwined with contrariety, then the First horn 
of the aporia is true, and contraries exhaust the set of the principles of natural things. 
 Accordingly, Phys., I.6, 189b2-11 contrasts two views on the substrate. The first view is that the 
substrate is one of the contrary four elements. The second view is that the substrate does not 
identify with any determinate nature, and therefore also not with contrariety. 
 Aristotle does not confine himself to highlighting this contrast, but credits the second party with 
a superior, although partial, understanding of what the substrate is. The result of this 
confrontation with the predecessors is that the thinkers who identified their substrate with one of 
the elements failed to recognise its indeterminate nature. This failure of the predecessors 
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amounts to the failure to draw a clear dividing line between the contraries and the substrate. I 
refer to this as to the Alterity condition. 
 The idea of a substrate whose nature does not coincide with any of the positive, contrary 
features shaping reality is theoretically a difficult one. It has been probably endorsed for the first 
time, among the philosophers, by Anaximander of Miletus. If we consider Anaximander’s 
Apeiron from the Aristotelian perspective, namely as a substrate, then the endorsement of the 
Indefinite by Anaximander is testimony of an alternative concept of matter and substrate. From a 
passage in which Aristotle is believed by Ancient commentators and modern scholars to unfold 
Anaximander’s rationale for endorsing the Indeterminate as a principle, we learn that the never-
ending process of reciprocal change and destruction occurring among the contraries would have 
led Anaximander to posit as a principle a nature that is independent and beyond the contraries. 
The idea of a primeval matter that is radically different from contrariety is not one that 
Anaximander’s contemporaries and successors were prone to accept. Neither Anaximander’s 
predecessor Thales nor his successors Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, Heraclitus, in 
Aristotle’s understanding of their principles as matter, were ready to detach their speculation 
from their experience of reality and of the contrariety constituting it, postulating as a principle a 
pure indeterminate nature such as Anaximander’s Apeiron. 
 As Anaximander’s successors, modern scholarship has also found the idea of an indeterminate 
first substrate unappealing, and has rejected a long scholarly tradition on matter attributing to 
Aristotle the endorsement of an indeterminate prime matter as the ultimate substrate of reality. 
The idea that Aristotle’s ontology may contemplate an item which is existing and devoid of any 
positive quality and contrariety constituting reality is admittedly a dubious one. Not only is the 
idea of an existing indefinite item contrary to experience; also, it violates one of Aristotle’s basic 
requirements for substantiality, namely the requirement of being something determinate.94 
 In conclusion, 189b2-11 witnesses Aristotle’s confrontation with two opposing views of matter 
and of the relation between matter and contraries. 
 On the one hand, the view that matter is something determinate and intertwined with contraries, 
for instance one of the elements. This is the view on matter underlying the First horn of the 
 
94 Metaph.VII.3; Cat.5. 
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aporia on the number of natural principles. If matter can be reduced to the contraries, then the 
contraries are exhaustive principles of natural things both with relation to being and with relation 
to change. Respectively, the idea that the contraries are the only principles of natural things 
raises a difficulty both with relation to the substance of things (for contraries are not substances) 
and with relation to the possibility of change (for contraries do not qualify as subjects of change). 
 On the other hand, the view that matter is something indeterminate. The indeterminacy of matter 
does not in itself amount to radical alterity from contrariety. Rather, it is presented by Aristotle 
as a scale. In its more radical version, matter is seen as non-intertwined and different from 
contrariety, such that it cannot be reduced to the contraries, but rather amounts to a third different 
nature from contrariety. This is the position on matter endorsed in the Second horn of the aporia 
on the number of natural principles raised at the end of Phys.I.6. Nonetheless, once it has been 
accepted, the claim of contraries to qualify as principles appears to be undermined, thus 
undermining also the consistency of the Second horn of the aporia itself. In fact, the claim of the 
substrate to qualify as a principle both rests on the claim that contraries are principles and 
undermines this claim. 
 A serious aporia, thus araises. I believe that the aporia on the number of natural principles is a 
serious one not only due to its formal features, but also because it affects Aristotle’s doctrine of 
matter. Aristotle’s doctrine of matter is, I believe, an attempt to reconcile the two opposing 
requirements mentioned above. 
 On the one hand, Aristotle endorses Empedocles’ idea that the world (or, at least, the natural 
world) is composed out of the four elements as its basic constituents. Thus, matter is necessarily 
intertwined with contrariety, for the four elements are themselves contraries. If the four elements 
are the basic matter of the natural world, then the claim of the First horn of the aporia on the 
number of principles receives some justification, for it appears that matter itself can be reduced 
to contrariety. 
 On the other hand, the idea that matter is the ultimate substrate of all things substantiates the 
claim that matter is indeterminate. If the ultimate substrate were determinate, then its determinate 
features would conflict with the nature of the things composed out of it. 
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 Aristotle’s confrontation with and solution of this difficulty concerning matter is contained in a 
few chapters of the second book of De Generatione et Corruptione. As this text endorses 
Empedocles’ theory of the four elements and discusses both them as contraries and as matter, I 
believe that this text represents a unique opportunity for a study of the relation between matter 
and contrariety. Although it may appear that (and although predecessors have endorsed that) the 
four elements are the simplest constituents of reality, Aristotle endorses the claim that they are in 
turn hylomorphic compounds. In fact, each of the four elements is composed out of one contrary 
out of each of the two pairs of primary contrarieties (hot/cold; dry/moist), and out of the primary 
substrate of reality, which is indeterminate and does not coincide with contrariety. The primary 
substrate is what the elements potentially are; the primary contraries are what the four elements 
are in actuality. As the indeterminate bearer of the primary contraries that is what it is only 
potentially, the primary substrate cannot be reduced to contrariety, and represents, thus, an 
exception to the First horn of the aporia on the number of natural principles. 
 
4.2.2.3. Primary matter and primary contrariety in Aristotle’s theory of the four elements. 
On GC.II.1-5. 
 Prime matter is one of the most controversial topics of Aristotelian scholarship. An enduring 
tradition has assumed that Aristotle is committed to the existence of an ultimate material 
substrate of all things, indeterminate and potential. This view has been criticised in the late 1950s 
and, more substantially, from the 1970s to nowadays. The core claim of the anti-traditionalists is 
that the ultimate material substance of reality is represented by the four elements fire, air, water 
and earth, which are simple beings and, as such, non-analysable into an alleged further substrate. 
 If the anti-traditionalists are right, then matter does not constitute an exception to the First horn 
of the aporia. If, instead, the traditionalists are right, then matter is something different from 
contrariety and opposition, thus ruling out the First horn of the aporia. 
 I analyse a crucial text for the controversy, GC.II.1.5. Against the traditionalists, I deny that this 
text provides any evidence for prime matter, namely for an ultimate, indeterminate material 
substrate of all beings. Against the anti-traditionalists, I show that Aristotle is committed to the 
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view that the four elements are hylomorphic compounds. As such, the four elements are 
composed out of an ultimate material substrate. 
 I enquire into the material substrate of the four elements, which I label “primary matter”. I show 
how its invention in GC.II.1-5 is Aristotle’s assessment of two opposite conception of matter of 
his predecessors. The majority of the predecessors identified primary matter with the four 
elements; a small group of predecessors with an indeterminate body. I show how Aristotle’s 
primary matter differs from both views on matter expressed by his predecessors and I try to 
understand the importance of the concept in Aristotle’s natural science. Unlike the blank capacity 
for everything of prime matter, primary matter is endowed with a determinate capacity, namely 
the capacity for the four primary contraries. Having a determinate nature, primary matter is 
instrumental to the explanation of the basic features of natural, sublunary reality, namely its 
being perceptible and changeable. 
 
4.2.2.3.1. Introduction and status quaestionis.  
 A favourite battlefield for discussion on prime matter is GC.II.1-5. And this on good grounds, as 
the second book of GC contains Aristotle’s theory of the four elemental bodies. Fire, air, water 
and earth are the simplest bodies constituting the sublunary world. Answering the question 
whether Aristotle endorses the existence of prime matter amounts to answering the question 
whether Aristotle endorses the existence of a substrate of the four elements or not. A reverend 
tradition stretching through centuries has endorsed that Aristotle does. A more recent, but well-
established interpretative line claims that the four elements are the basic, simple constituents of 
reality. 
 The traditionalists believe that there is a prime matter that:95 (a) is the substrate of all things, 
namely what ultimately underlies their properties, as well as what persists in every process of 
change they undergo. (b) As its nature is purely potential, and as (a), then primary matter 
 
95 Digging out the entirety of this tradition and displaying its internal complexity is a task that I will not pursue here. 
For what I take to be a standard exposition of the traditional interpretative line: Zeller 1879, pp.431ff; Joachim 1922, 
pp.92-3, 96-7; Robin 1944, 73-80. After King’s criticism, the traditional interpretation has been endorsed by: 
Solmsen 1958, Robinson 1974, Algra 2004, Brunschwig 2004, Scharle 2009. 
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possesses a capacity for all things. (c) Being purely potential, it is completely indeterminate and 
does not exist as such in actuality; rather, it exists in all things potentially. 
 The anti-traditionalist interpretative line is more nuanced than I will be able to depict in these 
pages.96 I believe that the most detailed argument for this interpretative line has been provided by 
Mary Louise Gill, whereas the most lucid reflection of the metaphysical underpinnings of the 
anti-traditional view can be found in Furth. The following assumptions, as I take it, are 
characteristic of the anti-traditional interpretation. (d) The four elements are simple, non-
composite beings, the ultimate material layer underlying every natural sublunary being. (e) 
Elemental change can occur in absence of a substrate different from the contraries proper to the 
elements; for instance, when fire changes into air, a sheer replacement of substances occurs. 
 I provide here several counterarguments against both of assumptions. How my reconstruction of 
GC.II.1-5 differs from the anti-traditionalist view will become evident in the following 
paragraphs. 
 With relation to (d), two points can be made. First, the arguments for (d) are subtle, but thin. For 
instance, Gill (pp.77ff.) denies that the four elements have a hylomorphic structure based on De 
Cael.III.3, where Aristotle distinguishes between simple bodies (the four elements) and 
composite bodies (the rest of the natural world). The latter ones are composed out of the former 
ones, which are the simplest bodies of all. Gill evidencetakes this to mean that the four elements 
cannot be composed out of anything else (i.e. that they are not further analysable tout court). 
Rather, Aristotle confines himself to excluding that the four elements are analysable into simpler 
bodies. GC.II.1, I argue, endorses that the four elements have a hylomorphic structure, namely 
that there is a matter underlying the four elements, and that this matter is a body in potentiality. 
The picture drawn in GC.II.1 is compatible with the non-analysability claim of De Cael.III.3, for 
this is restricted with relation to bodies. Thus, natural, sublunary complex beings are composed 
out of the four elements; the four elements are not composed out of simpler bodies, for they are 
the simplest among bodies. Nonetheless, they are composed out of a common material substrate 
and primary contraries. 
 Second, (d) is in contrast with the claim that the four elements are essentially endowed by the 
four primary contraries. If we refuse to admit that the four elements have a hylomorphic 
 
96 King 1956; Charlton 1983 and 1992 (1970); Furth 1988; Gill 1989; Broadie 2004; Frede 2004; Rashed 2005. 
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structure, then we are committed to the reification of the primary contraries. Namely, if fire is 
hot, and if there is no substrate underlying hotness, then hotness must a thing and not a property. 
But this is absurd. 
 Phys.I.6 raises the difficulty whether the principles of natural things are only the contraries or 
the contraries and the substrate. Namely, whether the substrate may be reduced to contrariety, or 
whether the substrate is rather a third nature different from the contraries. The difficulty is 
imported in Phys.I by the (partially) dialectical character of its analysis. Plausibly, Aristotle 
believes that his predecessors failed to grasp the difference between substrate and property, 
making their material principles reified contraries (fire=the hot; water=the moist). Part of the 
endeavour of providing a solution to the difficulty consists in clarifying the relation between the 
substrate and the contraries (Phys.I.7). Similarly, a passage from GC.II.1 contrasts two opposite 
views on primary matter endorsed by the predecessors. The first group of thinkers identified 
primary, unanalysable matter with one or more of the elements. The second group with an 
indeterminate body. The first group is committed to reifying contrary properties, for the four 
elements are endowed with contraries, and for their material principle is primary and 
unanalysable. The second group is committed to the actual existence of a body devoid of 
contraries. Both views are refuted by Aristotle and replaced by his own view on primary matter 
underlying the four elements. In making the four elements not further analysable, Gill commits 
to the philosophical error of the first group of the predecessors. 
 (e) In GC.II.2-5, Aristotle presents his account of elemental change. The four elements undergo 
generation out of and corruption into each other, when one or both of the primary contraries 
defining them changes into its/their contrary/contraries. As in other kinds of generation and 
corruptions, change occurs according to the hylomorphic scheme in which a matter loses a form 
and takes up a new one. Gill presents a cunning account of elemental change relying on the 
contraries alone, one of which undertaking the function of matter (namely, persisting through 
change), while the other two assume the function of form/privation (where form replaces 
privation). Gill’s reconstruction has the advantage of making good sense of Aristotle’s claim that 
adjacent elements (the ones sharing one contrary, but differing with relation to the second 
contrary) change into each other faster than contrary elements (the elements differing with 
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relation to both contraries).97 Nonetheless, Gill’s explanation is at best an analogical one. 
Claiming that a contrary assumes the role of matter in elemental change amounts to either 
reifying the contrary or entrusting a property with a role it cannot fulfil. In fact, (one of) the 
role(s) of the substrate in change is to be that which undergoes change by virtue of being the 
bearer of the contrary properties that alternate through the process of change. But a contrary 
property does not qualify as a bearer in a process of change. 
 In conclusion, with relation to Gill’s view, I have argued that she fails to demonstrate that the 
four elements are not analysable into further components, and that the claim that the four 
elements are simple, unanalysable bodies meets difficulties. 
 Against the traditionalists, I believe that GC.II.1-5 cannot be used along with other texts to 
ground (a,b). Metaph.VII.3, according some interpretations, might provide evidence for prime 
matter as the ultimate substrate underlying all things. The scope of GC.II.1-5 is, instead, the 
analysis of the material components of the natural, sublunary world. As matter is a principle, and 
principles are relative terms, matter must be specified with relation to the beings of which it is 
matter. Different realms of reality do not necessarily have the same matter, for example, among 
natural things, the sublunary world is composed out of the four elements, whereas the heavens 
are composed out of ether. The question whether there is a prime matter underlying all things is 
not pursued in GC.II.1-5. In the best-case scenario, the evidence for prime matter that 
traditionalists may receive from GC.II.1-5 is evidence for the existence of a material substrate 
underlying the natural sublunary world. 
 With relation to (c), widespread suspicion has marred the credibility of prime matter, to such an 
extent that “it has become fashionable to deny Aristotle’s commitment to primary matter” and 
that “the few traditionalists still around […] consider the view to be something of an 
 
97 On Gill’s account (pp.68-75): (a) when fire (hot, dry) is generated out of air (moist and hot), hot assumes the role 
of matter, while moist changes into dry in t1; (b) when fire (hot, dry) is generated out of water (cold, moist), what 
follows occurs: in t1, cold assumes the role of matter, while moist changes into dry; in t2, dry assumes the role of 
matter, while cold changes into hot. Thus, with relation to the speed of change: (a) < (b). Gill’s reading may seem to 
explain Aristotle’s remark on the speed of elemental change more satisfactorily than the traditional view, according 
to which, when fire is generated out of water, prime matter loses the qualities cold and moist, and acquires the 
qualities hot and dry. Gill objects that nothing prevents cold and moist to change simultaneously into their contraries 
in t1, so that the difference in speed between (a) and (b) would remain unexplained. For the sake of brevity, I do not 




embarrassment”.98 The utility and consistency of a pure capacity for everything devoid of any 
determinacy has increasingly become suspicious. This has led several modern scholars endorsing 
prime matter to concede primary matter a certain degree of determinacy.99 
 Along with the traditional view, I believe that GC.II.1-5 supports the claim that the four 
elements do not constitute the ultimate material layer of reality, for the four elements are 
hylomorphic compounds. As such, the four elements are composed out of four primary 
contraries and a substrate, which is indeterminate and potential. Nonetheless, I believe that these 
claims must be specified. The matter of the four elements is indeterminate with relation to 
actuality, for it is in itself a potential nature, i.e. as it is what the four elements are potentially. 
With relation to potentiality, nonetheless, the matter of the elements is a determinate capacity. 
Far from being a blank capacity for everything, the matter of the elements is the capacity for the 
primary principles of the natural, sublunary things, namely for the primary contrary pairs of hot 
and cold, dry and moist. These four contraries are the basic principles of natural sublunary 
beings, for they explain the two essential features of this realm of beings, namely being tangible 
and changeable. As they are contraries, and as change occurs between contraries, hot, cold, dry 
and moist account for changeability. As contrariety is what makes things perceptible, and as hot, 
cold, dry and moist are primary among the tangible contraries, they are the first principles of 
tangibility. Being a determinate capacity for a determinate set of properties essential to a 
determinate realm of beings, the matter of the four elements is the ultimate substrate of the 
natural sublunary world. Thus, although indeterminate with relation to actuality, the matter of the 
four elements still qualifies as a determinate, explanatory tool with philosophical importance. 
 In what follows, I analyse selected passages of GC.II.1-5 in order to reconstruct Aristotle’s 
invention of the concept the relevant matter of the four elements and, thus, of the natural 
sublunary world. In order to delimitate this concept from the traditional concept of prime matter, 
I speak of primary matter, meaning with it the primary matter of the natural sublunary world.100 
 
98 Scharle 2009, p.341. 
99 Sokolowski (1970, pp.263-88), Cohen (1984, p.179; 1996, p.62) and Sorabji (1988) believe that primary matter is 
spatially extended. Cohen adds the capacity to change, followed by Byrne (2001), who adds the feature of being 
corporeal. 
100 This paper is confined to the assessment of the significance of GC.II.1-5 for the discussion on prime matter, and 
provides partially negative news for the traditionalists. Nonetheless, I remain uncommitted on whether Aristotle 
endorsed a primary substrate for all beings in other texts. A study of this issue must first answer the general question 
“what kinds of beings have matter?”; then proceed to the analysis of the primary matter of each kind of being; 
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 Summing up, the results of my analysis of GC.II are both negative and positive. On the negative 
side, I contest that GC.II supports the anti-traditionalist view that the four elements constitute the 
ultimate layer of reality. Regarding the traditional view, I refute that GC.II may be used as a 
witness for prime matter, both from an extensional point of view (for it does not concern the 
matter of all things) and from an intentional point of view (for primary matter is not 
indeterminate tout court, but only with relation to actuality). On the positive side, I claim that 
GC.II.1-5 endorses and develops the concept of primary matter as the ultimate material element 
of natural, sublunary reality. The core of this project consists in clarifying the relation between 
primary contrariety and its substrate, primary matter. 
 
4.2.2.3.2. The agenda of GC.II.1-5. The four elements and primary contrariety. 
 In GC, II.1, 328b26-329a8, Aristotle sets the topic of the second book, namely the four 
elements. The analysis of the four elements connect to the general topic of GC, namely to the 
analysis of change in general and of substantial change in particular, for the four elements are the 
material principles responsible for the generation and corruption of the natural world. A possible 
reconstruction of the argument for this claim is the following. 
[P1] “generation and corruption in the case of all substances which are by nature 
composite do not occur without the perceptible bodies”.101 
[P2] (endoxon): Most of the predecessors claim that the four elements (one, two, three or 
all four of these) are the substrate and matter of the perceptible bodies (i.e. of natural 
things).  
[P3] And natural things undergo generation and corruption by virtue of their matter(s).102 
 
finally, ask whether Aristotle endorses a further substrate of the primary matters. My sympathy goes to the idea of a 
set of primary matters, each coinciding with the determinate capacity for the primary formal principles proper to 
each realm of the enmattered being. Several texts (among which Metaph.VII.3) may provide evidence that Aristotle 
engages in the mental experiment of stripping something down to its last feature and property in order to reach pure 
subjecthood. That the result of this mental experiment corresponds to a being and not to utter nothingness has been 
(I believe rightly) contested. 
101 GC, II.1, 328b32-3. For the Greek text of GC, I use the most recent critical edition of the work: Rashed 2005. 
Occasional diversion from Rashed’s text are signalled. 
102 [P2,3] cf. GC, II.1, 328b33-329a5. 
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[C] Therefore, the four elements are elements or principles of generation and 
corruption.103 
 [P2] is stated as an endoxon, and is apparently one that Aristotle does not intend to challenge. 
And this on two grounds. Firstly, Aristotle devotes the large section of GC.II.1 (329a8-b3) to the 
refutation of the heterodox view that matter is an indefinite body different from the four 
elements. Secondly, in GC, II.1, 329b3-6, Aristotle sets the agenda of GC.II.2-5 on the 
assumption that P2 is true. 
GC, II.1, 329b3-6 
Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ὣς σώματος ποίας καὶ πόσας λεκτέον ἀρχάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι 
ὑποθέμενοι χρῶνται, καὶ οὐδὲν λέγουσι διὰ τί αὗται ἢ τοσαῦται. 
And nonetheless, we must discuss also which ones and how many [of the elements] are 
principles of the body. In fact, the other [thinkers], make use [of the elements] [merely] 
by virtue of assuming them, but they say nothing about why [they make use of] these 
particular elements or [of] these many. 
 As in Phys.I.5, Aristotle’s use of dialectical premises in 329b3-6 follows two steps. The first 
step consists in accepting the dialectical premise as valid, namely, that there are four elements. 
The second step consists in providing the rationale for the truthfulness of the dialectical premise. 
The project of providing a rationale for the fact that the material principles of natural (sublunary) 
bodies are the four elements fire, air, water and earth, and only these four elements, is fulfilled in 
GC.II.2-3. 
 In GC.II.2, Aristotle selects the primary contraries that qualify as principles of the natural world. 
This selection is achieved in two steps. Firstly, as the natural things are the things which are 
tangible, the contraries qualifying as principles of natural things are the contraries belonging to 
touch (329b7-16). Secondly, the contraries qualifying as principles of natural things are, among 
the contraries belonging to touch, those that are primary. Thus, Aristotle enlists the contraries 
belonging to touch and shows that all of them can be reduced to two pairs of contraries, which, in 
turn, are not reducible to each other: hot/cold and dry/moist (329b16-330a30). 
 In GC.II.3, Aristotle answers the question on the number of the material elements on the basis of 
the results of the previous chapter. He argues that, as the primary contraries are four, and as the 
possible combinations of these four contraries are also four (for hot does not combine with cold, 
 
103 GC, II.1, 329a5-8. 
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nor dry with moist, in virtue of the principle of non-contradiction), then also the primary 
elements of the natural world are necessarily four. Specifically, each of the four elements posited 
by the predecessors is identified by one contrary in a robust sense (first position) and by another 
contrary in a weaker sense (second position): 
fire: hot and dry 
water: cold and moist 
air: moist and hot 
earth: dry and cold 
 Note that the four primary contraries qualify the four elements essentially. Unlike the case of my 
body becoming ill and undergoing a change in temperature, fire is in itself hot, and water is in 
itself cold. Therefore, the contraries constituting fire are contrary to those constituting water, so 
that fire and water can be viewed as contraries. The same is true of air and earth. 
GC, II.3, 331a1-3 
Καὶ ἑκάτερα ἑκατέροις ἐναντία· πυρὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίον ὕδωρ, ἀέρι δὲ γῆ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκ 
τῶν ἐναντίων παθημάτων συνέστηκεν. 
Two of them are contrary to the other two, respectively: water is contrary to fire and earth 
to air, for they are constituted by contrary affections. 
 Summing up, in GC.II.2-3 Aristotle endorses the claim that the four material elements are 
composed out of contrary affections. In virtue of this, Aristotle claims, the four elements are 
subdivided into the two contrary pairs of fire/water and air/earth. The contrariety reigning among 
the four elements is the rationale for the capability of the four elements to change into each other, 
thus causing generation and corruption in the natural world (GC.II.4-5). According to the picture 
drawn so far, the anti-traditionalist view identifying the ultimate material layer of natural, 
sublunary reality with the four elements may seem to hold.  
 In what follows, I rather show that Aristotle believes that the four elements, despite being the 
primary components of the natural world, are nonetheless not simple, unanalysable beings. 
Rather, the four elements are further analysable into a potential substrate and the four primary 
contrarieties (hot/cold; dry/moist). I claim that Aristotle endorses that there is a substrate that is 
common to all four elements, but whose nature does not coincide with that of the four elements 
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and with the contrariety affecting them. As the substrate of the four elements is only potentially 
the primary contraries that constitute the elements, this substrate, considered in itself (as 
potentiality), is not a contrary. 
 The invention of primary matter is achieved, in GC.II.1, through the confrontation with the 
predecessors. With the label “primary matter”, I refer to the ultimate material substrate of reality, 
without committing myself to whether it be the indeterminate prime matter endorsed by the 
traditional interpretation of Aristotelian matter. Aristotle begins his discussion of the doctrines 
on primary matter of his predecessors by confronting two groups of thinkers. 
 On the one hand, the group of the thinkers who posited one or more of the four elements as 
primary matter.104 The view that the four elements are the primary bodies constituting the natural 
world is one that Aristotle is willing to endorses.105  
 The prevailing view held by the predecessors that primary matter must be identified with the 
four elements and their contrariety is contrasted in GC, II.1, 329a8-b3 with the view of those 
philosophers, such as Anaximander and Plato, who identify primary matter with an indeterminate 
nature that is different and separate from the four elements and their contrariety. As the theories 
of Anaximander and Plato are criticised, this section has been broadly interpreted as a piece of 
evidence for Aristotle’s rejection of the existence of an indeterminate prime matter. 
 I claim, instead, that this section contains only the criticism of a particular model of 
indeterminate primary matter. Far from rejecting the concept of primary matter altogether, 
Aristotle’s criticism highlights the inconsistencies affecting his Anaximander’s and Plato’s 
primary matter. In the following lines (329a24-b3), where he states his own position about 
primary matter, Aristotle clearly endorses the existence of a primary matter underlying the four 
elements. As the primary substrate of reality underlying the primary contraries, primary matter is 
different, although not separate, from contrariety. 
 In conclusion, Aristotle on the one hand endorses the endoxon [P2] that the four elements are the 
primary bodies out of which the sublunary natural world is composed. On the other hand, he 
 
104 GC, II.1, 328b33-329a5. 
105 GC, II.1, 329a5-8. Note the words ἔστω συνομονολογούμενον. 
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argues that the four elemental bodies are in turn hylomorphic compounds, and thus analysable 
into primary matter and the four primary contraries. 
 
4.2.2.3.3. Aristotle’s criticism of the indeterminate primary matter of the predecessors. 
 The criticism of the second group of thinkers endorsing an indeterminate primary matter beyond 
the four elements can be divided into two sections. 
 In 329a8-13, Aristotle refutes the view of a group of philosophers,106 according to which there is 
a matter that is on the one hand corporeal and perceptible, and on the other hand separate from 
the elements. This refutation has, at least in part, the role of defending the endoxon [P2]. 
 In 329a13-24, Aristotle criticises Plato’s theory of the Receptacle from the Timaeus. Aristotle 
first laments Plato’s unclarity of expression. Then, he cautiously charges the Receptacle with the 
same inconsistency affecting the indeterminate matter endorsed by the previous group of 
thinkers. 
 The first group of philosophers (329a8-13) are not explicitly mentioned. It is most plausible that 
Anaximander belongs to this number. Likewise, it is plausible that the philosopher(s) endorsing 
an intermediate body between two of the four elements is/are also meant. A proximate reference 
to this/these philosopher(s) is contained in 328b35-329a1, where he/they are mentioned along 
with the philosophers who posited one of the four elements as the basic material constituent of 
reality. Although they belong to the first group of thinkers, namely to those who oppose 
Anaximander and Plato, the intermediate nature is described as a σώμα τε ὂν καὶ χωριστόν. Like 
the other monists, the philosopher(s) endorsing the intermediate assumed that the principle is a 
certain bodily nature. Unlike the other monists (who endorsed one of the four elements), the 
philosopher(s) endorsing the intermediate made the principle separate from the four elements. 
Thus, even if the philosopher(s) endorsing the intermediate is/are enlisted along with 
philosophers identifying matter with (one of) the four elements, they/she assume(s) that the 
intermediate is separate from the elements, and nonetheless a body. From Aristotle’s perspective, 
this position is implausible, as the arguments in 329a8-13 shows. 
 
106 Most probably Anaximander. Also, Rashed 2005, ad loc.  
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 Aristotle’s interpretation of the intermediate is nonetheless not free from ambiguity. In several 
passages, the intermediate is endowed with an intermediate degree of density and rarity between 
two of the four elements, and is thus assimilated to the determinacy and possession of contrariety 
proper to the elements.107 In this connection, the philosopher(s) endorsing the intermediate can 
be assimilated to the prevailing view that primary matter coincides with the four elements. Other 
passages, instead, attest the separateness of the intermediate from the four elements and their 
contrariety.108 Several among of these passages assimilate the intermediate to Anaximander’s 
apeiron, as both the apeiron and the intermediate are separate from the elements and lack 
qualitative determinacy. 
 It is possible that the ambiguity of Aristotle’s interpretation of the intermediate is not due to 
Aristotle’s lack of consistency. Rather, it may reflect the inconsistency with which the theory of 
the intermediate is charged in our passage, if the intermediate is both endowed with the 
contrariety proper to the four elements (being a mixture of two elements) and posited as separate 
from the elements.109 
 For the sake of brevity, as scholars accept unanimously that 329a8-13 tackle Anaximander’s 
apeiron, I refer to the kind of primary matter discussed in these lines as apeiron. 
 
107 Phys., I.4, 187a14ff.; De Cael., III.5, 303b12ff.; Metaph., I.8, 989a12ff. 
108 A list of relevant parallels to our topic, namely the relation between matter (i.e. the intermediate) and contrariety, 
is the following one. In Metaph, I.7, 988a23-32, the intermediate is mentioned as a material principle. Bodiliness or 
lack thereof shape the survey of material principles of the predecessors, along with the number of material 
principle(s) assumed. It is not clear from this passage, though, whether Aristotle believe the intermediate to be 
bodily or not. In Phys., I.6, 189b1-8, as we have seen, Aristotle mentions the intermediate as a close approximation 
to his own concept of indeterminate primary matter, as the intermediate fulfils the alterity requirement for matter 
more than the other principles of the predecessors. Apparently, the rationale for this claim is that the intermediate is 
not intertwined with contrariety, whereas the elements are (189b4-5: µετ’ ἐναντιοτήτων συµπεπλεγµένα). 
109 It is plausible that the philosopher(s) positing the intermediate as a principle also endorsed its separateness from 
the four elements. As I said, the doctrine of the intermediate is always mentioned anonymously in Aristotle’s 
Corpus. Moreover, Aristotle refers to two different kinds of intermediate substance, namely one that is between fire 
and air and one that is between air and water (for a complete collection of passages, see Kahn 1960, p.36-7). Against 
this background, it is difficult to assess whether the thinker(s) endorsing the intermediate committed 
himself/themselves to its separateness from the elements. Aristotle seems to believe that he/they both did and did 
not, thus contradicting himself/themselves. Simplicius and Philoponus, both making use of Theophrastus’ Physikon 
Doxai, attribute in several passages the paternity of the doctrine of the intermediate to Anaximander, on the basis of 
the fact that both the apeiron and the intermediate are separate from the elements, thus conflating Aristotle’s 
presentation of the theories as two different ones. Whether Anaximander’s apeiron should be identified with the 
intermediate or not has been and is object of controversy. According to me, the most complete collection of material 
and the most useful discussion of the topic can be found in Schleiermacher (1811) and Zeller-Mondolfo (1950), who 
refute the identification of intermediate and apeiron (pace a more recent and authoritative defence of the 
identification in Barnes (1982)). What is important with relation to the present discussion, though, is that both 
Simplicius and Philoponus lend some support to the claim1 that also Theophrastus interpreted the intermediate as 
separate from the four elements. 
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GC, II.1, 329a8-13 
Ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν [a] ποιοῦντες μίαν ὕλην παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, ταύτην δὲ [b] σωματικὴν καὶ [c] 
χωριστήν, ἁμαρτάνουσιν· [d] ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο 
αἰσθητῆς·110 [e] ἢ γὰρ κοῦφον ἢ βαρὺ ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον τοῦτο, 
ὃ λέγουσί τινες εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν.  
But those [thinkers] who posit one single matter beyond those mentioned [i.e. beyond the 
four elements], making it both bodily and separate, are mistaken. For it is not possible for 
this body to exist without perceptible contrariety. In fact, the indefinite [nature] that some 
[thinkers] posit as a principle must be either light or heavy, either cold or hot. 
 Aristotle’s criticism in GC, II.1, 329a8-13 takes up the inconsistency between two features of 
the apeiron: on the one hand, [b] being a natural body; on the other hand, [a] being beyond and 
[c] separate from the four perceptible elements and [d] from the contraries they are intertwined 
with. These two features attributed to the apeiron are, according to Aristotle, incompossible. In 
fact, it is impossible for the primary material principle to be both a body and [e] devoid of any 
positive, contrary feature. 
In his criticism of the existence of the apeiron, Aristotle endorses the view that an indeterminate 
body separate from contrary perceptible features cannot exist, for [d] all natural bodies are 
endowed with contraries. Two attributes of the apeiron ([b,c]) are in antinomy:  
[b] bodiliness; 
[c] separateness from:  
[c1] the contraries;  
[c2] perceptibility (i.e. the power of contraries to be principles of perception). 
 The argument seems to assume a certain degree of reciprocal entailment between the notions of 
natural body, perceptibility and contrariety. A natural body is something that is necessarily 
endowed with perceptible qualities, and perceptible qualities coincide with the contraries. In fact, 
there seems to be for Aristotle a certain degree of interchangeability between being a natural 
body and being something perceptible. The common ground underlying perceptibility and 
 
110 With Joachim 1922 and Williams 1982, I accept the lectio difficilior (attested by the manuscripts H, J1 and V) 
αἰσθητῆς, referring back to ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως. The most recent critical text of GC, Rashed 2005, reads instead the 
accusative αἰσθητόν, so that the sense which of the sentence would be: “for it is not possible for this perceptible 
body to exist without contrariety”. Rashed’s reading is both attested by the majority of the manuscripts and 
syntactically plainer. Nonetheless, being the lectio facilior, it is more likely to be an interpolation than the other one. 
Moreover, the development of the argument seems to support Joachim’s reading rather than Rashed’s. 
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bodiliness may be found in the contraries themselves. In de An.II.5-12, contrariety is made 
responsible for the capacity of the object to affect the perceptive capacity of the soul.111 Thus, 
[c2] can be seen as a subcase or consequence of [c1]. 
 A similar criticism is contained in Phys., III.5, 204b22-35, where Aristotle refutes the existence 
of an indeterminate body beyond and separate from the four elements. This passage is close in 
terminology with the previous one, and is commonly believed to tackle Anaximander’s apeiron. 
Aristotle first (lines 24-9) provides an argument for positing as principle an indeterminate, 
perceptible body existing beyond the elements, and then (lines 29-35) refutes the existence of 
such an indeterminate principle. 
 The argument for positing such an indeterminate principle derives from the observation of the 
destructive power of one feature over its contrary. If one of the four elements were infinite, say 
fire (i.e. a hot and dry substance), then the power of hot and dry would also be infinite, thus 
undermining their contraries, cold and moist. The consequence would thus be material monism, 
as reality would consist exclusively of fire. In order to avoid rule out this consequence, the 
infinite must be something indeterminate, beyond and separate from the four elements and their 
contrariety. 
 Aristotle’s criticism to Anaximander’s apeiron in Phys., III.5, 204b29-35 addresses the 
inconsistency arising from positing a natural body that is both perceptible and beyond the four 
elements (and their contrariety). It is not to be assessed whether Anaximander was committed to 
the claim that his apeiron is perceptible. Nonetheless, Aristotle apparently believes he should be, 
and paraphrases Anaximander’s own words in order to nail him to this assumption. A plausible 
reconstruction of the argument is the following: if all things are dissolved into that out of which 
they have come into being; and if the elements come into being from the apeiron and dissolve 
 
111 One passage for all: de An., II.11, 422b23-27: πᾶσα τε γὰρ αἴσθησις μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι δοκεῖ, οἷον ὄψις 
λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος, καὶ ἀκοὴ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, καὶ γεῦσις πικροῦ καὶ γλυκέος· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἁπτῷ πολλαὶ ἔνεισιν 
ἐναντιώσεις, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, σκληρὸν μαλακόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα. […] καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
αἰσθήσεών εἰσιν ἐναντιώσεις πλείους, οἷον ἐν φωνῇ οὐ μόνον ὀξύτης καὶ βαρύτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης, 
καὶ λειότης καὶ τραχύτης φωνῆς, καὶ τοιαῦθ’ ἕτερα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ χρῶμα διαφοραὶ τοιαῦται ἕτεραι. [Critical text: 
Jannone/Barbotin 1966] “For every sense seems to be concerned with one pair of contraries, e.g. sight with white 
and black, hearing with high and low pitch, and taste with bitter and sweet; but in the object of touch there are many 
pairs of contraries: hot and cold, dry and wet, rough and smooth and so on for the rest. […] there are many other 
contraries in the case of the other senses, also, e.g. in vocal sound there is not only high and low pitch, but also 
loudness and softness, and smoothness and roughness of the voice, and so on. There are other differences of this 
kind in the case of colour, too”. [Transl.: Hamlyn 1993, slightly modified]. 
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into it; then the apeiron must exist in the natural world beside the four elements, and at the same 
time be separate from them, being an indeterminate nature. But such an indeterminate nature is 
not perceived beside the elements. Although Aristotle’s argument is not the most perspicuous 
one, it is clear that the strategy is to confront Anaximander’s apeiron with the perceptual 
counterfactual. Being the source of generation and corruption of the primary perceptual bodies 
(namely of the elements), the apeiron must be placed in the natural world of which we have 
experience (line 204b34: ἐνταῦθα), along with the four elements. Our common experience of the 
natural world, nonetheless, provides no indication of the existence of an indeterminate simple 
body such as the apeiron. 
 The refutation of the intermediate as an indeterminate body in GC and that of Anaximander’s 
apeiron in Phys.III.5 present a certain degree of terminological and conceptual ambiguity. The 
expressions παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα and χωριστός recurring in both passages in order to address the 
alterity between the principles and the four elements can have both a weak and a robust meaning. 
Respectively, they can mean both “beside the elements” and “different” from them, and “beyond 
the elements” and “separate” from them. The former and weaker meaning is not committed to 
existential import, whereas the latter and stronger meaning rather entails that the apeiron exists 
independently of the elements, but not the other way round. 
 As the apeiron and the intermediate are principles, and thus ontologically primary and separate 
beings, a robust interpretation of the arguments may be privileged. Aristotle would thus pinpoint 
the inconsistency of positing as principle an indeterminate body separate from the elements, the 
fact notwithstanding that anything qualifying as a body must be endowed with contraries and be 
perceptible. 
 In his own assessment of the relation between primary matter and the four elements/primary 
contraries (GC, II.1, 329a24-b3), Aristotle takes up the same language used in his refutation of 
the intermediate, and clarifies in which sense primary matter is different/separate and 
beside/beyond the four elements and their contrariety. If Phys.III.5, purporting to clarify the 
nature of the infinite, confines itself to rule out the existence of an indeterminate body beyond 
the elements (along with GC, II.1, 329a a8-13), GC, II.1, 329a24-b3 accepts the positive import 
of Anaximander’s argument for not reducing the material principle to the four elements. This 
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partial acceptance of Anaximander’s argument results in a revised version of Anaximander’s 
material principle, namely in the invention of primary matter. 
 The rationale for the appeal of a revised version of Anaximander’s material principle is not 
stated. Some light on the issue may be shed by a premise from the argument in Phys., III.5, 
204b24-9, namely by the claim that the four elements are, due to their contrariety, reciprocally 
destructive. Aristotle may have concerns about the ontology of change, as some interpreters 
believe, and posit a persistent primary substrate of the elements in order to avoid sheer 
replacement in elemental generation and corruption. The idea that the material substrate persists 
through generation has been, nonetheless, strongly criticised in the last decades. 
 Aristotle’s concern may be a different one, namely to get the relation between contrariety and 
the elements right. Not positing a primary matter for the four elements, and accepting that the 
elements are endowed with contraries, is a conceptual stance that is unlikely to escape the charge 
of reifying properties. Thus, Aristotle’s rationale for positing primary matter may regard being 
rather than change. 
 
 The following section of our text (GC, II.1, 329a13-24) deals with Plato’s doctrine of the 
Receptacle in the Timaeus. Aristotle’s criticism addresses details of Plato’s doctrine that are of 
little interest for the present discussion. Two pieces of evidence can be nonetheless drawn from 
Aristotle’s account. 
 Firstly, Plato (should have) endorsed the claim that primary matter is separate from the elements 
and from contrariety, for he posits his Receptacle as the primary substrate of the four elements. 
Being prior to the creation of the four elements, it is also existentially separate from them. 
 Secondly, Plato is not consistent with his own claim, for he seems to assume that his Receptacle 
is something determinate, by virtue of comparing it to the gold underlying golden objects (and of 
conflating qualitative and substantial change from matter). Aristotle’s criticism refers most 
probably to Tim., 48e-50c. In this passage, Plato introduces the Receptacle. Quite surprisingly, 
he contrasts the cycle of elemental change, characterised by instability, to the stability of the 
primary substrate. It is this latter, he argues, that should be labelled “this and that” (τόδε καὶ 
τοῦτο), whereas the ever-changing elements should be labelled as “in this wise” or “having this 
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quality” (τοιοῦτο).112 Likewise, with relation to golden artefacts, the matter gold qualifies as 
“this”, whereas the forms into which it can be moulded are only wises and qualities of the stable 
matter. 
 Aristotle’s criticism may seem to take Plato’s parallelism between the Receptacle and gold too 
literally, attributing to Plato the idea that the Receptacle is something determinate as gold is, and 
therefore a “this” in the Aristotelian sense (i.e. as “something determinate”) and not in the 
Platonic sense (i.e. as a synonym of “something stable”). 
 I believe, instead, that Aristotle’s criticism hits the target. In 50a5-b5, Plato introduces the 
example of the gold and the golden artefacts that Aristotle addresses in GC.II.1. In 50b5-c6, what 
has been said with relation to gold is extended to the Receptacle. Now, there is some evidence 
that Plato should be committed to the view that the Receptacle is a formally determinate nature 
just as gold is, for he is committed to the idea that matter provides the most reliable answer to the 
question on the essence of something. Plausibly, Plato’s argument hinges on the requirement for 
stability that the essence of something must possess. If the form of the artefacts is changeable 
and the matter of the artefacts (i.e. gold) remains stable through the process of moulding, then 
the essence of something must coincide with its matter rather than with its form. The same holds 
for the case of the Receptacle. As the four elements are the ever-changing appearance 
determining the Receptacle, which in turn remains what it is through the process of elemental 
change, it follows that the Receptacle is the essence of the elements. 
 Once this has been endorsed, Plato’s assumption is evidently confronted with two absurdities: 
either the essence of reality is something indeterminate and uninformative or the Receptacle is 
both indeterminate and determinate. 
 In conclusion, I have claimed that, in GC, II.1, 329a8-24, Aristotle criticises several models of 
indeterminate primary matter (Anaximader’s apeiron, Plato’s Receptacle; possibly the 
intermediate). These models are opposed to the doctrines of the thinkers endorsing determinate 
primary matter (i.e. the four elements). I have claimed that Aristotle does not undertake his 
critical agenda with the intention of ruling out the possibility of the indeterminate primary matter 
tout court. Rather, Aristotle wants to criticise the inconsistencies affecting his predecessors’ 
 
112 Tim., 49b-50a4. 
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models of primary matter in order to develop his own concept of primary matter. The core of this 
project lies on the clarification of the way in which the primary matter of the four elements is 
separate (χωριστός) from the contraries identifying the four elements. Clarifying this amounts to 
assessing also the claim to bodiliness and perceptibility of primary matter. My next paragraph is 
devoted to the analysis of this project. 
 
4.2.2.3.4. Aristotle’s primary matter. 
 In what follows, I show that Aristotle endorses himself the existence of a primary matter. In 
introducing his own concept of an indeterminate primary matter, Aristotle solves the difficulties 
affecting the doctrines of his predecessors. As a reminder, these difficulties rest on the antinomy 
between two features attributed to primary matter by the predecessors: 
[b] bodiliness; 
[c] separateness from: 
[c1] the contraries; 
[c2] perceptibility (i.e. the power of contraries to be principles of perception). 
 Instrumental to this project are two conceptual endeavours: firstly, the clarification of the way in 
which primary matter is χωριστός from contrariety (and therefore from perceptibility); secondly, 
the introduction of the concept of potentiality. The second point clarifies the first one. 
 In a nutshell, Aristotle’s primary matter is not a body (actually) existing in separation from (i.e. 
independently from) contrariety. Rather, the nature of primary matter is to be potential. The 
potentiality of matter does not coincide with complete indeterminacy, but rather with a 
determinate capacity, namely the capacity for the four primary contraries defining the four 
elements. Thus, primary matter is the determinate capacity for the four elements, and is 
perceptible in potentiality, but not in actuality. As the determinate capacity to the primary 
contraries and to the four elements, primary matter does not exist in actuality as an indeterminate 
body. Rather, primary matter exists only dependently on the actual existence of the four elements 
(and of the bodies constituted out of them), as substrate of the primary opposition (directly) 
shaping the four elemental bodies (and, derivatively, the complex bodies constituted out of the 
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four elements). Therefore, primary matter does not exist independently of the contraries and the 
four elements. 
 Nevertheless, taken in abstraction from the elemental bodies, i.e. considered as the substrate of 
the primary contrariety, primary matter is different from the contraries, for it is the capacity for 
the primary contraries, but does not coincide with the contraries in actuality. Thus, primary 
matter, considered in itself, is not a contrary, for its nature is to be potential. 
 In conclusion, as primary matter is the determinate capacity for the four primary contraries, 
primary matter is χωριστός from contrariety in the following sense. With relation to actuality, 
primary matter is different from contrariety, for it is in itself potential. With relation to 
potentiality, as primary matter is a determinate capacity for the primary contraries, primary 
matter is not (existentially) separate from contrariety. 
 In what follows, I analyse Aristotle’s discussion of his own concept of primary matter in GC, 
II.1, 329a24-b3. 
GC, II.1, 329a24-b3 
[f] Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμὲν μὲν εἶναί τινα ὕλην τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, [g] ἀλλὰ ταύτην οὐ 
χωριστὴν ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐναντιώσεως, [h] ἐξ ἧς γίνεται τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα. Διώρισται 
δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑτέροις ἀκριβέστερον. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτόν ἐστιν 
ἐκ τῆς ὕλης τὰ σώματα τὰ πρῶτα, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων, [i] ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ πρώτην 
οἰομένους εἶναι τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἀχώριστον μέν, [j] ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· [k] οὔτε 
γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὕλη τῷ ψυχρῷ οὔτε τοῦτο τῷ θερμῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφοῖν. [l] 
Ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἀρχή, [m] δεύτερον δ’ αἱ ἐναντιώσεις, λέγω 
δ’ οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, [n] τρίτως δ’ ἤδη πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· [o] ταῦτα 
μὲν γὰρ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα [...] αἱ δ’ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ μεταβάλλουσιν. 
[f] But we claim that there is a certain matter of the perceptible bodies, [g] but that this is 
not separate, but rather always intertwined with contrariety; [h] and out of this the so-
called [four] elements are generated. These topics have been tackled with more precision 
in other writings. Nonetheless, as it is in this manner that the primary bodies come to be 
out of matter, it must be also enquired into these, [i] claiming that what is a principle and 
primary is the matter that is, on the one hand, non-separate and, on the other hand, [j] the 
substrate of the contraries. [k] For, neither is the hot the matter of the cold nor the other 
way round; rather, the substrate [of them] is the matter of both. [l] In conclusion: first, 
that which is potentially a perceptible body is a principle; [m] second, the contraries, e.g. 
hotness and coldness; [n] third, also fire, water and the others such as these, [o] for they 
change into each other, whereas the contrarieties do not change [into each other]. 
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 The topic of the passage is the primary matter of the four elements, namely the matter [h] out of 
which the four elements have come into being and the matter underlying [f] perceptible reality 
and [j] the contrarieties constituting it. 
 Aristotle’s doctrine of primary matter is introduced in [g] by a criticism of one of the two 
opposing features of the primary matter endorsed by the predecessors, namely by a criticism of 
its [c] separateness from the four elements and their contrariety. Aristotle’s primary matter is, 
against his predecessors’, “not separate, but rather always intertwined with contrariety”. If we 
consider [g] alone, Aristotle may seem to reject altogether the predecessors’ claim that there is a 
primary, (actually) indeterminate matter. If we stopped at this stage of Aristotle’s argument, we 
could go along with the scholars who claim that the four elements are the most primary matter 
that Aristotle is willing to endorse. This impression reveals itself to be misleading, once we 
analyse the rest of the argument. 
 In [g], Aristotle claims generally that (primary) matter is intertwined with contrariety and (thus) 
“not separate” (cf. also [i]). The general claim of [g] on the relation between matter and 
contrariety is clarified in [j,k], and finally in [l]. 
 Aristotle contrasts in [i-k] two ways in which primary matter is χωριστός from contrariety. [i] 
states that primary matter is existentially non-separate from contrariety. In [k], which provides 
the rationale for the claim of primary matter to be the substrate underlying primary contrariety in 
the four elements, primary matter is said to be different from the contraries. 
 Let us analyse [j,k]. [k] provides the rationale for the claim that primary matter, as the substrate 
of the primary contraries, cannot be itself a contrary. Rather, what is the matter of the contraries 
must be something different from the contraries and must be common to them. For example, let 
us take what is cold and what is hot; neither what is cold can be the substrate of what is hot, nor 
the other way round. Rather, the substrate of what is cold and the substrate of what is hot must be 
common to both hot and cold, and must be different from each of them. Aristotle does not 
explain why this is necessary, but a most plausible interpretation of this argument is gained by 
invoking the principle of non-contradiction and the incompossibility of the contraries. If H+ and 
H- are contraries, then H+ and H- are incompossible. Thus, if H- were the substrate of H+, then H- 
would be at the same time H+, which is impossible. Therefore, H- is not the substrate of H+. The 
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hypothesis that H+ is the matter of H- is necessarily false for the same reason. Thus, primary 
matter, as it is the substrate of the primary contraries, is different from the primary contraries. 
 An opponent of this results may reply that matter could nevertheless be a contrary, provided that 
it is a different contrary from the contraries of which it is matter. For example, the matter of what 
is hot and of what is cold may be what is smooth. Against this possible observation, Aristotle 
uses in his argument the primary contrariety of hot and cold. Clearly, it would be nonsense to 
assume that the primary contrariety of hot and cold may have a posterior contrariety as matter 
(e.g. smooth), for smooth would be both prior and posterior to hot and cold, if matter is (at least 
in a certain sense) prior to that of which it is matter. Assuming that the matter of hot and cold 
may be a member of the other pair of primary contraries (dry or moist) will also lead to 
nonsense, for hot and cold would fail to qualify as primary contraries along with dry and moist. 
In conclusion, what is the matter of H+ and H- is not itself a contrary and is common to both H+ 
and H-. 
 Let us come back to the way in which primary matter is χωριστός from contrariety. The particles 
μέν/δέ introducing, respectively, [i] and [j,k], indicate a contrast between two ways in which 
primary matter is χωριστός from contrariety. In a nutshell, as substrate of the contraries in the 
four elements, primary matter is both non-separate from the contraries and distinct from the 
contraries. 
 This having been assessed, there seems to be at least a mild antinomy between the claim that 
matter is: [i] not separate from opposition; and [j,k] different from opposition. This antinomy is 
solved in [l-o], where Aristotle draws the general conclusion of his previous argument (ὥστε), 
enumerating the principles of the natural sublunary world and of its generation and corruption. 
The introduction of the concept of potentiality in [l] clarifies in which sense primary matter and 
primary contrariety are related to each other. 
[l] Ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἀρχή 
[l] In conclusion, firstly, what is potentially a perceptible body is a principle 
 The solution of the antinomy rests on the claim that matter is bodily and perceptible, i.e. 
intertwined with contraries, only potentially. With relation to actuality, namely to the four 
elements of which it is substrate, primary matter is non-separate from the contraries. Rather, it 
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exists only in conjunction with contrariety and with the basic constituents of the natural 
sublunary world, the four elements. With relation to potentiality, namely with relation to what 
primary matter is in itself, primary matter is different from contrariety.  
 Aristotle’s conclusion, thus, modifies the aporetic claims on primary matter of his predecessors. 
The predecessors’ endorsement of [b] bodiliness is qualified into the claim that primary matter is 
[l] (=[b*]) potentially a body. Primary matter does not qualify as an actual body, for it is 
indeterminate, and no indeterminate body exists in actuality. Nonetheless, as the substrate of the 
primary natural bodies (the four elements) constituting all sublunary natural bodies, primary 
matter possesses capacity for bodiliness. 
 The capacity for bodiliness of primary matter can be understood with respect to its being 
χωριστός from contrariety. The indeterminate matter of the predecessors, being [b] separate from 
[c1] contrariety and [c2] perceptibility, cannot qualify as a body in actuality, as the predecessors 
are committed to believe. Aristotelian primary matter is [c1*] different and non-separate from 
contrariety. It is non-separate, for it is the capacity for the primary contraries, and is thus 
intertwined with contrariety with relation to potentiality. It is different, for it is in itself merely 
potential, and thus indeterminate with relation to actuality. As primary matter is what it is only in 
potentiality, then primary matter is in itself different from contrariety. Thus, as contrariety is the 
principle of perceptibility, [c2*] primary matter is potentially perceptible. 
 Thus, primary matter is [b*] different with relation to actuality and non-separate with relation to 
potentiality and capacity [c1*] from contrariety. As capacity for the four primary contraries, [g] 
primary matter is not without opposition. 
 In conclusion, Aristotle’s doctrine of primary matter can be summarised as follows. Primary 
matter is: 
[j] the substrate of the contraries; 
[c1*] potentially endowed with contraries; 
[l,c2*] potentially perceptible; 
[l,b*] and thus, as [c1*] and [c2*], potentially a body.  
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 The claim that matter is the potential substrate of the contraries has some bearing on the role of 
the contraries principles of natural things. In [m], contrarieties (ἐναντιώσεις) such as hotness and 
coldness (θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης) are reckoned as the second principle of the natural, 
perceptible beings along with their substrate, i.e. along with primary matter. As they inhere in 
primary matter, the contrarieties must be understood as properties; in the present case, as the 
property of being hot and of being cold. This assessment implies a clarification of the ontological 
status of the contraries. In [k], in fact, the ontological status of the contraries (ἐναντία) “what is 
hot” and “what is cold” (τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ψυχρόν) is indeterminate to such an extent that the 
contraries can be, accepting ex hypothesis the thought of the predecessors, considered as 
substrates. In fact, the terms τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ψυχρόν, being substantive adjectives, indicate no 
determinate ontological status. “What is hot” and “what is cold” can both refer to properties 
(being-hot and being-cold) and to the substances that are endowed with the properties of, 
respectively, being hot and of being cold (e.g. fire and water). As substances endowed with a 
certain property, “what is hot” and “what is cold” are entitled to qualify as substrates of 
properties (e.g. what is hot, i.e. fire, is bright). As properties, “what is hot” and “what is cold” are 
entitled to qualify as substrates with relation to subordinate properties, but not as ultimate 
substrates, for hotness in turn exists only in a substrate. 
 The passage from “contraries” (indeterminate ontological status) to “contrarieties” (properties) 
is picked up in [n,o]. In [n], the third principle of natural, perceptible beings are said to be the 
four elements. The four elements are principles in the third place not only in a numerical sense, 
but rather also in a temporal sense: primary matter and the opposition determining it are prior to 
the four elements, for the four elements are composed out of them. 
 It is not accidental that the examples provided in [n] for the four elements are fire and water, 
namely the elements identified by virtue of possessing each by itself, respectively, the property 
of hotness and coldness mentioned in [m] as a property inhering in primary matter and in [k] 
with an indeterminate ontological status. 
 In order to distinguish [m] the properties F+/F- from [n] the substances mF+/mF- (enmattered 
properties, i.e. the compounds of, respectively, the properties F+/F- and of the primary matter 
“m”), Aristotle provides [o] an argument related to change. In a nutshell, Aristotle claims that the 
items in [m] are different from the items in [n], for mF+ and mF- (enmattered properties) change 
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into each other, whereas F+/F- do not change into each other (by themselves, but rather only 
coincidentally, namely on condition that mF+ and mF- have changed into each other, and F+/F- 
belong to mF+/mF-). 
 In conclusion, primary matter is in GC.II.1 is the primary potential substrate of the primary 
contraries (hot/cold, dry/moist). As such, it is different from contrariety and indeterminate, for, 
considered in itself, namely with relation to potentiality, it does not coincide with contrariety. 
This does not amount to claiming that primary matter is an indeterminate body existing in 
actuality. Rather, with relation to actuality, the primary constituents of the natural sublunary 
world are the four elements. If we analyse natural things with relation to matter, their primary 
actual and determinate substrate coincides with the four elements. Although the four elements 
are the primary existing bodies, they are not primary in general. With relation to potentiality, 
they are composed out of a primary and indeterminate matter. Primary matter is indeterminate 
with relation to actuality, for, as an element of the four elements that is only potentially, it is not 
determinate in actuality. With relation to potentiality, primary matter is instead the determinate 
capacity for the four primary contrarieties, and is thus capable to qualify as the primary potential 
substrate of the natural world. Nonetheless, even though, being the primary substrate of the 
natural world, primary matter is primary with relation to the four elements and with relation to 
contrariety, still primary matter is not ontologically independent from contrariety and from the 
four elements. In fact, it is only intertwined with contrarieties, for it is the capacity for the four 
primary contrarieties. Moreover, primary matter exists (actually) only dependently on the 
existence of the four elements. Thus, primary matter does not exist (actually) independently of 
the four elements and of contrariety. 
 Primary matter, as it is what it is only potentially, does not identify with the primary matter 
endorsed by most of the predecessors, for it is not one (or some, or all) of the four determinate 
elements. As a potential being, primary matter is not an actually determinate being as the four 
elements are. Thus, primary matter is not a contrary. 
 Nonetheless, as primary matter is the determinate capacity for the primary contraries (and not 
another determinate capacity, or an indeterminate capacity for just anything), primary matter is 
what is capable to be the substrate of a particular set of actual beings (the four elements) and of a 
certain kind of reality, namely of the perceptible natural world. Therefore, primary matter is not 
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the actually-existent body devoid of any determination endorsed by Anaximander, (possibly) by 
the thinkers of the intermediate and by Plato. Aristotle’s primary matter is rather the determinate 
capacity for the primary opposition underlying the four elements as their proximate substrate and 
the natural sublunary world as its remote matter. As such, it is in actuality nothing existent as 
such and nothing determinate, as it is something determinate only potentially, or as a capacity. 
 
4.2.2.3.5. Conclusion. 
 In the previous discussion, I have shown that Aristotle is committed to the view that all 
sublunary, natural things are composed out of the four elements. Nonetheless, Aristotle is also 
committed to the claim that the four elements are not simple entities. Rather, the four elements 
are in turn composed out of a primary matter, which functions as the bearer of the primary 
contraries that proper to each element. 
 As the primary matter that is common to the four elements is not determined by any contrary in 
actuality, this matter is indeterminate with relation to actuality. Nevertheless, this does not 
amount to endorsing the view that primary matter is indeterminate tout court. In fact, primary 
matter is not devoid of any determination and contrariety in general, i.e. both in potentiality and 
in actuality. On the contrary, primary matter, i.e. the matter underlying the so-called primary 
elements of natural sublunary world, is indeterminate in actuality, but determinate in potentiality. 
The determinacy proper to primary matter amounts to possessing the capacity for the two 
primary pairs of contraries shaping the natural sublunary world: hot/cold and dry/moist. Thus, 
what qualifies as the primary substrate of the natural sublunary world is not any matter 
whatsoever, or a primary matter devoid of any determination. What qualifies as the primary 
substrate of the natural sublunary world is rather a determinate kind of matter that possesses the 
determinate capacity for the four primary contraries. 
 Let us come back to the positions held in the debate on primary matter, in order to assess 
whether and to what extent the analysis of GC.II.1-5 confirms or rejects them. 
 With relation to the anti-traditionalist view on prime matter, it has become clear that Gill 
conflates the claim that the four elements are the simplest bodies with the claim that they are 
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simple tout court. Rather, the four elements are hylomorphic compounds analysable into primary 
matter contrariety. Thus, Gill cannot make sense of claims [l-n]. 
 The assessment of the traditionalist view with relation to the doctrine of GC.II.1-5 must be a 
nuanced one. First, the traditionalists who employ GC.II.1-5 as evidence, get the scope of this 
text wrong. The scope of GC.II.1-5 is, in fact, to grasp the basic principles of natural, sublunary 
reality. Therefore, GC.II.1-5 cannot be used as evidence for the existence of a prime matter of all 
beings. I have claimed that the text, instead, provides evidence for Aristotle’s endorsement of a 
primary substrate underlying the four elements and natural, sublunary reality in its entirety. I 
have labelled this concept as “primary matter” in order to differentiate it from the traditional 
prime matter. 
 This notwithstanding, the general traditional picture has appeared to be confirmed by GC.II.1-5. 
Primary matter is an indeterminate, potential nature. It does not exist as an actual, indeterminate 
being, but exists as the potential aspect of natural, sublunary, determinate reality. As such, critics 
of its internal consistency do not seem to do justice to Aristotle.113 Critics of the philosophical 
importance of prime matter, instead, seem to have a point.114 I believe, nonetheless, that their 
point about prime matter does not affect primary matter. Primary matter is indeterminate in 
actuality, but determinate in potentiality. As a determinate capacity for a determinate set of 
properties (i.e. the four primary contraries), primary matter is something and not a nothing; 
moreover, possessing determinate properties, it qualifies as a positively determinate tool with 
philosophical significance. This significance lies both in providing a bearer to the essential 
properties defining the four elements and in distinguishing natural sublunary realty from other 
kinds of enmattered realities, such as the heavens, whose primary matter, the ether, is endowed 
with a different kind of capacity from the primary matter of the element. 
 In conclusion, GC.II.1-5 endorses the Alterity condition for matter. Although the primary 
material bodies (i.e. the four elements) are contraries, GC.II.1-5 advocates the necessity of 
positing a primary matter underlying the four elements, and thus the whole natural, sublunary 
world. Since the primary matter is the substrate underlying the whole set of the contraries, it is 
necessarily not a contrary itself, for otherwise it would be annihilated by its contrary. 
 
113 Williams 1982, pp.211-9. 
114 Charlton 1983. 
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 Thus, although the primary material bodies (the four elements) do not constitute an exception to 
the First horn of the aporia on the number of natural principles, their underlying primary matter 
does. GC.II.1-5, thus, confirms the idea put forward by Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6 that the substrate 




CH.5. ARISTOTLE’S TRIAD OF PRINCIPLES. MATTER, FORM AND PRIVATION. 
 
5.1. Introduction: Setting the enquiry. 
 This introductory section has the role of setting the scope and object of Phys.I.7, as well as the 
main conceptual distinctions shaping the argument developed in the chapter. 
 
5.1.1. What is enquired into. 
 Phys.I.7 is, with good reason, the chapter of Phys.I that has attracted most strongly the attention 
of scholars. And this for a series of good reasons, first and foremost because it most clearly 
presents the result of the enquiry pursued in Phys.I. Two tendencies with relation to the scope of 
Phys.I are prevailing. The first tendency consists in interpreting Phys.I.7 as a treatment of 
substantial change (coming into being).115 The second tendency is to interpret Phys.I.7 as a key 
text of Aristotle’s hylomorphism.116 The first tendency of scholarship endorses that the analysis 
of change is the aim of Phys.I. The second tendency of scholarship endorses that the being of 
natural things is what is at stake in Phys.I. 
 With relation to the first tendency of scholarship, it is beyond doubt that Phys.I.7 accomplishes 
an analysis of change in general, and of substantial change in particular. In setting the topic of 
the enquiry, Phys.I.7 opens with three claims. 
 
115 Waterlow 1982; Code (forth.); Henry 2015. 
116 Ebrey (unpublished), Kelsey 2010. 
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Phys., I.7, 189b30-2 
Ὧδ’ οὖν ἡµεῖς λέγωµεν πρῶτον περὶ πάσης γενέσεως ἐπελθόντες· ἔστι γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν 
τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτον εἰπόντας οὕτω τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον ἴδια θεωρεῖν. 
Thus, we now say [how the difficulty is solved], first by approaching coming to be in 
general, for it is according to nature to speak first of the things that are common, and thus 
to contemplate what is proper to each single case. 
 The first claim is that Aristotle is going to speak with his own voice. This may seem 
incompatible with my claim that Phys.I.5-6 contain arguments and results that Aristotle is 
willing to endorse in Phys.I.7. I think that it is neither the case that the arguments of Phys.I.5-6 
are dialectical ones, nor that they are unbiased by dialectical assumptions. These dialectical 
assumptions do not undermine the validity of the arguments contained in Phys.I.5-6, but require 
Aristotle’s own weighing and assessing their force. As the dialectical assumptions of Phys.I.5-6 
are also responsible for the aporia on the number of natural principles, Aristotle’s assessment in 
Phys.I.7 also solves the aporia. 
 The second claim is that the starting point of the enquiry is coming to be in general. The 
connected third claim is that the enquiry proceeds from change in general to what is proper to 
each specific case of change. Thus, Phys.I.7 naturally divides itself into two macro-sections. The 
first one deals with change in general and with the conceptual tools required for its analysis 
(189b32-190a31). The second one (190a31ff.) lays down the difference between non-substantial 
and substantial change, and focuses on the analysis of substantial change, which constitutes the 
aim of Phys.I.7. 
 Although it can hardly be denied that the analysis of change has the lion’s share in the economy 
of Phys.I.7, I doubt that the principles of substantial change are the only aim of the enquiry of 
Phys.I.7. Rather, the analysis of substantial change reveals itself to be an ontological analysis of 
the substances functioning as starting points and end points of substantial change. The principles 
searched for in Phys.I.7 are not – or better, are not only – the principles of coming into being. 
Rather, they are the principles of change and being with relation to substance; namely, the 
principles of coming into being and of the ontological composition of natural things. 
 This analysis not only yields the principles of natural things with relation to substance, but also 
constitutes a means to assess the relation among the substrate and the opposites, and thus a 
means to solve the aporia raised in Phys.I.6. 
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5.1.2. The two projects of Phys.I.7. 
 I believe that Phys.I.7 pursues two projects. On the one hand, Phys.I.7 provides Aristotle’s 
solution to the aporia on the number of natural principles raised in Phys.I.6. On the other hand, it 
accomplishes Aristotle’s own doctrine of the natural principles. The accomplishment of both 
projects entails a strong continuity between the arguments of Phys.I.5-6 and Phys.I.7. 
 I have shown that Aristotle is committed, at least to some extent, to the validity of the arguments 
in Phys.I.5-6. Phys.I.7 does not provide any independent argument for the identification of the 
natural principles. Rather, the aim of Phys.I.7 is to refine the material on the identity and number 
of the natural principles provided by Phys.I.5-6. Since this material presents a certain degree of 
internal antinomy leading to the aporia on the number of natural principles, the project of 
refining the material of Phys.I.5-6 overlaps with the project of solving the aporia. 
 A conclusive remark of Phys.I.7 contains some evidence for the overall project of Phys.I.5-7. 
Phys., I.7, 191a14-19 
ταῦτα δὲ πῶς δύο καὶ πῶς πλείω, εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἄνω.  πρῶτον µὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη ὅτι ἀρχαὶ 
τἀναντία µόνον, ὕστερον δ’ ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ ἄλλο τι ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ εἶναι τρία· ἐκ δὲ τῶν 
νῦν φανερὸν τίς ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας, καὶ τί 
τὸ ὑποκείµενον. […] ἀλλ’ ὅτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ τρεῖς καὶ πῶς τρεῖς, καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος αὐτῶν, 
δῆλον. πόσαι µὲν οὖν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐκ τούτων θεωρείσθωσαν. 
It has been said above in which way these [the principles] are two and in which way they 
are more than two. First, it has been said that the principles are only the contraries; then, 
that it is necessary that something different underlies, and that they are three. From what 
has been said now, it is clear what the difference between the contraries is, how the 
principles are related to each other and what the substrate is. […] But it is clear that, and 
how, the principles are three, as well as their mode. It has been observed above how 
many, and which ones, the principles are. 
 Lines 14-5 state the success of the first project of Phys.I.7, namely the solution of the aporia of 
Phys.I.6. The solution consists in explaining in which sense the principles are only the contraries 
(First horn) and in which sense it is true to say that they are the contraries and the substrate 
(Second horn). Adding to this, lines 20-22 conclude that three topics have been assessed thus far: 
the number of natural principles, their identity and their mode. The first and the third points are 
directly accomplished by Phys.I.7. The second point, I believe, is the product of the arguments of 
Phys.I.5-6 and of the process of their refinement unfolded in Phys.I.7. Some evidence for this 
claim can be gained from the preceding lines. 
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 Lines 15-7 contain a backward look at Phys.I.5-6. These chapters have concluded that principles 
are, respectively, only the contraries and also the substrate. The “only” (µόνον) in line 16 should 
be taken as qualifying the conclusion of Phys.I.5 rather than as referring to the stage of the 
argument. In other words, µόνον does not express, I believe, that the third principle has not yet 
been argued for in Phys.I.5. Rather, it clarifies that Phys.I.5 concludes that contraries are the only 
principles of natural things. 
 Lines 17-9 recapitulate three main results of Phys.I.7. The list must not necessarily be 
understood as complete, but it is certainly of importance. The results presented are: (a) assessing 
the difference between the contraries; (b) clarifying the reciprocal relation enjoyed by the three 
principles; (c) clarifying what the substrate is. 
 I claim that Phys.I.5-6 provide the raw material for the triad of the principles of natural things 
gained in Phys.I.7. This raw material consists of the basic idea that principles are the opposites 
and the substrate. 
 As I have claimed, the main task of Phys.I.7 is to determine the principles proper to the natural 
substances that have come into being (of the end points of substantial change). This entails a 
major shift from the enquiry contained from Phys.I.5 to Phys., I.7, 190a31, concerning the end 
point and starting point of change in general. 
 Thus, the refinement of the raw material of Phys.I.5-6 accomplished by Phys.I.7 through (a-c) is 
to be understood as realising this shift towards the principles of natural substance. In what 
follows, I show how (a-c) accomplish the shift towards substance realised in Phys.I.7, and thus 
the refinement of the results of Phys.I.5-6 into the principles of natural substance. 
 
5.1.3. How the two projects accomplished in Phys.I.7 are actually one single project. 
 In the previous sections, I have claimed that Phys.I.7 pursues two projects by virtue of achieving 
(at least) three tasks (a-c). These two projects are actually one single project, for the material of 
Aristotle’s doctrine of natural principles is argued for in Phys.I.5-6, whose conflicting arguments 
give raise to the aporia whether the opposites exhaust the kind of the natural principles or 
whether the substrate must be added to the count. Thus, clarifying whether the substrate should 
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be reduced to the opposites, thus answering the aporia, overlaps at least partially with the project 
of bringing the doctrine of the natural principles to its accomplishment. In the next three sections 
(5.1.5.a-c.), I show how each of these tasks is instrumental both in solving the aporia on the 
number of natural principles and in bringing the doctrine of the natural principles to its 
completion. 
 
5.1.3.a. The refinement of the concept of opposition qualifying as a principle. 
 (1) In one sense, task (a) consists in assessing in which different ways and to what different 
extent each of the two opposites, i.e. form and privation, qualifies as principles. In Phys.I.5-6, the 
contraries qualify as principles to the same extent. Phys.I.7, instead, draws a distinction. In a 
nutshell, privation is said to be a principle only coincidentally, whereas form qualifies as a 
principle without restriction. The difference in etiological status between form and privation can 
be explained by virtue of (b) the clarification of the relation of the three principles to each other. 
Part of the results gained with relation to (b) is that privation can be reduced, to some extent, 
both to the substrate and to the form. Thus, in one sense, the task of clarifying (a) “the difference 
between the contraries” undertaken in Phys.I.7 consists in assessing that form and privation are 
endowed with different etiological statuses. 
 (2) In another sense, task (a) consists in the progressive refinement of the concept of opposition 
qualifying as a principle of natural things. Phys.I.5 first considers (188a30-b8) the narrow 
concept of contrariety (white/black; musical/unmusical), to further consider (188b8-23) 
substantial opposition (being-joined and non-being-joined); being-composed and being-
scattered; formedness and formlessness). To be sure, substantial opposition is presented as a pre-
technical notion in Phys., I.5, 188b8-23. Namely, it is not explicitly thematised with relation to 
substantial change, for substantial change is distinguished from non-substantial change only in 
Phys.I.7. Two plausible explanations for this are the following ones. 
 First, Aristotle pursues in Phys.I.5-6 a general heuristic project that, according to the method put 
forward in Phys.I.1, is still in its καθόλου phase and has not yet reached its analytic 
diversification (i.e. its καθ’ ἕκαστα phase). Thus, Aristotle’s aim in Phys.I.5-6 is to find the 
principles of natural things regardless their categorical difference. 
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 Second, a favourite critical target for Aristotle is the failure of the theories of change of his 
predecessors with relation to their capability to detect the difference between substantial and 
non-substantial change. In GC., I.1, 314a3ff, for example, Aristotle confronts his predecessors 
with the charge of explaining away substantial change through non-substantial change. In 
314b2ff, he divides the predecessors into two groups, the first one reducing substantial change to 
alteration, the second one to aggregation and separation. The failure of Phys.I.5-6 to 
acknowledge the specificity of substantial change may hinge on the fact that Phys.I.5-6 is 
partially dependent on the conceptual framework inherited from the predecessors. Aristotle’s 
general project of drawing the truth underlying the theories of his predecessors and providing his 
own argument for it entails a temporary and partial acceptance of the conceptual framework of 
the predecessor. 
 The two arguments against the First horn of the aporia contained in Phys., I.6, 189a21-b1 first 
take up the narrow concept of contrariety in play in Phys., I.5, 188a30-b8. Then, Phys.I.6 
presents a reduction of the contraries qualifying as principles to the general pair of excess and 
defect. By virtue of analogy, Aristotle claims, each term of a contrary pair is related to the other 
in the same way as excess is related to defect. This analogical reduction is telling on two 
grounds. 
 First, it anticipates in a pre-technical terminology (excess/defect) the opposite pair of 
form/privation that are members of the definitive triad of principles selected in Phys.I.7. Spelling 
out contrariety as the opposition of excess and defect is in fact a first move towards the 
opposition of form and privation introduced in Phys.I.7 in order to account for the substance of 
natural things. As I have claimed (cf. §4.2.1.), there is good reason for denying that substantial 
forms have a contrary. Rather, a substantial form is opposed to privation in a different way than 
contraries are opposed to each other. Introducing form and privation in place of contrariety 
accounts for the substance of natural things, with relation to both their capacity to change and to 
their being (or composition). 
 Second, the reduction of contraries to excess and defect entails a reflection on the difference 
between the members of each contrary pair of principles. In fact, the contraries in play in 
Phys.I.5-6 are reduced analogically into two columns. In Phys., I.7, 191a3-7, where form and 
privation are said to be two modes, namely presence and absence, of one single item, the form. 
159 
 
The result of this process is that privation, after having been declared a principle only 
coincidentally with relation to the substrate, is further excluded from the number of the non-
coincidental principles by virtue of its reducibility to form. 
 In conclusion, task (a) is instrumental to the two projects pursued in Phys.I.7. 
 With relation to the solution of the aporia of Phys.I.6, (a) spells out the possibility to reduce the 
opposite principles to matter and form, on the ground that privation is merely coincidental. 
 With relation to the accomplishment of Aristotle’s theory of the natural principles, task (a) both 
expands the theory to include substance and clarifies that form and privation have a different 
etiological status. 
 
5.1.3.b. Task (b): clarifying the reciprocal relations enjoyed by the three principles. 
 The main task undertaken by Phys.I.7 consists in clarifying the relation that matter, form and 
privation enjoy with each other. 
 (1) A main result is gained through the analysis of the starting point and end point of coming 
into being. In Phys., I.7, 190b10-1, Aristotle assesses that everything undergoing change is a 
composite being, for necessarily a substrate must underlie what changes. The starting point of 
change can be considered, numerically, as what lacks a certain form; by account, it is twofold, 
namely privation and matter. Similarly, the end point of change can be considered, numerically, 
as what is formed; by account, it is twofold, namely matter and form. 
 Thus, the aporia on the principles of natural thing is solved in so far as we consider the 
principles either numerically (privation and form) or with relation to their difference in account 
(privation, form and matter). 
 (2) The passage from Phys.I.5-6 to Phys.I.7 entails a refinement of the internal relation among 
the principles. The coincidental predication in play in Arg.2 of Phys.I.6 has shown that, if the 
substrate is posited as a principle, the contraries fail to qualify as such, for they are posterior to 
the substrate they are predicated of. Whereas the result of Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 (i.e. the claim that, 
for change to be possible, there must be a substrate underlying the opposites) is crucial in 
Phys.I.7 (cf. §5.5.1.), the result of Arg.2 might seem to be dropped. In fact, Phys.I.7 posits matter 
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and form on the same footing. Moreover, the question on the priority of either form or matter is 
left undecided in Phys.I. 
 These negative results suggest that Phys.I.7 understands the relation between matter, form and 
privation in a different way than Phys.I.6. If coincidental metaphysical predication in Phys.I.6 
entails the priority of the substrate (i.e. of substance) over its properties, the fact that matter and 
form are on the same footing suggests that the reciprocal relation is of a different kind than the 
previous one. I label the relation between matter and form (and matter and privation) substantial 
metaphysical predication, since all three parties involved are, to some extent, substances, and 
since their reciprocal relation is not coincidental. 
 Other texts expand on the relation between matter and form. A key-strategy developed in 
Metaph.VIII.6 seems to be that form is said of matter according to an identity predication of the 
kind: M is potentially what F+ is actually. 
 The negative result of Phys.I.7 seems to place Phys.I on the way from the substace-properties 
ontology of the Categories and more mature treatments of hylomorphism such as Metaph.VIII. 
Phys.I ascertains the existence of a level of analysis below the substance-properties relation of 
the Categories, and denies that matter and form stand in a relation of coincidental metaphysical 
predication. How the relation between matter and form can be spelled out remain, nonetheless, a 
topic for further study. 
 
5.1.3.c. Task (c): clarifying what the substrate is. 
 As a matter of fact, a central part of Aristotle’s endeavour to find the principles of natural things 
and to solve the aporia on the number thereof consists in clarifying what matter is. The Second 
horn itself derives from the conceptual necessity to posit a matter and substrate that are different 
from the opposition that endows them. Aristotle’s hesitation to endorse the Second horn 
straightaway depends, I have claimed, on the difficulty of positing a substrate/matter that is itself 
different from the opposites. 
 The determination of the nature of the substrate/matter goes through the following steps. In 
Args.1-2 of Phys.I.6, the substrate/matter is introduced on two grounds. Namely, both in order to 
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solve the impossibility for contraries to qualify as subjects of change and as substances. 
Moreover, Phys.I.6 puts forward the requirement for substrate to be different from the 
opposition, and weighs the failure of the theories of the predecessors according to their failure to 
safeguard this difference (Phys., I.6, 189b2-11). 
 A major endeavour of Phys.I.7 lies in assessing the difference between matter and privation 
constituting the starting point of change, namely in differentiating “the black” in its elements: the 
substrate undergoing change (e.g. the man) and the property black inhering in the substrate. If 
this difference is rather clear with relation to the starting point of non-substantial change, it gets 
fishier and fishier the more we deal with low-layered substantial changes. If we consider the case 
of a statue coming into being through the acquisition of a figure out of the figurelessness of a 
lump of bronze, spotting the difference between the figurelessness and the bronze may be an 
easy task. Regardless of the variety of shapes the figurelessness of the bronze may take before 
being moulded into the figure of the statue, the bronze is a definite material substance, whereas 
the figurelessness is a negative determination of the form of the statue. If we consider elemental 
change, instead, conceiving a matter that is different from the primary contraries defining each 
element becomes fishier. I have shown that this is a controversial issue among the predecessors, 
and that the invention of primary matter as a potential substrate of the four elements different 
from the primary contraries is the endeavour of GC.II.1. 
 
5.2. The introduction of conceptual distinctions. 
 Phys., I.7, 189b32-190a13 introduces conceptual distinctions that are instrumental to the 
achievement of the two projects pursued in Phys.I.7. Namely, the solution of the aporia on the 
number of natural principles and the refinement of the results of Phys.I.5-6 into the triad of 






5.2.1. First distinction: being simple vs being composite. Second distinction: starting point 
vs end point of change. 
Phys., I.7, 189b32-190a5 
φαµὲν γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἄλλου ἄλλο καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρου ἕτερον ἢ τὰ ἁπλᾶ λέγοντες ἢ τὰ 
συγκείµενα. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὡδί. ἔστι γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνθρωπον µουσικόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ µὴ 
µουσικὸν γίγνεσθαι µουσικὸν ἢ τὸν µὴ µουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον µουσικόν.   
ἁπλοῦν µὲν οὖν λέγω τὸ γιγνόµενον τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ µὴ µουσικόν, καὶ ὃ γίγνεται 
ἁπλοῦν, τὸ µουσικόν· συγκείµενον δὲ καὶ ὃ γίγνεται καὶ τὸ γιγνόµενον, ὅταν τὸν µὴ 
µουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον φῶµεν γίγνεσθαι µουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον. 
And we say, in fact, that something comes to be out of something other, and that 
something comes to be out of something different. And these things we mentioned are 
either simple or composite. And I mean this way: it is the case that man comes to be 
musical, and that the unmusical comes to be musical or that the unmusical man comes to 
be musical man. 
And I say what-comes-to-be as simple: the man and the non-musical; what-has-come-to-
be: the musical. [We say] what-has-come-to-be and what-comes-to-be as composite 
things, when we say that the non-musical man comes to be the musical man. 
 The passage opens with a collection of ways in which we commonly describe coming to be. The 
three ways mentioned share the common two-place pattern “x γίγνεται y”, where x and y stand 
for the two kinds of items selected by Phys.I.5-6 as sources, either singularly or in conjunction. 
Namely, x can be filled either with a contrary or with a substrate or with the conjunction of them; 
y can be filled either with a contrary or with the conjunction of a substrate and a contrary. 
 Aristotle’s reference to the way in which we commonly speak of coming to be has been 
idiosyncratically interpreted by Wieland et all. as bearing the burden of proof for the result of 
Phys.I.7.117 Far from being so, 189b32-190a1 most clearly takes up both source conditions for 
natural change stated in Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 (188a30-b8). The reference to change between others 
(ἐξ ἑτέρου ἕτερον) picks up the necessary otherness condition. The reference to change between 
things that are different (ἐξ ἑτέρου ἕτερον) picks up the sufficient condition. The reference to the 
substrate obviously refers to the result of Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 rather than to linguistic analysis. 
Thus, 189b32-190a1, instead of invoking historically accidental linguistic structures as evidence 
for a metaphysical claim, actually make reference to what has been achieved by argument in the 
preceding chapters. 
 
117 See §0.4. 
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 The distinction between the starting point and end point of change marked in Phys.I.5 by the 
particles ἐκ/εἰς is labelled in our passage, respectively, by the expressions τὸ γιγνόµενον and ὃ 
γίγνεται. These expressions undergo changes throughout Phys.I.7, and the former one is 
ambiguous. In our passage, it designates the starting point of change, whereas, in a later passage 
(190b9-17), it applies to the things undergoing change in general. These, in turn, are said to 
include both the starting point (τι γιγνόµενον) and the end point of change (τι ὃ τοῦτο γίγνεται), 
labelled with two slightly modified expressions. 
 Further, the first conceptual distinction is connected with the second distinction. This distinction 
might also seem to be anticipated in Phys.I.5, namely in the difference between simple contraries 
(cf. §2.1.) and composite contraries (cf. §2.2.). This is nonetheless mere appearance. In fact, 
Phys., I.5, 188b8-23 analyses contraries that are in themselves composite of conceptual parts. 
Formedness and formlessness refers to the composition of formal parts (e.g. of the head, arms, 
legs and torso of the statue). The kind of composition addressed in our passage is, instead, the 
composition of the contraries with the substrate advocated in Phys.I.5 and Phys.I.6. 
 
5.2.2. Third distinction. Two ways of qualifying the starting point of change: “x comes to be 
y”, “y comes to be out of x”. 
 Phys., I.7, 190a5-8 introduces two ways of qualifying the starting point of change with relation 
to coming to be. 
Phys., I.7, 190a5-8 
τούτων δὲ τὸ µὲν οὐ µόνον λέγεται τόδε γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦδε, οἷον ἐκ µὴ 
µουσικοῦ µουσικός, τὸ δ’ οὐ λέγεται ἐπὶ πάντων· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐγένετο µουσικός, 
ἀλλ’ ἅνθρωπος ἐγένετο µουσικός. 
And out of these, something is not only said to come to be this, but also to come to be out 
of this, e.g. the musical comes to be out of the non-musical. Nonetheless, this does not 
apply to all of them. For musical does not come to be out of man, but man comes to be 
musical. 
 In common speaking praxis on coming to be, we do not use only the formula “x γίγνεται y” in 
play in the preceding lines. Rather, the starting point of change is referred to either directly or 
indirectly, namely by adding the preposition ἐκ. Thus, the general mode of speaking about 
coming to be can be summarised into the formula “(ἐκ) x γίγνεται y”, meaning that the starting 
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point of change is: either considered as the subject of the formula “x γίγνεται y”; or as the 
provenance of the subject of change. 
 Through the observation of the speaking praxis in the case of the example of the non-musical 
man coming to be musical man, the First, Second and Third distinctions overlap in the following 
way. For the starting point of change (x) considered as a simple item: the contrary allows for 
both ways of speaking about change, whereas the substrate allows only for the pattern “x 
γίγνεται y”. 
 
5.2.3. Fourth distinction. Persistence and non-persistence of the starting point of change. 
 This distinction has become highly controversial since Barrington Jones refuted, in an influential 
paper, the traditional belief that the substrate persists through substantial change. Both sides have 
found their champions in successive scholarship, and even today the debate is far from waning. 
 I discuss the topic of the persistence of the substrate in substantial change in §5.6. In Phys., I.7, 
190a9-13, the distinction between what-comes-to-be persisting through change and what-comes-
to-be without persist is drawn with relation to non-substantial change. 
Phys., I.7, 190a9-13 
τῶν δὲ γιγνοµένων ὡς τὰ ἁπλᾶ λέγοµεν γίγνεσθαι, τὸ µὲν ὑποµένον γίγνεται τὸ δ’ οὐχ 
ὑποµένον· ὁ µὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὑποµένει µουσικὸς γιγνόµενος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ 
µὴ µουσικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄµουσον οὔτε ἁπλῶς οὔτε συντεθειµένον ὑποµένει. 
And out of what-comes-to-be, and comes to be as a simple thing, we say, on the one 
hand, that something comes to be persisting; on the other hand, that something comes to 
be without persisting. In fact, on the one hand, the man persists [being] man while 
coming to be musical, and is [man] [or: and [still] exists]. On the other hand, the non-
musical and the unmusical do not persist either as simple beings or as composite beings. 
 On the basis of the previous distinctions, Aristotle is here concerned with the starting point of 
change only, first considered as simple (i.e. either as the substrate or as the contrary), then as 
composite. 
 When the unmusical man comes to be the musical man, the substrate (the man) persists, whereas 
the contrary (both as a simple and as a composite – the unmusical and the unmusical man) does 
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not persist. That the claim is presented as a plain fact is evident from the lack of inferential 
particles. 
 The evidence of the claim is supported by the following consideration. According to GC.I.2, 
non-substantial change is a change with respect to the non-substantial properties pertaining to a 
certain substance, whereas substantial change is a change with relation to the substrate or the 
form. By definition, the substrate of the properties undergoing change persists as such and 
remain unchanged. Evidently, when the man comes to be musical, it does not cease to be man. 
Rather, man persists through coming to be, so that the end point of change consists of the same 
man that has come to be musical. 
 The persistence or lack of persistence of the starting point of change is assessed, I believe, by 
the words καὶ ἔστι at line 11. The καί may well be considered as epexegetic, and the ἔστι may 
mean either existence or identity. If the former is the case, the man persists, if it [still] exists in 
the end of the process of change. If the latter is the case, the man persists, if it is identical (in its 
essence) with the man of the end point of change. 
 Thus, what is the starting point of change at t1 (x) persists through change on either of these two 
conditions: 
existential condition (weaker): x persists through change, if x still exists at t2; or: 
identity condition (stronger): x persists through change, if x is identical with x at t2. 
 The existential condition and the identity condition evidently coincide in the case of non-
substantial change, for non-substantial change does not mutate the nature of the substrate, but 
only its non-substantial properties. In the case of substantial change, it is not clear how far the 
two conditions may coincide, for substantial change is a mutation of the starting point of change 
with relation to its substance. 
 In conclusion, the substrate persists through non-substantial change, for it exists and is identical 
to itself both in the starting point of change and in the end point of change. The contrary does not 





5.2.4. Fifth distinction. Substantial change vs non-substantial change. 
 After having introduced the first result of Phys.I.7, namely that the starting point of change in 
general is one in number and twofold in being, and before extending the result to the case of 
substantial coming to be, Aristotle distinguishes between substantial and non-substantial change. 
Here, I merely flag this difference, which is of major importance. 
Phys., I.7, 190a31-3 
πολλαχῶς δὲ λεγοµένου τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν µὲν οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τόδε τι γίγνεσθαι, 
ἁπλῶς δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν µόνον […]. 
And coming to be is said in many ways. And out of these, on the one hand, [things] not 
[only] come to be, but come to be this; on the other hand, [things] come to be simply, and 
this is proper to substances only.  
 The text presents a common claim in Aristotle’s treatment of change, namely that change is not 
a univocal term. Rather, it is said both transitively and intransitively (or simpliciter). 
 In the first sense – which is expressed by the general formula “(ἐκ) x γίγνεται y” employed so 
far –, something changes into something else, i.e. “comes to be this (τόδε τι)”. The expression 
τόδε τι is here used quite ambiguously, since it is extensively used to mean substance through the 
Corpus. In this passage, instead, it evidently stands for a non-substantial feature acquired through 
the process of change. 
 In the second sense, change is meant as intransitive, substantial coming to be in the form of 
coming to be simpliciter (ἁπλῶς). I refer to this kind of change as “coming into being”, along 
with the expressions “substantial change/substantial coming to be”. 
 Coming to be, evidently, does not share the same linguistic structure with coming to be (“(ἐκ) x 
γίγνεται y”). Rather, coming into being is expressed by the one-place formula “y γίγνεται”. 
Aristotle’s attempt throughout Phys.I.7, nonetheless, is to normalise coming into being by virtue 
of assimilating it to coming to be (something). Thus, the one-place pattern proper to substantial 
change is resolved into the two-place pattern of non-substantial change. When y comes into 
being, there is a matter (M) that is endowed with the privation of the form of y (F-) at t1, and 




5.3. The analysis of the starting point of change in general. Substrate and privation as 
principles. 
 The analysis of the starting point of change has already gained important elements in the 
previous section (§5.2.) This section is declared concluded in line 190a13, which marks the 
transition from the collection of conceptual differences (189b32-190a13) to the analysis of the 
starting point of change (190a13-b17) on the basis of the conceptual distinctions previously 
achieved. 
 According to the program set out at the opening of Phys.I.7 (189b30-2) reaching from what is 
general to what is particular, the analysis of change first deals (190a13ff.) with what is common 
to all change, before turning to what is proper to substantial change (190a31ff.) The latter 
represents the culmination of the enquiry on natural principles of Phys.I. 
 This move engenders a difficulty, insofar as the analysis of change in general stems from 
consideration of non-substantial change, the case of an unmusical man coming to be musical. 
The question arises, whether the conclusions drawn from this case ([a]-[c] below) are also valid 
for the case of substance and substantial change. 
Phys., I.7, 190a13-21 
διωρισµένων δὲ τούτων, ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν γιγνοµένων τοῦτο ἔστι λαβεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπιβλέψῃ 
ὥσπερ λέγοµεν, ὅτι [a] δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τὸ γιγνόµενον, καὶ [b] τοῦτο εἰ καὶ ἀριθµῷ 
ἐστιν ἕν, ἀλλ’ εἴδει γε οὐχ ἕν· τὸ γὰρ εἴδει λέγω καὶ λόγῳ ταὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ 
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀµούσῳ εἶναι. [c] καὶ τὸ µὲν ὑποµένει, τὸ δ’ οὐχ ὑποµένει· τὸ µὲν µὴ 
ἀντικείµενον ὑποµένει (ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὑποµένει), τὸ µὴ µουσικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄµουσον 
οὐχ ὑποµένει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀµφοῖν συγκείµενον, οἷον ὁ ἄµουσος ἄνθρωπος. 
And after having drawn these distinctions, this has to be a grasped from what comes to be 
in general, if one examines the topic in the way we propose. Namely, [a] that there is 
always something that underlies, i.e. what-comes-to-be; that, [b] if this [what-comes-to-
be] is one in number, it is nonetheless not one in form. For I mean by “in form” and “in 
account” the same thing, and what it is to be for the man and what it is to be for the 
unmusical are not the same thing. [c] And one of these persists, whereas the other one 
does not: what is not opposed persists (for the man persists), whereas the non-musical 







 Three claims are made in 190a13-21 about what comes to be in general. 
[a] there is always a substrate underlying the process of change as a starting point (i.e. as 
what-comes-to-be); 
[b] what-comes-to-be (the starting point of change in general) is one in number, but not 
one in form (i.e. in account); 
[c] of what-comes-to-be [c1] one part, namely the substrate and what is not opposed, 
persists; [c2] the other part, namely what is opposed, does not persist. 
 Claims [a-c] constitute a coherent unity both on their own and with relation to the results of 
Phys.I.5-6. 
 The continuity with Phys.I.5-6 is clear from the following: [a] endorses the truth of the claim 
that Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 had argued for in a cautious way, namely that there is something such as a 
substrate that is not reducible to the opposites, and that qualifies as a principle of change along 
with the opposites. Claim [b], in turn, endorses both the result of Arg.2 of Phys.I.5 and that of 
Arg.1 of Phys.I.6, thus arguing that both the substrate and the opposite qualify as starting points 
of change. Moreover, it clarifies both what the relation between the opposite and the substrate is 
and how many principles there are under different considerations (numerically and according to 
form), thus contributing to the solution of the aporia of Phys.I.6. [c] is consistent with the 
rationale for positing the Second horn of the aporia of Phys.I.6, namely for not reducing the 
principles to the opposites alone. In fact, [c1] to some extent restates the alterity condition of the 
substrate, by virtue of highlighting the difference between opposites and the substrate with 
relation to the persistence through change. Since there is starting point of change that does persist 
and one that does not persist through change, it is evident that, at least with relation to form, 
there are two different starting points of change: the substrate and the opposite. 
 As regards the internal unity of [a-c], once [a] is secured, as it is the case that things come to be 
out of the opposites (cf. Arg.2 of Phys.I.5), the necessity arises to explain how many starting 
points of change there are and what their reciprocal relation is. 
 [b] accomplishes this task by virtue of explaining that, on the one hand, there is one starting 
point of change, for the substrate and the opposite coincide numerically. On the other hand, the 
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starting points are two, for they are different in being (in fact, being man is different from being 
unmusical). Thus, with relation to number, there is one starting point of change, namely the 
numerical unity constituted by the substrate and the opposite; with relation to form and being, the 
starting points of change are two, namely the substrate and the opposite. The difference in being 
is not the only difference that distinguishes the substrate from the opposite. 
 In [c], the substrate and the opposite are distinguished with relation to their, respectively, 
persistence and non-persistence through coming to be. Thus, [c] spells out the diachronic 
structure of the substrate through the process of coming to be: when something comes to be, [c1] 
the substrate that underlay the negative opposite at t1 is not destroyed, but rather still exists at t2 
and is identical with what it was and is at t1. In other words, the substrate of coming to be meets 
both the existential and the identity condition for permanence (§5.2.3.), for the man both exists 
and is man, when he comes to be musical out of being unmusical. Unlike the substrate, [c2] the 
opposite is destroyed in the process of coming to be. In fact, since the opposite at the starting 
point of change is incompossible with the opposite supervening at the end point of change, the 
former opposite must be destroyed and does not persist through change. For the opposite 
constituting the starting point of change fulfils neither the existence nor the identity condition. 
For instance, when the unmusical man comes to be the musical man, the unmusical neither exists 
in the musical man nor is identical with it. 
 This having been clarified, we should consider what the rationale supporting [a-c] is. A common 
answer, as I have mentioned in §5.2.2, is that Aristotle would draw on the analysis of the way in 
which we speak about change. The analysis of common language would show us the necessity of 
endorsing [a-c], due to a robust parallelism between reality and language allegedly assumed by 
Aristotle. 
 This interpretation has several disadvantages that are, I believe, damning. First, supporting [a-c] 
with linguistic structures that are contingent to a certain language in certain contingent 
geographical and historical coordinates amount to ruling out any claim to necessity of [a-c]. 
Second, this interpretation endorses an excessively strong claim, namely that language should 
faithfully reflect reality. Third, it undermines the importance of the rational endeavour of 
Phys.I.5-6 and the continuity of [a-c] with the claims argued for in these chapters. Fourth and 
generally, I believe that this interpretation misrepresents the relation between argument and 
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common speech about change. I believe that this becomes evident by considering how Aristotle 
argues for [a] and [c]. 
 In the case of [a], it is clear that linguistic analysis cannot bear the burden of argument. At best, 
it highlights a pre-philosophical understanding of the difference between the substrate and the 
negative opposite with relation to the starting point of change. The necessity of a substrate 
underlying the contraries through change is argued for in Arg.1 of Phys.I.6, opposing to Arg.2 of 
Phys.I.5. The arguments of Phys.I.6, we have seen, are put forward quite tentatively, for it is 
unclear whether the substrate should or should not be reduced to opposition. It is clear that, in 
190a5-8 of Phys.I.7, Aristotle distinguishes between two ways of speaking about coming to be 
with relation to the starting point of change (“out of x comes to be y”, “x comes to be y”), and 
uses this distinction to highlight the difference between the substrate and the opposite. 
Nonetheless, admitting that the distinction between two ways of speaking about coming to be is 
instrumental in highlighting this difference does not amount to assuming that it has the value of 
an argument. Rather, the decisive argument for [a] is found in Phys., I.7, 190a31-b9, where 
Aristotle distinguishes between substantial and non-substantial change (lines 31-3; cf. §5.2.4.), 
and introduces his attempt to extend the κοινά of change gained by analyis of non-substantial 
change ([a-c]) to the more complex case of substantial change (lines 33ff.). Here, Aristotle 
admits that [a] does not apply to substantial change as uncontroversially as to non-substantial 
change. The reason why, instead, [a] evidently applies to non-substantial change is provided by 
the following argument. 
Phys., I.7, 190a33-b9 
[…] κατὰ µὲν τἆλλα φανερὸν ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑποκεῖσθαί τι τὸ γιγνόµενον (καὶ γὰρ ποσὸν 
καὶ ποιὸν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον [καὶ ποτὲ] καὶ ποὺ γίγνεται ὑποκειµένου τινὸς διὰ τὸ µόνην 
τὴν οὐσίαν µηθενὸς κατ’ ἄλλου λέγεσθαι ὑποκειµένου, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τῆς 
οὐσίας)· 
[…] And with relation to the others [to what is not a substance], it is evident that 
something must necessarily underlie [ὑπoκεῖσθαι], i.e. what-comes-to-be [τι τὸ 
γιγνόµενον]. For quantity, quality, relation, [time,] and place come to be on condition that 
there is a certain substrate, because it is only substance that is not said of any other 
substrate, whereas the others [what is not substance] are all said of substance. 
 The argument supporting [a] with relation to the case of non-substantial change contained in 
190a33-b1 employs the tool of metaphysical predication that is in play in Arg.2 of Phys.I.6. 
There, metaphysical predication concludes that the substrate is prior in being to the contraries, 
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and therefore principle of being more (or rather) than the contraries. Here, metaphysical 
predication is employed with the aim of showing that [a] there must be a substrate underlying 
non-substantial change. The argument hinges most plausibly on the notorious doctrine contained 
in the fifth chapter of the Categories claiming that substance is not predicated of anything, 
whereas the other categories are predicated of substance. 
 It is possible to interpret the argument in various ways, and I suggest the following one. 
According to the kind of metaphysical predication in play in the Categories, it is evident that it is 
not possible to conceive of a starting point of any non-substantial change without positing a 
substance functioning as a substrate of the opposite that comes to be. Let us consider any non-
substantial change of the kind: H- comes to be (out of) H+, where H+ and H- are a pair of 
contraries and do not belong to the category of substance; for instance, white and black. Now, let 
us assume the quality black as the only starting point of a process of change towards white 
(⌐[a]). If this were the case, then a non-substances (black) exists in separation from substance as 
a free-floating property. But this is evidently impossible. Therefore, [a] there must be a substance 
underlying every non-substantial change. 
 Far from endorsing alleged, and in themselves contingent, linguistic arguments, Aristotle 
grounds the truth of [a] on an a-priori, necessary argument. The argument in 190a33-b1 has the 
intuitive certainty of an a-priori truth, for it rests on the basic, self-evident principle that non-
substances cannot exist separately from substances. 
 Let us now consider how [c] (the claim that the substrate persists through change) is argued for. 
Scholars such as Barrington Jones have endorsed that the rationale for Aristotle’s persistence 
claim with relation to the substrate of substantial change rests on the assumption that the Third 
conceptual distinction (“out of x y comes to be” vs “x comes to be y”; cf. §5.2.2.) and the Fourth 
conceptual distinction (persistence vs non-persistence of the starting point of change; cf. §5.2.3.) 
run parallel. Namely, that an ontological claim such as [c] would find justification in the 
linguistic fact that the substrate is said to change only according to the linguistic pattern “x 
comes to be y”, whereas the opposite is said to change according to both linguistic patterns. In 
fact, in drawing the Third distinction, Aristotle clarifies that “musical does not come to be out of 
man, but man comes to be musical” (cf. Phys., I.7, 190a7-8). 
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 Now, if there there is something such as a linguistic argument, it is evident that the way in 
which we speak about change should shows a consistent regularity. Nonetheless, as it will 
become evident from the next passage, Aristotle does not hold this view. Therefore, the (in itself 
unappealing) idea of a linguistic argument must be rejected. 
Phys., I.7, 190a21-31 
τὸ δ’ ἔκ τινος γίγνεσθαί τι, καὶ µὴ τόδε γίγνεσθαί τι, µᾶλλον µὲν λέγεται ἐπὶ τῶν µὴ 
ὑποµενόντων, οἷον ἐξ ἀµούσου µουσικὸν γίγνεσθαι, ἐξ ἀνθρώπου δὲ οὔ·οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποµενόντων ἐνίοτε λέγεται ὡσαύτως· ἐκ γὰρ χαλκοῦ ἀνδριάντα γίγνεσθαί 
φαµεν, οὐ τὸν χαλκὸν ἀνδριάντα. τὸ µέντοι ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειµένου καὶ µὴ ὑποµένοντος 
ἀµφοτέρως λέγεται, καὶ ἐκ τοῦδε τόδε καὶ τόδε τόδε· καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀµούσου καὶ ὁ ἄµουσος 
γίγνεται µουσικός. διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκειµένου ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀµούσου ἀνθρώπου 
καὶ ὁ ἄµουσος ἄνθρωπος γίγνεσθαι λέγεται µουσικός. 
And “to come to be out of this” and “not to come to be this” is said prevailingly with 
relation to what does not persist. For example, “musical comes to be out of unmusical”, 
and not “out of man”. Nonetheless, in some cases, “to come to be out of this” is said also 
with relation to what persists. For we say that “the statue comes to be out of the bronze”, 
not that “the bronze comes to be the statue”. And what comes to be out of the contrary, 
i.e. out of what does not persist, is said in both ways, namely both “this comes to be out 
of this” and “this comes to be this”. For it is the case that both “out of the unmusical” and 
“the unmusical” [are said to] “come to be the musical”. And the same applies also to 
what is composite, for both “out of the unmusical man” and “the unmusical man” [are 
said to] “come to be the musical”. 
 In this passage, Aristotle corrects the impression of a perfect parallelism between the two ways 
of speaking of change and their application to either the substrate or the opposite. In fact, against 
his previous statement (190a5-8, cf. §5.2.2.), the linguistic pattern “out of x y comes to be” is 
said to be employed not exclusively to the case in which x is the opposite, but also occasionally 
(ἐνίοτε) in the case in which x is a substrate. Thus, the linguistic distinction between “this comes 
to be out of this” and “this comes to be this” does not present the regularity that might allow it to 
perform the function of proof for [c]. 
 In conclusion, on a negative note, the interpretations assuming something such as alleged 
linguistic arguments as rationales for [a-c] are both faced with the unappealing consequence of 
undermining the any claim to necessity of [a-c] and do not find textual support. These are 
sufficient grounds for denying that alleged linguistic arguments are endorsed as rationales for the 
ontological claims [a-c]. 
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 On a positive note, I have shown that, at least with relation to [a], Aristotle provides an 
argument hinging on basic a-priori principles, this securing its necessity. I show in §5.6. that 
Aristotle has solid arguments for [c] that are of a different nature and of a different force than the 
alleged linguistic arguments attributed to him by commentators. 
 
5.4. From change in general to substantial change. Or rather, from non-substantial change 
to substantial change. 
 After having gained the κοινά of change [a-c] (190a13-31), Aristotle approaches his 
argumentative aim (the analysis of substantial change) by way of setting out the difference 
between coming to be (non-substantial change) and coming into being (substantial change) 
(190a31-b1, cf. §5.2.4.) The general strategy of Aristotle’s analysis of substantial change seems 
to lie in extending the κοινά of change ([a-c]) to the particular case of substantial change. The 
dimension of this extension is, nonetheless, problematic. 
 On the one hand, [a-c] are presented as the κοινά of change and are therefore expected to apply 
to substantial change. A main vector of analysis in play in Phys.I, I have claimed (cf. §5.1.3.), 
departs from what is general in order to reach to what is proper to the single case. 
 On the other hand, despite being presented as the κοινά of change, [a-c] are evidently gained 
through the analysis of non-substantial change. Non-substantial change seems to function, in 
Phys.I.7, as a model for substantial change, to such an extent that what holds of non-substantial 
change also extends to substantial change. 
 This attempt to give account of substantial change by employing the model of non-substantial 
change is not an isolated one in Aristotle’s Corpus. In GC.I.3, the model of substantial change 
“Y comes into being” is to some extent reduced to and explained away through the model of 
non-substantial change, before its peculiarities are spelled out with relation to the other kinds of 
change (GC.I.4-5). The reduction of the one-place model of coming into being to the two-place 
model of coming to be permits Aristotle to solve the aporia that substantial change should 
coincide with coming to be out of nothing. By endorsing that the formula “Y comes into being” 
should be spelled out into the two-place formula “X comes to be Y; or Y comes to be out of X”, 
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Aristotle shows that Y does not come into being from nothing, but rather from something, if X is 
(cf. Phys.I.5-6) either a substrate or an opposite, or rather118 the unity of substrate and privation. 
 This nothwithstanding, the parallel between non-substantial change and substantial change is 
suspicious on at least two grounds. 
 (1) The application of [c] to substantial change has been strongly criticised over the past 
decades. A numerous group of scholars has argued that substantial change amounts to a sheer 
substitution of substances, without anything persisting through change. I discuss the topic of 
persistence in §5.6, where I argue that Aristotle endorses [c] with relation to substantial change. 
 (2) A second problem is related to the kind of opposition selected as the relevant source of 
susbtantial change. 
 
5.4.1. The source condition of substantial change between Phys.I.5-7 and Phys.V.1. 
 In 2.1.1.2, I have claimed that Aristotle posits a necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
identification of the relevant sources of per se change:  
A and B qualify as sources of per se change, if they are maximally different, i.e. if they 
are contraries (A/B=H+/H-). 
 In §5.1.3.a, I have hinted at the fact that, in Phys.I.7, narrowing down the object of Phys.I to the 
principles of substance is parallel to the refinement of the concept of opposition in play with 
relation to change. In fact, the kind of opposition in play in non-substantial change is contrariety, 
whereas the kind of opposition in play in substantial change is the substantial opposition of form 
and privation. 
 In §2.2, I have shown that Aristotle addresses substantial opposites in a pre-technical way, 
namely not by way of explicitly thematising them as such. Aristotle’s strategy in Phys.I.5 is to 
argue that substantial change can be normalised as a change between contraries. In Phys.I.7, the 
transition from the contrariety entailed in non-substantial change to the substantial opposition of 
form and privation entailed in substantial change occurs smoothly and in absence of further 
 
118 Cf. Phys., I.7, 190a13-b17 and the solution of the same aporia in Phys.I.8. 
175 
 
explanation. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that the pair of substantial opposites of form and 
privation do not fulfil the difference condition and are thus not on the same page with the 
contraries of Phys.I.5. 
 Other texts are more careful than Phys.I in articulating the difference between the sources of 
substantial change and those of non-substantial change. Phys.V.1 is the most lucid recognition of 
this difference. The view endorsed by Aristotle in Phys.V.1 is that the sources of substantial 
change (a kind of μεταβολή) are the contradictories, whereas the sources of non-substantial 
change (κίνησις) are the contraries. This is in plain contrast with the source condition elaborated 
in Arg.2 of Phys.I.5. For the sources of substantial change in Phys.V.1 fulfil only the first, more 
general and weaker condition for natural change posited by Phys.I.5 (i.e. the otherness 
condition), but fail to fulfil the second, narrower and stronger difference condition. According to 
the results of Phys.I.5, the sources of substantial change selected by Phys.V.1, the 
contradictories, fail to qualify as sources of change per se. 
 In what follows, I analyse the agenda and the main claims of Phys.V.1, in order to show that the 
individuation of the species of κίνησις (i.e. non-substantial change) within the genus of μεταβολή 
rests on the individuation of the relevant source of change proper to either kind of change. 
Namely, the contradictories A/⌐A for μεταβολή and the contraries H+/H- (and their 
intermediates) for κίνησις. 
 Phys.V.1 opens (224a21-34) with a distinction between coincidental change and change ἁπλῶς, 
which is in turn subdivided into change with relation to the parts or with relation to the whole. 
The term ἁπλῶς is most likely to mean non-coincidental (or per se) instead of simpliciter (as 
elsewhere, e.g. Phys.I.7 and GC.I.3). Moreover, the account of coincidental change is similar but 
not the same as that of Phys.I.5. Both accounts hinge on the notion of numerical coincidence or 
unity. Nonetheless, in Phys.I.5, the items that come to coincide numerically are the source of 
coincidental change A and the source of per se change H+, so that A and H- are sources of 
coincidental change, if H+/H- are sources of per se change, and if A coincides numerically with 
either H+. In Phys.V.1, it is rather what undergoes change and an arbitrary feature of it that come 
to coincide. For instance, let what undergoes change be a man and the change per se the man 
undergoes be walking. Coincidental change occurs, if walking is attributed to an arbitrary feature 
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pertaining to man; for instance, if we say that the musical is walking, for musical is numerically 
one with the man that is walking per se. 
 224a34-b4 provides a list of the necessary conditions of change: the motor and the time in which 
something changes, and the three internal principles of change of Phys.I, namely what undergoes 
change (τὸ κινούμενον/τὸ ὅ) and the sources of change (τὸ ἐξ οὗ/τὸ εἰς ὅ). Then, Aristotle 
restricts the enquiry to the internal principles of change, namely to what undergoes change and to 
the sources of change, in order to argue for the first result of the chapter, namely that change is in 
neither of the sources of change, but rather in what undergoes change (224b4-8; b25-6). The end 
point of change, i.e. the form, instead, cannot qualify as what changes and is rather unmoved. If 
this were not the case, then the absurdum would result that the end point of a change would be a 
change. 
 The enquiry moves further (224b26ff.) to qualify the sources of per se change, for both 
coincidental change and per se change relative to the parts must be discarded. 
Phys., V.1, 224b26-30 
ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μεταβολὴ ἀφείσθω· ἐν ἅπασί τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ αἰεὶ καὶ 
πάντων· ἡ δὲ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ τοῖς μεταξὺ 
καὶ ἐν ἀντιφάσει· τούτου δὲ πίστις ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. 
And [the kind of] change that occurs coincidentally has to be left aside, for it is in all 
things and all the time and of all things. Instead, [the kind of change] that does not occur 
coincidentally is not in all things, but rather in the things that are contraries, intermediates 
[between contraries] or contradictories. And knowledge of this is provided by induction. 
 The result gained with relation to per se change in general (i.e. to μεταβολή in general, including 
κίνησις) is that the sources of per se change coincide with either the contradictories or the 
contraries (and their intermediates). 
 The following passage (224b35-225b9) represents the core of Phys.V.1, namely the distinction 
between μεταβολή and κίνησις. What is relevant to our purpose is that this difference is drawn 
the basis of their different sources of change. Namely, contradictories for μεταβολή and 
contraries for κίνησις. 
 The kinds of change μεταβολή and κίνησις are derived from the following a-priori 
consideration. Let us consider an affirmative term (F) and its contradictory or negation (⌐F) as 
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sources of change.119 Four possible relations between these terms are given, but only three of 
them qualify as relations of change, for every source of change is an opposite, and ⌐F and ⌐F are 
not reciprocally opposite. 
 It is clear that Aristotle endorses that μεταβολή is the genus of κίνησις, so that all κινήσεις are 
μεταβολαί, but not the other way round. Let us therefore start from the analysis of μεταβολή 
(225a12-34). There are two cases of μεταβολαί: 
(1) ⌐F → F 
(2) F → ⌐F, 
where the first position is the starting point of change, the second position is the end point of 
change, and the arrow means “comes to be”. Now, depending on the values of F in (1) and (2), 
two further kinds of μεταβολαί are given: 
If F = substance, then the change occurring is a μεταβολή ἁπλή; 
If F = non-substantial feature, then the change occurring is a μεταβολή τις. 
 Thus: 
(1) ⌐F → F: 
a) F = substance, then: γένεσις ἁπλῶς (coming into being); 
b) F = non-substance, then: γένεσις τις. 
(2) F → ⌐F: 
a) F = substance, then: φθορά ἁπλῶς (ceasing to be); 
b) F = non-substance, then: φθορά τις. 
 For instance, if we consider (1), we have coming into being, when a substance comes into being 




119 Uncommonly, Aristotle employs the word ὑποκείμενον in order to qualify the sources of change. In 225a6-7, he 
clarifies “By ὑποκείμενον I mean that which is shown through affirmation”. Thus, I believe that the pair 
ὑποκείμενον/μὴ ὑποκείμενον in Phys.V.1 can be rephrased into F/⌐F. 
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 The third and final kind of μεταβολή is the κίνησις, which occurs between two positive features: 
(3) F → F. 
 Now, this is obviously meant so signify: 
(3*) F1 → F2, 
where F1 and F2 necessarily fulfil the otherness condition (F1 ≠ F2), lest there be no change 
altogether occurring in the passage from F1 to F2. 
 Moreover, F1 and F2 must also fulfil the difference condition stated in Phys.I.5 and qualify as 
contraries (H+/H-), as the following passage argues. 
Phys., V.1, 225a34-b5 
ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα κίνησις μεταβολή τις, μεταβολαὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ εἰρημέναι, τούτων δὲ αἱ κατὰ 
γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν οὐ κινήσεις, αὗται δ’ εἰσὶν αἱ κατ’ ἀντίφασιν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐξ 
ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον μεταβολὴν κίνησιν εἶναι μόνην. τὰ δ’ ὑποκείμενα ἢ ἐναντία 
ἢ μεταξύ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις κείσθω ἐναντίον), καὶ δηλοῦται καταφάσει, τὸ γυμνὸν καὶ 
νωδὸν καὶ μέλαν. 
And as every κίνησις is a certain μεταβολή, and as the [kinds of] μεταβολή are the 
aforesaid three ones, and as, among these, those according to coming into being and 
ceasing to be are not κινήσεις, [for] they are according to contradiction – it is necessary 
that only the μεταβολή [occurring] out of a ὑποκείμενον (F) into a ὑποκείμενον (F) is a 
κίνησις. And the ὑποκείμενα are either the contraries or their intermediates, for privation 
must be taken as a contrary, and naked, toothless and black are shown through 
affirmation. 
 The passage is a dense one and makes several points which are worth mentioning. 
 First, it is clear that the difference between pure μεταβολή and μεταβολή as κίνησις rests on 
their respective sources of change. If pure μεταβολή (i.e. substantial change: (1a) coming into 
being and (2a) ceasing to be) occurs between contradictory pairs, the sources of (3) κίνησις are 
rather the contraries or their intermediates. As the intermediates are reducible to the contraries, 
for these constitute the extremes through which the intermediates are defined, I will speak only 
of contraries. Thus: 
(3**) κίνησις: F1 → F2, where F1 = H+ and F2 = H-. 
 Moreover, privation is itself reduced to contrariety. Aristotle provides no rationale for this 
move, but it is clear that he feels the need to solve a difficulty, namely that privations appear to 
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be more similar to a negative term ⌐F than to a positive term F. If this were the case, the change 
whose sources includes one privations would be a pure μεταβολή and not a κίνησις. Aristotle 
claims instead that also privative features such as naked or black are affirmative features (i.e. are 
F). This argument is clearly insufficient to the scope of reducing all privations to contrariety.120 
Nonetheless, it is plausible that Aristotle is here interested in arguing only for the weaker claim 
that privations are not mere contradictories (and thus sources of pure μεταβολή), but rather 
affirmative terms, and thus sources of κίνησις. 
 Second, the relation between κίνησις and μεταβολή τις is unclear. To be sure, our text explicitly 
distinguish between κίνησις and (1a, 2a) μεταβολή simpliciter (coming into being and ceasing to 
be), but remains uncommitted with relation to (1b, 2b) μεταβολή τις. If κίνησις is a μεταβολή 
(for it is a species thereof), then H+/H- (e.g. white and black) can be spelled out in terms of 
contradictories (e.g. white and non-white). But change from white to non-white (or backwords) 
is (1b, 2b) a μεταβολή τις. I have claimed in §2.1. that the otherness condition and the difference 
condition are not only different in force, but also that the former is included in the latter, for 
H+/H- are H+/⌐H+, but not the other way round. In this connection, I believe that μεταβολή τις is 
a way of describing a per se κίνησις as a coincidental μεταβολή. In other words, I believe that 
there is one and only one phenomenon, namely H+ undergoing κίνησις per se out of H- (e.g. 
black coming to be white). Nonetheless, as H+/H- are by definition H+/⌐H+, it is always true to 
say that the κίνησις between H+ and H- is also a μεταβολή τις between H+ and ⌐H+. 
 If this is true, what is the status of μεταβολή τις between H+ and ⌐H+? Jacob Rosen has recently 
argued that it is a coincidental change.121 Although I am sympathetic with the view that there is a 
proper kind of change (the κίνησις between H+ and H-) and that the μεταβολή τις is dependent on 
it, I believe that Rosen’s interpretation meets two problems. First, kinds (1-3) of change are 
presented as non-coincidental ones (224b26-30). Second, ⌐H+ seems to be one with H- not in a 
merely numerical way, but also with relation to form. If it is not necessarily true to say that 
musical holds of the man, it is instead necessarily true to say that ⌐H+ holds of every H-. This 
consideration is consistent with the claim of Phys.I.5 that the otherness condition is a necessary 
condition for A and B to qualify as sources of per se change, but not a sufficient one, for the 
 
120 As I have claimed, the converse seems to be rather true, namely that all contraries are reducible to the opposition 
habitus/privations (whereas not all habiti/privations are contraries). 
121 Rosen 2016. 
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sufficient condition prescribes that A and B are reciprocally different, i.e. contrary. On the basis 
of these considerations, I believe that μεταβολή τις is a description of per se κίνησις with relation 
to the otherness condition only, namely with relation to the more general, merely necessary 
source condition. Thus, μεταβολή τις is a not merely coincidental, but rather a non-coincidental, 
merely necessary and non-sufficient description of per se κίνησις, for it considers the sources of 
κίνησις only with relation to the otherness condition.    
 In conclusion, Phys.V.1 endorses the following picture with relation to the sources (A and B) of 
substantial change and non-substantial change: 
Substantial change ((1a), (2a): γένεσις/φθορά ἁπλῶς): A/B = F/⌐F (contradictories); and 
F = substance; 
Non-substantial change (3: κίνησις): A/B = H+/H- (contraries) or habitus/privation of H; 
and H = non-substantial feature (quality, quantity or place).122 
 Phys.I, instead, provides the following picture: 
Substantial change: A/B = (substantial) form/privation; 
Non-substantial change: A/B = contraries. 
 As an overview, for each kind of change, in Phys.I and Phys.V.1, A/B are: 





Non-substantial change Contraries 
Contraries; Non-substantial 
habiti/privations 
 As a further step, let us analyse the claims on the sources of substantial and non-substantial 
change in of Phys.V.1 through the lense of the source condition as it is spelled out in Arg.2 of 
Phys.I.5. 
 
122 Phys.V.2 expands on κίνησις and argues ad absurdum that no κίνησις is given in non-substantial categories other 
than quality, quantity and place.  
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 With relation to the otherness condition (i.e. A/B = F/⌐F) for A/B to qualify as sources of per se 
change, Phys.I and Phys.V.1 disagree to this extent: 
 Phys.I Phys.V.1 
Substantial change Only necessary123 Sufficient 
Non-substantial change Only necessary Only necessary 
 As both Phys.I and Phys.V.1 entrust non-substantial change to a kind of opposition that is 
narrower than contradiction, they must agree that the otherness condition cannot be sufficient. 
The same view seems to be endorsed by Phys.I with relation to substantial change, for it rests on 
sources of change that are opposed to each other not only as contradictories, but also as form and 
privation. Phys.V.1, unlike Phys.I, rather endorses that the otherness condition must be sufficient 
for A and B to qualify as sources of per se substantial change. 
 The difference condition (i.e. A/B = H+/H-), instead, seems to apply in the following way: 
 
Phys.I Phys.V.1 
Substantial change Not fulfilled Not fulfilled 
Non-substantial change Sufficient Sufficient (at least in some cases) 
 Let us start from Phys.V.1. With relation to non-substantial change (κίνησις), the difference 
condition is fulfilled to the extent to which the opposition of habitus/privation can be reduced to 
contrariety. As I have claimed, this reduction does not seem to be Aristotle’s concern in 
Phys.V.1. The difference condition seems to apply at least to the cases of non-substantial change 
that do not involve the opposition of habitus/privation. Substantial change, instead, as it involves 
the most general opposition of contradiction, rests to no extent on the difference condition. 
 Phys.I, as Phys.V.1 (at least partially) does, endorses that the difference condition is sufficient 
with relation to non-substantial change. The case of substantial change in Phys.I is, as I said, a 
tricky one. Aristotle’s attempt to bridge the passage from non-substantial to substantial change in 
Phys.I.5 is pre-technical and tentative. As it precedes the distinction between substantial and 
non-substantial change drawn in Phys.I.7, we cannot expect the attempt of Phys.I.5 to be 
 
123 For all forms/privations are contradictory, but not all contradictories are forms/privations. 
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conclusive. Phys.I.7, however, in implicitly recognising that substantial change must rest on a 
different kind of opposition than that of contrariety, draws a neat distinction between substantial 
and non-substantial change with relation to their respective sources. Thus, Aristotle’s final 
answer on the sources of substantial change in Phys.I cannot be that the difference condition is 
sufficient. For neither does substantial change rest on contrariety nor does the opposition of form 
and privation identify with contrariety. 
 If Phys.I posits something such as a sufficient source condition for substantial change, it can 
neither be as broad as the otherness condition endorsed in Phys.V.1 as sufficient (for 
form/privation do not coincide with the contradictories) nor as narrow as the difference condition 
(for form/privation are not contraries, although all contraries are forms/privations). 
 Less introductory and more in-depth treatments of change than Phys.I’s bring in the conceptual 
tool of potentiality in order to account for the identity of the relevant sources of substantial 
change. As I have claimed, the concept of potentiality is absent from the main elaboration of 
Phys.I and appears only pre-technically in the last chapter of the text. If this is true, as I believe it 
is, then invoking the concept of potentiality in order to account for the relevant sources of 
substantial change is not a viable strategy. Gill’s reading of Phys.I.7, although the problem she 
tackles is different from the one I tackle here, may provide a solution in this spirit.124 According 
to Gill, the example of the man coming to be musical provided in our text is not a casual one, but 
is rather a particular kind of change in which a substrate changes with relation to what is proper 
to it (for musical seems to be proper to the man alone). In Gill’s view, changing with relation to 
what is proper to the substrate means changing with relation to a determinate potentiality or 
capacity of the substrate. For instance, the relevant sources of change selected in Phys.I.7 are 
those that possess a determinate capacity that is proper to a determinate substrate. In other words, 
a certain substrate that is endowed with a capacity for F changes, if it is F only potentially at t1 
and actualises F at t2. 
 Although I do not contest that Gill’s picture is genuinely Aristotelian, I do not think that it is 
developed in Phys.I. If we consider the Physics alone, the tool of natural potentiality or capacity 
belongs to a more advanced explanation of nature than the one pursued in Phys.I, namely where 
 
124 Gill 1989, 98ff. 
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the doctrine of the four causes is introduced and teleology is in play. This upgrade of the science 
of nature is foreshadowed in Phys.I.9, where Aristotle tackles and refutes the Platonic 
identification of the substrate with opposition (i.e. with the Great and the Small). One of the 
main difficulties of Plato’s doctrine of the substrate is that it is inconsistence with the idea that 
the substrate has an innate tension to the form. The idea that the substrate is something with an 
innate tension and potentiality for something else is fleshed out in Phys.II, where the doctrine of 
the four causes and teleology are introduced. In paradigmatic cases, the substrate, or the matter, 
is something that has tension to a certain form that represents its intrinsic end, for the realisation 
of the form is the actualisation of the determinate potentiality of the matter. Having introduced a 
complete causal explanation and the concept of potentiality, it is open for Phys.III to qualify 
change as the passage from being potentially F to being actually F occurring in a certain 
substrate. 
 Gill’s reading of Phys.I.7 along the pattern of natural potentiality is exposed, I believe, to the 
danger of importing a conceptual machinery that is not present in Phys.I. I believe that, as the 
answer to the question whether matter or form be substance and primary, the rationale for 
positing form and privation as the relevant sources of substantial change is not provided in 
Phys.I. Both these issues require in fact an upgraded explanation of nature, and one that is both 
causally complete and dynamic. In fact, there is some reason for believing that the 
accomplishment of the potentiality of something, which is also the fulfilment of its intrinsic end, 
qualifies as substance to the highest extent. Likewise, the relevant sources of change cannot be 
selected only horizontally, namely with regard to the relation binding the sources to each other. 
Rather, it is reasonable that the rationale for the sources of change to be such and such is a 
vertical one. Namely, that it regards the relation between the substrate that undergoes change and 
the sources. Form (and the privation thereof) is the relevant source of substantial change, for it is 
the end to which the substrate that is the starting point of substantial change tends, and because 
its actualisation is the actualisation of the intrinsic potentiality of this substrate. 
 Thus, differently from the horizontal opposition of contrariety in play in non-substantial change, 
the opposition of form/privation that constitutes the sources of substantial change is intrinsically 
a vertical one and is incomplete in absence of a reference to the potentiality of the substrate. 
Nonetheless, the vertical relation between substrate and form/privation, as well as the dynamic 
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and teleological perspective of a complete study of nature are absent from Phys.I, or at best just 
foreshadowed in Phys.I.9. 
 The most plausible way to harmonise Phys.I and Phys.V.1 with relation to the sources of change 
is, I believe, to endorse that the contradictories selected in Phys.V.1 as sources of substantial 
change are not any contradictories whatsoever, but rather the contradictories that are proper to a 
certain substrate. In the Corpus, the pair of form and privation is consistently referred to as the 
contradictories in the substrate. This can be plausibly taken to mean that the opposites 
form/privation neither coincide with the contradictories F/⌐F nor with the contraries H+/H- (i.e. 
with two particular contradictories belonging to the same genus, where H- ⸧ ⌐H+, and H+/H- ⸧ 
one genus). Rather the items qualifying as forms and privations of these forms (F+/F-) are a 
particular pair of contradictories F/⌐F enjoying a certain relevant relation with a certain substrate 
S. This relation is codified by the positive opposite F and is such that it F is proper to S in the 
sense that S has a natural capacity C for F (C(F)). Form and privation are the presence or absence 
of F in a S that has C(F). Thus, form and privation are the contradictories F/⌐F, when F 
necessarily belongs to a certain S that is endowed with C(F). 
 Let us consider a typical example of the opposition of habitus and privation, namely having 
sight and being blind. Unlike the contradictory pair of having sight and not having sight, the 
scope of having sight/being blind is confined to the set of substrates S that are endowed with the 
capacity for sight. For, a substrate lacking the capacity for sight may either have or not have 
sight, but cannot be blind. In order to be blind, a substrate must either possess the capacity for 
sight as an individuum, and have lost it (e.g. Oedipus), or possess the capacity for sight with 
relation to its species or genus, but fail to realise it (e.g. someone who is congenitally blind).125 
Thus, the scope of the contradictory pair of having sight/not having sight is unlimited, for every 
substrate is either one or the other. The scope of form/privation (F+/F-), instead, is confined to a 
certain subset of substrates, namely to those that are endowed with the capacity for F+ (C(F+)). 
With relation to the broad set of all substrate S, F+/F- are incompossible, but not by necessity 
disjunctively true as the contradictories F/⌐F. With relation to S*, namely to the set of the 
substrates that are endowed with C(F+), F+/F-, instead, behave as contradictories, for, with 
relation to S having C(F+), F+/F- are incompossible and by necessity disjunctively true. Let us 
 
125 Metaph., V.22, 1022b22-7. 
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consider again the previous example: in any given time t, each and every animal that can 
exercise the sense of sight is necessarily either endowed with sight or blind, but not both 
endowed with sight and blind. In this connection, the opposition of form and privation can be 
said to be a contradiction proper to a certain substrate. In conclusion, with relation to the proper 
set of substrates S*, form/privation are contradictories. 
 If we endorse that the contradictory pair F/⌐F that is said to be the relevant sources of 
substantial change in Phys.V.1 is the contradiction that is proper to a certain set of substrates and 
not to any substrate; namely, that F/⌐F are the relevant sources of the substantial change for a 
substrate S* that is endowed with C(F); then, the discrepancy between Phys.V.1 and Phys.I is 
reconciled. 
 Let us assume that this hypothesis is true and go back to the otherness condition with relation to 
substantial change. I have claimed that, at face value, the otherness condition seems to behave in 
the following way: 
 Phys.I Phys.V.1 
Substantial change Only necessary Sufficient 
 If, in order to be harmonised with Phys.I.5, Phys.V.1 is understood to claim that F/⌐F are 
sources of substantial change of S only on the proviso that S is endowed with C(F), then it is 
evident that the previous claim is false, and that both in Phys.I and Phys.V.1 the otherness 
condition is only necessary. For, a further and more specific condition is needed. Namely, are 
sources of substantial change (otherness condition), if(f) 
capacity condition: S is endowed with C(F). 
 I remain uncommitted whether the capacity condition be sufficient or only necessary. What is 
relevant is that its addition makes the otherness condition only necessary, thus correcting the 
previous impression and dispelling the apparent inconsistency between Phys.V.1 and Phys.I.5. 
Rather, Phys.I and Phys.V.1 convene in stating that the otherness condition is only necessary. 
 
Phys.I Phys.V.1 
Substantial change Only necessary Only necessary 
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5.4.2. The analogy between contraries and substantial opposites (form/privation).  
 The enquiry of the previous section has shown that Aristotle endorses in Phys.V.1 a certain 
degree of difference between the sources of non-substantial change (the contraries) and the 
sources of substantial change (the contradictories fulfilling the capacity condition). 
 In the present section, I argue that Phys.I does not endorse a homogeneous account of the 
sources of substantial and non-substantial principle. Rather, Aristotle endorses that there is a 
certain analogy between the sources of non-substantial change (the contraries) occupying the 
stretch of text from Phys.I.4 to Phys., I.7, 190a31 and the opposition of form/privation qualifying 
as sources of substantial change according to the second part of Phys.I.7. 
 Contraries and substantial opposites (form/privation) are not identical. Nonetheless, there is a 
certain sort of analogy between the sources of non-substantial change and those of substantial 
change, amounting to the facts that: (a) the sources of change must be exclusive opposites (i.e. 
either contradictories or substantial opposites or contraries); (b) but the otherness condition is 
necessary and non-sufficient (thus excluding contradictories from the range of the sources of 
change). 
 In §2.2, I have shown that Phys.I.5 (188b8-23) tackles the issue of the difference between the 
sources of substantial change and the sources of non-substantial change in a pre-technical way. 
The strategy of the passage consists in showing that opposite couples such as 
formedness/formlessness; being-composite/being-scattered are sources of change just as other 
contraries are. Two issues are left to the vagueness of a pre-technical treatment. First, the 
opposite couples mentioned are not explicitly ranked as cases of substantial opposites; rather, 
form and privation are introduced explicitly only once the difference between substantial and 
non-substantial change is drawn. Second, it is unclear whether Aristotle means to endorse a 
perfect identity between substantial opposites and contraries, or rather an analogy. Although the 
letter of the text may seem to support the stronger reading, I have dispelled it as theoretically 




 The analogy between the members of opposite couples is in play in at least two passages of 
Phys.I. 
 First, Phys.I.5 (188b26-189a10, cf. §2.4.) clarifies that each member of a contrary couple is 
either positive or negative. Thus, two columns (συστοιχίαι) of contrary terms are created 





 The same principle is in play in Phys.I.6 (189b8-11, cf. §4.2.2.2.),126 where Aristotle reduces the 
two aforesaid columns of contraries to the categories of excess and defect (ὑπεροχή/ἔλλειψις). 
Excess and defect are the closest Aristotle gets to anticipating form and privation in a pre-
technical context. Although they have a quantitative flavour, they spell out contrariety as the 
relation of having (much of) a certain F and lacking F. A similar conceptual move can be found 
in Metaph.X.4,127 where the relation of contrariety is spelled out into the relation of 
habitus/perfect privation (i.e. lacking the habitus completely). Aristotle, however, makes clear 
that the opposition of form and privation cannot be reduced to that of contrariety, whereas the 
converse is the case. Thus, excess and defect, namely the pre-theoretical placeholders for the 
substantial opposition of form and privation, do not qualify as genera of the columns of 
contraries H+/H-. Rather: 
H+: H- (contrariety) = excess: defect (substantial opposition: form/privation). 
 In conclusion, I have claimed that the passage from the sources of non-substantial change 
(Phys.I.4 to Phys., I.7, 190a31) to the source of substantial change (Phys., I.7, 190a31ff.) is 
guided by analogy rather than by complete homogeneity. 
 
126 ἀλλὰ πάντες γε τὸ ἓν τοῦτο τοῖς ἐναντίοις σχηµατίζουσιν, πυκνότητι καὶ µανότητι καὶ τῷ µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. 
ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅλως ὑπεροχὴ δηλονότι καὶ ἔλλειψις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. “But all of them shaped the one by 
means of the contraries – by means of density and rarity, of the more and the less; and these are namely, in general, 
excess and defect, as I have claimed before.” 
127 Cf. §4.1 and §4.2.1. 
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5.5. The analysis of the starting point of substantial change. 
 After having argued for the κοινά of change [a-c], Aristotle narrows down the scope of his 
investigation to the principles of substantial change, analysing first (190b1-17) its starting point, 
and then (190b17-29) its end point. 
 Scope of the analysis appears to be to argue that the κοινά of change [a-c] extend to the special 
case of substantial change. Nonetheless, Aristotle’s intention to claim [c1] that the substrate 
persists through substantial change has been widely criticised; discussion will be delayed to §5.6. 
In the following two sections, I show that [a-b] hold with relation to substantial change. 
 
5.5.1. There is a substrate underlying every substantial change as its starting point ([a]). 
Phys., I.7, 190a31-b9 
πολλαχῶς δὲ λεγοµένου τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν µὲν οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τόδε τι γίγνεσθαι, 
ἁπλῶς δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν µόνον, κατὰ µὲν τἆλλα φανερὸν ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑποκεῖσθαί 
τι τὸ γιγνόµενον (καὶ γὰρ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον [καὶ ποτὲ] καὶ ποὺ γίγνεται 
ὑποκειµένου τινὸς διὰ τὸ µόνην τὴν οὐσίαν µηθενὸς κατ’ ἄλλου λέγεσθαι ὑποκειµένου, 
τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας)· 
[a] ὅτι δὲ καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι καὶ ὅσα [ἄλλα] ἁπλῶς ὄντα ἐξ ὑποκειµένου τινὸς γίγνεται, 
ἐπισκοποῦντι γένοιτο ἂν φανερόν.  ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστι ὃ ὑπόκειται, ἐξ οὗ τὸ γιγνόµενον, οἷον τὰ 
φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐκ σπέρµατος. 
γίγνεται δὲ τὰ γιγνόµενα ἁπλῶς τὰ µὲν µετασχηµατίσει, οἷον ἀνδριάς, τὰ δὲ προσθέσει, 
οἷον τὰ αὐξανόµενα, τὰ δ’ ἀφαιρέσει, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὁ Ἑρµῆς, τὰ δὲ συνθέσει, οἷον 
οἰκία, τὰ δ’ ἀλλοιώσει, οἷον τὰ τρεπόµενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. πάντα δὲ τὰ οὕτω γιγνόµενα 
φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὑποκειµένων γίγνεται. 
And coming to be is said in many ways. And out of these, on the one hand, [things] not 
[only] come to be, but come to be this; on the other hand, [things] come to be simply, and 
this is proper to substances only. And with relation to the others [to what is not a 
substance], it is evident that something must necessarily underlie [ὑπoκεῖσθαι], i.e. what-
comes-to-be [τι τὸ γιγνόµενον]. For quantity, quality, relation, [time,] and place come to 
be on condition that there is a certain substrate, because it is only substance that is not 
said of any other substrate, whereas the others [what is not substance] are all said of 
substance. 
[a] And that also substances, i.e. those things which exist simply, come into being 
[γίγνεται] out of a certain substrate, will become evident through attentive examination. 
For there is always something underlying [ὃ ὑπόκειται], i.e. the what-comes-into-being 
[τὸ γιγνόµενον] out of which [something comes into being] [or: For there is always 
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something underlying out of which what comes into being [comes into being]], as for 
example plants and animals [come into being] out of the seed. 
What comes to be simply [τὰ γιγνόµενα ἁπλῶς] comes into being [γίγνεται] through a 
change of figure (e.g. the statue), through addition (e.g. the things that grow), through 
subtraction (e.g. the Hermes out of the stone), through composition (e.g. the house), 
through qualitative change (e.g. the things that change with relation to their matter). And 
it is evident that all the things that come to be in this way [i.e. that come into being] come 
into being [γίγνεται] out of substrates. 
 This passage presents the analysis of the starting point of substantial change, i.e. the analysis of 
what-comes-into-being. 
 The claim that [a] there is a substrate underlying substantial change as a starting point is less 
evident than in the case of coming to be, where its necessity is revealed by an argument hinging 
on coincidental metaphysical predication. Here, the metaphysical dependence of non-substantial 
predicates on the substances they are predicated of entails that there must be a substance 
underlying what undergoes non-substantial change as a substrate. The same argument cannot 
hold for substances, for substances are metaphysically independent of non-substances. Rather, 
the argument rests on induction. Aristotle examines a collection of cases of substantial change, 
and shows that in each of them, [a] holds.  
 Extending [a] to (natural) substances presents at least two difficulties. The first one concerns the 
being of natural things; the second one their changeability. 
 (1) The argument stretching from Phys.I.5 to Phys., I.7, 190b1 accounts for natural reality from 
the perspective of coincidental metaphysical predication in play in Cat. 5. According to it, the 
analysis of reality stops at the level of what the Categories call primary substance, i.e. the bearer 
of properties (non-substances). 
 The upshot of the analysis started in Phys., I.7, 190b1 is that natural substances are not the 
simplest layer of reality. Rather, the primary substances that are substrates of properties are in 
turn composed out of a substrate, i.e. matter, and of either the form informing it or the lack 
thereof (privation). Matter functions as the bearer of either form or privation (mF+; mF-), as 
primary substances are the bearers of properties in coincidental compounds such as the musical 
man. Only, not quite in the same way. 
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 When metaphysical analysis of natural reality is brought a step further and applied to substance, 
the territory is uncharted and the dependence relations holding in the previous case do not seem 
to apply. Endorsing a dependence relation in play in coincidental metaphysical predication, 
where this is understood existentially, would lead to the absurdum of a formless, indeterminate 
primary matter. Thus, the relation of substantial predication, i.e. the relation between matter and 
form/privation, appears to distance itself from the relation of coincidental metaphysical 
predication in play from Phys.I.5 to Phys., I.7, 190b1, and requires further clarification. 
 (2) We commonly describe processes of (non-substantial) coming to be according to the 
conceptual/linguistic pattern “x comes to be (out of) y”. (Substantial) coming into being is, unlike 
the previous case, simple (ἁπλῶς). The qualification “simple” concerns, on the one hand, the 
ontological status of what comes into being, namely of substances, as the only beings that exist 
simply, i.e. independently of other beings. On the other hand, it regards the peculiar way of 
conceptualising coming into being according to the pattern “x comes into being”, which makes 
no reference to anything other than the substance resulting from the process of coming into 
being. One of the tasks of Phys.I.7 is to show that the model “x comes into being” proper to 
substantial change must be spelled out into the general model of coming to be “x comes to be 
(out of) y”, according to which the starting point y is a compound of substrate and privation, 
whereas the end point x is a compound of substrate and form. 
 In conclusion, the necessity of a substrate underlying coming into being is not evident and 
requires being argued for. 
 
5.5.2. The starting point of substantial change as a composite nature ([b]). 
Phys., I.7, 190b10-17 
[1] ὥστε δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρηµένων ὅτι τὸ γιγνόµενον ἅπαν ἀεὶ συνθετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἔστι µέν 
τι γιγνόµενον, ἔστι δέ τι ὃ τοῦτο γίγνεται, [2] καὶ τοῦτο διττόν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείµενον ἢ 
τὸ ἀντικείµενον. [3] λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι µὲν τὸ ἄµουσον, ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, 
καὶ [4] τὴν µὲν ἀσχηµοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀµορφίαν καὶ τὴν ἀταξίαν τὸ ἀντικείµενον, τὸν δὲ 
χαλκὸν ἢ τὸν λίθον ἢ τὸν χρυσὸν τὸ ὑποκείµενον. 
[1] Therefore, it is clear from what has been said that all what comes to be [τὸ 
γιγνόµενον] is always composite. And this is, on the one hand, this-that-comes-to-be [τι 
γιγνόµενον]; on the other hand, this-that-something-has-come-to-be [τι ὃ τοῦτο γίγνεται]. 
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[2] And this [this-that-comes-to-be] is twofold, for it is both the substrate and the 
opposite. [3] And we say that the unmusical is what is opposite; the man is what 
underlies [ὑποκεῖσθαι]. [4] And figurelessness, formlessness and disarrangement are the 
opposite; bronze, stone and gold are the substrate. 
 Having assessed that [a] applies to substantial change by virtue of induction from a collection of 
cases, Aristotle proceeds in [2] to secure the same result with relation to [b]. The starting point of 
all changes is said to be composed out of a substrate and an opposite. First ([3]), the claim is 
exemplified with relation to non-substantial change. In the case of a man coming to be musical, 
the relevant starting point of this change is, on the one hand, the man and, on the other hand, the 
unmusical. Finally ([4]), [b] is shown with relation to substantial change, by way of taking up a 
paradigmatic case out of the ones collected previously, the cases of the statue. Be it the product 
of moulding bronze or gold, or of carving a block of stone, the statue comes into being, on the 
one hand, out of the abovementioned matters and, on the other hand, out of the privation of 
figure, form or arrangedness constituting the form of the statue. 
 In conclusion, the analysis of the paradigmatic example of the statue shows, according to 
Aristotle, that [b] the starting point of substantial change is twofold. Spelling out the claim 
according to the conceptual distinctions previously introduced, the starting point of substantial 
change (mF-) is the numerical unity of two items that are different by account. If one does not 
disentangle numerical unity from unity by account, one may claim, for example, that the statue 
comes into being out of the gold, or out of the figureless, thus overlooking the other starting 
point of substantial change. The truth is rather that matter and privation constitute a numerical 
unity, for privation comes to coincide with its bearer, matter. Nonetheless, matter and privation 
are different in account. 
 Once [b] has been proved with relation to the starting point of substantial change, and thus with 
relation to all per se change (for [b] has been already proved to hold of non-substantial change), 
it remains to argue that it holds also of the end point of substantial change. In [1], the distinction 
between starting point and end point of change (cf. §5.2.1.) is repeated in slightly varied 
formulas (τι γιγνόµενον for the previous τὸ γιγνόµενον; τι ὃ τοῦτο γίγνεται for the previous ὃ 
γίγνεται).128 If [2,4] argue for [b] with relation to the starting point of substantial change, the next 
 
128 Although, for the sake of brevity, I traslated τοῦτο in the second formula as “something”, I assume that it picks 
the previous τι γιγνόµενον. The main variation on the previous formulas, consisting in the addition of τι, is, I 
believe, of little or no importance. The main focus of the section is, admittedly, substantial change. In this context, τι 
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passage (Phys., I.7, 190b17ff.) argues for [b] with relation to the end point of substantial change. 
I analyse the passage in the next section. 
 
5.6. The persistence of the substrate through substantial change ([c]). 
 Phys.I.7 seems to claim for [c] as a character of change in general. When something changes, 
[c1] the substrate persists; [c2] the contrary and the opposite do not persist. 
 The claim [c1] that the substrate persists through substantial change has become highly 
controversial over the past decades. The debate is more nuanced than I can portray here, and is, 
at least to some extent, twined with the debate concerning prime matter. In fact, according to the 
long-standing traditional interpretation, the generation of a new substance (S2) out of a previous 
substance (S1) always entails the persistence of prime matter as a pure capacity underlying both 
S1 and S2.129 
 The traditional interpretation has been rejected altogether by a vast front of scholars from the 
Seventies of the last century. The anti-traditional view has been initiated, to my knowledge, by 
Charlton and has been advocated most convincingly by Barrington Jones and Sarah Broadie.130 
The anti-traditional view denies that there is anything persisting through substantial change, let 
alone prime matter. Thus, whenever a new substance S2 comes into being out of the corruption of 
a pre-existing substance S1, what occurs is a sheer replacement of S1 with S2. 
 An intermediate position is the one held by scholars who admit the persistence of the substrate 
through substantial change, but identify it with the four elements rather than with prime 
matter.131 
 The scepticism against [c1] rests on three arguments. 
 First, the gist of the controversy is an obvious difficulty posed by complex cases of generation 
such as the generation of organisms. Abstracting from exegetical problems and difficulties, it 
 
might highlight the substantiality of the starting point and end point of change. Nonetheless, the passage seems to be 
concerned with all comings to be (τὸ γιγνόµενον ἅπαν), and [3] refers to non-substantial change. 
129 Digging out the entirety of this tradition and displaying its internal complexity is a task that I will not pursue 
here. For standard expositions of the traditional interpretative line: Joachim 1922, pp.92-3, 96-7; Robin 1944, 73-80. 
130 Charlton 1992 (1970), Jones 1974, Broadie 2004. 
131 King 1956, Gill 1989.  
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seems evident that the substance out of which a human being comes into being, e.g. the menses, 
is not the matter of the substance that has come into being, e.g. the human being. The thin 
conceptual import of the anti-traditionalist view and the fact that it solves the obvious (not to say 
naive) difficulty posed by complex cases of substantial change have contributed to make the anti-
traditionalist view into the new commonplace. 
 Second, Aristotle appears to endorse in other texts that coming to be and coming into being 
diverge with relation to the persistence of the substrate. For instance, GC.I.3-4 may seem to 
claim that substantial change occurs, when the substrate existing at t1 is substituted by a new 
substrate at t2. 
 Third, Phys.I.7 presents a complex situation. On the one hand, [c1] is included among the 
characters of change in general ([a-c]) and is thus supposed to hold of substantial change as well. 
On the other hand, the κοινά of change are derived from the analysis of non-substantial change 
and have therefore a two-faced status. They both are supposed to apply to substantial change and 
are exposed to the suspicion of pertaining to non-substantial change alone. Moreover, if [a-b] are 
explicitly argued for with relation to substantial change, [c] is not. 
 I believe that [c1] holds for several reasons. 
 First, GC.I.3-4 can be – and, I believe, should be – interpreted in a persistence-compatible way. 
I do not fully pursue this task here, but I confine myself to point out that GC.I.4 distinguished 
between the case of non-substantial change, in which the substrate persists identical to itself, 
from the case of substantial change. When a substrate S1 changes into a substance S2, then two 
requirements must be fulfilled: [1] that S1 changes completely (i.e. ceasing to be as S1: otherness 
condition, cf. §2.1.1.1.); [2] that nothing perceptible (or nothing that is perceived (as S1)) 
persists.132 [1] does not rule [c] out, and [2] can be interpreted in a persistence-friendly way, 
either as leaving space for the possibility that something non-perceptible persists or (according to 
the alternative translation proposed) as re-echoing [1].  
 
132 GC, I.4, 319b17-20: Ὅταν δ’ [1] ὅλον μεταβάλλῃ [2] μὴ ὑπομένοντος αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς ὡς ὑποκειμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ, 
ἀλλ’ οἷον ἐκ τῆς γονῆς αἷμα πάσης ἢ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ ἢ ἐξ ἀέρος παντὸς ὕδωρ, γένεσις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον, τοῦ δὲ φθορά 
[…]. (Text: Rashed 2006) When, instead, [something] changes [1] entirely [2] without there being anything 
perceptible that persists as a substrate of it (as when from all the seed [comes to be] the blood, or when from water 
[comes to be] air, or when from all the air [comes to be] water), then such [a change] is coming to be, whereas the 
other is ceasing to be […]. 
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 Second, the method of Phys.I, I have claimed, consists in starting from what is common, in 
order to reach what is proper to the single cases. Programmatically, the analysis of the starting 
point of coming to be (cf. §5.3.) presents what is common to change in general, whereas our 
passage analyses the peculiarities of coming into being. What we expect our passage to do 
against this methodological background is to extend [a-c] to substantial change. 
 Third, if Aristotle omits to argue for [c] with relation to substantial change (although he argues 
for [a-b]), he selects most of the cases of coming into being among those that most evidently 
fulfil [c1]. Thus, it appears that Aristotle wants to show the truth of [c] by induction. 
 Fourth, substantial change is consistently qualified through the Corpus as that change in which a 
substrate is characterised by a privation at t1, and by a form at t2. To be sure, this picture does not 
exclude that a certain degree of change in the one substrate may take place from t1 to t2, provided 
that the substrate at t1 is preserved in the substrate at t2. 
 In what follows, I make conceptual space for this possibility, in order to explain away the 
complex cases of substantial change in which it is not immediately evident that [c1] holds. I first 
introduce two conceptual distinctions in order to qualify what kind of matter can be said to 
persist through substantial change, and in what sense persistence should be understood. Finally, I 
show that every instance of substantial change analysed in Phys.I.7 confirms [c1], and in which 
sense. 
 Let us consider the diachronic structure of substantial change presented in Phys., I.7, 190a31-b9 
(cf. §5.5.1.) Aristotle’s argumentative aim in our passage is assessing [a-b]. [c] is more an aside 
Aristotle is not directly concerned with. 
 Nonetheless, by considering the instances of starting points and end points of substantial change 
collected in our passage, I argue that Aristotle mostly chooses examples (numbers 2-6) in which 
[c1] is evident. Example 1 is in need of explanation, but can be shown to fulfil [c1], provided that 
some conceptual distinctions are made. In the table below, I gather the material collected in our 





S1 (starting point) → S2 (end point) Through (dative): 
1. σπέρµα → Plants and animals -- 
2. Lump of gold → Statue Change of figure 
3. Block of stone → Statue of Hermes Subtraction  
4. Substantial parts (twigs) → Substantial whole (bundle) Addition 
5. Bricks, planks, cement… → House Composition 
6. Graphite → Diamond Alteration (of matter) 
TAB.1 
 
5.6.1. Defining persistence. 
 Trivially, persistence is a diachronic concept. Let us consider two substances S1 and S2 
occupying, respectively, two points in time t1 and t2 (where t1<t2). Every substance coming into 
being does so out of a pre-existent substance ceasing to be, and S1 and S2 are, respectively, the 
starting point and the end point of substantial change. Broadly, we say that S1 persists through 
substantial change, if, in some sense, it is at t2. 
 In §5.5.2, I have assessed that S1 [b] is a composite source of change. The same will be shown to 
hold with relation to the end point of substantial change (cf. §5.7.2.) In short: S1=MF- and 
S2=MF+. Thus, [c1] must be spelled out with relation to the elements of S1/S2. In particular, it 
must be assessed whether the same matter M persists in the process of losing the privation F- and 
acquiring the form F+. Asking this question implies to admit the possibility that M may not be 
the same; therefore, I reformulate the previous of analysis of the sources of change into: S1=M1F- 
and S2=M2F+, and ask whether M1=M2. 
 I have claimed in §5.2.3. that this condition can be spelled out in (at least) two ways. Thus, in 
the case in which S2 comes into being, i.e. in the case in which M1F- changes into M2F+, 
assessing [c1] depends on assessing whether or not: 
existential condition (weaker): M1 still exists in S2, i.e. M1 still exists in M2. Or: 
identity condition (stronger): M1 is still the same M1 in S2, i.e. M1 is identical with M2. 
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 The identity condition is stronger, because it entails also the existential condition, as well as the 
requirement that the matter persists unchanged. The existential condition allows for M1 to persist 
by way of changing into M2. Existential persistence, thus, admits of the following scenario: 
M1 is not identical with M2 (for133 M1<M2); nonetheless, 
M2 is a complex matter, which includes M1 as a material part. 
 In my analysis of Phys.I.7, I show that the examples of substantial change provided by Aristotle 
fulfil either the stronger or the weaker condition for persistence. The majority of the cases of 
substantial change is shown to fulfil the stronger identity condition. The more complex case of 
the coming into being of organisms requires separate treatment. As the scope of my analysis is to 
lay out the ultimate structure of natural reality, I will not deal with the details of Aristotle’s 
embryology. My scope will be to show that, given a broad picture of the process of coming into 
being of an organism such as man, there is at least one sense according to which the substrate 
persists through substantial change, for the weaker existential condition is fulfilled.  
 
5.6.2. Diachronic and synchronic matter. 
 I have claimed that there are two senses in which matter (and the opposites) are principles of 
natural things. 
 In the first sense, matter is a principle of natural beings with relation to (substantial) change, for 
it is that out of which natural things (S2) come into being. I label the matter that functions as a 
principle of change diachronic matter, in order to pinpoint the fact that it is involved in a process 
of change involving time. If we consider case [1] in the table above, the diachronic matter at t1 
out of which S2 (the plant) has come into being at t2 is the seed. 
 In the second sense, matter is a principle of natural things with relation to their being or 
substantial composition, for it is that out of which natural things (S2) are composed. I label the 
matter that functions as a principle of being synchronic matter, in order to pinpoint the fact that it 
is the matter constituting either the starting point of change or the end point of change, in 
 
133 I use the symbol < as meaning “is less complex than”. 
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abstraction from the process of change in which they are involved.134 Let us consider case [1] in 
the table above. If S2 is the plant, the synchronic matter out of which S2 is ontologically 
constituted (SM2) most plausibly coincides its material parts, such as the trunk, the leaves and 
the roots. If S1 is the seed, namely a kind of matter that is quite low in the scale of complexity, its 
synchronic matter (SM1) is most plausibly one or more of the four elements taken in a specific 
quantity. 
 In the following table, I expand the collection of material presented in TAB.1 according to the 
concepts just introduced. 
S1 (DM2 of S2) 
SM1 of S1 
(DM1 of S2) 
→ S2 SM2 of S2 Through 
1. σπέρµα Four elements → Plants and animals 
Body of the 
organism 
-- 
2. Lump of 
gold 
Gold → Statue of Hermes Gold  
Change of 
figure 
3. Block of 
stone 
Stone → Statue of Hermes Stone Subtraction  













 Now, I believe that the two categories of starting points of change on the left of the arrow stand 
in the following reciprocal relation with the end points of change on the right of the arrow. 
 By definition, the instances of substances (S1) in the first column represent the diachronic matter 
out of which the new substance S2 comes into being (DM2). S1’s are instances of lower-level 
substances than S2’s, and as such they are in turn composed out of a synchronic matter (SM1) and 
a certain formal feature. This formal feature is either extremely low in complexity and 
 
134 For the sake of clarity, this is the kind of matter that several scholars refer to as “functional matter”. 
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determinateness (such as the form of lumpness and being-block may be) or simply coincides 
with the privation of a proper form (the figurelessness of non-being-composed). 
 The second column presents a collection of the synchronic matter out of which each S1 is 
ontologically composed (SM1). As SM1 is the matter of S1, and S1 is the diachronic matter of S2 
(DM2), SM1 is in turn the diachronic matter of S2 (DM1). Being an element of S1, DM1 (=SM1) < 
DM2 (=S1). 
 The new substances generated (S2’s) are also composite beings. I collect in the fifth column the 
instances of the synchronic matter of S2 (SM2). 
 According to the collection of material presented in TAB.2, endorsing that the substrate of 
substantial change [c1] persists through change amounts to showing that one of the following 
options holds: 
Identity persistence: either SM1 or S1 are identical with SM2; 
Existential persistence: either SM1 or S1 still exist in S2. 
 I argue in the next two sections that Aristotle endorses [c1]. As I have claimed in §5.3, [c1] is a 
κοινόν of change. This does not entail, nonetheless, that the mode in which the substrate persists 
must itself a κοινόν of change. I have claimed that GC.I.4 contemplates two different modes of 
persistence for substantial and non-substantial change. Identity persistence applies to every non-
substantial change. For instance, S1H- → S1H+, where S1 at each side of the arrow is one and the 
same substance, for H-/H+ are non-substantial feature and do not change therefore what S1 is. In 
certain cases of substantial change, such as [2-6] in TAB.2, identity persistence holds. In other 
cases ([1]), nonetheless, the substrate fails to persist remaining identical to itself. Nonetheless, I 
argue that, in these cases, the substrate persists in an existential sense. 
 In the next two sections, I expand on the instances of substantial change enlisted in TAB.2, in 





5.6.3. Evident cases of persistence. Artefacts. 
 I first analyse cases [2-6] in which the diachronic matter of S2 (namely S1) evidently persists 
through substantial change. These are mainly [2-5] cases of production of artefacts, which are 
evidently considered by Aristotle as standard cases of substantial change, even if the ontological 
status of artefacts and their capacity to qualify as substances is not always clear in Aristotle’s 
Corpus. I believe that Aristotle chooses to analyse these cases of substantial change, because 
they make [c1] immediately evident. In fact, [2-5] are characterised by identity persistence, 
which is the most evident mode of persistence. Let us briefly go through each of these cases of 
substantial change. 
 [2] A lump of gold is moulded into the form of Hermes, thus undergoing a change in figure from 
shapelessness at t1 to shapedness at t2. This change of figure results in the production of the 
statue of Hermes. In the process of moulding, the gold that is the SM1 of the lump of gold (S1) 
and the DM2 of the statue of Hermes (S2) persists as identical to itself as the SM2 of S2. The 
process of substantial change occurring is not related to the matter, but rather to the shape. In S1, 
the gold lacks the shape of Hermes; in S2, the same gold is endowed with the shape of Hermes. 
In [2], [c1] holds, for SM1 at t1 is identical with SM2 at t2.  
 [3] A block of stone is carved into the statue of Hermes. By subtracting spatial parts out of the 
stone (SM1), SM1 loses its shapelessness and acquires the shape of Hermes at t2. As in [2], the 
identity condition for persistence is fulfilled, for SM1 is identical with SM2; in fact, the stone 
remains stone through the process of carving. Unlike [2], which allows for conservation of the 
mass, in [3], the quantity of SM1 is not identical with the quantity of SM2, for carving entails a 
process of subtraction. In [3] (as in [2]), [c1] holds, for SM1 at t1 is identical with SM2 at t2. From 
a mereological/quantitative point of view, unlike in [2], in [3] SM2 is part of SM1. 
 [4] Several twigs (S1) existing separately at t1 are collected and tied together at t2 to produce a 
bundle (S2). Now, the bundle is not identical with the twigs, for it is rather identical with the 
twigs that have been informed by their being collected and tied together. Moreover, the matter of 
the twigs (SM1) does not coincide with the matter of the bundle, namely with the twigs 
considered in abstraction from their being-gathered and being-tied. Rather, the material 
components of S2 (SM2) are identical with S1 (the twigs), on the proviso that, at t2, the twigs have 
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lost their separateness and their substantiality. When they are tied together into the bundle, the 
twigs exist dependently on the bundle as its material constituents. Once the band or rope tying 
the twigs together has been cut and the twigs are scattered around, they start again existing as 
independent substances. In [4], [c1] holds, for S1 at t1 is identical with SM2 at t2. 
 [5] This case of substantial change should be reconstructed, I believe, in a similar way as the 
previous one. Bricks, planks and cement exist at t1 as independent substance and in a state of 
lack of reciprocal composition. At t2, they are composed into the composite whole of the house 
(S2). Now, S2 is not identical with either S1 or SM1, for it is rather identical with S1 informed by 
composition. Rather, in [5], [c1] holds, for S1 at t1 is identical with SM2 at t2. 
 [6] This instance of substantial change is presented in a quite nebulous way. I reconstruct it 
using as paradigm the coming into being of a new chemical substance (e.g. diamond) out a 
different, preexistent chemical substance (e.g. graphite) through the alteration of its chemical 
structure. Diamond and graphite are two different substances, but are composed out of the same 
matter, namely out of atoms of carbon. Let us assume that a lump of graphite buried several 
miles under the surface of the Earth is exposed to a dramatic variation of temperature and 
pressure. As a consequence of this variation, the atoms of carbon out of which the lump of 
graphite is composed undergo an alteration in the kind of chemical bond and in their spatial 
disposition. As a result of this alteration, a new substance, the diamond, comes into being. 
Despite being composed out of the same matter as the graphite (i.e. atoms of carbon), the 
diamond differs from the graphite with relation to its form. Therefore, the coming into being of a 
crystal of diamond out of a lump of graphite through a process of alteration of their common 
synchronic matter obviously entails [c1]. In [6], [c1] holds, for SM1 at t1 is identical with SM2 at 
t2. 
 In conclusion, I have shown that the cases [2-6] of substantial change are all clear evidence of 
the fact that Aristotle endorses [c1] with relation to substantial change. They are carefully chosen 
examples on two grounds. First, because they immediately suggest that [c1] is the case. Second, 
because they present us with a vast range of different kinds of substantial change, thus securing 




 A at t1 Is identical with B at t2 Notes 
2 SM1 (gold) is identical with SM2  
3 SM1 (stone) is identical with SM2 
Quantitatively, SM2 is a part 
of SM1 
4 S1 (twigs) is identical with SM2 
At t1, S1 is a substance; at t2, 
it is not. 
5 S1 (bricks, planks, cement) is identical with SM2 
At t1, S1 is a substance; at t2, 
it is not. 
6 SM1 (atoms of carbon) is identical with SM2  
TAB.3 
 
5.6.4. Fishier cases of persistence. Organisms. 
 I now turn to analyse case [1], which is both the most complex example and the example most 
commonly invoked against [c1]. 
 [1] entails a whole causal story that Phys.I.7 omits to provide. The coming into being of a plant 
or of a human being out of their relevant diachronic matter is twined with a series of non-
substantial changes (alteration of the material substrate, growth…). Moreover, it requires to 
distinguish among several layers of matter: the primary diachronic matter (the seed, the menses), 
the synchronic matter of the organism (i.e. the body in its whole), its homogeneous and non-
homogeneous parts (the relevant organs that are necessary for each kind of organism); the 
intermediate stages between the diachronic matter and the organism (e.g. the embryo). 
 It is not a case that [1] is used as a counterexample for [c1]. Most obviously, in fact, the 
synchronic matter of S2 does not coincide with the diachronic matter of S2. The plant is not 
composed out of the seed, and the human being is not composed out of the menses. 
 I believe that this counterargument rests on the failure to qualify the relevant levels of matter 
persisting through change, as well as the mode of persistence proper to [1]. I argue that [c1] can 
be shown to hold with relation to organisms, provided that we clarify correctly at what level of 
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analysis matter can be said to persists, and in which sense. Once we have operated the relevant 
conceptual distinctions, the complex case of the coming into being of organisms can be shown to 
square with the previous, simpler and more evident cases of persistence. 
 With relation to [1], the synchronic matter constituting (S1) a pre-existing material substance 
(i.e. the seed and the menses) functioning as the diachronic matter of (S2) the new substance (i.e. 
the plant, the human being) can be shown to persist through the process of substantial change. 
Thus, showing that [c1] holds in case [1] amounts to clarifying at what level of analysis of S1/S2 
into their material components the identity condition holds. Or to switch to the weaker existential 
condition, claiming that the synchronic matter of S1 (SM1) still exists in S2. 
S1 (DM2 of S2) 
SM1 of S1 
(DM1 of S2) 
→ S2 SM2 of S2 Through 









 In the process of substantial change, the seed and the menses do not persist as such, thus 
fulfilling the ὅλον condition from GC.I.4. In fact, both the seed and the menses lose their status 
of substances, once the new substance has come into being. As the anti-traditionalists rightly 
notice, S1 does not persist as such in S2. Without delving into biological details that are irrelevant 
for the present purpose, the process leading from the seed and the menses to the organism can be 
summarised in the following way. 
 At t1, S1 (the seed, the menses) are, at least to some extent, substances. Even being in a sense 
parts of an organic and complex substance (the tree, the female human being), they nonetheless 
enjoy some sort of separate existence by virtue of being the material principles of another 
substance. 
 
135 This translates the Greek word σπέρµα, which prevalently means the animal seed and the seed of plants (i.e. their 
diachronic matter). Aristotle’s standard position on animal generation is that the menses are the (diachronic) 
material cause, whereas the seed is the moving cause of generation. In GA.I.20, nonetheless, σπέρµα refers to the 
menses, or rather to a certain fertile principle within the menses. I take our passage to use this sense of the term, and 
refer generically to the menses, regardless whether Aristotle means something more specific within the menses. 
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 Within the span of time t1-t2, S1 undergoes a complex series of necessarily-concurrent non-
substantial changes.136 These entail the growth of S1 through nourishment, namely by virtue of 
the addition of particles of the same kind as those constituting S1 (i.e. of the same kind as SM1). 
As the seed and the menses are comparatively simple material substances, their SM1 is a mixture 
of the four elements in peculiar reciprocal proportions concocted in a certain way. During the 
process of growth of SM1, S1 undergoes alteration, as the homogeneous mixture of the four 
elements is gradually diversified into the non-homogeneous material components that constitute 
S2 (SM2, the organs). 
 When the necessary, concomitant non-substantial changes have been accomplished, in a 
determinate time t2, the passage from S1 to S2 is accomplished. S1 has ceased to exist as an 
independent substance and a whole new substance has come into being. 
 If the process of coming into being of organisms can be described as I did, it is evident that there 
is a substrate persisting through the passage from S1 to S2, namely SM1. In fact, it is the case that: 
SM1 persists existentially in S2, for SM1 still exists in S2. 
 As a matter of fact, this can also be spelled out according to the identity condition, provided that 
we further analyse S2 into its remote matter (i.e. into the synchronic matter of SM2): 
S1 (DM2 of S2) 
SM1 of S1 
(DM1 of S2) 
→ S2 
SM2 of S2  
(proximate M of S2) 
SM of SM2 
(remote M of S2) 
1a. Seed Four elements → Plant 












 Once we have analysed S2 down to its remote matter, [c1] can be shown to hold, for 
SM1 is identical with the remote matter of S2 (identity persistence). 
 
136 For the sake of brevity, I mean with S1 both the original diachronic matter of S2 or some intermediate stage of it. 
In the case of animal generation, what undergoes the aforementioned processes of non-substantial change is 
probably the embryo, rather than the menses themselves. 
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 In conclusion, I have shown that [c1] can be defended also in the more complex case of coming 
into being of organisms. This case is fishier than the previous ones, because neither S1 nor SM1 
are identical with SM2. Nonetheless, [c1] holds, for SM1 still exists in S2 (existential persistence); 
and for SM1 is identical with the remote matter of S2 (identity persistence). 
 
5.6.5. Conclusion. 
 I have claimed that, against a well-established recent interpretative line, Aristotle endorses that 
[c1] the substrate persists through substantial change. This claim is first made with relation to 
change in general, and should therefore be expected to hold of substantial change as well. 
Nonetheless, a doubt on the applicability of [c1] to substantial change is raised by the fact that [a-
c], the κοινά of change, are argued for by assuming non-substantial change as a paradigm for 
change in general. Whereas explicitly argues for that [a-b] hold of substantial change, he does 
not do the same with relation to [c]. 
 I have claimed that Aristotle does not explicitly argue for [c1], but selects instances of 
substantial change ([1-6]) that evidently show that [c1] is true. 
 In cases [2,3,6], the synchronic matter of S1 obviously persists in S2 and constitutes its 
synchronic matter (SM1=SM2). In cases [4-5], it is S1 itself that persists in S2 and constitutes its 
synchronic matter, thereby losing its substantiality, i.e. its independent existence (S1=SM2). 
 The only case that may raise doubts is [1] the coming into being of organisms such as the human 
being and the plant out of, respectively, the menses and the seed. In these cases, it is evident that 
neither the seed and the menses (S1) nor the four elements (SM1) are identical with SM2. I have 
shown that the difficulty can be solved in two ways. First, by invoking existential persistence, 
namely by claiming that SM1 persists through the coming into being of the organism, for it still 
exists in S2. Second, by analysing SM2 into its own synchronic matter. SM1 persists through the 





5.7. The analysis of the end point of change. Substrate and form as per se principles of 
natural things. 
 The enquiry proceeds with the analysis of the end point of change (190b17-29). This section is 
introduced with a blast of trumpet, even if it may seem to be the mere continuation of the 
analysis of the sources of change started in the previous section. 
Phys., I.7, 190b17-20  
φανερὸν οὖν ὡς, εἴπερ εἰσὶν [a] αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων, [b] ἐξ ὧν πρώτων [c] 
εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνασι [d] µὴ κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς [e] ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, 
[f] ὅτι γίγνεται πᾶν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειµένου καὶ τῆς µορφῆς· 
In conclusion, if there are [a] causes and principles of natural things, [b] primary 
[sources] out of which [c] they are and have come into being [d] non-coincidentally, [e] 
but rather each said according to substance, it is evident that [f] every [natural thing] 
comes into being out of the substrate and the form. 
 On the one hand, the present section is the accomplishment of the analysis of the composite 
sources of substantial change into their elements (substrate, form and privation) initiated in the 
previous passage. 
 On the other hand, it is evident that the second stage of the analysis of the sources of natural 
change, namely the analysis of the composite end point of substantial change into its elements, is 
presented as the crowning of the enquiry into the principles of natural things, and thus of the 
whole pursuit of Phys.I. 
 
5.7.1. What the principles of natural things are. 
 Phys., I.7, 190b17-20 ([a-e]) represents the key passage to establish what kind of principles are 
looked for in Phys.I. I have already dealt with the question in the introduction. Here, I confine 
myself to summarise my results and defend them, where necessary. 
 
5.7.1.1. Principles, causes and elements of natural things ([a]). 
 As I have claimed in the Introduction (cf. §0.2.), the principles searched for in Phys.I are the 
internal principles or elements of natural things, as opposed to the external principles (the 
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moving and the final causes). This kind of principles are labelled interchangeably as principles 
(ἀρχαί), causes (αἰτίαι) and elements (στοιχεῖα), regardless the distinction between αἰτία and 
στοιχεῖον drawn in Metaph.V.1-3. 
 The equivalence of the three terms is particularly evident in [a], where, due to its conclusive 
value, we would most expect to find the term στοιχεῖον. Instead, Aristotle here labels the internal 
principles natural things as ἀρχαί and αἰτίαι. 
 This notwithstanding, that Aristotle is concerned with the internal principles of the natural world 
is clear both from parallel texts such as Metaph.XII.2-4 and from the arguments following our 
passage. As I show in §5.7.2, Aristotle claims that matter and form are the principles of natural 
things, for they are the elements composing both natural things and their essence. 
 
5.7.1.2. The causal field of the principles of natural things ([c]). 
 I have interpreted Args.1-2 of Phys.I.5-6 as arguments claiming that the contraries and the 
substrate are principles of natural things either with relation to being or with relation to 
change.137 This interpretation hinges on the difference in meaning of the verbs εἶναι and 
γίγνεσθαι. [c] supports my interpretation, if καί is understood as “and”.  
 Nonetheless, it is possible to understand καί as epexegetic, for the formulas ἐξ οὗ/εἰς ὅ εἶναι are 
occasionally used as synonyms of ἐξ οὗ/εἰς ὅ γίγνεσθαι. If this were the case, the distinction 
between principles of being and principles of change may seem to collapse. 
 Some support against my claim on the causal field of the principle may be gained from the 
opening of Phys.I.7 (189b30-2), where Aristotle claims that the enquiry will turn on change. 
Nonetheless, the enquiry into change soon reveals itself as an enquiry into the things that change. 
Namely, as the analysis of what-comes-to-be and of what-has-come-to-be. The analysis 
contained in Phys., I.7, 190a13-b29 is the analysis of the things that function as starting points 
and as end points of change into their elements. 
 Moreover, the definitive answer on the identity of the principles of natural things provided in 
Phys.I mentions only change (190b20): “every [natural thing] comes into being out of the 
 
137 For my justification of this endorsement, cf. §0.3.2.  
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substrate and the form”. After two brief arguments (190b20-23), this result is restated.138 
Nonetheless, the arguments in 190b20-23 hinge on the ontological composition of the end point 
of change and of its definition. Thus, a claim about the principle of substantial change (190b20, 
23) is argued for through the being and ontological composition of natural substances. Matter 
and form perform two different kinds of causal action with relation to natural things. 
 In conclusion, I have claimed that the principles of natural things searched for in Phys.I perform 
two explanatory tasks. Namely, they account both for the capacity to change and for the 
ontological composition of their objects. The principles of natural things are related to two causal 
fields: change (γίγνεσθαι) and being (εἶναι). 
 
5.7.1.3. The source condition and the priority condition of the principles of natural things 
([b]). 
 I have dealt with the basic notion of principle, as well as with the source and priority conditions 
in the Introduction (cf. §0.3.1), and applied these concepts throughout my analysis of Phys.I.5-6. 
Here, I just need to point out that, as in my analysis of Args.1-2 of Phys.I.5-6, the principles are 
required to fulfil the source and priority conditions with relation to two causal fields, namely 
change and being. In other words, the principles of natural things are required to be that out of 
which natural things primarily both are composed and come into being. Namely, A is a principle 
of natural things, if natural things have come into being out of A and are ontologically 
constituted out of A, and if there is no B out of which A has come into being and is ontologically 
constituted. In our passage, the source condition and the priority condition for being principle, as 
well as their application to two different causal fields, are expresses by the formula ([b-c]) ἐξ ὧν 
πρώτων εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνασι. 
 
5.7.1.4. The categorical dimension of the principles of natural things: substance ([d-e]). 
 Finally, [d-e] set the categorical dimension of the principles of natural things. The principles of 
natural things must be selected within the category of substance. 
 
138 Phys., I.7, 190b23: δῆλον οὖν ὡς γίγνοιτ’ ἂν τὰ γιγνόµενα ἐκ τούτων [ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειµένου καὶ τῆς µορφῆς]. 
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 The formula λέγεται µὴ κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν seems to refer to substantial 
metaphysical predication.139 Phys., I.7, 190b17-20 argues that the principles of natural things are 
the elements of the end point of substantial change. What [d-e] makes clear is that only the 
elements that are predicated of each other substantially (and not coincidentally, as in the case of 
“man is white”) qualify as principles. 
 I understand [d-e] as qualifying the verbs εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι in [c]. 
 The principles of a certain natural things are the principles causing it to have come into being; 
not those explaining its change in size or quality or place. 
 Moreover, the principles of a certain natural thing are its ontological consituents, namely the 
substantial elements of the thing that has come into being. 
 Let us consider the case of substantial change in which a baby is born, and she happens to be 
white. Now, white is a component of the end point of substantial change, the baby. Nonetheless, 
according to [e], white fails to qualify as a principle, for it is predicated of the baby 
coincidentally. 
 Furthermore, let us consider the baffling case in which a coincidental property necessarily 
accompanies a certain substantial change. For instance, the birth of a baby necessarily entails a 
process of growth. Now, even if a difference in size between the embryo and the baby is 
necessary to the process of birth, the size of the baby does not qualify as her principle, for size is 
predicated of the baby coincidentally. 
 In conclusion, [d-e] makes clear that the principles of natural things are those out of which they 
have come into being primarily and out of which they primarily constituted with relation to 
substance. 
 
5.7.2. Substrate and form as principles of natural things. 
 After having qualified what the principles searched for in Phys.I are, Aristotle states that [f] they 
are the substrate (or matter) and form. The reference to change alone (γίγνεται) must be meant as 
 
139 Compare the use of λέγειν Arg.2 of Phys.I.6, where it also introduces metaphysical predication, but of a different 
kind (coincidental metaphysical predication). 
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a short formula for the definition of the principles of natural things in [a-e], featuring both being 
and change as the causal fields of the principles. In fact, [f] is supported by an argument ([g]) 
which is far from being an argument on change, but that may rather be ranked as an argument on 
being. Thus, [f] introduces matter and form as principles of change, but [g] argues that they are 
principles of being. 
Phys., I.7, 190b20-3 
[φανερὸν οὖν ὡς] […] [f] ὅτι γίγνεται πᾶν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειµένου καὶ τῆς µορφῆς· [g] 
σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ µουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου καὶ µουσικοῦ τρόπον τινά· [h] 
διαλύσεις γὰρ τοὺς λόγους εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων. δῆλον οὖν ὡς γίγνοιτ’ ἂν τὰ 
γιγνόµενα ἐκ τούτων. 
[It is evident] […] that [f] every [natural thing] comes to be out of the substrate and the 
form. [g] For the musical man, in some way, is composed out of man and musical. [h] 
For one analyses the accounts [of composite things] into the accounts of these things [of 
their elements]. Therefore, it is evident that the things that come into being have come 
into being out of these [i.e. out of the substrate and the form]. 
 The claim that [f] the principles of the end point of substantial change, i.e. the principles of 
natural things, are matter and form is supported by two compositional arguments ([g-h]). As in 
the previous section, the claim [f] concerning substance is supported by [g] an argument 
concerning non-substances. Assuming a consistent homogeneity between substantial (i.e. 
hylomorphic) compounds and coincidental compounds, [g] argues that matter and form are 
principles of natural things, for they are the elements out of which natural things are composed, 
in the same way as the musical man is composed out of man and musical. The difference existing 
between the parts of the substantial compound and the parts of the coincidental compound is 
marked by the words τρόπον τινά, although it is not spelled out. 
 A second compositional argument [h] appears to hinge on the relation between definitions and 
their parts.140 
 A certain degree of textual uncertainty affects line 22. The words τοὺς λόγους have been 
bracketed by Ross, so that the text would read: “for one analyses [the musical man] into the 
accounts of these things [of their elements]”. The elision has been followed by nearly the totality 
of the subsequent scholars. It is plausible to consider τοὺς λόγους as an accidental insertion, due 
 
140 I believe that argument [h] must be referred to [f] rather than to [g], for [f] is the claim endorsed in 190b20-3, and 
because nothing prevents referring [h] to [f]. 
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to the presence of the same words in following sentence (εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων). This 
alleged scribal error must have occurred, if at all, on an early stage of the transmission, due to its 
extensive presence in the manuscripts. The alternative lectio τοὺς ὅρους, contained in E (Par.gr. 
1853, 10th AD) and supported by Philoponus, requires an independent explanation. 
 The elision of τοὺς λόγους (or of τοὺς ὅρους) might be understood as an attempt to avoid the 
reference to definition in [h]. Once the reference to definition is eliminated, [h] becomes the 
specular counterpart of [g]. 
 Even if one were to reckon this result were a desideratum, it is evident that Ross’ elision is not 
sufficient to secure it. In fact, εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων can hardly be understood without 
making reference to a definitional context. I believe that it makes sense to maintain τοὺς λόγους 
(or τοὺς ὅρους) in its place. The most natural sense of the argument, given the definitional 
context suggested by εἰς…ἐκείνων, is, I believe, the following. Matter and form are principles, 
for the account of the composite thing (and not the composite thing itself, as in [g]) is analysed 
into the accounts of its elements, i.e. into the accounts of matter and form. 
 In conclusion, I have claimed that matter and form qualify as principles of natural things with 
relation to change and being. As the rationale for matter and form to qualify as principles of 
being rests on two compositional arguments, I take the principles of being to be meant in a 
compositional sense, i.e. as substantial elements. Being a substantial element is spelled out in [g-
h]. 
 In the first sense, matter and form are principles, for natural things are constituted by them as 
substantial elements. If we analyse the end point of substantial change, e.g. the baby, we come 
up a broad variety of properties belonging to her, along with her matter (the human body) and 
her form (the form of the human being and/or her individual form). Among these components, 
only matter and form qualify principles, for only matter and form are substantial elements of the 
baby. 
 In the second sense, matter and form are principles, for they yield the substance of the end point 
of substantial change, i.e. its essence. In dealing with the essence and definition of the 
hylomorphic compounds, Aristotle makes clear in several passages through the Corpus that both 
matter and form – or rather, material and formal substance – contribute to the essence and 
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definition of the hylomorphic compounds. For instance, the essence of the brazen circle must 
contain both its matter (the bronze) and its form (the circle). Or the essence of the human being 
must contain both her matter (the human body) and her form (the soul). 
 The relation between matter and form in definition, and the possibility and the mode of their 
unity, are not topics broached in Phys.I. At this stage of the enquiry, it is sufficient to state that 
matter and form are principles and elements of natural things in virtue of the fact that they 
account for the substance of natural things, being substantial components of natural things, as 
well as components of their essence and definition. 
 
5.8. Privation as a coincidental principle of natural things. 
 One of the projects undertaken by Phys.I.7, I have claimed, is the clarification of the reciprocal 
relation among the three principles established. Phys., I.7, 190b17ff. presents various ways of 
understanding this relation, which I analyse in the next section. Instrumental to this project is the 
clarification of the role of privation as a principle of natural things. 
 The claim is that privation is a derivative principle. Two arguments are provided. (1) Privation is 
not an element of the analysis of the end point of substantial change. Rather, it is coincidental to 
matter, whenever matter is considered in itself, namely in abstraction from the form it undertakes 
in the the point of substantial change. (2) Privation is coincidental to form, for it is only a mode 
of the form, namely its absence. 
 
5.8.1. Privation is not an element of the end point of substantial change. 
 The following text recapitulates the three principles of natural substances and expands on their 
reciprocal relation with respect to the analysis of the end point of substantial change achieved in 
the previous passage. In lines 17-23, Aristotle had argued that the principles of natural things, 
coinciding with the elements of the end point of substantial change, are the matter and form out 
of which the end point of change and its definition are composed. Matter and form are still the 
focus of the recapitulation in Phys., I.7, 190b23-9 (cf. [i, l]), but a brief reference to the relation 
between privation and matter is added. 
212 
 
Phys., I.7, 190b23-9 
ἔστι δὲ [i] τὸ µὲν ὑποκείµενον ἀριθµῷ µὲν ἕν, εἴδει δὲ δύο ([j] ὁ µὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ 
χρυσὸς καὶ ὅλως ἡ ὕλη ἀριθµητή· τόδε γάρ τι µᾶλλον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ 
γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόµενον· [k] ἡ δὲ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἐναντίωσις συµβεβηκός)· [l] ἓν δὲ τὸ 
εἶδος, οἷον ἡ τάξις ἢ ἡ µουσικὴ ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουµένων. 
[i] And it is the case that the substrate is one in number and two in form. [j] For [it is], on 
the one hand, the human being, the gold and the countable matter in its whole; and these 
are more a certain this, and out of these what comes into being comes into being non-
coincidentally. [k] On the other hand, the privation and the contrariety are coincidental. 
[l] The form, instead, is one; for instance, the orderly disposition, the music and all the 
other things that are said in this way. 
 The contrast governing the passage is that between the way in which matter and form must be 
counted. 
[i] M is one in number, but two in form, for 
[j] M is a this and a non-coincidental principle of substantial change, and 
[k] M is coincidentally F-. 
[l] F is one simpliciter (both in number and in form). 
 It is clear that [j, k] are meant to pinpoint a contrast between matter and the privation inhering in 
it, but do it in a very concise way. [j] attributes to matter the characters of [j1] being a this and 
[j2] a per se principle of substantial change; privation’s character of merely coming to coincide 
with the matter is supposed to contrast both. 
 The character of being a this [j1] is attributed to matter only comparatively (µᾶλλον) and not 
absolutely, for Phys.I does not mean to solve the problem whether matter or form are substance 
to highest (or absolute) extent. Phys., I.9,192a1-6 tackles the Platonists’ failure to tell matter 
apart from privation. The Platonists, overlooking the fact that what in one in number need not be 
one absolutely, have endorsed that matter is the opposite to the Forms, and as such a non-being. 
Instead, claims Aristotle, even if matter is numerically one with privation, it is nonetheless 
formally distinct from it. For matter is “close to and to some extent substance” (ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν 
πως), whereas privation is not a substance, for it is rather per se a non-being. Matter, instead, is a 




 I expand on the rationale for the identification of privation and non-being in the next section, 
where I claim that privation is the absence of form, but that the converse in not true. What our 
passage makes clear is that matter (e.g. the gold) possesses a certain degree of determination. 
The gold out of which the statue of Hermes is composed is this patially determinate, particular 
piece of gold that is such and such and different from other materials and from other pieces of 
the same material. The privation of the statue of Hermes, instead, is nothing determinate, or is 
hardly anything determinate. I argue in the next section that the only (defective) sense in which 
privation may qualify as something determinate is the exclusion of its corresponding form. This, 
nonetheless, accounts for a capacity of determining that is both extremely scarce and derivative. 
 I have claimed that matter qualifies as a full-blown principle of natural substances, for it is a 
substantial element of the end point of substantial generation and a part of its definition. The 
same holds for the form. As such, matter and form are also the full-blown principles of 
substantial change. No argument is provided with relation to change, but we may think that 
Aristotle has the capacity of the principles to determine their product in mind. Matter persists 
through change and determinates thus what the product is (e.g. a statue of gold). Form 
supervenes, informing the gold as a statue of Hermes. 
 The privation of the form, instead, is only coincidental to the matter of the end point of change. 
Privation cannot qualify as a full-blown principle, and this on two grounds. 
 First, for privation is not an element of the end point of substantial change. When we analyse the 
golden statue of Hermes and its definition into its elements, these are the gold and the form of 
Hermes. The privation of the form of Hermes inhering in the lump of gold before the process of 
production is accomplished does not persist through change, for it and the supervened form are 
incompossible. Therefore, it does not belong to the element of the end point of substantial 
change.   
 Second, privation does not determine the process of change to any extent. For, even if the fact 
that the substrate is deprived of F in t1 may represent a necessary condition of the coming into 




 There is a certain tension between the necessity for privation to qualify as a source of change 
and its failure to qualify as a full-blown principle of change. It is probably for this reason that 
Philoponus141 understands the character of being coincidental of privation as referring only to 
being and ontological composition, thus accepting privation as a full-blown principle of change. 
This reading, I believe, is contradicted by 190b17ff, where Aristotle makes clear that he is going 
to expand on the principles of both change and being. 
 Thus, a stronger argument than the fact that privation is a source of change is implicitly 
requested by 190b17ff. in order for something to qualify as a principle of change. I suggest that 
the failure of privation to qualify as a full-blown principle of natural change hinges on the failure 
of privation to account for the determinacy of the end point of change. 
 How does this negative state of affairs stand in relation with the claim that [k] privation is 
coincidental to matter? 
 When matter is understood as the material element of the end point of substantial change, then 
matter is informed. In which sense in privation coincidental to the matter of the end point of 
substantial change? 
 To be sure, the coincidence invoked in [k] rests on the relation of numerical unity enjoyed by 
matter and privation, but does not identify with it. If it identified with it, the numerical unity 
between matter and privation assessed with relation to the starting point of change (cf. 5.3.3.) 
would be one of coincidence, and the starting point of substantial change MF- would be a 
coincidental compound. This, nonetheless, does not seem to be the case. 
 Privation inheres coincidentally in the matter, when matter is considered as an end point of 
change. Matter and form coincide numerically in the end point of change and are both per se 
principles, for they are the product of the analysis of the end point of change. Moreover, they are 
parts of the definition of the end point of change. Let us consider again TABS.2,4 and integrate 




141 Philoponus 2009, ad loc. 
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S2 SM2 (SM of S2) F2+ (F+ of S2) F2- 
1a. Plant Trunk, leaves, roots Vegetative soul Privation of the soul 
1b. Human being Human body Rational soul Privation of the soul 
2. Statue of Hermes Gold Form of Hermes Privation of Hermes 
5. House Bricks, planks, cement Form of the house Privation of the house 
TAB.6 
 According to our passage, matter (SM2) and form (F2+) are per se principles. The privation of 
the same form, instead, qualifies as a principle only coincidentally, i.e. in so far as it comes to 
constitute a coincidental numerical unity with matter (SM2). 
 Matter qualifies as the non-coincidental part of the coincidental numerical unity SM2F2-, 
probably on two grounds. First, because it is one the elements of the substance that has come into 
being (S2) resulting from the process of analysis of the end point of change. Second, because it is 
comparatively more substantial than privation. 
 If we consider the lacking of soul or of the form of Hermes, there is little doubt that material 
elements such as the human body or gold have better claim to qualify as a this than the privations 
do. Even if, when it functions as a material part of the hylomorphic compound, the gold has lost 
its separate existence, it is nonetheless a certain determinate material instead of another. The gold 
that has lost its separate existence in the stature of Hermes is endowed with a certain range of 
properties and with a determinate nature. The privation of the form of Hermes, instead, possesses 
no determinacy whatsoever; rather, it is the lack of determinacy pertaining to the gold composing 
the statue of Hermes, when it is considered in abstraction of the form of Hermes. If we consider 
the statue of Hermes with relation to its matter rather than with relation to its form, then we 
consider the gold as a matter endowed with a determinate nature, but lacking the form of the 
hylomorphic compound. 
 Let us contrast the coincidental status of the privation inhering in the matter of the end point of 
substantial change (S2) with the numerical unity of privation and matter in the starting point of 
substantial change (S1). 
 At t1, the gold exists as the synchronic matter of a material substance such as the lump of gold 
(S1). The lump of gold is as proximate to being an independent substance as it is possible for 
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gold, since the separately existent lump of gold qualifies as a low-order substance whose being – 
on an ideal continuum stretching from being-material to being-formal (cf. Meteo.IV.12) – is 
extremely close to matter. Nonetheless, the lump of gold is a (material) substance with 
determinate spatial coordinates, borders, qualities, essential properties. In short, the lump of gold 
has a determinate nature that can be said to amount to a high extent to that of its synchronic 
matter (gold). The lump of gold at t1 is, thus, a separately existing substance composed out of the 
gold (SM1) and a certain formal determinacy of a low order (the lumpness). 
 Now, what is the privation composing the lump of gold to which Aristotle refers? The lumpness, 
in fact, is a to such a great extent indeterminate form, that it may be thought as coinciding with a 
privation. This intuition is probably not on the right track. Let us take form in a seminal sense, 
namely as what provides a substantial determinacy to a given matter. In this sense, there will be 
low-order forms and high-order forms, according to the degree of determinacy that a certain 
form has capacity to lend to a certain matter.  
 On the one hand, it is true that the lumpness is to a great extent an indeterminate formal feature, 
for a lump has any possible figure (from regular to wildly irregular), any quantity and any quality 
of which its synchronic matter is capable (smooth and rough, light and dark…). As such, the 
lumpness may seem to identify with a privation of form, rather than with a low-order form. 
 On the other hand, it is nonetheless true that the lumpness defines and shapes to some extent the 
gold into a substance, although of the lowest possible rank and to the lowest possible degree. 
 Thus, although the conceptual distinction is a fine (or possibly thin) one, I believe that the 
privation mentioned as a starting point of change is not the same one as the form of the material 
substance. 
 What does it refer to, then? The following table presents a hylomorphic analysis of the 
substance functioning as the starting point of the substantial change leading to the coming into 
being of the hylomorphic compound (S2=SM2F2+). Moreover, it collects the possible candidates 
for what privation as a starting point of change is. It should be kept in mind that the analysis of 
the starting point and end point of change pursued in Phys.I.7 has the accomplishment of the 
hylomorphic compound as its implicit Leitfaden. Thus, a candidate is the privation of the form 
(F2) of the hylomorphic compound (F2-), pertaining to the lump of gold (S1), in that it is the 
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starting point of the change towards S2. Another candidate is F1-, namely the privation of the 
lumpness pertaining to the gold, when we considering the lump of gold with relation to its 
matter. 
S1 SM1 F1+ F1- F2- 
Lump of gold Gold Lumpness Privation of the 
lumpness 
Privation of the form of 
Hermes 
TAB.7 
 The privation that functions as a starting point of substantial change and that is one non-
coincidentally with matter is F2-. The privation of the form of the hylomorphic compound (i.e. of 
what-has-come-into-being) includes both F1+ (the lumpness) and F1- (the privation of the 
lumpness). In fact, both the form of the lump and its privation inhering in the gold are privations 
of the form accomplished by the lump of bronze at the end of the process of substantial change 
of which it is a (composite) starting point. Since it is an immediate element of the starting point 
of change considered with relation to the end point of change, F2- is not a coincidental element of 
the starting point of change, as well as SM1. 
 Thus, as the gold is a being endowed with a determinate nature, it is a this to a greater extent 
than privation is. As it is an ontological element of the hylomorphic compound, the gold is a 
principle per se. 
S1 (DM2) SM1 F2- 
Lump of gold Gold Privation of the form of Hermes 
TAB.8 
 A distinction must be drawn between the privation of the form of the hylomorphic compound 
(F2-) considered with relation to the end point of change and with relation to the starting point of 
change. 
 If we consider privation (F2-) with relation to the end point of change, and therefore as a 
principle of natural things (because the elements of S2 are the principles of natural things, 
according to our passage), what follows can be assessed about privation in contrast with matter. 
 Since privation is the lack of the formal determinacy pertaining to the gold when the gold is 
considered as the matter of the statue of Hermes (i.e. as DM1), then privation does not qualify as 
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a this. The gold (SM1=DM1), instead, being a determinate matter (i.e. gold instead of, say, 
silver), qualifies as a this to a greater extent than privation. To be sure, Aristotle does not assess 
whether matter qualifies as a this in an absolute sense. 
 If we consider privation S1 with relation to the end point of change (i.e. as DM2 of S2), then S1 is 
ontologically composed out of SM1 (gold) and F2- (the privation of the form of Hermes). As 
such, privation (F2-) is said to be one in number with SM1, but not to be merely coincidental to 
matter, for it is an ontological element of S1. 
 In this case, the privation of the form of the end point of change (F2-) includes both the form of 
S1 (F1+) and the privation thereof (F1-). Both the lumpness and the privation of the lumpness, in 
fact, lack F2. 
S1 (lump of gold) SM1 F1+ F1- 
In itself Gold Lumpness Privation of the lumpness 
With relation to S2 
(= DM2 of S2) 
Gold F2- = Privation of the form of Hermes 
TAB.9 
 If we apply to the starting point of change the same analytic procedure accomplished in Phys., 
I.7, 190b20-3 with relation to the end point of change, then it appears that the per se principles of 
S1 are SM1 (the gold) and F1+ (the lumpness). These are per se principles of the starting point of 
change considered in itself, for they are the results of the analysis of it into its constituting 
elements. 
 When the starting point of change is considered with relation to its matter alone, abstracting 
from the form informing it, then a different kind of privation than the one mentioned above must 
be considered: the privation of F1+ (F1-). Thus, going back to the example above, when we 
consider the lump of gold with relation to its matter alone, then the gold is endowed with the 
privation of the lumpness. As the privation of the lumpness (F1-) is not an element of the starting 
point of change, but rather inheres in the matter when it is considered in abstraction from the 
lumpness, then F1- is a principle of S1 only coincidentally. 
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 In conclusion, I have claimed that Phys., I.7, 190b23-9 argues that the privation of the form of 
the end point of change (F2-) is a coincidental principle of natural things, for it is not an 
ontological element of the end point of change (S2). Rather, it inheres coincidentally in the 
synchronic matter of S2 (SM2), when it is considered in abstraction from its form (F2+). In reality, 
SM2 is informed by F2+ (namely, by what S2 is from the formal point of view). Thus, in S2: 
SM2 is F2+ per se, and 
SM2 is F2- coincidentally. 
Which entails that: 
F2+ and SM2 are principles per se, and  
F2- is a principle only coincidentally, namely by virtue of coinciding numerically with 
SM2. 
 When (SM2) the matter of the hylomorphic compound that has come into being (S2) is 
considered as such, i.e. in abstraction from its form: 
SM2 is a unity only from a numerical point of view, for 
SM2 it is rather composed out of two formally distinct items: SM2 and F2-. 
 Unlike SM2, F2+ is a unity both numerically and formally:  
F2+ is a unity simpliciter (both numerically and formally).142 
 Moreover, with relation to their degree of determinacy, the elements constituting the numerical 
unity of SM2, when this is considered in abstraction from F2+: 
SM2 is more a this; 
F2- is less a this. 
 As an aside, I have enquired into the role of privation as a principle of the starting point of 
change (S1). 
 
142 This may seem in contradiction with 191a7-12 (see the following section), where the form is said to be twofold, 
namely itself and its privation. 
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 First, I have disambiguated F2- from the form of the starting point of substantial change (F1+). 
F1+ is, in most cases, a low-order form with little capacity to determine the matter of S1 (e.g. the 
lumpness). They are different, for the lumpness possesses an (albeit small) positive import, 
whereas a privation is only the absence of its corresponding form. 
 Second, I have applied to S1 the same kind of ontological analysis applied to S2. It has appeared 
necessary to distinguish two different kinds of privation: the abovementioned F2- and F1-, namely 
the privation of the form of S1 (F1+), e.g. the privation of the lumpness. 
 When S1 is considered with relation to the end point of change, so that S1=DM2, F2- (e.g. the 
privation of the form of Hermes) is a per se principle of the starting point of change, for it is a 
constitutive element of it. 
 When S1 is considered in itself as a substance (and not as the starting point the process of 
coming into being resulting in S2) the matter and form constituting S1 (SM1 and F1+) must be 
considered as per se principles of S1. The privation of F1+ (F1-), instead, is a coincidental 
principle of S1, for is not a constitutive element of S1, but rather inheres in SM1, when S1 is 
considered with relation to matter and in abstraction from the form. 
 
5.8.2. Privation and form. The reducibility of privation to its corresponding form.143 
 The next passage is presented after two different models of triad of principles have been 
explored (Phys., I.7, 190b17-191a3):  
(Model a) M/F+ are per se principles; F- is a coincidental principle (s. above);  
(Model b) F+/F- are the only principles with relation to number; M/F+/F- are principles 
with relation to the account. 
 The passage contains a reflection on the priority of form over privation, and thus on the 
possibility of reducing privation to form. This reflection is inserted in the text as an aside, neither 
fully developed in itself nor developed into a further model of triad.  
 
 
143 I have already presented part of the following material – in a different form – in Trentini 2016, 196-200. 
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Phys., I.7, 191a3-7 
πόσαι µὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περὶ γένεσιν φυσικῶν, καὶ πῶς ποσαί, εἴρηται· καὶ δῆλόν 
ἐστιν ὅτι δεῖ ὑποκεῖσθαί τι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ τἀναντία δύο εἶναι. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον 
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· ἱκανὸν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποιεῖν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ 
παρουσίᾳ τὴν µεταβολήν. 
In conclusion, it has been said how many – and in which way how many – the principles 
of natural things are with relation to coming into being. And it is evident that something 
must underlie the contraries, and that the contraries are two. In another sense, this is not 
necessary, for, in order for the contraries to produce movement, only one of them is 
sufficient, by virtue of its presence or absence. 
 The claim of the passage is presented as a limitation (Model b). This limitation concerns the role 
of privation as an independent principle, for, it is claimed, privation can be reduced to a mode of 
the form, namely to the absence thereof. Thus, F+ and F- are not to be reckoned as two distinct 
principles, but rather as a single one principle. Namely, as: 
→ as present: F+; 
F+ 
→ as absent: F-. 
 The model of triad derived from the reducibility of privation to form is close to (Model a). In 
fact, the reducibility of F- to a mere mode of F+ entails that F+ is a full-blown principle alongside 
M, whereas F- qualifies only as a derivative principle. 
(Model a’): M/F+ are per se principles; F- is a coincidental principle, for F- comes to 
coincide with F+. 
 Our text, in its conciseness, neglets not only to spell out the consequence of its claim on the 
relation among the three principles, but also to provide a complete account of the reducibility of 
privation to form. The possibility to reduce privation to its corresponding form hinges on the 
ontological priority of F+ over F-. F+ and F- are, in fact, not interchangeable. If it is true that F- is 
the absence of F+, it is false that F+ is the absence of F-: 
True: F- = ⌐F+ 
False: F+ = ⌐F- 
 The rationale for the priority of form over privation is not spelled out in Phys.I.7. This has to do, 
at least partially, with the fact that the conceptual machinery of Phys.I is not as rich as that 
presented in other texts with the same agenda. I reconstruct here three main rationales for the 
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priority of form over privation, in the attempt to bridge the argumentative gap left open in our 
brief passage. 
 (1) Form is prior to privation with relation to the teleological order of natural change. This 
teleological perspective is absent from Phys.I, which confines itself to the internal principles of 
natural things, omitting the moving and final cause. This notwithstanding, the principles of 
natural things are identified with the principles of what-has-come-into-being, which, in more 
complete accounts of natural change, is teleologically prior to ceasing to be. Thus, although 
Phys.I does not explicitly commit to the idea that coming into being is teleologically prior to 
ceasing to be, it is possible to believe that Phys.I assumes the priority of coming into being 
without providing the rationale thereof. Engaging in the project of grounding the teleological 
priority of coming into being would, in fact, require a conceptual machinery which is not proper 
to an introductory text such as Phys.I. Another possible interpretation of the identification 
between the principles of natural things and the principles of what-has-come-into-being is that, 
whenever we consider any change between two sources of change, be it F+ → F- or F- → F+, the 
principles of natural things are always the principles of the end point of change. In this 
perspective, the principles of natural things would not restrict to F+ (as the end point of 
teleologically-oriented coming into being), but would rather include both F- and F+ (as non-
teleologically-oriented end points of change). 
 Whichever option we choose for the interpretation of the interpretation of Phys.I, it is clear that, 
in more complex and complete accounts of nature (such as Metaph.VIII), coming into being (at 
least in standard cases) is a process in which a certain determinate matter changes towards a form 
which coincides with its proper end, i.e. with what its own good. In this scenario, coming into 
being is a process oriented towards a form F+ that coincides with an end and the good. 
 As sources of change considered within a teleological framework, forms and privations are 
ordered into two axiologically-oriented columns. One column contains the sources of change that 
succeed in qualifying as ends and as good (F+); the other column contains the sources of change 
that fail to qualify as such (F-). 
 Now, coming into being and ceasing to be are teleologically oriented in a relation of ontological 
priority. In fact, ceasing to be occurs necessarily in dependence of the previous occurrence of 
coming into being, for it is not the matter (the human body) that changes into the corpse, but 
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rather the hylomorphic compound (the human being). Accordingly, the end point of ceasing to be 
(F-) is teleologically posterior to the end point of coming into being. 
 (2) Form is prior to privation with relation to the capacity of matter. This claim is actually part 
of the picture presented in (1), for it hinges on the intrinsic capacity of matter. Nonetheless, it 
merits separate consideration. Different, determinate kinds of matter have different, determinate 
capacities (C) for different, determinate kinds of actualities (A). In short, M1 has C(A1), M2 has 
C(A2) and so on. In a process of coming into being, the actualisation, at t2, of the capacity that is 
potential at t1 is the realisation of the particular, determinate form for which each particular, 
determinate matter has capacity. Thus, M1 has C(F1+), M2 has C(F2+) and so on. The capacity of 
matter is not for the privation, but rather for the form. Explaining this claim would require us to 
bring in the advanced teleological machinery developed in Phys.II, Metaph.VIII.4-5, 
Meteo.IV.12, Somn.Vig and other texts. As an overview, forms and privations belong to two 
different columns that are axiologically-oriented. Forms can qualify as ends, whereas privations, 
fail to qualify as such, for they fail to qualify as good. There are cases in which a privation 
qualifies as instrumental to the good and the end (e.g. sleep, for it has the function of enabling 
and preserving the wakefulness). In other cases, privations are teleologically neutral, for their 
form also is (e.g. the eclipse). At the bottom of the scale, privations are evil, for they are the 
absence of the state of entelecheia reached by the matter when it realises the form it is 
intrinsically oriented towards. 
 In conclusion, within a teleological context, form is prior to privation with relation to the 
capacity of matter, for the matter has capacity for the form, and only coincidentally for its 
corresponding privation (for privation is the absence of the form). 
 (3) F+ is prior to F-, for F- fails to qualify as the principle of formal determinacy of F+. This 
failure hinges on the indeterminacy of privation. A case study of the most common instances of 
privations throughout the Corpus shows that privation is consistently described as indeterminate. 
 Indeterminacy appears to be constitutive of privation, if we consider Aristotle’s favourite 
definition of privation.144 
 
 
144 Also: Metaph., IV.2, 1044a15ff; IV.6, 1011b15-22.  
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Metaph., X.4, 1055b3-8 
ἡ δὲ στέρησις ἀντίφασίς τίς ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ἀδύνατον ὅλως ἔχειν, ἢ ὃ ἂν πεφυκὸς ἔχειν 
μὴ ἔχῃ, ἐστέρηται ἢ ὅλως ἢ πὼς ἀφορισθέν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὥσπερ 
διῄρηται ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις), ὥστ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ στέρησις ἀντίφασίς τις ἢ ἀδυναμία διορισθεῖσα ἢ 
συνειλημμένη τῷ δεκτικῷ· 
And privation is a certain contradiction. For [something] lacks either simpliciter or in a 
determinate way, [respectively,] either [in the case of] what is incapable possessing 
simpliciter or [in the case of] non-possessing what can be possessed by nature. […] 
Therefore, privation is a certain contradiction, or an incapacity that is determinate and 
intertwined with what is receptive [i.e. with the substrate]. 
 This definition both draws a distinction and a similarity between two kinds of opposition. I 
concentrate here on the similarity. As a species of the genus of contradiction, privation is 
constitutively the negative counterpart of a certain positive feature (F+). Thus, F- = ⌐F+. In this 
connection, privation appears to encompass the entire scope of what falls out of F+. As such, 
privation lack any proper capacity to identify a certain group of beings endowed with positive 
common features. In fact, the set F-, as it coincides with the set ⌐F+, includes items that are 
radically heterogeneous to each other, but that share at least one feature: non-being-F+. As non-
being-F+ is a merely negative feature, the capacity to determine of privation amounts or is 
proximate to zero. Even if we were to grant the latter option, it is clear that the (close-to-zero) 
degree of determinacy apparently lent by privation depends in reality on its positive counterpart 
F+. Thus, from this point of view, privation is constitutively indeterminate. 
 The criticism to the philosophers (such as Plato) who employed privative differentiae in their 
diairetic/definitory praxis may be understood against this background. 
PA, I.3, 642b20-24 
Ἔτι στερήσει μὲν ἀναγκαῖον διαιρεῖν, καὶ διαιροῦσιν οἱ διχοτομοῦντες. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ 
διαφορὰ στερήσεως ᾗ στέρησις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἴδη εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον τῆς ἀποδίας 
ἢ τοῦ ἀπτέρου ὥσπερ πτερώσεως καὶ ποδῶν. [Text: Louis 1956] 
Further, it is necessary to divide by privation, and the dichotomists do so divide. But 
there is no differentia of a privation qua privation; for there cannot be species of what is 
not, for example of footlessness or of featherless, as there are of featheredness and of 
feet. [Transl.: Balme 1992 (1972)] 
 In short, the text both recognises the necessity of operating the division by privation, as 
dichotomists do. The result of such a diairetic process is a couple of opposing differentiae of the 
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kind D+/D-, where D- is the privation of D+. Unlike the dichotomists, Aristotle refutes 
nonetheless that D- may qualify as a differentia in itself, namely as a privative differentia. 
 The argument for this claim can be understood as a refutation. (a) By definition, D- coincides 
with ⌐D+, for D- is the privation of D+, and privation is a certain contradiction. (b) Now, if D is a 
differentia, then, by necessity, D identifies a species. (c) But a negative feature such as ⌐D+ is 
not capable to identify a species, for non-being does not have species. (d=C) Therefore, D- does 
not qualify as a differentia. 
 For the sake of my argument, (a,c) are important premises. (a) is assumed implicitly as a fact 
about privation. (c) is a consequence of (a) that appears to be endowed with a priori 
transparency. In fact, a species is a set of items with one determinate feature in common that is 
essential to each and every item. Now, the lack of a feature (D-) cannot possibly identify any 
definite set of beings possessing a positive, definite, essential characteristic. In fact, D- does not 
identify with any positive feature and is rather indeterminate. 
 A limitation to the idea that privation is constitutively indeterminate, nevertheless, may be 
represented by the privations that functions as an end point of ceasing to be. For example, the 
privation of the soul in the corpse, unlike the privation of the soul in the menses, appears to 
account for a certain degree of determinacy of the corpse. In fact, being-corpse qualifies the 
human body as a corpse instead of anything else whatsoever. 
 In what follows, I explore the more cautious idea that indeterminacy may belong to privation 
constitutively at least when privation is a starting point of substantial change. This claim is 
presented in Metaph.VII.7, which shares with Phys.I the project of spelling out the ontology of 
natural things through the consideration of natural change. 
Metaph., VII.7, 1033a13-16 
ὧν δ’ ἡ στέρησις ἄδηλος καὶ ἀνώνυμος, οἷον ἐν χαλκῷ σχήματος ὁποιουοῦν ἢ ἐν 
πλίνθοις καὶ ξύλοις οἰκίας, ἐκ τούτων δοκεῖ γίγνεσθαι ὡς ἐκεῖ ἐκ κάμνοντος· 
And with relation to the things whose privation is unclear and without name, as [the 
privation] of any form whatsoever in the bronze or [the privation] of the house in the 
bricks and wood – also in these cases, [these things] appear to come into being as [the 
healthy] precedes out of the unhealthy. 
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 The text explores the failure of privation to fulfil the synonymy principle and thus transfer its 
(negative) identity to the end point of productions. The examples of privations provided in our 
passage are the same as the ones we find in Phys.I: the privation of the form of the house the 
bricks and the privation of the form of the statue in the wood or in the bronze. More importantly, 
these kinds of privations are said to be “unclear and without name”. The common speaker 
oversees that these privations are the one starting point out of which the products come into 
being, rather claiming that this is matter. And since the starting point out of which something 
comes into being does not persist, common speakers, in referring to the products, mention matter 
with modifiers (e.g. “golden statue” instead of “gold statue”). This erroneous linguistic use 
entailing the false belief that matter fulfils the synonymy principle only defectively, stem from 
the failure of the common speaker to tell privation apart from matter. This failure is fostered by 
the fact that the privation of the form of the statue and the privation of the house are 
indeterminate, and therefore difficult to identify. 
 In conclusion, I have shown that privation is reducible to form, for privation – either 
constitutively or at least with relation to the type addressed in Phys.I – for it is indeterminate and 
thus incapable of qualifying as a principle of formal determinacy. The only sense in which 
privation is (at least to a minimum extent) determinate is a derivative sense, namely dependently 
on the form (in so far as F- = ⌐F+). 
 (4) Wrapping up the results of this section, I have suggested three rationales for the claim that 
form is prior to privation. The first two rationales are drawn from considering change and its 
natural, teleological order. The third rationale rests on the failure of privation to qualify as a 
principle of formal determinacy, due to its constitutive indeterminacy. 
 
5.9. The accomplishment of the First project of Phys.I.7. The accomplishment of the 
doctrine of the principles of natural things. 
 The previous section has achieved a negative result: there are at least two senses in which 
privation fails to qualify as a principle. 190b17-191a12 presents several models of triad (or dyad) 




5.9.1. Matter and form as per se principles of natural things. Privation as a coincidental 
principle. 
  (Model a) and (Model a’) order the three principles with relation to their difference in 
aetiological status. 
(Model a):145 
M/F+ are per se principles, for they are elements of the end point of substantial change. 
F- is a coincidental principle, for F- is not an element of the end point of substantial 
change, but merely comes to coincide with M. 
 Matter and form are said to be principles of natural things in a non-derivative, per se way, 
because they are the ontological elements into which the substance that has come into being is 
analysed. Likewise, matter and form are also the parts of the definition of the hylomorphic 
compound that has come into being. Privation, instead, qualifies as a principle only derivatively 
and coincidentally. Namely only as far as it comes to coincide with matter, when matter is 
considered in abstraction from the form informing it. 
 Phys., I.7, 191a3-7 presents another rationale for reducing privation to a coincidental principle 
of natural things; this time, with relation to the form. 
(Model a’): 
M/F+ are per se principles;  
F- is a coincidental principle, for F- comes to coincide with F+. For F- = ⌐F+ and F+ ≠ ⌐F-.  
 Thus, (Model a) and (Model a’) present the same result: matter and form are per se principles; 
privation is a principle only coincidentally. The defective aetiological status of privation hinges 
on its reducibility to both form and matter. When matter is considered in absence of the form, 
then privation inheres coincidentally in the matter. Moreover, privation is coincidental to the 




145 Cf. Phys., I.7, 190b23-9. 
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5.9.2. Principles with relation to the account and with relation to the number. 
 A different way of understanding the relation between the three principles is according to their 
numerical unity and their difference in account. 
(Model b): 
With relation to number: only two principles: (composite) F-; (composite) F+. 
With relation to the account: three principles: M; F+; F-. 
 Considered as numerical unities with relation to their formal determinacy, the principles of 
natural things are confined to the opposites (F-; F+). What-is-formed and what-is-formless; what-
is-composed and what-is-scattered; what-has-a-figure and what-is-figureless. 
 On a closer look, these opposites are composite beings (MF-; MF+). Now, it has become clear 
that matter is different in being from the opposites inhering in it. Therefore, if we consider the 
principles with relation to the account, there are three distinct principles of natural things: matter, 
form and privation. 
 
5.10. The solution of the aporia on the number of principles. The fulfilment of the second 
project of Phys.I.7. 
 After having accomplished the analysis of the starting point and end point of substantial change, 
as well as having identified the principles of natural things as the elements of the end point of 
substantial change, Aristotle goes back to the solution of the aporia on the number of principles 
raised in Phys.I.6. I have labelled the solution of the aporia the second project of Phys.I.7, in 
order to differentiate it from the first project, namely from the accomplishment of Aristotle’s 
own doctrine of the natural principles. I have also claimed that these two projects coincide to a 
certain extent, for solving the aporia on the number of principles amounts to clarifying the 
relation among matter, form and privation. Drawing on the results of the first project, 190b29ff. 
presents the solution to the aporia on the number of principles. 
Phys., I.7, 190b29-191a3 
διὸ ἔστι µὲν ὡς δύο λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἔστι δ’ ὡς τρεῖς· [a] καὶ ἔστι µὲν ὡς 
τἀναντία, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ µουσικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄµουσον ἢ τὸ θερµὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἢ τὸ 
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ἡρµοσµένον καὶ τὸ ἀνάρµοστον, [b] ἔστι δ’ ὡς οὔ· ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων γὰρ πάσχειν τἀναντία 
ἀδύνατον. λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ἄλλο εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείµενον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ 
ἐναντίον. [c] ὥστε οὔτε πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ ἀρχαὶ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ δύο ὡς εἰπεῖν 
τῷ ἀριθµῷ, οὔτ’ αὖ παντελῶς δύο διὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς· 
ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀµούσῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἀσχηµατίστῳ καὶ χαλκῷ. 
Therefore, it must be said that, on the one hand, the principles are two, whereas on the 
other hand they are three. [a] And, on the one hand, it [must be said] that the principles 
are the contraries. For example, one says that [they are] the musical and the unmusical, 
the hot and the cold, what is joined and what is not joined. [b] On the other hand, this 
does not hold, for the contraries do not suffer action from each other. And this [problem] 
is solved by endorsing that the substrate is something different, for the substrate is not a 
contrary. [c] Therefore, on the one hand, the principles are no more than the contraries; 
they are, so to say, two by number. On the other hand, they are not two in every sense, by 
virtue of the fact that being belongs to each of them in a different way. Thus, they are 
three, for the being of the man is different from the being of the unmusical, and the being 
of the formless is different from the being of the bronze. 
 In [a], Aristotle presents the First horn of the aporia as (at least in a certain sense) a sound 
possibility. The possibility to reckon the First horn as true is explained in [c], and signalised in 
[a] by the use of substantive adjectives such as τὸ µουσικὸν and τὸ ἀνάρµοστον (respectively, 
for non-substantial and substantial beings). These terms, in fact, contain a certain ambiguity 
between the property and the thing possessing that property. [b] presents the Second horn of the 
aporia, supporting it with the same counterargument to the First horn provided in Phys.I.6 
(Arg.1: if contraries were the only principles of natural things, change would be impossible). 
 The First and Second horn of the aporia are thus both presented as true, which, if their 
truthfulness were not qualified according to different respects, would lead to contradiction. This 
task is undertaken in [c], which takes up the distinction between being one in number and being 
one in form drawn in 190a13ff. 
 Thus, [c] makes clear that, when the starting point and end point of change are considered with 
relation to their number – namely, as the privative thing undergoing change and as the informed 
thing resulting from change –, then the principles of natural things are exhausted by the two 
opposites. Numerically, it is true to say that natural things come into being and are ontologically 
composed out of their form (F+) and out of the privation of this form (F-). 
 When, instead, the numerical unities of the starting point and of the end point of change are 
considered with relation to their being or their account, then it is clear that the principles are 
three, namely matter, form and privation. When we say that what is unformed (F-) at t1 comes to 
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be formed (F+) at t2, the starting point and the end point of change are meant as composite 
beings. In fact, there is something underlying F-/F+, namely a certain matter, that is different in 
form or in account from both F- and F+. Thus, the starting point and end point of change are 
actually M1F- and M2F+.146 
 In conclusion, considered with relation to their being or to their account, it is clear that the 
principles are three: M, F-, F+. The necessity of this claim rests on the necessity of the alterity 
claim (M≠F- or F+) that had been shown in Phys.I.6 through two reductive arguments, one of 
which is contained in [b]: if M were identical with either F- or F+, then change would have to 
occur by direct action of F+ on F-, which is impossible. Therefore, there must be a third principle 





I have started this enquiry with a question on Aristotle’s rationale for positing privation as a 
principle alongside matter and form. Intuitively, characteristics such as formlessness, 
disarrangement, scatteredness, figurelessness are unappealing candidates to perform the role of 
principle. First, we expect a principle to account for the determinateness of its results; but 
privations seem to lack the positive content necessary to the task. Second, privations belong to 
the sphere of non-being; therefore, they seem incapable to account for the fact that their results 
exist. 
 I have provided a study of the triad of principles – matter, form and privation – in Phys.I. There 
are several rationales for engaging with this text. 
 First, numerous texts are important for hylomorphism, but only few present an extended version 
of hylomorphism including privation. In more advanced versions of hylomorphism than the 
introductory one presented in Phys.I, matter and form are endorsed as principles within the 
 
146 If the substrate persists only existentially (i.e. by undergoing change itself). In §5.6, I have shown that Aristotle 
endorses that the substrate persists through substantial change, and clarified the two senses in which sense it persists. 
If the substrate persists remaining identical, then M1=M2, and the starting point and the end point of change are 
actually MF- and MF+. 
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framework of the four causes, whereas privation is dropped. An example of this is represented by 
the development of the argument on the principles of natural things in Metaph.XII.1-3. 
Metaph.XII.1-2 notoriously presents a summary of the arguments of Phys.I.4-7, culminating in 
the endorsement of the triad of principles of matter, form and privation. In taking up this result 
and developing on it, Metaph.XII.3 silently lets privation drop and adds the moving and final 
cause. Phys.II.1 witnesses a similar conceptual move. As I have argued in the Introduction 
(§0.2.), Phys.I and Phys.II constitute a continuous enquiry, where Phys.II brings the results of 
Phys.I to a higher level of complexity. Namely, to the teleological account of the four causes, 
which had been prepared in Phys.I.9 by the dialectical confrontation with Plato’s theory of a 
privative matter yearning for the form. Phys.II.1, in presenting the four causes, confines the 
mention of privation to the claim that it is also, to some extent, a form. The arguments for the 
defective aetiological status of privation provided in Phys.I.7 presents a rare occasion to analyse 
the relation between privation, matter and form and their respective aetiological status. 
 Second, other texts employ the triad of matter, form and privation, but hardly anywhere else 
than in Phys.I is the triad extensively justified and defended against different views (e.g. 
Monism). The same holds in general for hylomorphism, which represents the core of the triad of 
principles of Phys.I. 
 Reconstructing the arguments for the triad of principles presented in Phys.I is a tough task. I 
have endorsed, along with Ross (1936), Kelsey (2008[b]) et all., that Phys.I.4-7 represents a 
continuous line of argument. Thus, I oppose a long-standing tradition that has confined itself to 
the analysis of Phys.I.7, implicitly or explicitly downgrading the previous chapters as merely 
dialectical. 
 It is beyond doubt that Phys.I.4-6 are partially dialectical. Phys.I.4 collects the doctrines of the 
predecessors as endorsing the general result that there are three principles of natural things: two 
contraries and the substrate. Phys.I.5-6, in arguing respectively for the former ones and the latter 
one, heavily rely on the framework of the predecessors and make large use of examples from 
their doctrines. This notwithstanding, it is clear that Phys.I.5-6 present arguments that Aristotle is 
willing to accept in his account of the principles in Phys.I.7, provided that they undergo a certain 
degree of reformulation. 
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 This reformulation pursues the agenda of providing an account of substance, which the 
predecessors failed to do. There are two main differences between the triad of the predecessors 
and Aristotle’s own triad. First, the kind of opposition qualifying as a principle changes from 
contrariety to form/privation. Contrariety does not extend to substance; form and privation do. 
Second, the majority of the predecessors failed to grasp the indeterminate nature of matter, 
reducing it to contrariety. Both these shortcomings of the triad of the predecessors contribute to 
the aporia on the number of principles raised at the end of Phys.I.6. 
 Due to the second point, it is not clear whether the principles are only the contraries (First horn) 
or also the substrate (Second horn). It appears, in fact, that the substrate is itself a contrary, so 
that it is sufficient to posit contrary principles. The First horn of the aporia, nonetheless, has been 
decisively refuted by two arguments in Phys.I.6. The last of these arguments, hinging on the 
priority of the substantial substrate over its contrary predicates proper to coincidental 
metaphysical predication, undermines the claim of the contraries to qualify as principles, thus 
marring the internal coherence of the Second horn. Thus, the triad of the predecessors is faced 
with difficulties whose solution leads to Aristotle’s own triad of matter, form and privation. 
Thus, the reconstruction of Phys.I.4-7 provides us with the rationale for Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the three internal principles and for its core, hylomorphism. In doing so, Phys.I shows us the 
rationale for positing privation as a principle. 
 Third, Phys.I presents an unparalleled reflection on the role of privation as a principle. As we 
expect from the results of Phys.II.1 and Metaph.XII.2-3, Phys.I.7 concludes that privation is a 
principle only to some extent, whereas matter and form are full-fledged principles. The defective 
aetiological status of privation hinges on two rationales. First, the fact that privation is not an 
element of the substance that has come into being (of the end point of substantial change). 
Second, privation is coincidental to the form, for privation has no determinacy of its own, but 
represents only the absence of the form. 
 Other texts reflect the aetiological defectiveness of privation within a full-fledged, 
teleologically-oriented hylomorphism. In standard cases of coming into being, a certain matter M 
realises in actuality the form F+ that it is in potentiality, thus achieving entelecheia. Standard 
cases of coming into being fall under the synonymy principle: what comes into being is F+ in 
actuality; the matter is F+ potentially; the moving cause is F+ in actuality (but is numerically 
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different from what comes into being); the final cause is the entelecheia, and therefore F+ itself. 
Metaph.VIII.4-5 analyses the intersection between potentiality, teleology and the three principles 
of Phys.I. Phys.I considers privation as a starting point of substantial change (of coming into 
being); Metaph.VIII.4-5 considers it as the end point substantial change (of ceasing to be). 
 Now, how does matter relate to form and privation in a teleological perspective? First, coming 
into being and ceasing to be occur in the same matter. Second, within the order of nature, ceasing 
to be is coincidental on coming into being, for it occurs in t2 only on condition that coming into 
being has occurred in t1. Third, privations fail to qualify as ends, for they are either axiologically 
neutral (the privation of light in the eclipse) or merely instrumental (sleep) or utterly negative 
(the privation of life in the corpse). 
 In a teleological perspective, matter has, in a proper sense, capacity for the form alone; since 
privation is coincidental to the form, matter has capacity also for privation, but not in the same 
way as for form. One and the same matter can come to be the form and can come to be the 
corresponding privation. Nonetheless, the verb “can” is employed in these two sentences in two 
different meanings. The capacity for form is according to the order of nature and leads to 
entelecheia. The capacity for privation is against the order of nature and leads to the loss of 
entelecheia. 
 Moreover, the matter of coming into being and of ceasing to be is one and the same. 
Nonetheless, when it is informed, it possesses the (actualised) internal capacity for the form that 
constitutes its nature. Once the hylomorphic compound has ceased to be, matter is deprived of its 
capacity for the form (for the corpse does not comes to be the man again). Although it is 
numerically the same matter as the matter of the hylomorphic compound, it is at the same time 
different, for its nature has been annihilated in the process of corruption. 
 The analysis of privation as a principle in a full-fledged, teleologically-oriented hylomorphic 
perspective is the most natural continuation of this study. The considerable length that this study 
has gained through the years has dissuaded me from writing in full form the extensive material in 





 In what follows, I recapitulate my results on Phys.I. 
 (1) The principles of natural science sought for in Phys.I have to be determined both with 
relation to their object (as the principles of natural things) and with relation to their causal field 
or to the quality of their causal action. From a field-related perspective, the principles are 
responsible for the being and the capacity to change of natural things. With principle of being, 
Aristotle means the ontological elements out of which natural things are composed with relation 
to their substance and which constitute their essence and definition. 
 The duality of the causal fields endorsed in Phys.I may be seen as threatening the unity of 
purpose of Phys.I. I have argued, instead, that the same set of principles (matter, form and 
privation) is responsible both for the being and for the capacity to change of natural things. This 
claim is grounded on what natural things are. The set of the natural things is identified 
throughout the Corpus as the set of things that are essentially capable of change (and that are 
perceptible). Thus, if the principles of natural things are sought in Phys.I are also the principles 
of their being, and thus perform the job of accounting for their essence, then they must also 
account for the capacity to change of natural things. 
 (2) I have argued that positing privation as a principle is a problematic move. Phys.I provides a 
justification for this move throughout Phys.I.4-7. Privation is posited as a principle in so far as it 
is opposed to the form. 
 The rationale for this endorsement is expounded in Phys.I.5, which argues that the contraries are 
principles of natural things. The chapter provides two arguments. The first one argues that the 
contraries are principles of being, whereas the second one argues that the contraries are 
principles of change. 
 Arg.1 claims that the contraries are principles, for they fulfil the Condition of ontological 
simplicity (COS), namely because the are the ultimate elements constituting natural things. I 
have shown that Arg.1 is dependent on the widespread endoxon that natural things are 
exhaustively composed out of the contraries. 
 Arg.2, instead, hinges on the fully-Aristotelian claim that (non-substantial) change occurs 
between contrary poles. I have analysed several possible rationales for this claim, and concluded 
that the evidence rests on an idea expressed in Metaph.X.3-4. Here, otherness (A/⌐A) is 
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contrasted with difference, i.e. the property of belonging to the same genus, but being its two 
extreme species (e.g. white and black belong to the genus of colour, and are its extreme species). 
Others do not qualify as termini of change, for they are too remote from each other to act on each 
other. The things that are different from each other, instead, are both close enough (for they 
belong to the same genus) and reciprocally other (for they are extreme species of the same 
genus) to yield reciprocal action. Now, the relation of difference is said to ground the relation of 
contrariety, so that if H+/H- are contraries, then they are reciprocally different. 
 Similar claims are made in Arg.2 of Phys.I. In spelling out the source condition for natural (per 
se) change, Aristotle establishes two conditions for A and B to qualify as sources of change. 
First, A and B must be others, i.e. contradictories. If this were not the case, namely if what was A 
in t1 were still A in t2, then no change would occur. The otherness condition is necessary for A 
and B to qualify as sources of change, but insufficient. In fact, in order for A and B to qualify as 
sources of change, A and B must be not only contradictories, but also contraries or maximally 
different. The difference condition is presented as necessary and sufficient, and includes the 
necessary otherness condition, for, if A and B are contraries, then A and B must also be 
contradictories. 
 (3) Having argued in Phys.I.5 that the contraries are principles, Phys.I.6 presents two arguments 
for a third principle, the substrate. Far from simply adding a third principle to the contraries, 
Phys.I.6 culminates in a serious aporia on the number of principles. Namely, on whether the 
principles are two (“the principles are only the contraries”) or three (“the principles are the 
contraries and the substrate”). 
 The First horn is supported by the arguments of Phys.I.5 and rejected by those of Phys.I.6. The 
Second horn is a combination of the weaker version of the First horn (“the contraries are 
principles”) and of the claim that the substrate is a principle. On the one hand, the arguments of 
Phys.I.6 argue for this combination. Arg.1 of Phys.I.6 claims that change is possible only on 
condition that a third principle is added to the contraries as the subject undergoing change. 
Subargument 1 of Arg.2 exposes the failure of contrariety to qualify as substance, and invokes a 
third principle different from contrariety and identifying with the substance of natural things. On 
the other hand, positing the substrate as a principle to some extent undermines the claim of the 
contraries to qualify as principles. If we understand the relation between the members of the triad 
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as a relation of Coincidental metaphysical predication (e.g. Socrates is black) between a 
substantial substrate (e.g. Socrates) and the non-substantial contraries (e.g. white and black), then 
the non-substantial contraries seem to fail to qualify as primary, and therefore as principles. 
Consequently, the Second horn appears to be internally inconsistent. 
 In conclusion, the aporia on the number of principles presents no viable solution and rests on 
two problems. First, on the relation between the opposites and the substrate. Is the substrate itself 
an opposite (First horn) or not (Second horn)? Second, is the substrate prior to the opposites? If it 
is, then the Second horn appears to be inconsistent, for the opposites fail to qualify as principles. 
If it is not, then the Second horn is an option. 
 (4) With relation to the first point, I have shown that, against several modern reconstructions 
Aristotle’s theory of the ultimate material substrate, matter is not reducible to contrariety. The 
decisive battlefield for the dispute is the theory of the four elements in GC.II.1-5. Traditionally, 
the four elements have been interpreted as compounds of the indeterminate prime matter and of 
the primary contraries. Several recent interpreters have been led by their vis polemica against 
prime matter to endorse that the four elements are aggregates of the primary contraries. 
 I agree neither with the defenders of prime matter nor with their opponents. Against the first 
party, I contend that a prime matter underlying and having capacity for all things is too general 
and indeterminate to perform any explanatory task. Against the second party, I object that it 
makes matter a free-floating mixture of contrary properties, thus failing to capture the difference 
between a property and a thing endowed with a property. 
 I argue, with the traditionalists, that the four elements are hylomorphic compounds of a common 
ultimate substrate and two primary contraries. Against the traditionalists, I show that the ultimate 
substrate is not an indeterminate capacity for everything. Rather, it is a determinate substrate 
possessing a determinate capacity, namely the capacity for the four primary contraries. In order 
to differentiate the ultimate substrate from prime matter, I call it primary matter. The determinate 
capacity of primary matter accounts for the essential properties of a certain province of being, 
namely of the natural sublunary beings that are composed out of the four elements. Since the 
four primary contraries are the primary difference of perceptibility, the ultimate substrate can 
account for the perceptibility of natural, sublunary things. Since the primary contraries are 
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contraries, the ultimate substrate can account for the capacity to change of natural sublunary 
things. 
 Now, primary matter bears a complex relation with contrariety, which has been misinterpreted 
by Aristotle’s predecessors. In GC.II.1, Aristotle contrasts two conception of primary matter held 
by his predecessors. Almost all physicists identified primary matter with one or more of the four 
elements, and therefore with contrariety. Exceptions to this endoxon are Anaximander’s apeiron 
and Plato’s Receptacle, which are purely indeterminate, actual bodies devoid of contrariety.  
 Like Plato and Anaximander’s matter, Aristotle’s primary matter is an actually indeterminate, 
non-contrary substrate. For it is what it is in potentiality, whereas it is in actuality the four 
elements. Unlike Anaximander’s and Plato’s principles, it is necessarily intertwined with 
contrariety, for it is the capacity for the four primary contraries. Moreover, it is not an 
indeterminate body existing in actuality. In fact, it is not a body existing in actuality, but rather 
what the four elements are with relation to potentiality. 
 In conclusion, Aristotle does endorse – against the First horn of the aporia of Phys.I.6 – that 
matter cannot be reduced to contrariety. 
 (5) The question whether the substrate is prior to the opposites (thus undermining their capacity 
to qualify as principles) or not is tied to the conceptual shift leading to the principles of 
substance. The kind of triad of the predecessors fails to account for the principles of natural 
substances. 
 Finding a triad of principles fit for the task of explaning natural substances entails a refinement 
both of what qualifies as a substrate and of the opposites qualifying as principles. This is part of 
the job accomplished by Phys.I.7. I have claimed that Phys.I.7 pursues two projects: 
Project 1: The accomplishment of the doctrine of the three principles (from S, H+, H- to 
M, F+, F-). 
Project 2: The solution of the aporia on the number of the natural principles raised at the 
end of Phys.I.6. 
 With relation to Project 2, the aporia on the number of principles had seemed to concentrate in 
two conceptual point: 
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Alterity condition: whether the substrate is or is not something different from the 
opposites; 
Priority issue: Whether the substrate is prior to the opposites (thus undermining their 
claim to qualify as principles) or not. 
 Answering these two questions coincides with clarifying three areas: 
Task a: The refinement of the kind of opposition qualifying as principle; 
Task b: Clarifying the reciprocal relation enjoyed by the principles; 
Task c: Clarifying what the substrate is. 
 This clarification is necessary on the backdrop of the main conceptual shift dividing Phys.I.4-7 
into two parts, namely the shift towards the principles of natural substances occurring in Phys., 
I.7, 190a31.   
 First, settling the issue of the Alterity condition of the substrate amounts to clarifying (Task c) 
that the substrate is different in being from the opposites, although it coincides with them 
numerically in the starting point and end point of change. 
 Second, settling the Priority issue requires (Task a) the passage from the opposition of 
contrariety to the opposition of form and privation, which extends within the category of 
substance. Moreover, (Task b) Since form and privation are substantial opposites, their relation 
to the substrate is not the same as the relation of coincidental metaphysical predication enjoyed 
by a substantial substrate and a non-substantial contrary. The kind of relation between matter and 
form and between matter and privation expressed by substantial metaphysical predication is not 
exposed to the Priority issue, since all its members are substances. 
 Thus, the ontological analysis of the substances functioning as the starting points and the end 
points of substantial change, Aristotle dismisses the idea that the opposites may be subordinated 
as such to the substrate. 
S1 (starting point of change): matter and privation (MF2-); 




 Thus, the aporia on the number of principles can be answered in the following way: 
Numerically, the principles are two, namely the (composite) opposites. 
With relation to the account, the principles are three, namely the opposites and matter, for 
matter is different in account from the opposites. 
 With this, Project 2 has been accomplished. So far, the conceptual machinery applied to the 
solution of the aporia has also contributes to Project 1, namely to the accomplishment of the 
doctrine of the principles of natural things. 
 This has been initiated in Phys.I.4-6 with the collection of the endoxon that the principles are the 
substrate and the contraries. The arguments provided in Phys.I.5-6 in support of this claim are 
arguments that Aristotle wants to endorse, provided that they undergo a certain degree of 
reformulation and clarification. This reformulation amounts mainly to the shift towards the 
principles of substance. 
Triad of the predecessors: S, H+, H-; 
Aristotle’s triad: M, F+, F-. 
 The triad of the predecessors, far from being rejected, merely revels itself to be insufficient to 
account for natural things with relation to their substance. One of its members, the substrate, is a 
substance, e.g. a man, a lump of gold, a block of stone. The contraries, instead, are non-
substantial properties inhering coincidentally in the substrate. 
 Aristotle’s triad situates itself on a deeper level of analysis than the predecessors’, for it 
represents the ontological analysis of the substance constituting the S of the triad of the 
predecessors. The analysis of substance culminates in the identification of its three constituting 
elements: matter, form and privation. 
S1 (starting point of change): matter and privation (MF2-); 
S2 (end point of change): matter and form (MF2+). 
 It must be noticed that the ontological analysis of the starting point of substantial change 
proposed is oriented towards the end point of substantial change. For what most deserves the title 
of principle of natural things is what is a principle of what-has-come-into-being, namely of the 
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substance that has come into being as the result of a process of substantial change. Considered in 
itself, the starting point of change is a low-level substance such as the lump of gold. Although 
extremely proximate to matter, the lump of gold is itself a hylomorphic compound composed out 
of a matter (the gold) and a low-level form (the lumpness). Thus, the privation of the form of 
what-has-come-into-being must be differentiated from the form of the starting point of 
substantial change as what is utterly negative must be differentiated from what is just feebly 
positive. 
 In conclusion, matter and form are what best qualifies as principles of natural substances, for 
they are the elements of what-has-come-into-being, and what-has-come-into-being is what best 
qualifies as a natural substance. 
Full-blown principles of natural substances: matter (M) and form (F2+). 
 Whereas the form is a unity, matter is twofold, namely itself and the privation of F2+. When the 
matter of what-has-come-into-being is considered in itself, namely as the matter of what-has-
come-into-being independently of it form, then matter coincides numerically with privation. This 
unity is coincidental, unlike the non-coincidental numerical unity MF2- of the starting point of 
change, because privation is not an element out of which what-has-come-into-being is composed 
out of directly, but only pertains to the matter on condition that it is considered in itself. 
 Moreover, privation is coincidental to the form, for every privation is the absence of its 
corresponding form, whereas the form is not the absence of its corresponding privation. Thus: 
Coincidental principle of natural things: privation (F2-).  
For F2- is coincidental to the M of what-has-come-into-being, when M is 
considered in itself. And  
for F2- is coincidental to F2+. 
 In establishing what most deserves to be called a principle of natural things (the elements of 
what-has-come-into-being, matter and form), as well as the role of privation with relation to 




 For (Task b) is accomplished, with relation to Project 1, through the construction of two models 
of relation among the principles: 
(Model a/a’): 
M/F+ are per se principles, for they are elements of the end point of substantial change. 
F- is a coincidental principle.  
For F- is coincidental to M, since F- is not an element of what-has-come-into-
being. 
For F- is coincidental to F+. For F- = ⌐F+ and F+ ≠ ⌐F-. 
(Model b): 
With relation to number: only two principles: (composite) F-; (composite) F+. 
With relation to the account: three principles: M; F+; F-. 
 Of these models, both necessary to complete Project 1, only (Model b) is relevant to the 
completion of Project 2, i.e. to the solution of the aporia on the number of natural principles. 
 (Model a/a’), instead, belongs wholly to the completion of Project 1 and entails a further way of 
reducing the triad of the natural principles to two, matter and form. 
 Although one might believe that the core of Phys.I.7 is to be identified more in the completion 
of Project 2 than in that of Project 1, it is instead Project 1 and (Model a/a’) that reveal 
themselves crucial for Aristotle’s doctrine of the natural principles and its further development 
into the doctrine of the four causes in Phys.II. For (Model a/a’) represents the core of the 
doctrine of the three internal principles of natural substance, namely hylomorphism. 
Triad of natural principles (M, F+, F-) → (Model a/a’) → Hylomorphism (M, F+ as full-





 In conclusion, matter and form constitute the core of the doctrine of the internal principles of 
natural substances (i.e. of what-has-come-into-being), for they account for natural substances 
with relation to three respects: 
Ontological composition: M and F+ are the substantial elements of what-has-come-into-
being; 
Essence: M and F+ are the parts of the definition of what-has-come-into-being; 
Substantial change: M and F+ account for the determinacy of what-has-come-into-being. 
 Privation, instead, fails to qualify as a full-fledged natural principle with relation to all three 
respects: 
Ontological composition: F- is not an element of what-has-come-into-being; 
Essence: F- is not an element of the essence of what-has-come-into-being; 
Substantial change: F-, despite qualifying as a source of substantial change, fails to 
















Bonitz, H. 1870, Index Aristotelicus (Berlin: Reimer). 
Zeller, E. 1879 (3rd ed.), Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. 
Zweiter Theil, Zweiter Abtheilung. Aristoteles und die alten Peripatetiker (Leipzig: Feus’s 
Verlag). 
Joachim, H. H. 1922, Aristotle. On Coming-to-be and Passing-away (De Generatione et 
Corruptione). A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Ross, W. D. 1924, Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2 voll., Intr., Crit. Text, Comm.) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
Hardie, R. P./Gaye, R. K. 1930, Aristotle. Physica (Intr., Transl., Notes) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
Ross, W. D. 1936, Aristotle’s Physics (Crit. Text, Intr., Comm.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Anderson, J. 1938, ‘The Problem of Causation’, Australian Journal of Philosophy, 2, 127-142. 
Le Blond, J.-M. 1939, Logique et Méthode chez Aristote (Paris: Vrin). 
Düring, I. 1943, Aristotle’s De Partibus Animalium. Critical and Literary Commentaries 
(Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag). 
Robin, L. 1944, Aristote. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France). 
Zeller, E./Mondolfo, R. 1950, La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico, Vol. 2. Ionici e 
Pitagorici (Firenze: La Nuova Italia) 
Jaeger, W. 1955 (1923), Aristoteles. Grundlegungen einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung 
(Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung). 
King, H. R. 1956, ‘Aristotle without Materia Prima’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 17, 370-
389. 
Louis, P. 1956, Aristote. Les Parties des Animaux (Paris: Les Belles Lettres). 
Smyth. H. W. 1956, Greek Grammar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
Anton, J. P. 1957, Aristotle’s Theory of Contrariety (London: Routledge & Kegan). 
Jaeger, W. 1957, Aristotelis Metaphysica (Crit. Text) (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Solmsen, F. 1958, ‘Aristotle and Prime Matter’, Journal of The History of Ideas, 19, 243-252. 
Kahn, C. H., Anaximander and the Origin of Greek Cosmology (New York: Columbia 
University Press). 
Mansion, S. (ed.) 1961[a], Aristote et Les Problèmes de Méthode. Symposium Aristotelicum 
(Louvain: Publications Universitaires). 
244 
 
Mansion, S. 1961[b], Le Rôle de l’Exposé et de la Critique des Philosophies antérieures chez 
Aristote, in: Mansion 1961[a], 35-56. 
Owen, M. G. E. L. 1961, Τιθέναι τὰ φαινόμενα, in: Mansion 1961 [a], 83-103. 
Ackrill, J. L. (1963), Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione (Intr., Transl., Notes) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
Mackie, J. L. 1965, ‘Causes and Conditions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2: 4, 245-264. 
Moraux, P 1965, Aristote. Du Ciel (Crit. Text, Intr., Transl., Notes) (Paris: Les Belles Lettres). 
Jannone, A./Barbotin, E. (1966), Aristote. De l’âme (Crit. Text, Intr., Transl., Notes) (Paris: 
Budé). 
Brunschwig, J. 1967, Aristote, Topiques. Tome I. Livres I-IV (Crit. Text, Transl., Notes) (Paris: 
Les Belles Lettres). 
Lloyd, G. E. R. 1968, Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Düring, I. (ed.) 1969, Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast (Heidelberg: Lothar 
Stiehm). 
Ferguson, J. 1969, ‘The Opposites’, Apeiron, 3: 1, 1-17. 
Owens, J. 1969, The Aristotelian Argument for the Material Principles of Bodies, in: Düring 
1969. 
Sokolowski, R. 1970, ‘Matter, Elements, and Substance in Aristotle’, Journal of The History of 
Philosophy, 8, 263-288. 
Wieland, W. 1970 (1962), Die Aristotelische Physik: Untersuchungen über die Grundlegung und 
die sprachliche Bedingung der Prinzipienforschung bei Aristoteles (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht). 
Jones, B. 1974, ‘Aristotle’s Introduction of Matter’, Philosophical Review, 83: 4, 474-500. 
Robinson, H. M. 1974, ‘Prime Matter in Aristotle’, Phronesis, 19, 168-188. 
Barnes, J./Schofield, M./Sorabji, R. (eds.) 1975, Articles on Aristotle. 1. Science (London: 
Duckworth). 
Weil, E. 1975 (1951), The Place of Logic in Aristotle’s Thought, in Barnes/Schofield/Sorabji 
1975. 
Wieland, W. 1975, Aristotle’s Physics and the Problem of Inquiry into Principles, in: 
Barnes/Schofield/Sorabji 1975. 
Code, A. 1976, ‘The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter’, Philosophical Studies: An International 
Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 29: 6, 357-367. 
Evans, J. D. G. 1977, Aristotle’s Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
245 
 
Bostock, D. 1982, Aristotle on the Principles of change in Physics I, in: Nussbaum/Schofield 
1982. 
Lewis, F. 1982, ‘Accidental Sameness in Aristotle’, Philosophical Studies, 42, 1-36.  
Matthews, 1982 G. B., Accidental Unities, in: Nussbaum/Schofield 1982. 
Nussbaum, M. C./Schofield, M. (eds.) 1982, Language and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek 
Philosophy presented to G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Williams, C. J. F. 1982, Aristotle. De Generatione et Corruptione (Intr., Transl., Notes) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
Charlton, W. 1983, ‘Prime Matter: A Rejoinder’, Phronesis, 28, 197-21. 
Barnes, J. (ed.) 1984, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation (2 voll.) 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Cohen, S. 1984, ‘Aristotle's Doctrine of the Material Substrate’, The Philosophical Review, 93: 
2, 171-194. 
Bolton, R. 1987, Definition and scientific Method in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and 
Generation of Animals, in: Gotthelf/Lennox 1987. 
Gotthelf, A./Lennox, J. G. 1987 (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Graham, D. W. 1987, Aristotle’s two Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Furth, M. 1988, Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Irwin, T. 1988, Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Sorabji, R. 1988, Matter, Space, and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel (London: 
Cornell University). 
Gill, M. L. 1989, Aristotle on Substance. The Paradox of Unity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press). 
Bolton, R. 1990, The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic, in Devereux/Pellegrin 
1990. 
Devereux, D./Pellegrin, P. (eds.) 1990, Biologie, Logique et Metaphysique chez Aristote (Paris: 
CNRS Éditions). 
Bolton, R. 1991, Aristotle’s Method in Natural Science: Physics I, in: Judson 1991. 
Judson, L. (ed.) 1991, Aristotle’s Physics. A Collection of Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Balme, 1992 (1972), Aristotle. Parts of Animals (Intr., Transl., Notes) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 




Waterlow, S. 1982, Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
Fritsche, J. 1986, Methode und Beweisziel im Ersten Buch der “Physikvorlesung” des Aristoteles 
(Frankfurth/M: Hain). 
Bogen, J. 1991, ‘Aristotelian Contraries’, Topoi, 10, 53-66. 
Bogen, J. 1992, ‘Change and Contrariety in Aristotle’, Phronesis, 37: 1, 1-21. 
Charlton, W. 1992 (1970), Aristotle. Physics, Book I and II (Intr., Transl., Notes) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
Hamlyn, D. W. 1993, Aristotle. De Anima, Books II and III (with passages from Book I) (Intr., 
Transl., Notes), rev. ed. by C. Shields (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Hussey, E. 1993 (1983), Aristotle. Physics. Books III and IV (Intr., Transl., Notes) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
Kirwan, C. 1993 (1971), Aristotle. Metaphysics Γ, Δ and Ε (Intr., Transl., Notes) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
Smith, R. 1993, ‘Aristotle on the Use of Dialectic’, Synthese, 96: 335-358. 
Bostock, D. 1994, Aristotle. Metaphysics. Books Z and H (Transl., Comm.) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
Charles, D. 1994, Matter and Form: Unity, Persistence, and Identity, in: Scaltsas/Charles/Gill 
1994. 
Ferejohn, M. 1994, The Definition of Generated Composites in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in: 
Scaltsas/Charles/Gill 1994. 
Mesch, W. 1994, Ontologie und Dialektik bei Aristoteles (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). 
Lewis, F. 1994, Aristotle on the Relation between a Thing and ist Matter, in: 
Scaltsas/Charles/Gill 1994. 
Scaltsas, T./Charles, D./Gill, M. L. (eds.) 1994, Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press).   
Buchheim, T. 1996, Genesis und Substantielles Sein. Die Analytik des Werdens in Z 7-9, in: 
Rapp 2016. 
Cohen, S. 1996, Aristotle on nature and incomplete substance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Gill, M. L. 1996, Metaphysics H 1-5 on Perceptible Substances, in: Rapp 2016. 
Primavesi, O. 1996, Die Aristotelische Topik. Ein Interpretationsmodell und seine Erprobung am 
Beispiel von Topik B (München: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung). 
Rapp, C. (ed.) 1996, Metaphysik. Die Substanzbücher (Ζ, Η, Θ) (Berlin: Akademie Verlag). 
247 
 
Waterfield, R/Bostock, D. 1996, Aristotle. Physics (Intr., Transl., Notes) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Coloubaritsis, L. 1997, La Physique d’Aristote (Bruxelles: Ousia). 
Horstschäfer, T. M. 1998, Über Prinzipien (Berlin: De Gruyter). 
Charles, D. 2000, Metaphysics Λ 2: Matter and Change, in: Charles/Frede 2000. 
Charles, D./Frede, M. (eds.) 2000, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda. Symposium Aristotelicum 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Sedley, D. 2000, Metaphysics Λ 10, in: Charles/Frede 2000. 
Bodéüs, R. 2001, Aristote. [Catégories] (Intr., Crit. Text, Transl. and Notes) (Paris: Les Belles 
Lettres). 
Byrne, C. 2001, ‘Matter and Aristotle's Material Cause’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31: 1, 
85-112. 
Giardina, G. 2002, I fondamenti della Fisica. Analisi critica di Aristotele, Phys. I (Catania: 
CUECM). 
Pellegrin, P. 2002, Aristote: Physique (Transl., Notes) (Paris: Flammarion). 
Rapp, C. 2002, Aristoteles. Rhetorik (2 Voll.; Intr., Transl. and Comm.) (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag). 
Algra, K. 2004, On Generation and Corruption I. 3: Substantial Change and the Problem of 
Not-Being, in: De Haas/Mansfeld 2004. 
Broadie, S. 2004, On Generation and Corruption I. 4. Distinguishing Alteration, in: De 
Haas/Mansfeld 2004. 
Brunschwig, J. 2004, On Generation and Corruption I. 1: A False Start?, in: De Haas/Mansfeld 
2004. 
Charles, D. 2004, Simple Genesis and Prime Matter, in: De Haas/Mansfeld 2004. 
Frede, D. 2004, On Generation and Corruption I. 10: On Mixture and Mixables, in: De 
Haas/Mansfeld 2004. 
De Haas, F./Mansfeld, F. (eds.) 2004, Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, Book I. 
Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Rashed, M. 2005, Aristote. De la géneration et la corruption (Intr., Trad, Crit. Text, Notes) 
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres). 
Bostock, D. 2006[a], Aristotle’s Theory of Matter, in: Bostock 2006[b]. 
Bostock, D. 2006[b], Space, Time, Matter, and Form: Essays on Aristotle's Physics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
Kelsey, S. 2008, ‘Aristotle Physics I.8’, Pronesis, 51: 4, 330-361. 
248 
 
D’Angelo, A. 2007, ‘Aristotele: sostanza e contrarietà’, La Cultura, 45, 403-438. 
Corkum, P. 2008, ‘Aristotle on Ontological Dependence’, Phronesis, 53: 3, 65-92. 
Crowley, T. J. 2008, ‘Aristotle’s ‘So-Called Elements’’, Phronesis, 53: 3, 223-242. 
Kelsey, K. 2008, ‘The Place of I 7 in the Argument of Physics I’, Phronesis, 53: 3, 180-208. 
Philoponus, 2009, On Aristotle Physics 1.4-9 (Transl.: C. Osborne; Ed.: R. Sorabji) (London: 
Duckworth). 
Scharle, M. 2009, ‘A Synchronic Justification for Aristotle's Commitment to Prime Matter’, 
Phronesis, Vol. 54: 4/5, 326-345. 
Buchheim, T. 2010, Aristoteles. Über Werden und Vergehen (Intr., Tranl., Comm.) (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag GmbH). 
Kelsey, S. 2010, ‘Hylomorphism in Aristotle’s Physics’, Ancient Philosophy, 30, 107-124. 
Cohen, S. M. 2012, Alteration and Persistence: Form and Matter in the Physics and De 
Generatione et Corruptione, in: Shields 2012. 
Frede, D. 2012, ‘The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa are and what they are not’, Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 43: 185-215. 
Shields, C. (ed.) 2012, The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Simplicius, 2012, On Aristotle, Physics 1.5-9 (London: Bristol Classical Press). 
Crowley, T. J. 2013, ‘De Generatione et Corruptione 2.3: Does Aristotle identify the Contraries 
as Elements?’, Classical Quarterly, 63: 1, 161-182. 
Ebrey, D. 2014, ‘Making Room for Matter: Material Causes in the Phaedo and the Physics’, 
Apeiron, 47, 245-265. 
Rosen, J. 2014, ‘Essence and End in Aristotle’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 46, 73-
107. 
Ebrey, D. (ed.) 2015, Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Falcon, A./Leunissen, M. (2015), The scientific role of eulogos in Aristotle’s Cael II 12, in: 
Ebrey 2015. 
Henry, D. 2015, Substantial generation in Physics I.5-7, in Leunissen 2015. 
Leunissen, M. (ed.) 2015, Aristotle’s Physics. A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).  
Horn, C. (ed.) 2016, Aristotle’s "Metaphysics" Lambda – New Essays (Berlin: De Gruyter).   
Rapp, C. 2016, The Principles of Sensible Substance in Metaphysics Λ 2-4, in Horn 2016. 
Trentini, S. 2016, The internal Coherence of De Anima III 6, in Fronterotta/Sillitti/Stella 2016. 
249 
 
Fronterotta, F./Sillitti, M. G./Stella, F. 2016, Il Nous di Aristotele (Sankt Augustin: Akademia 
Verlag). 
Carraro, N., Aristotle on Generation and Alteration (Doctoral dissertation; Unpublished). 
Code, A. (forth.), Aristotle’s Physics I.6. 
Anagnostopoulos, A. (forth.), Physics I 6. 
Delcominette, S. (forth.), Physics I 5. 
Ebrey, D., Aristotle’s Motivation for Matter (Doctoral dissertation; Unpublished). 
Judson, L. (forth.), Physics I 5. 
Menn, S. (forth.), Physics I,1. 
